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ABSTRACT 
One of the most significant developments affecting local 
government in the past fifteen years has been the imposition of 
compulsory competitive tendering. Initially compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT), as imposed by the Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act 1980, only affected the ability of local 
authorities to perform construction and maintenance work via 
their Direct Labour Organisations. However, the Local Government 
Acts 1988 and 1992 now establish a CCT regime for local authority 
services: this study will examine the development of this regime, 
rather than that established by the 1980 Act, and evaluate its 
provisions. 
This study will be divided into three major Parts. The first will 
examine the policy developments which preceded the establishment 
of compulsory competitive tendering for local authority services 
by virtue of Part I of the Local Government Act 1988, and then 
consider the developments in policy which led to the subsequent 
expansion of the range of services subject to CCT and the 
refinement of the tendering regime which has followed the 
enactment of the Local Government Act 1992. It is intended to 
consider the development of the CCT regime within the context of 
wider legislative developments in local government over the past 
fifteen years, and of wider policy initiatives relating to the 
institutional structure and role of both central and local 
government. 
The second, and main, Part of the research will be a detailed 
evaluation of the tendering regime which applies when local 
authorities wish to perform work via Direct Service Organisations. 
This regime is put in place by the Local Government Acts 1988 and 
1992, and the delegated legislation issued pursuant to those 
statutes. A wide number of issues will be considered in this Part 
of the research. 
First, as the intention is to evaluate the provIsions of the 
domestic legislation against the standards set by the EC Services 
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Directive (Directive 92/50) in particular, it is necessary to assess 
whether that Directive applies in the same circumstances, and to 
the same services, as the domestic legislation. In the course of 
doing so the nature and content of the services currently subject to 
CCT will be considered. 
The next task will be to examine the tendering regime contained 
in Part I of the Local Government Act 1988. The tendering regime 
requires local authorities to fulfil a number of conditions before 
awarding work to Direct Service Organisations, each of which will 
be considered in turn. One of the conditions is a prohibition of anti-
competitive conduct. The concept of anti-competitive conduct is 
central to the operation of the CCT regime, permeating all stages 
of the tendering process, and therefore must receive extensive 
consideration. 
A complex web of regulation has evolved around the basic 
prohibition of anti-competitive conduct contained in the Local 
Government Act 1988. The Secretary of State was endowed with a 
range of powers by the Local Government Act 1988 to define what 
would constitute anti-competitive conduct. Pursuant to these 
powers one set of regulations and Guidance on the avoidance of 
anti-competitive conduct have been issued. It is intended to 
evaluate the potential uses of the powers given to the Secretary of 
State by the 1992 Act, and to assess the propriety of the 
regulations and Guidance which have been issued against both 
domestic legislation and the objective standards set by the EC 
public procurement regime. 
The 1988 Act, however, does not simply establish a tendering 
regime: it also establishes a system of imposing sanctions upon 
local authorities which fail to comply with the provisions of the 
tendering regime, or with related duties concerning the 
maintenance of accounts and performance of work. This system of 
redressing failures, which places considerable power in the hands 
of the Secretary of State, will be examined and evaluated. In 
evaluating this element of the statutory regime particular 
attention will be paid to the corresponding element of the EC 
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public procurement regime, which in this instance is the 
Compliance Directive (Directive 89/665). Having considered the 
way in which the statutory regime seeks to redress failures to 
comply with the prescribed tendering process, attention will then 
be given to the way in wh.ich aggrieved contractors may seek 
redress through the courts for: the failure of local authorities to 
comply with standards required by domestic and EC law in the 
conduct of tendering procedures. 
There is one other issue affecting the CCT regime which will be 
considered: namely the additional requirements imposed by Part " 
of the Local Government Act 1988. Part II, which contains the non-
commercial considerations regime, has an impact upon all aspects 
of the procurement activities of local authorities, although 
particular attention will be paid to its impact upon the CCT regime 
established by Part I of the 1988 Act. Part II essentially does 
three things: it forbids local authorities to take non-commercial 
considerations into account in the award of contracts and during 
the conduct of their contractual relationships; establishes a duty 
to give reasons in certain circumstances; and clarifies the rights 
of action available to those contractors who allege that local 
authorities have referred to a non-commercial consideration in the 
course of their contractual relationships. The provisions of Part II 
will be examined in detail, and their propriety will be assessed 
against the relevant EC legislation. 
Three other issues will be considered in the course of this study. 
The first is the extent to which it can now be said that a body of 
law which specifically regulates the contractual relationships of 
public authorities exists, contrary to the orthodoxy that the 
contracts of public authorities are subject to the ordinary law. 
This will involve examination of the degree to which the 
contractual relationships of central and local government, and the 
NHS, are now regulated, and consideration of the impact of the EC 
public procurement regime. 
Second, the third Part of this study will consider the impact of 
CCT upon the accountability of local authorities for the provision 
iii 
of services. This will involve examination of the duties imposed by 
the 1988 and 1992 Acts regarding the maintenance of accounts, the 
attainment of financial objectives and the dissemination of 
information. The interaction of the legislation's provisions with 
the other statutory procedures regarding the financial 
accountability of local authorities will be reviewed. In addition the 
wider issue of how CCT affects the accountability of local 
authorities for the delivery of services via the traditional avenues 
of accountability (financial, legal and political) will be examined. 
Finally, the conclusion will not only draw together the various 
issues raised during the earlier examination of the developments 
which have shaped the CCT regime, and the evaluation of the 
regime's provisions, but will also consider the direction which 
future developments may take 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
The years since 1979 have witnessed almost unparalleled 
legislative activity in the field of local government, with the 
multitude of statutes enacted during this period effecting some 
profound changes on local government in the United Kingdom. 
Amongst other things changes have been made to the structure of 
local government1 , the financing of local government2 , the conduct of 
local authority business3, and the way in which local authorities 
perform their various functions. 
It is the last of these with which this research will be concerned. 
Three statutes enacted over the past fifteen years have been of 
particular relevance in shaping the way in which local authorities 
perform their functions: the Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 19804; the Local Government Act 19885 ; and the Local 
Government Act 19926, The first of these, the 1980 Act, introduced 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) for construction and 
maintenance work7, The second, the 1988 Act imposed CCT upon the 
performance of a variety of local authority services8. Finally, the 
1992 Act was intended to enable the establishment of a tendering 
regime for white-collar services9 , endowed the Secretary of State 
with powers to regulate further certain elements of the tendering 
1 See e.g. Local Government Act 1992 Part II; Local Government 
(Wales) Act 1994; Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994 
2 The statutes relating to local government finance are almost too 
numerous to enumerate. To give some example of the volume of 
legislation on this matter see e.g. Local Government, Planning and 
Land Act 1980, Part VI; the Local Government Finance Acts 1982, 1987, 
1988 and 1992; Rates Act 1984 and the Abolition of Domestic Rates 
(Scotland) Act 1987 
3 Local Government and Housing Act 1989, Part I 
41980c.65 
5 1988 c.9 
61992 c.19 
7 1980 Act, Part III 
8 1988 Act, Part I 
91992 Act, S8 
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procedures established by the earlier legislation lO, and effected 
significant substantive amendments to the 1980 and 1988 Acts. 
Unfortunately, for reasons of space, consideration of the tendering 
and accounting regime contained in the Local Government Planning 
and Land Act 1980 has had to be excised from this research, 
although that statute will be considered to the extent to which it is 
relevant in tracing policy developments regarding eeT. Likewise, the 
provisions of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 regarding 
competitive tendering for waste disposal will not be considered for 
reasons of space. 
The central part of this research is, therefore, an examination of 
the legal regime established by the Local Government Acts 1988 and 
199211: essentially eeT for local authority services. This involves 
consideration not only of the services subject to eeT by virtue of 
the 1988 Act l2 , and of the provisions of the tendering regime 
contained in Part I of that statute13, but also a detailed examination 
of the system of regulation which has developed around the 
prohibition of anti-competitive practices contained in the 
legislation l4. In addition, the non-commercial considerations regime 
set out in Part II of the 1988 Act, which permeates all aspects of 
local government procurement, will be considered as its provisions 
will obviously have an impact on tendering procedures conducted 
under the 1988 Act l5 . Furthermore, the examination of the statutory 
regime is supplemented by consideration of the practice of eeT, and 
its impact on the organisation and working practices of local 
authorities: in order to do so it has been necessary to interview the 
officers of a number of local authorities. In examining the tendering 
regime two issues of particular salience must be considered. The 
first is the extent to which the subordinate legislation which is a 
significant element of the tendering regime is in accordance with 
the primary legislation: as will be seen this is a problem with 
10 S9 
11 See Part II 
12 See part II, Ch 1 
13 See Part II, Ch 2 
14 See Part II, Ch 3,4 
15 See Part II, Ch 6 
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regard to the issue of anti~competitive conduct in particularl6 . The 
second, and arguably the more important, is the relevance of the EC 
public procurement regime. 
In evaluating any piece of domestic legislation today it is 
necessary to bear in mind the potential impact of EC law. This is no 
less the case when examining the CCT regime established by the 
Local Government Acts 1988 and 1992, as it is with other statutes. 
As the regime contained in the 1988 and 1992 Acts concerns CCT for 
local authority services, the element of the EC public procurement 
regime which is of most relevance to evaluating the domestic 
legislation is the Services Directive l7 . However, while consideration 
of the EC public procurement regime must permeate evaluation of 
the tendering regime, there is one factor which presently limits the 
utility of the Services Directive in doing so. Although, as shall be 
seen18, there is considerable identity between the services subject 
to CCT and those set out in the Services Directive, the Directive 
itself makes a distinction between services as to the extent to 
which the tendering procedures contained in the Directive apply19. 
This two-tier application of the Directive means that a range of the 
service subject to CCT will be evaluated against the standards of 
the Services Directive in its entirety, while others may only be 
evaluated against a more limited range of the Directive's provisions. 
This may make the evaluation of the domestic legislation a slightly 
more complex exercise, but, fortunately, it is proposed that any 
revision of the Directive will consider the discontinuation of its 
two tier application20. If that is the case, then the comments made 
regarding the compatibility of the domestic legislation with the 
Directive will, in future, apply with equal force to those services 
which are subject to CCT but which are not currently subject to all 
of the provisions of the Services Directive. However, it must be 
emphasised that the two-tier application of provisions only applies 
to the Services Directive: the general principles of EC law, and the 
16 Part II, Ch 3,4 
17 Dir. 92/50 
18 Part II, Ch 1 
19 See Articles 8- 10 
20 Article 43 
3 
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provisions of the Treaty of Rome may be used to evaluate all aspects 
of the domestic tendering regime. 
In considering whether the 1988 and 1992 Acts, and the Services 
Directive apply in the same circumstances, there is one other issue 
which must be considered. This is the requirement that the 
agreements which are the result of the operation of a tendering 
procedure are of the nature of a contract. As will be seen, some have 
contended that the majority of agreements arising from the 
operation of the 1988 Act cannot represent a contract21 . However, it 
would appear that there is a compelling argument in support of the 
proposition that, in certain limited circumstances, the agreements 
resulting from the 1988 Act's operation will be a contract for the 
purposes of the Directive22 
There is one other aspect of the regime put in place by the 1988 
and 1992 Acts which must be considered, namely the system of 
investigating and issuing sanctions for alleged breaches of the 
tendering regime, and failures to comply with the accounting 
regime23. The statutory regime endows the Secretary of State with 
extensive powers to investigate alleged breaches of the statutory 
regime and impose sanctions. While doing so it is also necessary to 
evaluate the Secretary of State's powers against the standards set 
out in the relevant EC legislation, namely the Compliance 
Directive24, in order to ascertain whether the procedures contained 
in the 1988 Act provide sufficient protection for aggrieved 
contractors whenever a breach of EC law is at issue. It is also 
convenient to consider the other means by which aggrieved 
contractors may seek redress for a local authority's failure to 
comply with the tendering regimes contained in the 1988 Act, and 
the Services Directive. 
One final issue arising from the operation of the legislation must 
be addressed. The essential question to be asked is: are the 
21 See Part II, Ch 1 
22 Ibid. 
23 See Part II, Ch 5 
24 Directive 89/665 
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agreements resulting from the operation of the CCT legislation 
indicative of a deeper trend towards the development of an 
administrative law of contract? The thesis will examine the extent 
to which the 1988 and 1992 Acts, and European legislation, put in 
place a set of principles which regulate the contracts of public 
authorities, and whether other domestic developments provide 
support for this trend25 . 
However, while the main theme of this research will be a 
consideration of the regime established by the 1988 and 1992 Acts, 
two other important issues must be considered. The first is that of 
the policy developments which have resulted in the enactment of 
CCT legislation. The second issue is the way in which CCT affects 
accountability for the provision of local authority services. 
The first Part of this research will be concerned primarily with 
the policy developments which led to the Local Government Act 
1988's imposition of CCT, and to the various changes in the 
statutory regime which have subsequently taken place. The starting 
point for this examination is a consideration of the development of 
local government service provision26. This involves a brief 
consideration of the way in which local authorities acquired their 
various functions, and also, more importantly, the way in which 
those functions have been performed. The question to be posed is: 
has it ever been assumed automatically that services must be 
directly provided by the local authority workforce? 
Having considered the extent to which local authorities a.cquired 
their functions, and the extent to which those functions were 
directly provided, attention then .must be. turned to the series of 
developments which led to the imposition of CCT. The first statute 
which imposed CCT was the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
1980. The circumstances which produced this le.gislation would 
appear to have been different from those which produced the 1988 
and 1992 Acts. The 1980 Act would appear to have been the product 
of a considerable amount of consensus between Government and 
25 See Part II, Ch 7 
26 See Part I, Ch 1 
5 
opposition which had its roots in their common acceptance of the 
findings of an independent report in the mid-1970s which had been 
highly critical of the efficiency of building and works Direct Labour 
Organisations, and recommended that such bodies should only 
perform construction and maintenance work where they had won it 
in open competition, and should be subject to a rigorous accounting 
regime in order that their performance could be monitored27• 
The 1980 Act thus appears to belong to a different era of politics 
from subsequent CCT legislation. However, there are many aspects 
of the development of CCT for local authority services which are of 
particular interest. The debate on the application of CCT to local 
authority services began soon after the 1980 Act was enacted28. The 
initial impetus for the debate came from a peculiar source: rather 
than originating from ministers, or from a Conservative think-tank, 
competitive tendering and contracting-out of services were initially 
recognised as having certain benefits by a number of Conservative-
controlled local authorities with a history of poor industrial 
relations during the Winter of Discontent of 1978-9. The benefits of 
competitive tendering and contracting-out appealed to both 
Conservative ministers and to think-tank ideologues. This 
necessitates some consideration of both what are perceived to be 
the benefits of CCT, and also why the pursuit of competitive 
tendering is compatible with the New Right ideology espoused by the 
Conservative Party in Government after 1979. 
In tracing the development of Government policy on competitive 
tendering for local authority services during the 1980s one is struck 
by the problem of coherence. At first a policy of encouraging 
authorities to subject services to competitive tendering and 
contracting-out was followed29 , with a policy of compulsion being 
followed from 1985 onwards, although the first attempt to impose 
CCT was unsuccessful3o. When the Local Government Act 1988 was 
enacted, imposing CeT for a variety of essentially manual services, 
27 See Part I, Ch 2 
28 See Part I, Ch 3 
29 See Part I, Ch 3 
30 See Part I, Ch 4 
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and the establishment of the non-commercial considerations regime, 
it appeared that Government policy was not to extend CCT to 
services which were not sufficiently definable, or from which an 
insufficient level of savings would be realised. The adoption of 
these criteria appeared to preclude the extension of CCT to 
professional, technical and administrative services. The subsequent 
abandonment of this policy and the decision to seek to extend CCT to 
white-collar services, must be considered31 . 
While the extension of CCT to a new range of services, and 
particularly to white-collar services has perhaps been the most 
visible aspect of government policy since 1988, a no less important 
development has been the regulation of anti-competitive conduct. 
One of the defects of the 1988 Act was that, while it prohibited 
local authorities from doing anything anti-competitive in the course 
of awarding work to a Direct Service Organisation, it made no 
attempt to define what constituted such conduct, although one could 
attempt to divine what the Secretary of State considered to be anti-
competitive by observing the circumstances in which he used his 
powers of investigation and sanction under S13 and S14 of the 1988 
Act. The deficiencies of the 1988 Act were remedied by S9 of the 
1992 Act, which permitted the Secretary of State to issue 
subordinate legislation in order to define conduct which would be 
anti-competitive. The matters which the Secretary of State has 
defined as being anti-competitive reveal much about the model of 
competition which the Government wishes to follow, and thus merit 
considerable consideration32 • 
When discussing CCT, one must always bear in mind the wider 
context in which the legislative developments have occurred. Two 
themes must be developed here. The first is the extent to which the 
CCT legislation reflects the trend which has become particularly 
obvious in the past fifteen years of enacting legislation which is 
intended to restrict the amount of discretion which local authorities 
enjoy. The 1988 and 1992 Acts enact a series of provisions which 
attempt closely to circumscribe the amount of discretion which 
31 See Part I, Ch 5 
32 See Part I, Ch 5; Part II, Ch 3, 4 
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local authorities enjoy in making decisions about the delivery of 
services. The second theme is the position of CCT in relation to 
initiatives to reform the way in which services are provided in both 
central and local government. However, these initiatives themselves 
must be placed within the context of the wider issue of the 
restructuring of the role and institutions of central and local 
government which has occurred in recent years33. Thus, for example, 
the importance of competitive tendering to the concept of the 
enabling authority which has been of such importance to the 
restructuring of local government will be considered. 
The final issue which will be considered is that of the implications 
of CCT upon accountability for local authority service delivery34. 
This matter will be discussed after the tendering regime and the 
issues related to it have been considered in Part II. While it is not 
intended to explain the accounting regime established by the 1988 
Act in detail, it will be necessary to consider some elements of it to 
the extent to which they impact upon accountability for the delivery 
of services. However, it is proposed not only to consider the issue of 
financial accountability, but also the other strands of 
accountability, namely political accountability and legal 
accountability, although many issues relating to the latter wi" have 
been considered to a great extent in the earlier chapter relating to 
the Secretary of State's powers of sanction and the remedies 
available to aggrieved contractors35 . 
An extensive range of issues will therefore be considered during 
the course of the research. Before evaluating the provisions of the 
1988 and 1992 Acts, and prior to considering the way in which CCT 
affects the accountability of local authorities, it is first necessary 
to consider the development of local authority service prOVision, and 
the policy developments surrounding the evolution of the compulsory 
competitive tendering regime for local authority services. The 
matters discussed are intended to reflect the legal position as at 
33 See Part I, Ch 5 
34 Part III, Ch 1 
35 Part II, Ch 5 
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1 st June 1995, although in a few select instances events after that 
date will be considered. 
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PART I 
CHAPTER 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONS 
In exammmg the legislation establishing compulsory competitive 
tendering, one must not lose sight of what is regulated by the Local 
Government Acts 1988 and 1992: namely the manner in which the 
functions of local authorities are performed. As the sphere of local 
authority activity has never been a static one it is desirable to 
consider briefly the evolution of local authority functions, and the 
manner in which those functions have been performed, prior to 
examining the development of the compulsory competitive tendering 
regime, and the import of the legislation itself. 
It must be emphasised that this chapter only seeks to examine the 
development of local authority functions, and trends relating to 
their performance, particularly the circumstances in which, and the 
extent to which, contracting out and competitive tendering have 
been resorted to. While the functions of local authorities have often 
been linked to their constitutional position, with, for example, 
certain statutes allocating functions to different tiers of 
government, it is felt that the constitutional development of local 
government merits extensive research in its own right. 
Consequently, changes in the constitutional arrangements of local 
government will only be considered to the extent that they affected 
the range of local authority functions and the manner of their 
performance. 
The development of the functions of local authorities must be 
considered in relation to three periods. The first is the period prior 
to the 1830s. The second, stretching from the 1830's to 1945, is 
arguably the most significant due to the vast expansion of the scope 
of local government. The final period stretches from 1945 to the 
point in the 1 970s at which the debate began on whether or not 
competitive tendering should be imposed upon local authorities in an 
attempt to improve their efficiency. 
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Local government prior to 1830 
In comparison to today, local government prior to the 1830s could 
hardly be characterised as such. There were a number of reasons for 
this. The first relates to the organisational structure of local 
government: 
"At the start of the nineteenth century the functions of local government were 
undertaken by a variety of bodies such as the municipal corporations, the justices of the 
peace, the parishes and a range of special purpose authorities" 1 
For some time local administration had been in decline, and by the 
early nineteenth century neither its chaotic structure nor its 
personnel could cope with their task any longer2. In England at least, 
the ineffectiveness of local government has been ascribed by some 
to the fact that those who administered it, primarily Justices of the 
Peace, were too few in number, and lacked the competence to 
perform the task with which they were charged3. 
The second major reason why local government prior to 1830 bears 
little relationship to local government today is that it possessed 
comparatively few functions. Chief among these was administration 
of the Poor Law4 . Other functions included maintenance of gaols and 
other houses of correction, policing, and the construction and 
maintenance of roads. While it was comparatively rare to do so, a 
few enlightened authorities did assume additional functions such as 
the provision of street lighting5, or established public utilities such 
as municipal gasworks6. 
1 Loughlin, Local Government in the Modern State, p4 
2 See Halevy, Before 1835 in Laski et al, A Century of Municipal Progress; 
Clarke, History of Local Government of the United Kingdom (13th Ed, 1955) Ch 
N; Redlich and Hirst, Local Government in England (lst Ed, 1903), Vol 1 pp 111-
124. The system of local government in Scotland shared many of the 
deficiencies of its English counterpart: see Ross, Early Scottish Local 
Government [1946] 24 Public Administration 30. 
3 See Halevy, op. cit. pp 24-7 
4 See Clarke, op. cit. Chapters II, III on the administration of the Poor Law by 
local government bodies. 
5 Manchester did so in 1806; Liverpool, Brighton, Nottingham and Sheffield in 
1818; Birmingham and Bristol in 1819 
6 Manchester, for example, did so in 1817 
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The functions of local authorities were, therefore, of a minimal 
nature. But how were they performed? Certainly parishes employed 
overseers of the poor and surveyors, who may often have been 
unwilling employees7, to administer poor relief, and build and 
maintain roads. Some authorities even required that those in receipt 
of poor relief should perform work for the parish under a system of 
parish employment which also necessitated the employment of a 
parish overseer. More interestingly, in performing their functions: 
"Their main reliance for the fulfilment of these duties was in the characteristic device of 
eighteenth-century administration, the employment of a contractor. Up and down the 
country, in every conceivable service, the easiest way of getting the work done seemed 
to be to 'farm' it, or put it out to contract, to the man who offered the most advantageous 
terms." 8 
It would therefore appear that during this period the use of 
contractors to perform the limited functions of local government 
was the norm, not the exception9, and that contractors were 
generally selected by some form of competitive tendering. 
In their seminal work English Local Government, the Webbs make 
extensive reference to the use of competitive tendering by local 
authorities from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century: 
"In 1712 the West Riding Justices, having spent over £538 a year during the past 
fourteen years in their casual bridge repairs, contracted, after tenders had been 'heard 
in open court' with four men for keeping in repair all the Riding bridges for eleven 
years for £350 a yearrrlO 
7 See MacColl and Hadfield, British Local Government, p14 
8 B and S Webb, Local Government in England, Vol 1, The Parish and the 
County, at pS2S. See also Halevy, Before 1835, in A Century of Municipal 
Progress, at p26. See also Ross, who discusses corrupt practices in the "letting 
of contracts" in Early Scottish Local Government, [1946] 24 Public 
Administration 30 at p36 
9 Indeed, it has been described as being of "almost universal prevalence" by 
the Webbs, op. cit., pS25 
10 English Local Government, Vol I, The Parish and the County, pS13 
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Nor was the phenomenon confined to the Counties, as is illustrated 
by the corruption surrounding the construction of the Mansion House 
in the City of London: 
" ... an inferior architect was chosen merely because he was a freeman. The various 
contracts for the building were not given to the lowest tenderers, but to those who had 
most interest in the council" 11 
By the mid-eighteenth century the minimal functions of local 
government were ordinarily performed by contractors, who were 
selected following the submission of tenders, with the work ideally 
being awarded to the contractor who submitted the lowest tender. 
This was the case as regards both construction and maintenance 
work and, apparently, the other services provided by local 
authorities l2 . As a result, the number of local authority employees 
was small. However, in the years after 1830, this would gradually 
change. 
1830-1945: The Period of Expansion 
The period stretching from the 1830s to 1945 is in many respects 
the period of most interest to those wishing to trace the 
development of local authority service prOVision. This era, the early 
part of which saw significant political changes, witnessed the 
emergence of truly effective local government and the immense 
expansion of the range of functions with which it was entrusted. 
The advances made in the earlier part of this period cannot be 
divorced from the wider reform of the British system of government 
occurring at this time13. It was perhaps inevitable that measures to 
reform local government should follow the reforms of Parliament 
pursued in the Reform Act 1832. In 1833 Scottish burghs became 
11 See Vol 2, The Manor and the Borough, p649 
12 See Vol 1, The Parish and the County, p525 
13 See Redlich and Hirst, Local Government in England, Vol I, Book I on the 
relationship between wider political change and local government reform in 
the nineteenth century. 
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more democratic by virtue of the Royal Burghs (Scotland) Act14, 
while the functions of burghs could be regulated to a not 
insignificant degree by the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act1S, if a 
burgh's electors chose to adopt its provisions. However, arguably the 
most significant event of 1833 was the appointment of a Royal 
Commission "to enquire as to the existing state of the municipal 
corporations in England and Wales": the Commission's report on the 
constitutional position and administration of the municipalities 
resulted in the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 being passed. This 
statute was primarily concerned with the municipal franchise and 
with imposing some degree of uniformity upon the constitutional 
arrangements of muniCipalities: except for the administration of 
local revenues and finance, licensing, policing, and passing bye-laws 
for the good government of the town, little was said of the functions 
of local authorities. In spite of the fact that the Act's provisions 
only applied to the majority of municipalities, and thus to a small 
geographical area16, it assumed a far greater significance as: 
" ... proof of the excellence of the municipal organisation created by the Act of 1835 is to 
be found in the unparalleled expansion of local activities which followed, and in the 
extension of the principles of the Act to other parts of the field of local government. 
'Local government has been municipalised' is the formula under which Englishmen 
summarise the history of the legislation which has ended in County, District, and Parish 
Councils. And not only has the structure of the municipal councils has been copied, but 
their modes of working and doing business ... "17 
The Municipal Corporations Act 1 835 was thus the catalyst for two 
important trends. First, it marked the beginning of legislative 
activism in local government affairs, exemplified by the 
constitutional restructuring of various tiers of local government in 
the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, the Local Government Acts 
14 1833 c.76. Ross, op.cit., relates that this Act was the result of the 
investigations and reports of a select committee of the Commons from 1819-
1821. If this is so it illustrates a lack of political will in tackling local 
government issues, and the tardiness of the legislative procedure 
15 1833 c.46 
16 The Act did not apply to London, and only applied to 178 of the other 245 
towns considered to exercise municipal powers by the Commissioners: the 
remaining 67 were considered too insignificant to be dealt with. 
17 Redlich and Hirst, Local Government in England (1st Ed. 1903), Vol 1, p128 
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1888 and 1894, and the London Government Act 1899. Secondly, 
after the 1 835 Act was passed, the sphere of local government 
activity began to expand, as authorities began to assume more 
functions. However, the Municipal Corporations Act itself had little 
to say about the functions of local authorities. This raises three 
questions. First, by what means did local authorities acquire new 
functions? Secondly, what functions did local authorities acquire? 
Finally, by what means did authorities perform their functions? 
The functions acquired by local authorities during this period were, 
as one might expect, conferred by Act of Parliament. Prior to the 
1830s powers and functions had almost invariably been acquired by 
private Act of Parliament. When the Municipal Corporations Act 
1835 was passed: 
" ... Parliament interrupted a tradition of centuries by its first active interference with 
local government, it broke in upon a local autonomy which knew not general Acts, 
departments or duties. II 18 
After 1835 functions were conferred upon authorities by means of 
one of four legislative instruments. The first was the private Act of 
Parliament, which meant that the authority petitioned Parliament to 
grant it additional powers. This was the means by which local 
authorities had traditionally sought to extend their powers. The 
second means of assuming powers were Clauses Acts l9, which are 
essentially a half-way house between private Acts and public 
general Acts. Basically a public Act is passed by Parliament which 
provides a model set of clauses which do not confer powers on local 
authorities until they are adopted in a private Act. The third means 
of acquiring powers is an adoptive Act20, which, once again stands 
half-way between a local and a public Act. These are essentially 
public Acts which do not come into force until their provisions are 
adopted by a local authority : the difference between a Clauses and 
an Adoptive Act is that a Clauses Act's provisions must be assumed 
18 Willis, Parliament and the Local Authorities, in Laski et aI, A Century of 
Municipal Progress, at p401 
19 For a fuller explanation of this device see Willis, op.cit. For an example see 
the Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847 
20 For a fuller explanation see Willis, op. cit. p402 
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via a private Act, but an Adoptive Act's provIsions may be assumed 
without further legislative action. Finally, authorities may be 
endowed with additional powers and functions by virtue of public 
general Acts. From the late-nineteenth century onwards the public 
general Act assumed particular importance in imposing functions on 
local authorities: a prime example is the public health legislation 
enacted from 1875 onwards. However, while public general Acts may 
have assumed greater importance from the late-nineteenth century 
onwards in imposing functions upon local authorities, even as late 
as 1935 it could still be observed that: 
" ... Parliament is reluctant ... to cast any doubt upon its faith that the regular method 
for obtaining new powers should be by private Bill ... "21 
Local authorities' exercise of the powers and functions acquired 
during this period was subject to control by the courts, however. By 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century the law regarding the 
exercise of statutory functions was well developed, and the 
principles to be applied to questions of vires could be identified 
with considerable certainty: 
" ... where there is an Act of Parliament creating a corporation for a particular purpose, 
and giving it powers for that particular purpose, what it does not expressly or impliedly 
authorise is to be taken as prohibited ... these things which are incident to, and may 
reasonably and properly be done under the main purpose, though they may not be 
literally within it, would not be prohibited. "22 
While this is not the place to discuss in detail the relationship 
between local authorities and the judiciary, it is clear that Lord 
Blackburn's statement of principle did not seek to impose unduly 
strict limitations on the activities of local authorities23 . 
21 See Willis, op. cit. p403, emphasis added. For a discussion of the frequency 
with which private Bills were used, their uses and expense, see Harris, 
Municipal Self-Government in Britain pp 116-122. 
22 A-G v Great Eastern Railway Co. [1880] 5 App. Cas. 473, per Lord Blackburn at 
p478 
23 On this point see Loughlin, the Restructuring of Central-Local Government 
Relations, in Jowell and Oliver, The Changing Constitution (3rd Ed., 1994) at 
p266 
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Having examined the means by which functions were acquired 
during this period, one must now ask: which functions were 
acquired? Given the fact that throughout the era in question the 
principal means of acquiring new functions and powers was not a 
public general Act of universal application, but either a private Act 
(which mayor may not have incorporated the terms of a clauses 
Act), or an adoptive Act, one cannot identify any universal range of 
functions acquired by authorities: except for those relatively few 
(although undeniably important) occasions on which public general 
Acts imposed functions, the fact that authorities acquired functions 
at their own initiative renders attempts to identify the functions 
possessed by each authority an immensely difficult exercise. 
However, while it is extremely difficult to identify the powers and 
functions of each individual local authority, it is possible to place 
the functions of local authorities within several broad categories. In 
Local Government in the Modern State, Loughlin placed the functions 
performed by local authorities during this era into three categories: 
public goods, redistributive services, and trading services24. 
Public goods can be identified by the fact that they are either non-
excludable, or that it is practically impossible to charge inhabitants 
of the locality for the amount of the good being consumed, and by 
their non-rival ness: once the good is provided, it can be consumed 
without additional costs being incurred25 • The classic example is the 
provision of street lighting. Other examples would be the provision 
of pavements, and sewage facilities. 
Initially many of the public goods were provided by virtue of 
powers contained in private Acts of Parliament26• Almost inevitably, 
the next step was to provide the authority to perform these 
functions in adoptive Acts27 , and clauses Acts28• Finally, public Acts 
gave local authorities the power to provide public goods, and, in the 
case of public health legislation in particular, imposed a duty to 
24 See pp 4-6 
25 Foster, Jackman and Pearlman, Local Government in a Unitary State, pp 40-
42 
26 See Willis, op. cit., p401 
27 E.g. the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833 
28 E.g. the Towns Improvements Clauses Act 1847 
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provide some public goods29• The shift to using public general Acts 
to impose some duties regarding the provision of public goods in the 
field of public health, regarding, for example, sanitation, began in 
the mid-nineteenth century30, with Parliament becoming 
increasingly active in this field during the last quarter of the 
century31 
The second category of services to be considered are the 
redistributive services provided by local authorities during this era. 
The most obvious of these services was the provision of poor relief, 
a function which local authorities had performed for centuries, the 
provision of which was reformed by the Poor Law Amendment Act 
1834, and continued until well into the twentieth century. Other 
examples are education, which progressively assumed greater 
importance after the Elementary Education Act 1870 was passed, 
the provision of hospitals and medical care (which was not always 
universal, and was in some instances linked to the provision of poor 
relief), and, from the last decade of the nineteenth century, and 
particularly after World War One, the provision of public housing. 
The provision of these services was generally aimed at benefiting 
members of the working class who could not afford to purchase 
these services from a private sector which was either unable or 
unwilling to provide an adequate standard of service to a broad 
section of the populace. 
What is noticeable about most of these services is that private 
legislation, clauses and adoptive Acts played very little part in their 
provision. Provision of assistance under the Poor Laws and the 
provision of elementary education were rooted in legislation which 
not only endowed local authorities with certain powers, but also 
imposed important duties. In relation to housing the Housing of the 
Working Classes Act 1890 gave local authorities powers to close 
houses which were insanitary, pursue slum clearance schemes, and 
to build accommodation for the working classes where there was an 
29 See Maud, Local Government in Modern England, p214. 
30 Public Health Act 1848 
31 See e.g. Public Health Acts 1872 and 1875, and the Public Health Amendment 
Act 1890. For a fuller commentary on the progress of public health legislation 
see Clarke, History of Local Government of the United Kingdom, Chapter XII 
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insufficient supply of it. These powers were supplemented over the 
next forty-five years32 . Redistributive services relied heavily upon 
public general Acts for their authority, in spite of the assertion that 
as late as 1935 the common means by which the powers of local 
authorities were extended was by means of private legislation33. 
The final category to be considered is trading services. To a 
greater or lesser degree local authorities have engaged in trading 
activities for centuries, carrying on everything from the operation 
of markets and airports, to the maintenance of municipal banks34. 
However, during the period in question many authorities acquired the 
power to run public transport, and public utility undertakings such 
as gas, electricity and water. J.P.R. Maud succinctly stated the 
reasons why these functions were ascribed to local authorities: 
" ... it is generally true to say that when a service is such (a) that the undertaker must 
have special powers of overriding private interests, or (b) that its provision is closely 
bound up with some activity for which the local authority is already responsible, or (c) 
that it is most economically run as a monopoly (and the consumer therefore needs 
special protection from abuse), or (d) that it wi" not be undertaken by private 
enterprise for profit, or (e) that it is connected with some piece of property belonging 
to the citizens at large or with a peculiar local amenity, then the local authority if (sic) 
often allowed by Parliament to provide the service."35 
The fact that local authorities possessed powers to pursue such 
activities was always the source of some controversy, with debate 
on the scope and management of municipal utilities intensifying 
after World War One36. Nevertheless it is true to say that in the case 
of gas, water and electricity there was a strong tendency to local 
monopoly and that attempts to maintain competition in the mid-
32For a fuller explanation of the development of public sector housing 
legislation see Clarke, op. cit. Chapter XIII. See also Simon, Housing and Civic 
Planning, in Laski et al, A Century of Municipal Progress 
33 See fn. 17, supra 
34 See Clarke, op. cir., Chapter 17; Harris, Municipal Self-Government in 
Britain Chapter 10 
35 Maud, Local Government in Modern England, p 41 
36 See e.g. Summer Conference of the Institute of Public Administration on 
Administration of the Public Utilities [1926] 4 Public Administration 281; 
Mackenzie, Municipal Trading [1927] 5 Public Administration 244; Conference 
on the Management of Public Undertakings [1929] 7 Public Administration 103 
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1 850s had been counter productive, as private sector undertakings 
were quite often inefficient, or formed price-fixing cartels, or 
caused such disruption to local life in laying necessary pipes that 
Parliament and public opinion became more kindly disposed to 
monopoly, and to municipal ownership37. However, it was not the 
case that all local authorities acquired trading functions: in 1933, 
for example, of 656 gas undertakings, only 247 were operated by 
local authorities38, while local authorities supplied only eighty per 
cent of the nation's water39 and two thirds of the nation's 
electricity supplies40 
Local authorities most commonly acquired the power to conduct 
trading undertakings by virtue of private Acts of Parliament41 , 
although clauses or adoptive Acts could also be used42 • However, 
public general Acts also played a part, as is illustrated by the Public 
Health Act 1 848 which empowered local Boards of Health to provide 
a water supply where no private undertaking existed. 
Having examined briefly the functions which local authorities 
acquired during this era, one must now pose the question: by what 
means were these functions performed? Given the nature of some of 
the functions acquired by local authorities during this era it is 
perhaps inevitable that the number of local authority employees 
should expand. As the involvement of authorities in education 
expanded, for example, more teachers would have to be employed. 
Similarly, as local authorities assumed powers to provide utilities, 
and run public services, the number of employees would also expand. 
In the case of utilities this was inevitable, given that monopoly 
undertakings were generally established in response to the fa il u re 
of the market to provide an efficient service: in such circumstances 
contracting with the private sector was not an option. 
37 See Robson, The Public Utility Services, in A Century of Municipal Progress, 
at pp 304-7, discussing gas undertakings 
38 Ibid. at p309 
39 Ibid., p319 
40 ibid. p326 
41 Manchester, for example, acquired approval for the maintenance of its 
gasworks by a private Act of 1824 
42 E.g. Tramways Act 1870 
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However, in many cases it was open to authorities either to employ 
their own workforce, or to engage contractors. An example of this 
situation is to be found in the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833, 
which not only addressed policing functions, but also matters such 
as street lighting, paving, refuse collection, street cleaning and the 
provision of drainage. Section 45 stated that police commissioners 
were "authorised to contract with any person for carrying into 
execution any of the operations herein authorised". This discretion 
either to employ their own workforce or to engage contractors was 
emphasised by S111, relating to refuse collection, which declared 
that Commissioners: 
" ... may appoint Scavengers, and others for sweeping and cleansing the Streets .. , or 
contract with any person for these Purposes ... " 
Thus local authorities which expanded their workforce were often 
taking a positive decision to exercise their discretion in relation to 
a given function which led to that result. However, in respect of 
many functions it is apparent that local authorities were reluctant 
to expand their workforces. It was not until 1893 that the first 
direct labour organisation was formed by West Ham, to deal with 
their housing and building programmes. Other authorities later 
followed suit. It would therefore appear that authorities, until the 
late-nineteenth century, very often contracted with the private 
sector for the performance of many of their functions. 
As local authorities, particularly during the first half of this 
period, contracted out the performance of many of their functions, it 
is perhaps inevitable that many such contracts would be awarded 
following a tendering process: this had been the standard method of 
awarding contracts in the preceding era, and there is no reason to 
infer that it was not the procedure followed during the period in 
question. In addition, towards the end of this period, competitive 
tendering was given statutory recognition, Section 266 of the Local 
Government Act 1933 compelled authorities to adopt standing orders 
for competitive tendering for "the supply of goods or the execution 
of works", However, while the adoption of such standing orders was 
obligatory, adherence to them was not: the standing orders could be 
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set aside in "special circumstances", a term which was left 
undefined, and a failure to comply with the orders would not affect 
the validity of any contract entered into. 
By the end of the 1930s the functions, and the workforce, of local 
authorities had expanded to an extent which would have been 
unthinkable little over a century before. However, throughout this 
period local government had always possessed the discretion to 
contract with the private sector for the performance of its 
functions, and had often done so, thus illustrating that there was no 
presumption that the functions of local authorities should 
automatically be performed by direct labour. Once more, after 1945, 
there would be great changes in the range of functions performed by 
local government, and in the manner in which they were performed. 
Developments in Service Provision 1945- late 1970s 
This was a period which also witnessed extensive restructuring of 
local government in both England and Scotland43 . However, 
significant changes had taken place prior to reorganisation. Chief 
amongst these was the removal from local authorities of many of 
their functions in the redistribution of responsibilities between 
central and local government in the years after 1945. With the 
advent of the welfare state local authorities lost their role in 
administering unemployment and related benefits, and their role in 
provision of health services by the National Health Services Act 
1946. In addition, the supply of gas and electricity was nationalised. 
Of the other trading functions, the provision of public transport, 
primarily buses, remained in local authority hands, while those 
English authorities which supplied water were stripped of that 
function in 1974. 
However, while local government may have lost responsibility for 
these services, the sphere of local authority activity actually 
expanded during this period. It has been commented that authorities: 
43 Local Government Act 1972, London Government Act 1963; Local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1973 
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" .,. have both retained and assumed responsibility for many services which have grown 
in importance with the establishment of the welfare state; especially education, housing 
and personal social services ... Local government is now largely concerned with the 
provision of redistributive services; in 1975, for example, 65 per cent of local 
expenditure was devoted to redistributive services"44 
The redistribution of functions between central and local 
government therefore left local government with no less influence 
than it had previously held. How did local government perform the 
functions it did possess, however? 
There is some evidence that, in the late 1950s, due to difficulties 
in recruiting sufficient staff to perform their functions, local 
authorities engaged private contractors to fulfil some of their 
requirements. However: 
"Records from this period are patchy ... and most of the firms which held these contracts 
have long been out of business; as a result, the total value of 'privatised' work is not 
known."45 
The example given of this phenomenon is the provIsIon of refuse 
collection, contracts for which were most common in the South~ 
East46 . It is not discussed whether the contracts were negotiated, or 
if a tendering process was used. 
In certain respects it is unnecessary to concern ourselves unduly 
with the methods utilised in the 1950s, as: 
"In the 1960s, contractual work in local authorities dried up, possibly as a result of the 
more fluid employment situation. "47 
Just as the near full employment of the 1950s had rendered it 
impossible for some local authorities to recruit or maintain staff, 
thus forcing their reliance on contractors, the rise in unemployment 
in the 1960s removed local authorities' staffing problems, thus 
obviating the need to retain contractors, and reSUlting in a decline in 
44 Loughlin, Local Government in the Modern State, p6 
45 Ascher, Politics of Privatisation, p23 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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contracting out. There was a massive expansion of the local 
authority workforce from 1,800,000 in 1960 to three million in 
1975- a rise in the order of sixty-six per cent. In such 
circumstances, with the tendency to resort to in-house performance 
of functions, neither contracting out or competitive tendering was a 
live issue, except in relation to construction projects, where it 
remained the norm 
If the period from the 1830s to the 1940s had witnessed the 
functional expansion of local government, the factor which 
distinguished the era between 1945 and the late 1970s was the 
growth of the local authority workforce, and the increasing 
performance of work in-house: prior to this there had been no 
assumption that work should be performed in-house, and even in the 
1950s contractors had been engaged by local authorities to perform 
services in cases of necessity. However, by the late 1970s, with 
public expenditure spiralling, and increasing concern about the 
efficiency of direct labour organisations, the ideological debate 
began on how to improve the efficient running of local authorities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1975-80: BROAD CONSENSUS EXISTS ON THE FUTURE OF 
DIRECT LABOUR ORGANISATIONS 
The political debate on the performance of work in-house by local 
authority direct labour organisations CDLOs) can be traced to the 
mid-1970s. In 1975 the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy published a report entitled Direct Works Undertakings 
Accounting 1. This was the report of a CIPFA working group charged 
with examining the accounting practices of direct labour 
organisations, and the means by which performance could be 
measured against financial results, and was divided into two parts. 
Part I amounted to a manual of accounting practice, but Part II 
examined the principles of accounting and management which the 
working party believed needed to be debated. This Part of the report 
proposed three principal changes to the way in which DLOs operated: 
they should be run as trading organisations; the vast majority of 
major works contracts should be tendered for; and charges to 
accounts should be based on the valuation of work, not on the work 
carried out. It was felt that if these proposals were adopted, the 
accounts of DLOs could give an accurate annual illustration of their 
performance which would facilitate clear and fair comparison with 
similar entities. 
The CIPFA report was the catalyst for the debate on the future of 
building and works DLOs which was to continue for the next five 
years. Within five months the Labour Government of the day had 
established a departmental working group charged with 
investigating the organisation and operation of DLOS2, and 
considering the recommendations contained in the CIPFA report. At 
this relatively early stage Ministers were already convinced that: 
"The efficiency of dit-ect labour departments should be tested in competition with 
private contractors." 3 
1 See also Direct Works Undertakings Accounting, [1975] 2 Public Finance and 
Accountancy 235 
2 Announcement by IVIinister of Housing and Construction, 14/10/75 
3 Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, 1974-5 HC Debs Vol 897 col 
1338 
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In fact, the majority of new construction work was awarded 
following a tendering procedure, and the Department of the 
Environment endeavoured to ensure that work was awarded to DLOs 
following competition with the private sector-4. However the fact is 
that no legislation existed at that time to ensure that work was 
awarded to DLOs on a competitive basis. Consequently there were a 
few well-publicised cases of DLOs performing work so inefficiently 
that massive cost overruns resulted, the burden of which was 
passed on to local ratepayers or central government. Prime 
examples of this situation were the construction of the Darnley 
housing scheme in Glasgow, which resulted in £ 2.2m of losses 
having to be written off, and the loss of £ 1 m over two years by 
Wandsworth's DLO, in spite of forecasts that it would break even. In 
an era of poor economic performance, when the expenditure on 
direct works was around £ 1 SOOm, the fact that the majority of 
local authority construction Cif not maintenance) work was awarded 
competitively mattered little: the potential for abuse of the 
arrangements which existed regarding the award of work, and for 
enormous cost overruns, was obvious and needed to be addressed. 
While the Departmental working group continued its deliberations, 
the Labour government had, by late 1976 committed itself II among 
other things, to establish a financial objective supported by 
charging, tendering and accounting requirements for the future 
operation of direct labour organisations" S, In spite of this 
commitment, and the undertaking given by the Minister for Housing 
and Construction in July 1977 that these matters would be dealt 
with II when we have the opportunity for comprellensive legislation 
on local authority direct labour organisations" G no legislation was 
introduced by the Callaghan administration. Moreover, in spite of 
the early recognition of the necessity of legislation, and the fact 
that the content of any legislation was identified at an early stage, 
the Departmental working group appointed in October 1975 did not 
report until August 1978. 
-4 See He Debs Vo1897 col1339 
S See 1976-7 He Debs Vol 919 co1342w. See also 1976-7 He Debs Vol 921 co1s 42-
3vv. On the establishment of separate accounts for DLOs see 1976-7 He Debs Vol 
922 col7191\1 
61976-7 He Debs Vol 936 co1607 
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It is not surpnslng, considering the Labour government's 
protracted period of inaction, that the Conservative opposition 
should attempt to seize the legislative initiative. The first attempt 
was the Direct Labour (Restriction of Works) Bill introduced under 
the ten minute rule late in the 1977-8 session of Parliament. This 
Bill sought to preclude DLOs from performing any new construction 
work, to ensure th at most other work over £ 5000 should be 
tendered for, and to provide that DLOs should be treated as trading 
services in accordance with the CIPFA proposals. The Bill was 
clearly very restrictive, and was defeated by 212 votes to 198. 
The second attempt, the Direct Labour (Major Construction Works) 
Accounting Bill, which was only intended to apply to England and 
Wales, was introduced in mid-February 1979, and received its 
second reading on 27th March. This Bill sought to ensure that DLOs 
only performed work for their parent authorities, or within the 
ambit of the Local Authorities (Goods and Services) Act 1970 and 
that they should be trading organisations required to compete for 
eighty per cent of the work performed in each financial year. The 
Bill also prescribed the accounting regime. Significantly, however, 
while works of II construction, adaptation and renewal" of II public 
buildingsll was expressly covered by the Bill, works of general 
maintenance were not. 
The Biliis promoter, Lord Kinnoull, accepted that the vast majority 
of DLOs were livery efficient units which give an extremely good 
service to ratepayers and represent good value for moneyll 7: it was 
only the performance of a few which gave cause for concern, 
because the legal and accounting regime within which they operated 
neither required them to think, or to act, like trading undertakingsS• 
Both the Opposition and Government were agreed on the principles 
underlying the Bill, namely the improvement of DLO efficiency via 
the imposition of tendering procedures and the adoption of an 
improved accounting regime9 • However, the Government pointed out 
7 27/3/79 HL Debs col 1497 
8 Ibid. cols 1497-8 
9 See Baroness Stedman, ibid. cols 1517-8 
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two serious flaws in the scheme of the proposed legislation: it 
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that DLOs possessed legal 
personality distinct from their parent authorities, and the Bill was 
too limited in scope, as it was primarily concerned with accounting 
procedures, and only with construction works, not maintenancelo. It 
was therefore pointed out that the Government would introduce a 
Bill with the same objectives, but of greater scope, as soon as 
possiblell. While the Bill was sent to Committee, it fell on 
prorogation. 
The 1979 election manifestos did not directly address DLO 
efficiency, Labour, seeing an efficient construction industry as 
essential to its economic and social aims, dealt with the issue 
under the heading of II Building and our Futurelll2. It implicitly 
accepted that DLOs had to be run as trading undertakings forced to 
tender for their work and subject to new rules governing their 
accounts. This was accompanied by an almost incongruous 
commitment to expand DLOs, although this was not a new policy13, 
The Conservative manifesto dealt with the issue in the wider 
context of general governmental inefficiency and overspending, and 
the problem of II over-governmentll , under the heading of II Better 
value for moneyll: 
"The reduction of waste, bureaucracy and over-government will yield substantial 
savings ... By comparison with private industry, local direct labour schemes waste an 
estimated £400m a year." 14 
When it came to power in May 1979 the Conservative government 
was thus determined to tackle the issue of DLO inefficiency 
legislatively. 
10 Ibid., col1519 
11 Ibid .. col 1523-4 
12 See The Labour vvay is the better way. The Labour Party IvIanifesto 1979 pp 
20-1 
13 See e.g. 15/10/75 HC Debs Vol 897 col 1339; 3/7/78 HC Debs Vol 953 col 78w 
14 Conservative Ivlanifesto 1979: Restoring the balance 
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The passage of the 1980 Act through Parliament 
The election of the Conservative government in 1979 resulted in 
many radical changes in policy, particularly in relation to local 
government. The Local Government, Planning and Land Bill, when 
introduced in early 1980, was almost universally criticised as 
being six or seven important Bills wrapped into one. In the midst of 
provisions relating to planning applications, the administration of 
the Rate Support Grant, the establishment of Urban Development 
Corporations, and controls of local authority capital expenditure, 
Part III sought to establish compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
for construction, maintenance, and highway work, and to regulate 
the activities of local authorities' DLOs. 
Part III can be viewed in the context of the other parts of the Bill, 
many of which, such as the provisions regarding capital 
expenditure, addressed financial issues, while others, such as the 
provisions of Part XIS, which regulates local authorities' land 
holdings, may be viewed as emanations of the Conservative belief 
that the role of the public sector and scope of public ownership 
should be limited. The Secretary of State for the Environment 
expressed the objective of the CCT provisions contained in Part III 
as: 
" ... simply to cut waste and inefficiency. Authorities will have to put their DLO accounts 
on a sound footing, closely comparable with a commercial undertaking. Unless they can 
do this they would be better employed using their assets in a more productive area 
elsewhere" 16 
This indicates that CCT for highway, construction and maintenance 
work represents one strand of one of the common threads running 
through the 1980 Act: the more efficient use by local government of 
its financial resources and physical assets. The tendering regime 
proposed in the Bi1117, predicated on the pursuit of greater value for 
money, could contribute to controlling the cost of local authority 
15 Enacted as SS 93-99 
16 1979 - 80 He Debs Vol 978, col 272 
17 The regime contained in the 1980 Act will be discussed briefly belmv 
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Iligllway, construction and maintenance work, wllile tile accounting 
regime would ensure accountability, and greater responsibility, for 
OLOs by illustrating their performance and pointing out situations 
where OLO costs Ilad exceeded initial valuation of the work. 
In comparison witll the other parts of tile Bill, the passage of Part 
III of the Local Government, Planning and Land Bill was relatively 
uncontroversial. While concern was expressed by the Opposition in 
tile course of debates on the bureaucratic costs of tendering and tile 
expansion of white collar services to cope witll tile tendering 
process, tile effect that CCT would have on the role of local 
authorities as model employers, and tile prospect of generally 
efficient DLOs being replaced by corrupt or incompetent 
contractors, it was conceded that there was a need to require all 
OLOs to be run efficiently, although most were in fact run 
efficiently, and won most of their major work in competition with 
the private sector l8 , 
Proceedings in Standing Committee provide some insight into the 
tenor of the debate during tile Biliis passage tllrough tile Commons. 
On e Labou r Member of th e Committee expressed con cern th at 
proceedings were: 
" ... so reasonable. We are making suggestions and tliey are being accepted." 19 
There was considerable give and take in Committee, with matters 
such as the distinction between functional work and works 
contracts, much of the accounting regime, the rates of return on 
capital employed, annual reports, most of the Secretary of Statels 
powers, and the consequential repeal of other legislation, were 
disposed of with little or no discussion. Most debate centred on the 
regulation of functional work. The issue of wllat constituted II fair 
competition li may have been the issue which separated the 
parties 20, but some significance may be attached to tile fact that 
18 See e.g. Roy Hattersley, 1979-80 HC Debs Vol 978 col 272 
19 jvlr. Cant, Standing Committee D, col 203 
20 See e.g. Cant, ibid., col 203; Litherland, co1s 194, 222; Graham, col 239. 
Concerns had already been ex"J)ressed during the second reading debate: see 
e.g. Douglass-Mann, 1979-80 HC Debs Vol 978 col 254 
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the majority of matters raised in Committee were settled by 
agreement, rather than forcing a division. Debate centred, as it 
should have, upon practical matters rather than issues of ideology, 
alth ough members often tried to represent localised interests: only 
rarely were attacks made on the imposition of market-based 
techniques and the philosophy underlying them21 . To counter such 
criticisms the Government pointed out that it was not intent on 
"murdering" DLOs, but only wished to impose greater discipline 
upon them necessitated by the expanded role they had assumed over 
time22. Taking this assertion at face value one can accept that, like 
the legislation mooted by the previous Labour government, the 
Conservative administration's proposals were compatible with the 
CIPFA report's recommendations. Moreover, given that a government 
Minister declared in Committee that he neither viewed the private 
sector as being perfect, nor all DLOs as imperfect23 , one can accept 
that debate was not as doctrinally entrenched as it would become 
during the course of the 1980s, the gap between Government and 
Opposition not being as wide as one would expect as a matter of 
course later in the decade. 
Subsequent consideration of the Bill by the Commons followed a 
similar pattern. A considerable degree of consensus prevailed, with 
the majority of amendments being either accepted or withdrawn, 
and most clauses being dealt with almost summarily, although there 
was some concern that the Secretary of State's powers to sanction 
local authorities for poor DLO performance, including closure 
orders, represented a negation of local democracy, as local 
authorities could thus be deprived of making certain choices as to 
service provision. However, in spite of cracks appearing in the 
consensus, Labour politicians still conceded that there was "room 
for improvement" of DLOs' performance24, while the government 
could counter suggestions that the Bill was an attack on DLOs by 
cogently pointing out that it had been the intention of the Labour 
government to introduce measures to address the same issue25 
21 S T C 'b' j ~ 1 22~ 2-'0 Lee e.g. ant, 1 Ie " cO S 1-:) 
22 Fox, ibid., cols 244-5 
23 Fox, ibid., col 260 
24 See Heffer, 1979-80 HC Debs 987 col 1892 
251979-80HCDebsVo1987,col1912 
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In the Lords the Bill was agam presented as being designed to 
implement the CIPFA report and reduce local government 
inefficiency. However, the gap between the parties was wider on 
several issues: although the essential principle of improving OLO 
efficiency was accepted, there was increasing fear that the Biliis 
provisions would prove to be a negation of local democracy. 
The passage of Part III of the Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 1980 thus presents a curious situation: while ideological 
differences between Government and Opposition were generally 
becoming more pointed, a broad consensus existed regarding the 
problems of local authority OLOs, and the way in which they could 
be tackled. While differences did emerge on particular issues, it 
must be remembered that in any era, in any particular legislative 
situation, differences will exist between party groups on the 
particulars of legislation. Setting aside the inevitable differences 
on particular provisions, and focusing on the wider picture, one may 
ascribe the broad consensus which existed to genuine fears about 
OLO performance expressed over a considerable period, and common 
acceptance by both Labour and Conservative Governments of the 
recommendations made in the CIPFA report of 1975 as the basis of 
legislative proposals. As a result, Part "' of the 1980 Act, and the 
debate surrounding its passage, were hangovers from the mid-
1970s era of consensus politics. 
The provisions of Part III of the Local Government, Planning and 
Land Act 1980 itself were relatively limited in scope. The Act 
only applied to II works of construction and maintenancell 26, which 
was defin ed as: 
"building or engineering work involved in the construction, improvement, 
maintenance or repair of buildings and other structures or in the laying out, 
construction, maintenance or repair of highways and other land ... " 27 
26 See S5(1)(c); S8(1) 
27 S20( 1). Hovvever, S20( 2) contains exceptions relating to parks, 
gardens, playing fields, open spaces, and allotments, and for \vork 
which is essentially carried out by janitors and caretakers, vvhile 
S20( 3) excepts work relating to docks and harbours. 
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The limited scope of the 1980 Act was emphasised by tile fact 
that, while the Secretary of State was given powers to issue 
regulations regarding specific descriptions of construction and 
maintenance work28 , it contained no mechanism for the 
extension of compulsory competitive tendering to local authority 
services. The fact that the 1980 Act contained no such 
mechanism was a significant omission: had it existed it is 
conceivable that the Government would have availed itself of the 
opportunity to extend CCT to local authority services some 
considerable time before it did so by means of the Local 
Government Act 1988, probably around 1985, when it indicated 
its intention to bring a variety of services within the ambit of 
CCT29. 
The 1980 Act established two tendering regimes30: the works 
contra ct regime, wh ich essentially provided that an auth ority 
could not perform work for another local authority unless it had 
been awarded a contract following the submission of a tender in a 
situation after the authority and three other potential 
contractors had been invited to submit tenders31, and the 
functional work regime. The functional work regime basically 
provided that, where an authority wishes to perform construction 
and maintenance work via its Direct Labour Organisation it must 
prepare a written statement of the amount which it intends to 
credit to the DLO revenue account in relation to that work, and 
the means by which that sum will be calculated (this is 
essentially the DLO tender), and prior to performing the work via 
its DLO an authority must invite at least three other persons 
contained on a list of approved contractors to submit tenders32. 
The tendering regimes established by the 1980 Act lacked 
sophistication. First, the tendering regimes only apply where 
local authorities wish to perform work via their own, or another 
28 See e.g. 9(3)(a) 
29 See chapter 4 on the adoption of the policy of compelling 
competitive tendering for services 
30 These did not apply, however, to small direct labour organisations 
which had employed less than thirty people in the previous year: S21 
31 See S7 
32 See S9 
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local authority's DLO. Moreover, the functional work regime only 
required the invitation of tenders from three persons contained 
on a list of approved contractors maintained by a local authority: 
neither the possibility of inviting tenders after the publication of 
a tender notice, and the notification of interest by approved 
contractors, nor the circumstances in which contractors would be 
admitted to lists of approved contractors, were addressed in the 
statute. Finally, the provisions regarding the content of the DLO 
tender were fairly rudimentary. 
If the scope of the 1980 Act was limited, and the tendering 
regimes were fairly rudimentary, the provisions relating to the 
maintenance of accounts and the Secretary of State's powers of 
sanction were more substantial. Authorities were required to 
maintain detailed annual accounts of all construction and 
maintenance work which they performed33 , although DLOs employing 
less than thirty persons were exempt34. Authorities were prohibited 
from crediting to the DLO account an amount in excess of the sum 
contained in the DLO bid35, or calculated in accordance with any 
variation envisaged in the DLO bid36, Authorities were required to 
produce a balance sheet, revenue account and statement of rate of 
return by 30th of September each year37. Complementing this is the 
duty to prepare annual reports for public inspection 38. The 
Secretary of State was endowed with substantial powers to 
regulate the accounting regime further39. The statement of rate of 
return on capital employed must show that the DLO has complied 
with the duty imposed by S 16 to show such positive rate of return 
on capital employed as the Secretary of State may specify40. Local 
authorities were placed under a duty to inform the Secretary of 
State of their failure to meet the specified rate of return, and if 
they failed to perform that duty in three consecutive financial 
33 SIO 
34S11 
35 S12(1), (2), (3) 
36 S12(4) 
37 S13 
38 SIS 
39 See e.g. SlO(4), Sll(3), S12(S) 
40 S13( 6) 
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years there was a procedure which permitted the Secretary of State 
to impose sanctions on an authority, including the closure of the 
DL041. While the accounting regime was highly detailed, it is 
notable that th e powers of sanction contain ed in S17 only applied to 
a failure to meet the rate of return on capital employed specified by 
the Secretary of State. Significantly, the Secretary of State 
possessed no powers to impose sanctions on local authorities for 
failure to comply with the requirements of the tendering regimes. 
While broad consensus may have existed regarding the problems of 
building and works DLOs, attention was now focused on local 
authority service provision in general. The importance of 
ideological beliefs would become more pointed during the debate on 
the extension of competitive tendering and contracting out to local 
authority services. 
41S17 
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CHAPTER 3: 
II Our policy is II. From encouragement of contracting out to 
frustration at authorities' failure to do so, 1980-5 
A new government, a new outlook: the Thatcher administration and 
the New Right 
In spite of the broad consensus evident during the passage of the 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the Thatcher 
administration, on coming to power in 1979, espoused policies 
which represented a departure from many of the assumptions of 
post-war politics. Collectivist notions were little respected and, as 
was evident from the Conservative's 1979 election manifesto l , 
there existed clear dissatisfaction with the scope and role of the 
state. Such dissatisfaction reflected the ideal of the New Right, 
characterised as being the free economy and the strong state 2. The 
minimalist state is the preferred option of the New Right. It was 
accepted that in achieving a reduction in the size and scope of the 
state it would prove necessary to have II strong governmentll , as a 
variety of interests would have to be confronted, most notably 
public sector professionals and the trade unions representing those 
working in central and local government and the nationalised 
industries. In order to tackle the problem of over-government, 
resolute action would be required of those at the heart of the 
decision-making process. At a practical level, any government 
possessing a workable majority in the House of Commons, and the 
ability to control its MPs, will be II strong" enough to pursue the 
policies necessary to give effect to a reduction in the size and scope 
of the state. The sizeable majorities possessed by successive 
Conservative Governments during the 1980s ensured that there were 
few difficulties in giving legislative effect to their policies 
regarding denationalisation and local authorities. Changes in the 
scope and role of the civil service could be effected by exercising 
prerogative powers: legislation was the exception, not the rule. In 
view of the civil service's different legal basis the essential 
requirement for effecting changes has generally proved to be the 
1 Restoring the Balance: the Conservative ivlanifesto 1979 
2 See generally Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (2nd Ed. 1994) 
36 
political resolve to impose such changes in the face of opposition 
from public sector professionals and trade unions. 
If strong government (or the "strong state) In the sense of 
resolute political administration and minimal governmental 
institutions is one element of the New Right ideal, its counterpart, 
the free economy, is no less important in understanding the policies 
which have been pursued by successive Conservative administrations 
since 1979. The New Right believes that the free market must 
ultimately be the arbiter of what is economically sound as the 
market provides an environment in which only the most efficient 
economic actors can survive. The New Right thus have considered a 
large public sector as being at variance with their fundamental 
economic principles, because: 
"The existence of a substantial sector where services were provided by public bodies 
meant a large area where administr-ative rather than market criteria held sway. New 
Right economists endeavoured to show that market solutions would in every case be 
superior to the established public provision, and that there were very few goods that 
could not be supplied through markets .... The argument was that good intentions and high 
ideals were not enough. Any service would be more efficiently provided if it was subject 
to competitive tender and free from administrative controls and political interference. 
Another cr-ucial argument was that any system of administrative rationing necessarily 
conferred privileges on those groups best able to lobby the bureaucracy .. ,. If services 
were provided through markets then not only would there be less waste and inefficiency, 
there would also be greater choice." 3 
Thus, according to New Right theorists, the market provides a 
naturally superior mechanism for making choices about the delivery 
of services. While nationalised industries transferred to the private 
sector would be subjected to the rigours of the market (in theory if 
not always in practice), the services provided by central and local 
government, not being subject to the competitive forces of the 
market, and operated by self-interested bureaucrats within policy 
frameworks set by politicians pursuing their own policy goals, could 
remain havens of waste and inefficiency. By pursuing a market-
based approach to service delivery efficiency could be improved and 
~ lb' j c: - ..., l. pp ~)6-1 
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costs reduced4,l with a simultaneous de-bureaucratisation and de-
politicisation of service delivery, and increased customer choice. 
The innately superior market could remedy the public sectorls many 
inherent deficiencies. 
While the free economy and the strong state may represent the 
ideal of the New Right, the Conservative party in Britain has 
tempered this with its perception of itself as II the party of 
governmene. The pursuit of the ideal must be subordinated to the 
political expediency of the pursuit of power. Some contend that the 
pursuit of power, the existence of conviction politics, and the 
possibility that events may occur which are beyond the control of 
government (for example the stock market crisis of October 1987 
and the exchange rate crisis of September 1992) have resulted in the 
identification of a problem being perceived to exist in certain 
policies of successive Conservative administrations: a lack of 
coherence arising from attempts to satisfy the competing interests 
of the electorate and party ideologues at various times, and to react 
to world events. 
The extent to which there has or has not been a lack of coherence 
in the policies of Conservative administrations since 1979 regarding 
competitive tendering for, and the contracting out of, local authority 
services will be discussed below. However, at a more general level, 
some attempt has been made to show that these are but two 
elements of a wider, coherent, policy initiative. To accept that 
competitive tendering and contracting out form part of a coherent 
policy initiative, one must first recognise that they are two aspects 
of privatisation: this is logical, as both are intended to change the 
balance between the private and public sectors5. Once viewed in the 
wider context of privatisation, it can be argued that competitive 
tendering and contracting out form part of a coherent policy. 
Privatisation, however, can only be viewed as a coherent policy if it 
is analysed in political rather than economic terms, in view of the 
lack of consistency and coherence in the economic justifications 
4 See for an example of this argument Michael Forsyth, Reservicing Britain, 
Adam Smith Institute (1981) 
5 See Young, The Nature of Privatisation in Britain, 1979-85, (1986) 9 West 
European Poli tics 235 
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expressed by ministers for privatisation, and the emphasis placed on 
short term measures such as reduction of the public sector 
borrowing requirement when determining whether to privatise 
nationalised industries6. Therefore, in order to accept that 
privatisation has represented a coherent policy, it must be 
considered in purely political terms: it has thus been argued that 
privatisation was intended to be a means of maximising political 
power by, in effect, creating a wider body of voters who identified 
with the Conservative Party7. Following this analysis, one may 
assert that, at a broad conceptual level, potential tensions between 
the New Right agenda, and the pursuit of power can be reconciled 
quite simply: by altering the balance between the public and private 
sectors, which is an essential part of the New Right agenda, the 
Party's pursuit of power is assisted by creating a larger body of 
electors who may potentially identify with the Conservative Party. 
However, one should bear in mind that the argument that a coherent 
policy exists is dependent on an examination of a variety of policies 
at a broad conceptual level. At a more specific level one must ask: to 
what extent have the ideals of the New Right been pursued by 
Conservative governments in relation to local government services? 
Moreover, has there been a lack of coherence in the policies pursued 
regarding competitive tendering and contracting out? An 
examination of the development of government policies on local 
authority service provision may shed some light on the issue. 
II Our policy is to encourage .... ": encouragement of contracting out 
1980-83 
The most notable aspect of initiatives regarding competitive 
tendering for, or contracting out of, local authority services in the 
early 1980s is the small part which central government played in 
their formulation. In the years immediately following the passage of 
6 See Graham and Prosser, Privatising Nationalised Industries: Constitutional 
Issues and New Legal Techniques [1987] 50 MLR 16; Heald and Steel, Privatising 
Public Enterprise: An Analysis of the Government's Case [1982] 53 Political 
Quarterly 333 
7 See Dobek, Privatisation as a Political Priority: The British Experience, (1993) 
XLI political Studies 24 
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the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 the most active 
participants in the debate on the future of local authority service 
provision were members of certain Conservative-controlled local 
authorities who were convinced of the efficacy of II privatisation ll of 
service deliverY1- and those members of New Right think tanks who 
contributed the ideological dimension to the debateS, 
The impetus to contract out services initially came from within 
local government itself. While contracting with the private sector 
was by no means a new or novel idea, local authorities almost 
invariably chose to provide services in-house. In the case of refuse 
collection, for example, in 1979 only two English local authorities 
engaged private contractors to perform the service9 • Following the 
winter of discontent of 1978-9, during which some authorities had 
used contractors on an ad hoc basis to clear refuse from the streets, 
some authorities began to challenge the assumption that services 
must be provided in-house. The first council to take positive steps 
to explore alternative means of service provision was Southend, a 
Conservative-controlled authority with a history of poor industrial 
relations and an increasing sense of frustration at the working 
practices of its direct services organisation. After investigating th e 
possibilities of competitive tendering in the face of considerable 
union opposition Southend eventually awarded a contract to 
Exclusive Cleaning which undercut the in-house bid by almost 
£ 500,00010. 
The attractions of competitive tendering and contracting out 
thereafter became apparent to an increasing, although relatively 
small, number of local authorities, most significantly the London 
Borough of Wandsworth, which was to become the most high profile 
proponent of contracting out. Its resolve to subject to competition 
an increasing range of services such as street cleaning, refuse 
collection, ground an d vehicle mainten ance, buildin g cleaning, 
S It is interesting to note, however, that some privatising councillors 
disclaimed that they were pursuing an ideological end, but merel~l improving 
efficiency for its own sake: see Coombs, Privatisation- the Birmingharn 
experience, (1983) 9(2) Local Government Studies 9 
9 The two authorities in question were lvIaldon and IVlid-Bedfordshire: see 
Ascher, Politics of Privatisation, p217 
10 See Ascher, op. cit. pp 33-4 
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housing caretaking and the cleaning of public conveniences over a 
short period of time was remarkable. While threats of strike action 
regarding the council's proposals for street cleaning11, and 
Wandsworth's counter-threat of legal action l2, were amicably 
resolved 13 , the acrimony surrounding Wandsworth's plans for refuse 
collection was almost legendaryl4, involving rallies opposing the 
contracting out of this service l5, a lengthy strike l6, and attacks on 
the dust-carts of private contractors l7 . However, support for the 
industrial action waned after the local elections returned the 
Conservatives to power in Wandsworth, forcing a settlement of the 
dispute. The council's Conservative leadership then pressed ahead 
with its plans to conduct a tendering process, and awarded the 
refuse collection contract to Grand Metropolitan in July 1982. 
By 1983 the activities of Southend and Wandsworth had stimulated 
interest in II privatisation ll amongst other local authorities. A survey 
in that year revealed that, between April 1982 and April 1983, 150 
of the 314 councils in England and Wales which had replied had 
considered privatisation of one or more services l8. Of those who had 
considered the option only 9 were Labour controlled. Moreover, while 
26 councils had awarded contracts to the private sector, 79 of the 
authorities which had considered privatisation as an option had 
retained services in-house without submitting them to competitive 
tender. The contracts awarded to the private sector during the 
period in question were not large: only eight authorities had awarded 
contracts worth in excess of £ 100,000, while supplementary 
sources suggest that in the period from 1981 to 1983 only eleven 
authorities awarded contracts worth in excess of £50,000 19. The 
twenty-six contracts noted in the Local Government Chronicle 
survey represented a total saving of in excess of £ 4. 5 million over 
11 See FT4/9/81 p8 
12 See FT 9/9/81 p32, FT 15/9./81 p11 
13 See FT 8/10/81 p10 
14 For a fuller examination of Wandsworth's privatisation programme, and 
opposition to it, see Ascher, op. cit. pp 233-240 
15 See FT 11/5./82 p10 
16See FT21/5/82 p8 
17 See FT 18/5/82 p10 
18 Local Government Chronicle Privatisation Survey 1982-3, 1983 LGC 655 
19 Ascher, op. cit. p2 2 2 
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in-house provision, a figure which was no doubt significant in the 
context of the contracts in question, but would not be of such a 
magnitude as to result in a noticeable drop in local government 
expenditure as a whole. However, the survey does reveal several 
interestin g points. 
First, it is noteworthy how rapidly authorities had become aware 
of the attractions of competitive tendering, and that they were at 
least willing to consider this politically contentious option as a 
viable alternative to direct service provision. In 1980-1 only two 
councils had displayed the political will to break with the norm and 
embrace competitive tendering and contracting out: in the year prior 
to April 1983, 150 authorities had either considered, or were 
considering, what would have been virtually unthinkable three or 
four years before. Moreover, twenty-six had actually contracted out 
a service; not in itself a substantial number, although it did indicate 
that contracting out had gained a significant toe-hold, with six per 
cent of English and Welsh local authorities having done so. Secondly, 
as nine Labour-controlled authorities had been willing to consider 
privatisation as an option, this would indicate that commonly held 
assumptions about service delivery were being challenged on a wider 
political basis than one might have expected20. Thirdly, it was 
already apparent that the threat of privatisation was proving to be 
the catalyst for changes in direct services organisations which 
resulted in savings being made21 . 
The fact that competitive tendering and contracting out was 
proving attractive to authorities begs the question: what are the 
perceived benefits of competitive tendering? 
20 The nine Labour authorities in question had considered extensive 
privatisation. Thurrock D.C. had considered, but rejected, privatisation of all 
services, while the service most commonly considered as a candidate for 
privatisation by the other eight was refuse collection, with catering, ground 
maintenance and cleaning services also being candidates. 
21 See 1983 L.G.c. 655 
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Commentators have identified several major benefits of 
competitive tendering22, First, as competitive tendering, used 
properly, periodically exposes th e prOVISion of services to 
competition, costs are forced down and efficiency is maximised. 
Moreover, as it is generally assumed that there is little incentive to 
pursue economic efficiency where a service is directly provided, 
competitive tendering can act as a catalyst to remedy the 
inefficiencies of in-house teams. Second, regulation of the quality 
of service becomes more objective: as tender documents should 
specify the quality and quantity of service to be provided, quality 
standards are established and can be more effectively policed, with 
the ultimate sanction being the reallocation of the contract to 
another contractor if the specified standard is not attained. Third, 
competitive tendering focuses attention away from the resources 
used to provide a service towards monitoring the results of using 
those resources, thus allowing authorities to evaluate whether the 
resources employed in service delivery are being used efficiently. 
Fourth, those suppliers of services whose activities are not limited 
by politically determined boundaries can achieve economies of both 
scale and scope. Fifth, while those bodies engaging in competitive 
tendering may make cost savings, the Exchequer will benefit 
whenever a service is contracted out: direct service organisations 
pay no taxes, but contractors do. Sixth, it is argued that as private 
contractors tend to be more innovative and better managed than the 
public sector, they are more responsive to customer needs. Finally 
there may be a political advantage arising from the need for DSOs to 
be run in a more commercial manner which is consistent with the 
government's policy over the past fifteen years of reducing trade 
union power: 
"The need to compete implies a move away from centralised bargaining on wages and 
conditions towards local labour mat-ket rates .... it is unlikely that traditional bargaining 
structures can survive competitive tendering for long." 23 
22 See Parker, The 1988 Local Government Act and Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, 27 Urban Studies 653. See also Parker and Hartley, Competitive 
Tendering: Issues and Evidence, [1990] 10( 3) Public Money and lvlanagement 9 
23 See Parker and Hartley, op. cit. p13. See also Forsyth, Down With the Rates. It 
would appear, however that this transition has not ~yet taken place: see 
National Bargaining Remains the Norm Says LGlvIB Survey, 16-22/9/94 
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In theory the adoption of competitive tendering may force unions to 
operate increasingly within the strictures of the market in striking 
the most advantageous deal for their members in the course of each 
tendering exercise. If unions are forced to strike local, as opposed to 
national, agreements, their influence as national players is reduced 
as the object of pursuing their members' interests can no longer be 
effectively achieved there24. 
One must also accept that there has been considerable opposition 
to competitive tendering. Those opposed to its use have argued that 
there are four disadvantages. First, those critical of competitive 
tendering and contracting out contend that it results in a decline in 
service quality, However, while it was often the case that in the 
early-1980s a number of councils had to bring work back in-house, 
or invoke contractual penalties in response to contractor's 
inadequate performance25, it is now generally accepted that well-
developed monitoring procedures can effectively check any decline 
in service quality26, Secondly, it is argued that competitive 
tendering, the negotiation of contracts, and contract monitoring are 
costly administrative processes, which require the employment of 
more white collar staff at a time when blue collar staff are losing 
their jobs. Third, it is argued that, where contractors are engaged, 
th eir work forces' terms and conditions of employment are 
inferior27 , and that a high proportion of casual labour is employed. 
Finally, opponents of competitive tendering often play on the fear of 
contractors forming cartels, thus resulting in less competition. 
Between 1980 and 1983, therefore, contracting out and 
competitive tendering gained a degree of acceptance among local 
authorities, although few local authorities were sufficiently 
convinced of the benefits of market-based techniques actually to 
Iv'lunicipal Journal 5, and the Local Government lvlanagement Board, 
Framework and Flexibility - National Agreements for Local Authority Needs 
24 See Ridley, The Local Right: Enabling not Providing, p28 
25 See Ascher, Politics of Privatisation, Ch7 for examples: Wandsworth in 
particular had to fine several contractors, for example 
26 This will be discussed infra. 
27 The legal relevance of the terms and conditions of contractors' workforces 
will be discussed infra, Part II 
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apply them to the provision of local services. However, while the 
benefits of competitive tendering for, and the contracting out of, 
local authority services may have been made apparent to many 
authorities more by example than by intellectual argument, 
theorists did play their part in the debate on their merits. The most 
sign ificant contribution to the debate on "privatisation ii of local 
authority service provision during this period was the pamphlet 
published by the Adam Smith Institute entitled "Re-servicing 
Britain"28. The first lines of the pamphlet are indicative of its 
general tone: 
"Local government services in Britain provide in many ways a microcosm of British 
industry as a whole, exhibiting on a small scale many of the weaknesses and failings 
which afflict the national economy." 29 
The evils which were identified as existing in local government 
were II a combination of escalating costs and increased manpower 
levels with declining quality"30. The root of the problem lay in: 
"The combination of a protected monopoly position with a claim on tax revenues removes 
all incentive for efficiency of operation and quality of service." 31 
This analysis presented the public sector as being controlled by, and 
for, the benefit of the bureaucrats who ran it, and the unions which 
represented the workforce, at the expense of the public, who paid 
for each service via rates and taxes. The private sector was, 
however, viewed as inherently superior: 
"It is the need for profit which keeps the private sector alert to customer requirements, 
and the competition which keeps it both effective and innovative. The public service, 
having no need to attract custom, no profitability requirements to pare its costs, and no 
28 First Edition 1980, second Edition 1981. Its author, Michael Forsyth, was a 
Westminster City Councillor, and would later become a Conservative MP and 
Minister. 
29 Re-Servicing Britain, 2nd Ed. pi 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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competition to fear usurping its position, tends to operate in the interests of those who 
administer it" 32 
Local government services were consequently characterised as being 
"expensive, wasteful, inefficient and inadequate" 33, with cou ncillors 
either lacking the imagination to pursue alternatives to the status 
quo, or allowing themselves to follow too readily the advice of 
offi ci a Is not to pu rsu e certa in pol ici es rega rdin g service 
provision34, 
Forsyth opined that: 
"While the adoption of business efficiency methods and charges for services both have a 
role to play, undoubtedly the greatest potential for improvement in local services lies in 
the idea of privatisation .... By 'privatisation' we usually refer to the process by which a 
local authority service provided by its employees ... is I-eplaced by one contracted for by 
the authority, but provided by private businesses or, occasionally, by voluntary 
effort." 3 5 
By privatising serVices, costs could be forced down, and quality and 
efficiency of service delivery would increase. It should be noted that 
the role of local authorities envisaged in this analysis is solely that 
of ensuring that a service is provided: as is obvious from the 
extensive range of services which Forsyth wished to expose to the 
rigours of the market36 they are reduced to performing the role of a 
contracting authority, much akin to the concept of the enabling 
authority which would emerge later37 . In examining the advantages 
of privatisation, it is said that: 
"Most of all, perhaps, is the advantage which accrues from competition. With different 
firms vying for local government service contracts, the authority can not only pick out 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p2 
35 Ibid., p3 
36 The services mentioned in this work include not only refuse collection (see 
pp 4-6), but also fire-fighting (see pp 7-9), ambulance cover (see p9) and 
certain social services (see pIO) 
37 This concept will be discussed belovv, chapter ..f 
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the best and most efficient for its citizens, but it has in the performance of each 
contractor a means of assessing the achievement levels of others." 38 
The concept of II competition ll advocated by Forsyth dearly did not 
envisage the participation of DLOs in an attempt to prove that they 
could provide services as efficiently as the private sector. The 
assumption that the private sector would always provide services 
more efficiently was at variance not only with the scheme of the 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, but also with the 
practice of those (invariably Conservative) authorities which were 
then conducting competitive tendering exercises. 
There is, however, one potentially serious flaw in the argument put 
forward in Re-servicing Britain. This lies in the reliance placed on 
research into the experience of cities in the United States, such as 
the research which indicated that cities with a population in excess 
of 50,000 which contracted out refuse collection achieved savings 
of forty per cent. One may question whether this result could be 
replicated in the possibly different cultural, geographical and 
operational circumstances of British local authorities. However, 
more relevantly, aspersions have subsequently been cast on the 
validity, accuracy and methodology of research from this era into 
American experiences with privatisation39 
Re-servicing Britain, while it did not actually advocate the form 
which competition should take, did stimulate debate at a more 
doctrinaire level, with its recommendations figuring in the 
ruminations of Government Ministers4o. What, however, was the 
policy pursued by central government from 1981 to 19837 
Central government was relatively inactive in the debate on 
competitive tendering during this period. While Lord Bellwin, as 
Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, may have agreed with 
38 Forsyth, op. cit. p3. See also pl0 on the virtues of "contracting out". 
39 See for a summary Voytek, Privati sing government service delivery: 
theory, evidence and implications, [1991] 9 Environment and Planning c. 
Government and Policy 155 at pp 163-5 
40 See e.g. Why Lord Belhvin sa.ys contracting-out is a great opportunity', 1981 
Local Government Chronicle 130 
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Forsyth that II the profit motive promotes efficiencyll, and that II it is 
important to examine the scope for the increased involvement of the 
private sector in the provision of local services ll41, few of his 
colleagues entered into the debate publicly outside the confines of 
Parliament. Both Mrs Thatcher and Michael Heseltine were known to 
be enthusiastic supporters of competition in the supply of local 
authority services42, but generally refrained from making any public 
contribution to the debate on competitive tendering and contracting-
out outwith contributions to Parliamentary debates and answering 
Parliamentary questions. 
The source of most information on government policy at this time 
was the reply to Parliamentary questions. These questions, almost 
invariably planted, generally asked the Government to praise the 
work of authorities such as Southend or Wandsworth, or simply 
asked the government what its policy was. The classic formulation 
of the reply to such questions was: 
"Our policy continues to be to encourage local authorities to provide services by the most 
economical and cost effective means available, including the use of private sector 
contractors where this presents the best option.,,43 
Complementing this were the replies given to questions asking 
whether the government intended to introduce legislation to compel 
II privatisation ll of local authority services. At this early stage of 
policy development the possibility of legislation to compel 
competitive tendering and contracting out was discounted44. 
Why was a policy of encouragement, rather than compulsion, 
adopted at this stage? Part of the reason may lie in the report 
commissioned by the Department of the Environment from Coopers 
and Lybrand entitled Service Provision and Pricing in Local 
Government, which noted that local politics often interfered with 
41 Ibid. 
42 See "Birmingham highlights direct labour issue" FT 29/12/82 p5 for 
information on the views of lVIrs Thatcher and ],v'Ir Hese1 tine 
43 l'vlrs Thatcher, 1981-2 He Debs Vol 26 (01273w. See also Tom King 1981-2 He 
Debs Vo118 co182,>v, 1982-3 He Debs Vol 32 co1473-4w 
44 See 1981-2 He Debs Vol 18 col 283, 163w 
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decisions on service provision, and that a general scepticism existed 
regarding tendering for services. Deficiencies were also identified 
in existing tendering procedures. The report suggested that 
flexibility in service provision could be improved by introducing 
competitive tendering, but did not give it 
wholehearted support, concluding that services were best provided 
by a variety of means4S. In essence this research noted that 
competitive tendering and contracting out merited consideration, 
but that they were not solutions which should be applied as a matter 
of course. 
This report may have sat fairly easily with the publicly stated 
policy of encouragement of competitive tendering: the report 
explicitly, and the policy implicitly, accepted that competitive 
tendering was one of a variety of solutions to local government 
inefficiency, but not the only solution. However, one must ask: how 
consistent was the policy of encouraging local authorities to expose 
services to competition with other aspects of Government policy? In 
early 1983 the DHSS had issued a draft circular regarding the 
application of competitive tendering to certain ancillary services, 
thus indicating the government's commitment to its use. Given that 
commitment, the relative success of compulsory competitive 
tendering under the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 
(different though the ideological basis for that legislation was), the 
enthusiasm of the Prime Minister and others for the concept, and the 
general deterioration of central-local government relations at this 
time it is difficult to see why the Government did not legislate at 
this stage. Certainly the supportive nature of backbenchers' 
questions indicate that it had little to lose politically. Three 
obvious possibilities exist. The first is that it may have been felt 
that local government unions were still too powerful to confront at 
this point, and that the spectre of industrial disruption along the 
lines of 1978-9 would have been politically counterproductive. 
Secondly, it may have been felt that regulation of the market-place 
should be avoided if possible, and that the benefits of competition 
and the natural superiority of the market should become evident by 
example rather than imposed by legislation. This was certainly 
4S See Ascher, op. cit. pp 37-8 for a discussion of this report 
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consistent with the policy of encouragement being pursued at th is 
time. Finally, lack of Parliamentary time may have been a factor, 
although, given that the provisions of the 1980 Act could have been 
used as a model, and that the required provisions could have been 
included in anyone of the plethora of Acts relating to local 
government at this time, this explanation is only credible if 
initiatives relating to competitive tendering had a low political 
priority. 
In some respects the reasons why a policy of encouragement rather 
than coercion was adopted are academic as by early 1983 Ministers 
were 
" ... anxious that every local authority should test every service to ensure that it is being 
provided in the most cost-effective way." 46 
Following the 1983 General Election, the Government's attitude 
would undergo subtle changes. 
1983-5: Frustration mounts at the failure of the policy of 
encouragement 
The 1983 Conservative manifesto reflected the policy of 
encouragement: 
"The achievement of many Conservative authorities in saving ratepayers' money by 
putting services like refuse collection out to tender has played a major part in getting 
better value for money and significantly reducing the level of rate increases. We shall 
encourage every possible saving by this pOlicy."47 
In spite of this commitment, however, the period between mid-1983 
and early-1985 was to witness growing frustration expressed by 
Conservative Ministers and MPs at the failure of the vast majority 
of local authorities to respond to that encouragement. Consequently 
there was a restructuring of the balance of responsibilities between 
central and local government, with the Government, and notably 
46 See Tom King, 1982-3 HC Debs Vol 37 cols 920-1 
47 Conservative J:VIanifesto 1983: Law Democracy and the Citizen, p36 
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some Conservative backbenchers also, realising as time passed that 
sole responsibility for adding impetus to the adoption of 
competitive tendering could not be left to local government. 
In spite of the result of the 1983 Local Government Chronicle 
survey which showed that the use of market-based techniques had 
gained a toe-hold, and that the threat of their use often sufficed to 
galvanise DSOs into making efficiency improvements, by late-1983 a 
degree of frustration was becoming evident: 
"My Right Han. Friend has no immediate plans for legislation; but is always ready to 
consider practical proposals for encouraging the contracting out of local authority 
services"48 
The formulation of this answer indicates that the Government 
accepted that some impetus was being lost by permitting local 
authorities to set their own timetable for II contracting out ll 
services, and that, while the Government may have wished to see 
more councils doing so, on a practical level it did not yet see how it 
could influence their actions more effectively. Otherwise, Ministers 
continued to encourage the use of competitive tendering and private 
contractors49. By December 1983, as was evident by the reply to a 
question directed at the Prime Minister, frustration was clearly 
mounting: 
"Too few local authorities have been prepared to put too few services out to competitive 
tender, despite clear evidence of the savings that have resulted from such action. 
Progress remains disappointingly slow. We are considering what measures could be 
taken to speed things up." 50 
The government's sense of frustration at the virtues of 
competitive tendering not being seized upon by local authorities was 
no doubt emphasised by the results of the Local Government 
48 1983-4 He Debs Vol 45 col 263w 
49 See e.g. Jenkin 1983-4 He Debs Vol 47 col 111 w, Waldegrave, He Debs Vol 49 
col 214\v 
50 John Biffen replying on behalf of the P:tvi, 1983-4 He Debs Vol 50 col 132w 
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Chronicle Privatisation Survey of 1984 51 , which revealed that 
interest in using the private sector was fading. With an identical 
response rate to the 1983 survey (69%), it revealed that only 79 
councils had privatised services or considered it as an option in 
1983-4, compared with 150 in 1982-3. The Local Government 
Chronicle Survey for 1984-5 52 would further indicate that while 
privatisation of service delivery had gained some acceptance, with 
39 of the 346 respondents to the survey (including three Labour-
controlled authorities) having privatised services, 270 of the 
respon den t au th oriti es had n eith er privati sed services nor 
considered it as an option. Of those 270, nearly a third were 
Conservative-controlled, while in large tracts of the country, no 
privatisation took place53 . In some cases privatised services had 
been returned in-house. It has been commented that: 
"Although a majority of local councils considered privatisation of one or more services 
in the eat"ly 1980s, few took it seriously enough to undertake formal competitive 
tendering exercises and even fewer contracted out." 54 
To an extent this may miss the point. By 1984-5 the impetus 
towards competitive tendering may have been slowing down, but 
equally certain is the fact that the use of contractors to perform 
services had been accepted as a valid option; something almost 
unthinkable a decade before. The number of councils resorting to 
private contractors, though small, was not insignificant. The 76 
authorities, roughly one in seven, which had considered competitive 
tendering, may have indicated that there was hardly overwhelming 
support for the policy, but neither did they represent an 
insignificant body of opinion which could easily be ignored. However, 
while competitive tendering may not have been winning massive 
support amongst local authorities, it was winning support among 
Government Ministers and Conservative MPs, the corollary to which 
51 Privatisation Gets close examination but interest fades, 1984 Local 
Government Chronicle 704 
52 LGC Privatisation Survey 1984-5, 5/6/85 LGC 
53 In Cheshire, Cleveland, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Humberside, Lancashire, 
Norfolk, Oxfordshire and G\vent no privatisation took place at either District or 
Count)l Level. In Scotland the only evidence of privatisation was a £2000 refuse 
collection contract on Westray in the Orkneys. 
54 Ascher, Politics of Privatisation p227 
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was frustration at the general inactivity of local authorities 
regarding this issue. 
Such was the degree of frustration felt among backbenchers on the 
issue of competitive tendering and contracting out that Christopher 
Chope MP55, sought leave under the Ten-Minute-Rule II to bring a Bill 
to make provision for local authorities to put out to competitive 
tender certain of their functions and services" 56. Mr Chopels attempt 
to secure leave to bring this Bill, which he felt would result in 
considerable savings in local government expenditure, was only 
defeated by the narrow margin of 170 votes to 167. There is some 
evidence that, contrary to convention, several ministers wished to 
vote for the Bill and had to be restrained from doing S057!. 
By late 1984 the Government had clearly come to accept that it 
would have to play a major role in ensuring the expansion of 
competitive tendering throughout local government. When asked 
whether she was satisfied with the level of local authority 
privatisation, the Prime Minister replied: 
II No, I am not. The Government have been considering what might be done to speed things 
up. We shall announce our intentions very shortly. II 58 
The last sentence is a clear reference to the consultation paper 
which would be issued in early-1985 59. The Government was 
committing itself to playing a greater part in seeing competitive 
tendering extended. 
There is one more feature of government policy on competitive 
tendering throughout this era which should be noted. Both during the 
period when encouragement of contracting out was the policy, and 
55 lvIr Chope had been leader of Wandsworth LBC during the period of its 
pioneering privatisation drive. By 1987 he \,vould be part of the ministerial 
team steering the Local Government Act 1988 through Parliament, and, after 
losing his seat at the 1992 General Election, he would become a member of the 
Local Government Commission 
56 1983-4 HC Debs Vol 57 col 280. 
57 Ascher, op.cit. p40 
58 1983-4 HC Debs Vol 65 col 886w 
59 Competition in the Provision of Local Authority Services, DoE 1985 
S3 
the period when the Government was growing increasingly 
frustrated at the failure of authorities to use this device, one can 
call into question the factual basis of ministerial assertions. On 
several occasions, in spite of extolling the virtues of contracting 
out, Ministers were forced to admit that: 
"No systematic information is collected by the Government." 60 
While the number of authorities actually contracting out services 
were few, the savings to be made were readily emphasised. However, 
it was also admitted that no attempt was made by the Government 
to collate and examine information on this matter. This would tend 
to suggest that the practical experiences of those authorities 
pursuing this policy were of less significance than the ideological 
tenets of reducing the size of government and public expenditure and 
the conviction that the superiority of the market (in itself an 
important ideological tenet) would facilitate the accomplishment of 
these ideals, as well as having other benefits. 
60 PlvI, 1983-4 He Debs Vol 48 col 204, Waldegrave Vol 56 col 23w 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPULSION BECOMES THE POLICY 
1985-7: The Government makes a commitment, but takes no 
action. 
With the issuing of the consultation paper Competition in the 
Provision of Local Authority Services by the Department of the 
Environment in February 1985 the Government committed itself to 
compelling the use of competitive tendering with regard to a range 
of largely manual services. However, it would be three years before 
the Local Government Act 1988 gave substance to that commitment. 
Several issues arise regarding government policy during this period. 
First, and most importantly, while the Government may have made 
an ideological commitment to compelling competition for the 
provision of certain local authority services, it also appears to have 
failed to appreciate fully the practical consequences of that 
commitment1. Consistently between 1985 and early-19B7, Cabinet 
Ministers promised legislation "as soon as possible"2. The 
frustrations of several Conservative MPs at the Government's 
legislative inactivity during this period were expressed in an 
adjournment debate3 and a Private Members BiII4 which were clearly 
intended to force the Government's hand. 
Various explanations have been proffered for the Government's 
failure to introduce compulsory competitive tendering legislation in 
the 1985-6 Session. It was suggested that the Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Kenneth Baker, was reluctant to pilot 
lOne notable exception to this, however, was the provision of bus services, 
which were subjected to a competitive tendering requirement by Part V of 
the Transport Act 1985 
2 See e.g. Waldegrave, 19/4/85 He Debs Vol 77 col 300w (promised legislation 
in the 1985-6 Session); Rumbold 27/2/86 Vol 92 co1664w, 3/3/86 Vol 93 col 
33w; Waldegrave 2/5/86 Vol 98 col 356w (as soon as the Parliamentary 
timetable permits); Chope 4/2/87 Vo1109 col 719w, Boyson 6/2/ 87 Vo1109 col 
855w. The Prime Minister also made this commitment: see 12/3/86 HC Debs Vol 
93 co1465w 
3 1984-5 HC Debs Vo183 co1s 1126-46 
4 Local Government (Supply of Goods and Services) Bi111986-7 HC Debs Vol 
114 co1s 174-7 
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legislation on such a politically controversial issue through 
Parliament so close in the wake of the controversies surrounding 
rate-capping and the abolition of the metropolitan county councils. 
It was also suggested that the uneven results of NHS competitive 
tendering, which had recently been the subject of criticism by the 
Social Services Select Committee, may have tempered the 
Government's enthusiasm at this stageS, However, in November 1986 
the Queens Speech revealed that a Bill introducing compulsory 
competitive tendering would be brought in the 1986-7 Session. 
When the Bill came before the Commons in February 1987 the 
Secretary of State for Environment was forced to admit that the 
Government had not had time to draft either the competitive 
tendering provisions, or the provisions regarding non-commercial 
considerations6, Given the time which had elapsed since the 
proposals on CCT had first been mooted, and the importance ascribed 
to these measures by the Government, such an excuse appears feeble, 
even if the legislative timetable was a packed one and a prorogation 
was drawing nearer. Clearly ideological commitment had outstripped 
consideration of the practical issues involved: the provisions of the 
competitive tendering regime could have been modelled on those of 
the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (indeed the 
tendering prOVisions of the 1988 Act follow the same broad 
scheme), or on the tendering provisions contained in the Transport 
Act 1985 regarding the provision of bus services7, However, as has 
been pointed out by one commentator8: 
"The scale and complexity of the local government legislative programme since 1979 has 
been quite unprecedented; so much so that it has often outstripped the government's 
drafting procedures. The Government has consequently been pressed into using 
Parliamentary procedures mainly as the opportunity for tidying-up the rough drafts 
which it has submitted for ratification." 
S Council Tenders Bill Shelved FT 2/11/85 p28 
61986-7 HC Debs Vo1110 co1916 
7 See S88- 92 
8 Loughlin, The Restructuring of Central-Local Government Relations, in 
Jowell and Oliver, The Changing Constitution (3rd Ed, 1994) at p275 
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In this instance the ideological commitment to legislate outstripped 
consideration of the practical issues involved to such an extent that 
no provisions could be brought before Parliament: it is particularly 
ironic that, having derided local government for so long because of 
its failure to adopt competitive tendering, the Government should 
succumb to a period of inactivity due to its own failure to consider 
the practical import of its ideological commitment. 
Secondly, questions can again be raised about the factual basis for 
the Government's actions. The Government would often extol the 
virtues of competitive tendering, but the only benefits publicly 
identified by Ministers were the savings to be achieved by the 
application of market disciplines and the consequent reduction in 
the demands issued to ratepayers9, The intention was clearly to 
present this policy in a way which was attractive to voters, and 
thus represents an attempt to reconcile this policy with an 
important characteristic of the Conservative party: namely the 
pursuit of power10, which compels the party to present its policies 
in a way intended to increase its electability, However, the evidence 
cited regarding savings was quite vague. Very often no evidence was 
proffered regarding the savings to be achieved. On some occasions, 
bland statements were made about the actual monetary savings 
reSUlting from contracting-out, without identifying the relative 
importance of those savingsll, On one other occasion a Minister 
stated that: 
"141 different councils have contracted out at least one service, at a current annual 
saving of £22,390,000"12 
As the 1987 Local Government Chronicle Privatisation Survey 
illustrated, the value of contracts let to the private sector for the 
9 This had been a standard formulation since relatively early in the debate. 
See e.g. Waldegrave, 1983-4 HC Debs Vol 49 col 306; PM, HC Debs VoIS7 cols 
137-8; GowVol63 col 1034; Rumbold 1985-6 HC Debs Vol 90 col 303; Ridley 
1986-7 Vol 105 co1SS9. 
10 See Ch 3, supra 
11 See e.g. PM, HC Debs VoIS7 cols 137-8: 
"23 contracts have been let, but they result in a saving of more than £7 
million." 
12 Boyson, 1986-7 HC Debs Vol lOS co1244w 
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provIsIon of services in 1986-7 was £ 120 million, a comparatively 
small sum within the context of total local authority spending of 
£34 billion13. Viewed in the context of such a massive budget, 
savings of less than £23 million (even if not disputed14) appear less 
impressive than Dr. Boyson's statement would suggest. 
On those occasions when potential savings were expressed as a 
percentage it was often claimed that: 
"Local authorities which have contracted out service provision as a result of competitive 
tendering regularly report savings of 20 per cent to 30 per cent on previous costs."lS 
There are several grounds on which one can take issue with this 
statement. The first is its imprecision: while potential savings of 
between twenty and thirty per cent were emphasised, the ten per 
cent span indicates less than exacting statistical analysis. 
Secondly, if we assume that the PULSE and Local Government 
Chronicle Survey figures cited during this period are both correct, 
then the figures given by Mr. Ridley do not make sense. If the figure 
of £23 million of savings cited by PULSE is added to the value of the 
contracts awarded cited by the Local Government Chronicle, then the 
prior cost of providing those services would have been £ 1 43 million. 
However, when expressed as a percentage of £ 143 million, the figure 
of £23 million represents a saving of less than sixteen per cent -
far short of even the lower figure cited by Mr. Ridley. Third, the 
government was still declaring at this stage that it did not collect 
"systematic data" on the use of competitive tendering and 
contracting out in the provision of local authority services16• Thus, 
while the government did not seek to investigate the matter for 
itself, it was prepared to disseminate information extolling the 
financial benefits of competitive tendering, once again indicating 
that its commitment owed more to ideological than to practical 
13 3/7/87 Local Government Chronicle Survey p4 
14 Dr. Boyson used the figures of PULSE, a highly partisan organisation. 
Contrary to these figures the LGC reported that savings of only £1.5 million 
had been achieved in 1986-7 
IS See e.g. Ridley 1986-7 He Debs Vo1109 col 492w 
16 See e.g. Waldegrave, 1984-5 He Debs Vo182 col 511w; Rumbold, 1985-6 He 
Debs Vo193 co1s 188-9w; 1986-7 He Debs Vo1107 col 578w 
58 
considerations. However, it should be noted that on exceptional 
occasions Ministers did admit that it was impossible to estimate 
the financial savings to be reaped from exposing all local authority 
services to competition17 
The emphasis upon "savings" raises the issue of the application of 
the concept of "value for money" to competitive tendering. Value for 
money is generally defined as the pursuit of the "three Es", namely 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness: 
"The NAO gives the '3E's' the following meanings: 'economy' is concerned with 
minimising the cost of resources acquired or used, having regard to appropriate quality 
(in short, spending less); 'efficiency' is concerned with how far maximum output is 
achieved for a given input, or minimum input is achieved for a given output (in short, 
spending well); and 'effectiveness' is concerned with how successfully outputs of goods, 
services, or other results achieve policy objectives, operational goals and other intended 
benefits (in short, spending wisely)."18 
The extent to which the government concentrated on one aspect of 
the value for money equation is particularly noteworthy. The 
criterion of economy may be of paramount importance to a 
government committed to containing public expenditure, but the 
criteria of efficiency and effectiveness should not be ignored. 
Comparatively little attention was paid to the effect of competitive 
tendering upon standards of service, although it must be admitted 
that, in theory, good post-contractual monitoring of a well drafted 
specification of the work to be performed should preclude a drop i n 
standards. 
While one may question the Government's conception of value for 
money in the context of competitive tendering, one should not ignore 
the effect which the threatened imposition of competitive tendering 
based on the pursuit of value for money was having upon local 
government culture by the mid-1980s. By 1985 trade unionists had 
17 Rumbold, 1985-6 HC Debs Vol 90 col Sllw, Vol 102 col 263w 
18 Harden, Money and the Constitution: Financial control, reporting and 
audit, [1993] 13 Legal Studies 16 at p24. See also Voytek, Privatising 
government service delivery: theory, evidence and implications, [1991] 9 
Environment and Planning c. Government and Policy ISS at plS9 
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accepted the inevitability of the imposition of compulsory 
competitive tendering19, and soon both the Labour Party and the 
trade union movement were engaged in a reappraisal of the quality 
and performance of local authority services20. While the Local 
Government Chronicle Privatisation Surveys of 1985-6 and 1986-721 
may have revealed that councils were generally coolon tendering 
and contracting out, local authorities were preparing themselves for 
CCT. The 1988 Survey revealed that "Contracting Out Gets a Boost"22, 
and many of the articles appended to the Survey were aimed at 
emphaSising that direct labour organisations could organise 
themselves to ensure that they were successful in competition with 
the private sector23 . In addition, the Audit Commission emphasised 
in 1987 that the best twenty-five per cent of local authority DLOs 
were as good as any private sector company trying to supply local 
government services. When the result of the first tranche of CCT 
under the Local Government Act 1988 was made public, eighty per 
cent of all tendering exercises had been won by DLOs. This is a 
measure of the change in the culture of DLOs in the mid- to late-
1980s, which saw them transformed into organisations run 
increasingly on commercial lines with the aim of securing maximum 
value for money and winning work in competition with the private 
sector. Local authorities understood that winning a number of 
contracts may change little, but losing several may result in the 
closure of DLOs: operating in a more commercial manner was thus 
not just a matter of pursuing efficiency, effectiveness and economy 
- ultimately it was a matter of survival. 
The imposition of a tendering regime was not the only issue 
troubling Government, however. While many authorities were trying 
to operate in a more commercial manner, a few authorities were 
attempting to take into account non-commercial considerations in 
their contract award procedures. The Department of the Environment 
19 See IT 14/5/85 pll on the Secretary General of the TUC's acceptance of the 
inevitability of CCT in the foreword to a TUC paper 
20 See IT 2112/85 pl0 
21 See the Local Government Chronicle Surveys dated 4/7/86 and 3/7/87 
22 LGC Supplement 8/7/88 
23 See e.g. Griffiths, Talk to Staff, 8/7/88 LGC Supplement 34; Harlow, Barber 
and Jackson, Shepway DC: the steps to competing successfully, 8/7/88 LGC 
Supplement 38 
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had issued Circular 1 5/83 advising local authorities "not to place 
restrictions on the employment of a person solely on ideological 
grounds or on grounds unrelated to competitiveness or competence 
to carry out the work or supply the goods required"24. Having 
initially admitted to "practical problems" in preventing authorities' 
reference to non-commercial considerations in the course of their 
contractual relationships25, in February 1985 the consultation paper 
"Competition in the provision of local authority services" announced 
that the Government intended to prohibit reference to non-
commercial factors. However, the government was soon to abdicate 
responsibility for addressing this problem. In reply to a question on 
this issue, William Waldegrave stated that, although the Government 
had given commitments to legislate, and was no less concerned 
about the misuse of contractual powers than it formerly had been: 
" '" analysis of the recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of Wheeler and 
Others v Leicester City Council has led us to reconsider whether such legislation is 
necessary ... the decision fortifies the view that authorities which discriminate against 
firms on the basis of irrelevant political decisions do so unlawfully. The Government 
appreciate the practical difficulties facing a firm wishing to assert its legal rights in 
this area, but any new legislation would still require court action to be taken ... by or on 
behalf of individual companies. It would seem that the law as it stands gives sufficient 
scope for such action. "26 
The new policy was "that the existing law is adequate"27, as the 
decision in Wheeler28 illustrated, and that legislation was, 
therefore, unnecessary as an aggrieved contractor would still have 
to go to court to enforce his rights29.Given that only two dozen 
authorities sought information relating to non-commercial matters, 
and that only six of those councils actually engaged in political 
discrimination, one may consider this policy shift to be relatively 
sensible: why use Parliamentary time to address a (statistically) 
24 See 1983-4 HC Debs Vol 63 co149w 
25 Waldegrave, 1984-5 HC Debs Vol 68 co130w 
26 1984-5 HC Debs Vol 84 cols 535-6w 
27 Rumbold, 1985-6 HC Debs Vo198 col 706. See also 1985-6 HC Debs Vol 91 col 
399w; Vol 93 col 186w; Vol 94 col 253w 
281985AC 1054 
29 See e.g. 1985-6 HC Debs Vol 98 col 707-8 
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unimportant issue for which the common law already provided an 
adequate remedy? In the light of the numerous statements 
describing legislation as unnecessary, it is surprising that Nicholas 
Ridley spoke with such apparent regret at not being able to bring a 
non-commercial considerations regime before the Commons as part 
of the Local Government Bill introduced in the 1986-7 Session30. 
In considering Government policy between early-1985 and mid-
1987, two salient points spring to mind. The first is that this period 
is of particular note because of the government's legislative 
inactivity: having been so critical of local government for its failure 
to adopt competitive tendering, the government committed itself to 
compelling its use, then failed to bring any legislation. The second 
pOint, which is, to a great extent, the reason for the first, is that 
Government policy statement's and attempts at action were 
permeated with inconsistencies and lacking in coherence. The lack of 
coherence was most obvious in the failure to draft a competitive 
tendering regime despite the existence of an adequate model and 
having ample time, and in the changes in policy regarding non-
commercial considerations. The lack of consistency is most evident 
from statements regarding the savings to be reaped from 
competitive tendering and contracting out. 
The Conservative Party fought the 1987 General Election 
committed to compulsory competitive tendering: 
"We will require local authorities to put out to competitive tender a range of services ... 
"Ratepayers expect councils to provide their services as efficiently as possible. Yet 
some local authorities steadfastly oppose private sector companies tendering for 
services even though they could provide them more cheaply and efficiently. The ... Audit 
Commission has estimated £ 500 million a year could be saved if all councils followed the 
practices of the best -sums which could be used to lower rates or improve services. "31 
The second paragraph illustrates the Conservative belief in the 
inherent superiority of the private sector, and seeks to use the Audit 
Commission's figures to emphasise the perceived inefficiency of 
301986-7 HC Debs Vo1110 co1916 
31 The Next Moves Forward: The Conservative Manifesto 1987 
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local government. However, while the Government were willing to 
use Audit Commission figures to support their proposition that local 
government was inefficient, it failed to point out that the Audit 
Commission had also found that the best twenty-five per cent. of 
local authority DLOs were as efficient as the best private sector 
companies. 
The local Government Act 1988's passage through 
Parliament 
The local Government Bill was one of the first pieces of 
legislation introduced in the 1987-8 Parliamentary Session32, Part I 
of the Bill was represented as being: 
" ... a further significant step in two of the Government's major objectives - introducing 
greater competition and securing greater value for money. The first steps in this 
direction were taken in the Local Government, Planning and Land (No.2) Act 1980."33 
To a certain extent this statement is correct: the provisions of Part 
I of the local Government Act 1988 clearly owe much to the 
provisions of Part III of the 1 980 Act34. However, there is little 
justification for presenting the 1988 Act as being a logical 
extension of the 1980 Act. There are two reasons for this. First, as 
was illustrated above, the imposition of CCT upon building and 
works DlOs had its roots in a different set of circumstances from 
those which ultimately led to the imposition of tendering under the 
1988 Act. Secondly, while the scheme of both Acts is undoubtedly 
very similar, the concept of competition underlying each was clearly 
different: the 1988 Act could not be a logical extension of the 
competition requirements of the 1980 Act simply because, if it had 
been, then it would have been unnecessary to use the 1988 Act to 
revise the provisions of the 1980 Act so heavily35. 
32 1987-8 HC Debs VoI118 co1156 
33 1987-8 HC Debs Vo1119 coIs 79- 80 
34 See Part II, infra for a discussion of these provisions 
35 See Schedule 6 of the 1988 Act 
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What, however, do the debates relating to the passage of the Local 
Government Act 1988 reveal about the ideology underlying the Act? 
First, one must view the provisions of Part I of the 1988 Act within 
the context of the Act as a whole. The provisions of both Part I and 
Part /I (the non-commercial considerations regime) were intended to 
establish fairly mechanical, depoliticised, contract award 
procedures. While the non-commercial considerations regime may go 
further than simply outlawing political discrimination36, and 
extends beyond the services subjected to competitive tendering by 
the 1988 Act37 , the practical significance of this regime is 
increased by the existence of the CCT regime: with the greater 
number of tendering procedures which could be frustrated by 
reference to non-commercial factors, a prohibition on their use 
becomes vital. By limiting authorities to the use of purely 
commercial factors and by prescribing the tendering procedures 
which must be adhered to, market forces, as opposed to political or 
executive value judgements, begin to assume greater importance in 
making decisions as to service delivery. In effect this represents a 
restriction of the discretion enjoyed by local authorities to make 
decisions concerning service delivery. The depoliticisation of local 
government decision making is a process which is not confined to 
the Local Government Act 1988, however, and is, for example, 
detectable in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. 
Second, an examination of the debates during the passage of the 
Act, once again raises questions about the Government's conception 
of value for money. The part played by competition in securing value 
for money was pointed out early in the Second Reading debate: 
"The free operation of the market is the best way of delivering greater choice, higher 
productivity and better quality services at lower prices"38 
36 The non-commercial considerations regime will be examined in detail in 
Part II Chapter 6 
37 The six services originally subject to the 1988 Act's provisions were refuse 
collection, ground maintenance, vehicle maintenance, street cleaning, 
catering, and building cleaning 
38 Ridley, 1987-8 HC Debs Vol 119 col 80 
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Throughout the course of the Bill's passage, the Government was at 
pains to emphasise the nexus between "savings" and "value for 
money: 
"Competitive savings are typically between 20 per cent and 30 per cent. If we hit a 
modest saving of 10 per cent savings, it would save about £300 million a year. That is 
worth saving."39 
The emphasis in debate was upon passing on savings to ratepayers40, 
rather than on the other postulate of the 1987 Conservative 
Manifesto: improving services. Such an emphasis would appear to 
indicate that the legislation was intended to play an important part 
in controlling local government expenditure. While the focus may 
have been on the "economy" aspect of value for money, attempts 
were made to pre-empt concerns about efficiency and effectiveness 
by pointing out that exhaustive service specifications and 
monitoring of work being performed should prevent a decline in 
standards41 . However, there is a distinction to be noted here 
regarding the potential effects of the legislation: savings were 
represented as the inevitable result of the competition required by 
the Act, but a decline in services could only be prevented by the 
actions of each authority in the course of the contractual process. 
This distinction becomes more pointed when one realises that, while 
the 1988 Act did contain certain requirements regarding 
specifications42 , the monitoring of contracts is not addressed by the 
Act. 
The passage of the Local Government Bill through Parliament was 
far from smooth: although a disproportionate amount of time was 
spent discussing the abolition of dog licenses and the notorious 
clause 28, debate on Part I of the Bill is quite revealing. Deep and 
genuine concerns were raised about numerous aspects of the 
competitive tendering regime, particularly its scope (both in terms 
of the services covered by the Bill's provisions, and the ability of 
39 Ibid. col 82 
40 See e.g. Chope, Standing Committee A, col 150; Lord Belstead, 1987-8 HL Vol 
491 cols 1025-6 
41 See e.g. Ridley, 1987-8 HC Debs Vol 119 col 82-3 
42 See S7, discussed infra, Part II chapter 2 
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the Secretary of State to use his powers to add any service to the 
list of "defined activities"), the possibility that competent DSOs 
would be replaced by incompetent contractors, the accounting 
regime, and the powers reserved to the Secretary of State regarding 
the making of regulations and issue of directions, including the 
power, ultimately, to direct that a DSO should cease to have the 
power to perform a service43. Debate at every stage was polarised 
along party lines, with the government being determined to see that 
the scheme of the Act should allow decisions about service delivery 
to be dictated by the market as much as possible. However, it is 
noteworthy that free market principles were only being applied to a 
limited range of services. 
The reasons why the 1988 Act initially only related to a limited 
range of services become apparent when the attempt of four 
doctrinaire free-market Conservatives members of the Standing 
Committee to expand dramatically the range of services subject to 
CCT is considered. In effect, the four MPs in question were 
attempting to have the vast majority of local government services 
included in the list of defined activities. The Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Environment, Christopher Chope, thanked 
the MPs "for demonstrating the potential scope for the discipline of 
the competition process in local government services and 
administration"44 and proceeded to detail why the Government was 
averse to extending the list of defined activities to include the many 
services contained in the proposed amendments. Mr Chope noted that 
the process of competition for the six defined activities included in 
the Bill would be a massive undertaking, and that the Government did 
not wish to overload the administrative process of competition. 
Moreover: 
" ... I firmly believe we must be selective initially and go for those services which are 
both large enough for savings on them to add up to substantial amounts and sufficiently 
definable and free standing for specifications and contracts to be drawn up in a 
reasonably straightforward way. "45 
43 These provisions will be discussed at length in Part II 
44 1987-8 Standing Committee A col 180 
45 Ibid. co1180 
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This statement is of significance for two reasons. First, given that 
the proposed amendments included a considerable number of 
administrative services, some importance must be attached to the 
Government's reluctance to extend the list of defined activities to 
those services "not sufficiently definable and free standing" for 
specifications to be drawn up. Secondly, it is notable that, at least 
initially, only those services from which "substantial savings" could 
be derived would be subject to competition. It is implicit in this 
statement that the Government wished to select carefully those 
services which would result in the most visible savings and thus 
enable it to represent its policy as a success. In addition, one could 
be forgiven for thinking that, in choosing only those services from 
which "substantial savings" would result, the Government was either 
aware that the private sector would be reluctant to tender for 
certain services, or was implicitly accepting that the private sector 
did not enjoy an inherent superiority in relation to all services. 
Closely related to the issue of "substantial savings" was the fact 
that competitive tendering under the 1980 Act and the Bill's 
provisions would be of such a magnitude that: 
" ... the annual value of work presently carried out by DLOs but subject to competition 
will be almost £5 billion. The length of the list of activities not yet covered should not 
obscure the fact that if all those that could be added immediately could be added, their 
value would be dwarfed by the value of those that we have already tackled."46 
It was thus claimed that the most substantial services in terms of 
expenditure, and presumably the worst in terms of inefficiency, 
would be tackled with the passage of the 1988 Act. As the value of 
other services was not as great, savings from them would not be 
quite so "substantial", and consequently they would not be included 
in the list of defined activities. 
The Local Government Bill found its way onto the statute books in 
February 1988. However, the criteria used for inclusion of a service 
in the list of services subject to CCT raises questions about the 
46 Ibid. col 181 
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coherence of Government policy in the period following the passage 
of the 1988 Act. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS? 
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON COMPETITIVE TENDERING 1988-
Almost as soon as the Local Government Act 1 988 had been passed, 
attention was focused on the extension of compulsory competitive 
tendering to other services, particularly those of a professional or 
administrative nature. Backbenchers began to ask questions about 
the possibility of extending CCT to administrative services. Initially 
Ministers replied that: 
"My hon. Friend is right in emphasising that there are similar savings to be made by 
submitting administrative services to competition. I hope that local authorities will go 
down that road voluntarily, rather than our having to compel them to do so."l 
The similarity between this reply and those previously given in 
relation to the application of CCT to blue-collar services, is 
obvious. Once again the Government was adopting a policy of 
encouragement rather than compulsion. This policy obviously had 
much to do with the reluctance expressed by the Government during 
the passage of the 1988 Act to impose CCT on services which were 
not sufficiently definable, or from which "substantial savings" 
would not result2. The task of determining the extent to which 
administrative services should be subject to competition should 
therefore be left to those local authorities innovative enough to 
explore the possibilities. 
At this time a number of local authorities were experimenting 
with competitive tendering for administrative and professional 
services. Westminster City Council had subjected its architects 
department to competitive tender several years earlier, and had 
consequently contracted out the service. Most authorities, however, 
retained professional and administrative services in-house, and only 
engaged private contractors to carry out work of a specialised 
nature, or where the volume of work was so small that in-house 
provision of the service was rendered impracticable. The Local 
1 Chope 2014/88 HC Debs Vol131 eo1821. Emphasis added 
2 See Ch 4, supra, and 1987-8 Standing Committee A, eo1s 180-1 
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Government Chronicle Privatisation Survey for 1990-1 revealed that 
fifty per cent of authorities used external printers, thirty-three per 
cent used private security firms, forty-eight per cent used the 
private sector to pursue debts, seventy per cent used outside firms 
for software development, and sixty-five per cent relied on external 
agencies for personnel advertisements, while legal firms were used 
by fifty~nine per cent of local authorities for advocacy and 
litigation work, by fifty-one per cent for special projects and 
litigation, and by twenty-eight per cent for conveyancing3 Thus, 
while there were high profile examples of privatisation of council 
legal departments4 , or budget preparation functionsS, privatisation 
of discrete white-collar departments was rare, although the private 
sector was involved in the provision of many aspects of professional 
and administrative services on a fairly regular and extensive basis. 
The 1991 Privatisation survey also revealed much about chief 
executives' views on large scale contracting out: eighty-one per cent 
of local authority chief executives did not think that the costs of 
contracting out professional and administrative services would be 
outweighed by savings6, Authorities which had exposed their white-
collar services to competition generally found that their in-house 
service was competitive: eighty-two per cent of authorities which 
had compared in-house and private sector legal costs found their in-
house costs to be competitive7• Local authorities were, therefore, 
not averse to the use of competitive tendering, or to using the 
private sector to perform white collar services, but did question the 
efficacy of subjecting administrative and professional services to 
competition as a matter of course. However, in what way did the 
Government's views on the extension of CCT develop during this 
period? 
3 Local Government Chronicle Privatisation Survey 1991, 5/7/91 LGC 
pp 19-20 
4 See e.g. Into the Private Court, 7/7/89 LGC Privatisation Survey p4, 
concerning the privatisation of West Willshire's legal department. 
S See Chief Extends limits of Tender Process, 6/9/91 LGC 14, 
concerning South Oxfordshire DC's decision to award a budget 
preparation contract to Touche Ross in spite of a lower in-house bid 
6 Ibid. p18 
7Ibid. p19 
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In the three years after the passage of the 1988 Act only one 
other service was subjected to CCT: management of sports and 
leisure facilities8• There were comparatively few pronouncements 
regarding CCT. Occasionally, the Government would point to the 
benefits arising from the use of competitive tendering9 , or make a 
statement concerning the Secretary of State's use of his default 
powers lO• However, apart from the statement noted above 
encouraging local authorities to extend competitive tendering to 
white collar services voluntarily11, virtually nothing was said about 
the extension of CCT to professional and administrative services 
until late-March 1991. By then Mrs. Thatcher had been replaced by 
Mr. Major, who was known to favour the extension of CCT beyond the 
range of essentially manual services defined in the 1980 and 1988 
Acts. On 21 st March the Secretary of State for Environment 
announced his intention to extend CCT to legal and computing 
services l2 . A week later, in reply to a question concerning the means 
by which CCT would be extended, a junior Minister stated: 
"If further services are brought within the scope of the competitive tendering 
provisions of the Local Government Act 1988, consultation of local government 
representatives is a statutory requirement. If a new statutory framework is proposed, 
we shall want to take account of the views of local government in taking forward our 
proposals. "13 
The possibility of a new statutory regime to accommodate the 
extension of CCT was thus mooted. 
With the publication of the Citizen's Charter White Paper14 in July 
1991, the Government committed itself to the widest possible 
application of competitive tendering in the belief that this would 
8 See Local Government Act 1988 (Competition in Sports and Leisure 
Facilities) Order 1989 S.l. 2488 
9 See e.g. PM, 1990-1 HC Debs Vol 178 col 189w 
10 That is the powers contained in S19A and S19B of the 1980 Act and 
S13 and S14 of the 1988 Act. These will be discussed at length in Part II 
ChS 
11 Chope 1987-8 HC Debs Vol 131 col 189w 
12 1990-1 HC Debs Vol 187 col 402 
13 Portillo, 1990-1 HC Debs Vol 188 col S37w 
14Cm1S99 
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benefit service consumers and taxpayers. Later, the consultation 
paper Competing for Quality: competition in the provision of local 
government services outlined the government's proposals for 
clarifying the requirement to submit local authority services to 
competition, and for extending CCT to professional and 
administrative services. 
The commitment to extend CCT to professional and administrative 
services again raises the issue of coherence of government policy. In 
view of the fact that the Government had ensured that those 
services were excluded from the list of defined activities initially 
subject to CCT by virtue of the Local Government Act 1988, 
apparently due to difficulties in defining the services, and because 
it was felt that the savings to be realised would not be substantial 
enough l5 , one must ask: what had changed which now rendered 
professional and administrative services amenable to CCT? 
It would appear that very little had changed since the 1988 Act. 
Certainly the vast majority of chief executives opined that white 
collar services were competitive with the private sector, which 
implies that "substantial savings" would not result. However, 
perhaps the most significant support for the view that little had 
changed is contained in the report that the Department of the 
Environment had commissioned from PA Consulting concerning the 
possible extension of CCT to white collar services l6 . This report, 
which was leaked during the passage of the Local Government Bill 
through Parliament in the 1991-2 Session, identified four reasons 
why CCT for professional and administrative services would be a 
more complex proposition than CCT for other services. First, the 
services in question were carried out on a different scale, and 
possessed a different nature in different councils. Second, there 
existed wide variations in the organisation of corporate services 
and also as to the extent of devolution or decentralisation in each 
authority. Third, there was a direct link between several white 
collar services and the democratic process. Finally, there was a lack 
15 1987-8 Standing Committee A cols 820-1 
16 See for a summary, Labour Says CCT Advice Unheeded, 10/1/92 LGC 
1; Mac1ure, DoE Refuses to Heed CCT Advice, 17/1/92 LGC 8 
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of demonstrable savings where white collar services had been 
subjected to competitive tendering. 
PA Consulting, moreover, identified several potential difficulties 
which may arise from introducing CCT for white collar services. It 
was felt that where a service was carried out on a small scale, 
tendering costs could outweigh the benefits: that there could be 
difficulties experienced in defining the parameters of the services 
subjected to competitive tendering; that it might be possible for 
councils to reallocate service responsibilities from those areas 
subject to competitive tendering to those which are not; that wide 
variations would exist between authorities with regard to 
identifying what constituted the service subject to competition; and 
the fact that competition may force an element of rigidity into 
councils' organisational arrangements, thus stifling innovation. The 
report concluded that an internal market should be created in local 
authority services, that cross-boundary tendering should be 
permitted, and that authorities should be required to put only 
proportions of their services out to tender. 
The PA Consulting report clearly expressed reservations relating 
to how definable professional and administrative services can be, 
and the extent of savings which could be realised from white collar 
competitive tendering. However, in spite of the fact that it was the 
Government which had originally set the existence of a discrete and 
definable service, and the realisation of substantial savings, as the 
criteria for the extension of CCT, this report was largely ignored. 
Why did the Government choose to depart from the criteria which it 
had established, ignore the problems recognised in the PA Consulting 
report, and seek to extend CCT to professional and administrative 
services? 
The answer can be found in the Citizen's Charter White Paper's 
commitment to the widest possible application of competition, and 
in the Treasury White Paper Competing for Quality 17. In the forward 
to the latter the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, 
emphasised the virtues of competition; 
17 Cm1730 
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" ... competition is good for the users of public services. It gives them a wider variety of 
facilities and services. Competition is good for taxpayers, who get better value for their 
money. It is good for managers, who can concentrate on their core activities, looking for 
the best deal for their customers. It is good for staff, who can give of their best in a 
more competitive environment. And it is good for business, giving private firms new 
opportunities to market their services. 
"Competition is also good for the economy as a whole. It releases new ideas and new 
ways of doing things. it cuts through red tape and speeds up procedures." 18 
Once again this illustrates the Government's belief in the innate 
superiority of the market. Competition, is seen as the panacea for 
all economic ills and deficiencies in efficiency, and the benefits of 
competition in the provision of public services outweigh the 
difficulties. However, this ideological belief in the superiority of 
the market may explain why the Government were committed to the 
extension of CCT, but does not present a cogent argument for setting 
aside the criteria which had previously been applied in determining 
whether to extend CCT to a new service, or for ignoring the 
difficulties identified by PA Consulting which reflected those 
criteria. 
The chapter of Competing for Quality relating to competition for 
local authority services contained much praise for those authorities 
which had voluntarily extended competitive tendering l9 , and set out 
the proposals for the extension of CCT: 
"The Government has been considering the experience of local authorities using the 
private sector to provide functions not currently covered by statutory competition 
requirements, including professional services. In the Government's view there is scope 
for extending competition to cover professional functions. The tendering process for 
professional functions may require different procedures to those currently laid down for 
manual services. Nevertheless, good management and value for money in the provision of 
professional services are more likely to be achieved if the existing organisation of 
services has to face the challenge of competition. "20 
18 Ibid. pH 
19 Ibid. p23, 24 
20 Ibid. p24 
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The Government once again placed considerable reliance on the 
experience of those authorities which had experimented with white 
collar competitive tendering. However, the different procedures 
identified in the White Paper reveal little that is new21 . Internal 
trading accounts had been established, in effect, for each service 
previously put out to tender22. The requirement that only a 
percentage of each service should be exposed to competition bears 
similarities to the arrangements initially pursued for other 
services, most notably maintenance under the Part I" of the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The commitment to clarify 
anti-competitive behaviour23 reveals nothing other than a desire to 
see a perceived imbalance in tendering procedures redressed in order 
to give the private sector a greater chance of success. However, the 
proposals did not address concerns regarding the problems of 
defining professional and administrative services. 
It is important, however, to realise that the commitment to extend 
the use of competitive tendering throughout the agencies of 
government which is contained in Competing for Quality is of wider 
importance than one may initially realise. Apart from being a 
commitment to pursue greater value for money in the performance of 
the functions of governmental agencies, it should be realised that it 
is also of considerable importance to the process of restructuring 
the role and institutions of government which has become one of the 
major policy themes of the Major administration, although it is a 
process which was begun by the Thatcher administration. It is 
necessary to discuss this policy initiative in order that the 
provisions of the Local Government Act 1992 which wi" be 
discussed below may be placed in their proper context and fully 
understood. 
21 See pp 24-5. 
22See 1980 Act, S10; 1988 Act S9 
23 Ibid. p25 
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The Restructuring of Government 
Successive Conservative governments have subjected the organs of 
central24 and local government to market forces in order to 
determine patterns of service delivery, and to a process of 
institutional restructuring. Numerous parallels can be drawn 
between the process of change in central and local government. 
However, perhaps more importantly, it is also necessary to place 
events in the sphere of local government within the wider context of 
change in all governmental institutions which has occurred since 
1979. 
It must be remembered that the Conservative's General Election 
Manifesto in 1979 contained a commitment to the "reduction of 
waste, bureaucracy and over-government" throughout all 
governmental institutions, and not merely local government25 • Over 
the past sixteen years successive Conservative Administrations 
have consequently sought to redefine the role and structure of 
government and to extend the use of market-based techniques to as 
many governmental institutions as possible. Throughout the 1980s a 
variety of initiatives were pursued: civil service manpower was 
progressively reduced, competitive tendering for ancillary services 
was used extensively in the NHS after 1983, and efficiency in 
central government was promoted via the use of Rayner scrutinies 
and the Financial Management Initiative. However, perhaps the most 
significant development in central government was heralded by the 
publication of the Next Steps report by the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency Unit in 198826, In the interests of efficiency this report 
proposed that a distinction should be made between the policy 
functions of departments, and the service delivery functions. The 
latter functions could be performed by Executive Agencies which, as 
discreet managerial organisations, would be able to pursue the ideal 
of value for money by securing economy, efficiency and 
24 For a general discussion of the process of change in central 
government see Drewry, Revolution in Whitehall: The Next Steps and 
Beyond in lowell and Oliver, the Changing Constitution (3rd Ed. 1994) 
25 Conservative Manifesto 1979: Restoring the Balance. 
26 Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps, Prime 
Minister's Efficiency Unit (1988) 
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effectiveness in the delivery of the service which they provided. The 
original intention was that ninety-five per cent of the civil service 
should be transferred to Executive Agencies, and this process is at 
present well advanced27 . A parallel process has occurred in the NHS 
with the creation of NHS trusts. 
Initially the functions of Executive Agencies, and, indeed, of those 
parts of the civil service which had not achieved agency status, 
were not subject to competition. However, this changed with the 
publication of the Competing for Quality White Paper in 1991 28. 
Competing for Quality contained a commitment to the greater use of 
competition in not only local government29, but also in the NHS30 and 
central government31 . This meant that "market testing" - simply 
competitive tendering by another name- would be more extensively 
used in central government: 
" ... departments and Executive Agencies will in future set targets for testing new areas of 
activity in the market, to see if alternative sources give better service and value for 
money."32 
Since the publication of Competing for Quality the Government has 
gone a step further by applying the "prior options test"33 which 
involves posing several questions in relation to each function 
performed by central government : 
" ... Does the job need done at all? ... If the activity must be carried out, does the 
Government have to be responsible for it? ... Where the Government needs to remain 
responsible for an activity, does the Government have to carry out the task itself? ... 
27 As of July 1994 there were 97 Executive Agencies employing 64 per. 
cent of all Home Civil Service Staff; see Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee Fifth Report: The Role of the Civil Service (1993-4) HC 27 Vol 
1 para 154 
28Cm1730 
29 Chapter Five. See above for a discussion. 
30 See Chapter Four 
31 See Chapter Three 
32 Cm 1730,p 8 
33 See Drewry, op. cit. at p 171-2; Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 
Sixth Report (1992-3), vol. ii para 3 
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Where the job must be carried out within Government is the organisation properly 
structured and focused on the job to be done?" 34 
If the function does not need to be provided by Government, it will 
withdraw from providing it: where this happens, the service in 
question will either disappear, or the private sector will fill the gap 
in service provision. If there is some justification for providing the 
service, the question arises: does Government need to be responsible 
for it? If the answer is no, the Government will seek to privatise it. 
Alternatively, if it is decided that central government does need to 
provide a service, a decision must be taken as to whether or not it 
also has to perform the service. Thus a market testing exercise will 
almost certainly be initiated, with civil servants competing with 
the private sector for the right to perform the work. Finally, if all of 
the other options have been deemed inappropriate, a decision must 
be taken as to whether or not a an Executive Agency should be 
charged with delivery of the service. Even then the process has not 
finished, as Executive Agencies are subjected to the prior options 
test at periodic intervals35 . The result of the application of the 
"prior options test" is an increasingly diverse pattern of service 
delivery in central government: 
"In some instances, we took the strategic view that, in future, the work in question 
should be done by the private and not the public sector. In others, we found that the work 
no longer needed to be done at all. In several cases, we found ways of increasing in-house 
efficiency without going out to tender. In a host of others, services have now been 
successfully market tested, with the public and private sectors competing for work."36 
In order to facilitate the contracting out of functions which results 
from the application of the prior options test, Part II of the 
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 enables Ministers to 
contract out the exercise of their statutory functions37. It would 
34 The Civil Service: Continuity and Change (1993-4) Cm 2627 para 2.25 
35 See Fifth Report of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, op. cit. 
Vol I paras 178-9. 
36 Waldegrave, 1992-3 He Debs Vol 231 col 526 
37 See S69, which permits Ministers and office holders to contract out 
the exercise of their functions for a period not exceeding 10 years. The 
equivalent, although by no means identical, provision relating to local 
government functions is S70. For a discussion of the provisions of Part 
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appear that the prior options test has had an influence on the 
provisions contained in S69: its sole purpose is to facilitate the 
contracting out of functions which would occur after a decision had 
been made to privatise performance of a service, or after a market 
testing exercise had been conducted, but also, less obviously, it 
recognises that direct service provision may be a viable, and 
possibly the most efficient, option, by providing that, in spite of the 
fact that another person has been authorised to perform a function, 
this does not prevent a Minister or office holder (perhaps an Agency 
Chief Executive) from performing that function38, However, it should 
be noted that there are certain matters excepted from the ambit of 
S69, 
The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 provides that 
certain functions may not be contracted out39, This gives some 
indication of what will constitute the "inescapable core of 
government" which Stephen Dorrell referred to when Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury40, in spite of the fact that one other 
Government Minister recently told the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee that it would be "a waste of philosophical effort" to 
attempt to set out an enduring definition of the "inalienable core" of 
government41 , Even if the "inalienable core of government" is not an 
immutable concept, the matters excluded from the ambit of the 
powers to contract out functions contained in the 1994 Act give 
some indication of what the Government presently considers to 
constitute the core of governmental activity, Most obvious amongst 
these are the exercise of judicial functions42 , and the power to make 
subordinate legislation43 , and the power of right of entry, search or 
II of the 1994 Act relating to the contracting out of central 
government functions see Freedland, Privati sing Carltona : Part II of 
the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, 1995 PL 21 
38 S69(5)(c) 
39 See S71 
40 See e.g. Dorrell maps out long march of privatisation through 
Whitehall, 27/11/92 LGC 10. See also Fifth Report of the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee, The Role of the Home Civil Service (1993-4) HC 
27 Vol I para 173 fn 8 
41 Ibid. para 175 
42 S71(1)(a) 
43 S71(1)(d) 
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seizure of property44. Less obviously the functions of the official 
receiver may not be contracted out45 , and more cryptically, nor may 
be any function the exercise, or failure to exercise, which "would 
necessarily interfere with or otherwise affect the liberty of any 
individual"46. It would thus appear that, when an activity is 
subjected to the prior options test, the fact that it falls within the 
ambit of one of the exceptions listed in S71 of the 1994 act will 
identify it as a function which central government needs to carry 
out and preclude it from being privatised or subject to a market 
testing exercise. 
It should not be lost sight of that the various initiatives which 
successive Conservative administrations have pursued in relation to 
central government have had as their objective the realisation of 
greater value for money. This was certainly one of the justifications 
for the creation of Next Steps Agencies after 1988, and was always 
the primary justification for the use of market testing. However, the 
prior options test places these two initiatives in the context of 
other devices apparently intended to achieve greater value for 
money. In doing so, it reveals much about the direction which 
Government policy is now taking. The pursuit of value for money is 
no longer the criterion for determining how a function should be 
performed by central government, but is also, apparently, the 
principal criterion in determining the scope and structure of central 
government: the prior options test requires consideration of whether 
a function needs to be performed by or on behalf of government; 
whether it can be privatised, in which case central government can 
progressively reduce its role to that of simply being a purchaser of 
services; finally, if all other questions have been answered in the 
negative, it forces consideration of whether an Executive Agency 
should be formed. 
A number of parallels and contrasts can be drawn between events 
in local and central government since 1979. Both have been 
increasingly subjected to the rigours of market forces. However, 
44S71(1)(c) 
45 S72(2) 
46 S71(1)(b) 
80 
whereas eeT in local government has been imposed by statute, 
market testing in central government until recently has been the 
result of the Government's use of its common law powers. Moreover, 
whereas the imposition of eeT in local government preceded 
institutional reorganisation, and that the use of competitive 
tendering in the NHS pre-dated the creation of trusts, in central 
government the most obvious measure of institutional change, the 
creation of Executive Agencies, preceded the extensive use of 
market testing. In spite of the fact that there would not appear to 
have been a coherent attempt to impose competition and 
institutional change across local government, central government 
and the NHS, the changes which have occurred have common roots in 
a belief of the superiority of the market, and the pursuit of value for 
money. They also have certain shared effects: most obviously one 
would cite the emergence of the purchaser-provider split, which is 
really the result of the wider moves to redefine the province of 
government, its structure and the way in which it performs its 
functions. 
It is, however, the approach which has been taken to the current 
attempt to redefine the scope and structure of government which is 
of particular interest. In seeking to reconstruct the institutions of 
government, particular emphasis has been placed on the pursuit of 
value for money. The criteria of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness are thus of considerable importance to this process47 . 
While these criteria may validly be taken into account in 
determining the method of service delivery, it should be realised 
that they have their limitations, and that there are dangers inherent 
in their use in an attempt to determine the role and structure of 
government. It must be remembered that these are economic 
criteria, originally intended to be used to justify the application of 
market-based, primarily private sector, techniques, to the working 
practices of governmental institutions. To apply these criteria in 
order to reconstruct the province and institutions of government 
comes perilously close to allowing market-based techniques to 
become the master of government, not its servant. Government may 
47 The intention to use these criteria to shape the structure of local 
government was particularly obvious: see below 
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be an economic actor, but it is essentially a political beast48. 
Government is not like a public limited company: the free market 
alone cannot determine its size and shape. Politics permeates the 
work of Government institutions: the justification for the existence 
of those institutions which deliver services is that their role is to 
give effect to the decisions of their political masters. Attempts to 
define the role and structure of governmental institutions by 
reference to economic criteria may ultimately impoverish those 
institutions, simply because the institutions of government cannot 
be viewed in a political vacuum. However, one must also ask whether 
any concerted attempt to redefine government by reference to 
market-based techniques can ultimately be successful given the 
propensity of politicians to interfere with decisions about service 
provision where matters of political salience arise49. 
Having examined briefly the wider use of market-based techniques 
in the public sector, and the process of restructuring the 
institutions of government, it now remains to discuss the extension 
of eCT after the passage of the Local Government Act 1992, and the 
process of local government reorganisation of which that statute 
marked the beginning. 
The passage of the Local Government Act 1992 through 
Parliament 
How much does the passage of the Local Government Bill through 
Parliament in the 1991-2 Session reveal about the Government's 
intention to pursue the ideal of competition? The first thing one 
must do when examining the provisions of the Local Government Act 
1992 relating to eeT is ask whether all of its provisions were 
necessary? Certainly, activities could be subjected to CCT by virtue 
of the Secretary of State issuing the relevant order under the 1988 
Act, which also provides mechanisms to tailor a tendering process 
for a particular service: the provisions enacted as S8 of the 1992 
48 Nicholas Ridley accepted this fact in The Local Right: Enabling not 
Providing, Chapter 3 
49 See Dudley, The Next Steps Agencies, Political Salience and the Arms 
Length Principle: Barbara Castle At the Ministry of Transport 1965-68, 
[1994) 72 Public Administration 219 
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Act, which were intended to regulate the regime for white collar 
CCT, are thus superfluous50. 
The Local Government Bill was introduced in the House of Lords 
early in the 1991-2 Session. Less than a fortnight after the 
consultation paper "Competing for Quality - Competition in the 
Provision of Local Services" was issued, the Bill received its 
second reading. Baroness Blatch, Minister of State at the Department 
of the Environment, identified two aims underlying the Bill's CCT 
provisions: to "implement the commitment in The Citizens Charter 
White Paper to ensure that contractors have a fair chance to 
compete for local authority work", and to extend CCT to professional 
services51 . 
The first aim begs the question: at what point does helping 
potential contractors to compete actually contravene the dual 
principles of the superiority of the free market and the pursuit of 
value for money on behalf of consumers? There may come a point 
where tensions exist between the interests of the contractor and 
the interests of the consumer, necessitating a re-evaluation of 
which is to enjoy primacy. The second aim also raises the important 
question of how exactly the Government had resolved the practical 
difficulties involved in CCT for professional services. It would 
subsequently become apparent that the Government had not fully 
resolved the problem of defining professional and administrative 
services, although statements made in the course of the Bill's 
progress through Parliament indicate that it was convinced that 
substantial savings were to be realised from the application of CCT 
to those services. 
Very little information can be gathered from a simple examination 
of the Bill's provisions. The two central provisions of the Bill, 
clause 8, relating to the application of CCT to professional and 
administrative services, and clause 9, which sought to establish a 
framework for defining anti-competitive conduct, were drafted in a 
50 The necessity of S8 of the 1992 Act will be discussed more fully in 
Part II chapter 1 
51 1991-2 HL Vol 532 col 709 
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most skeletal manner. Both provIsions endowed the Secretary of 
State with an extensive range of powers, and were consequently 
heavily criticised by Lord Simon of Glaisdale52. However, the 
Government was determined to see these provisions enacted intact, 
and thus was prepared to disregard concerns about their 
constitutional propriety. 
In the Commons the CCT proVIsions of the Bill were presented as 
"bringing up the rear and ensuring that local authorities that have 
not yet taken advantage of those techniques are brought up to the 
level of the best"53. The Government's arguments bear considerable 
similarity to those employed during debates on the 1988 Act: 
emphasis was placed on the benefits of competition, which had been 
displayed by the work of a few pioneering (invariably Conservative) 
local authorities, which had realised almost incredible savings by 
subjecting certain services to competition and contracting them out 
to the private sector, and, as other, less enlightened, local 
authorities had failed to follow this example, the only option was to 
compel them to do so by means of legislation. Underlying this is the 
belief that the free market is the ultimate arbiter of economic 
efficiency. The provisions of clause 9 in particular were, ostensibly, 
sought in order to protect the operation of market mechanisms by 
permitting the Secretary of State to enact a regime of subordinate 
legislation proscribing those practices of local authorities which 
were perceived to preclude the private sector from competing 
effectively in the market place. The extremely broad powers 
contained in the Bill were therefore considered to be very necessary. 
As with the other statutes imposing CCT the provisions of the 
1992 Act must be viewed in their legislative context: most 
significantly the Local Government Act 1992 also put in motion the 
process of local government reorganisation in England. Central to 
local government reorganisation in not only England, but also 
Scotland and Wales is the concept of the enabling authority. This 
concept, and the role which CeT plays in it, merit deeper 
consideration. However, prior to doing so it is desirable to examine 
52 [1991-2] HL Vo1533 co1s 83-5 
53 Portillo, 1991-2 He Debs Vo1202 co1111. 
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briefly the extension of CCT since the 1992 Act, and the manner in 
which the Secretary of State has utilised his powers under that 
statute. 
Developments regarding CCT 1992-1995 
Since the passage of the 1992 Act there have been significant 
developments in two areas. First, the circumstances in which CCT 
has been extended to new services. Secondly, the emergence of a 
body of subordinate legislation to regulate the competition process, 
and to proscribe certain activities as anti-competitive reveals much 
about the model of competition which the Government wishes to 
pursue. 
The extension of CCT 
The extension of CCT since the passage of the 1992 Act reveals 
much about the coherence of Government policy. Having sought the 
powers contained in S8 of the 1992 Act in order to tailor the 
competition process for professional and administrative services, 
no commencement order has yet been issued to bring that section 
into force. The extension of CCT to white collar services has 
therefore proceeded solely on the basis of the powers given to the 
Secretary of State by the 1988 Act. While the commitment to extend 
CCT to white collar services which was obvious prior to and during 
the course of the 1992 Act's passage, has since been restated54, it 
would appear that much of the impetus to ensure its application was 
lost after the 1992 Act was passed. It was more than two years 
before housing management became the first white collar service 
would be added to the list of defined activities contained in the 
1988 Act55 . Both legal services56 and construction and property 
54 See e.g. Howard, The Advance of White Collar Competition, 13/11192 
LGC 10; Howard, 1992-3 HC Debs Vol 213 col 744W; Squire, 1992-3 He Debs 
Vol 223 col42w 
55 See Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) 
(Housing Management) Order 1994 S.l. 1671 
56 Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 
1994 S.I. 2884 
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related services57 were added to the list of defined activities in 
November 1994. However, these three services are, as yet, the only 
ones to have been added to the list of services subject to the 1988 
Act's provisions, although there are plans to add computing58, 
finance59 and personnel60 services. Local government reorganisation 
has undoubtedly had a considerable effect on the timetable for the 
introduction of CCT for white collar services. However, one must 
distinguish between problems in defining the services which are to 
be subject to CCT, and problems in the application of CCT arising 
from reorganisation. It was accepted by mid-1993 that CCT for new 
services would not apply in those authorities affected by 
reorganisation until after the process of reorganisation was 
complete61 . 
One must, however, question the Government's approach to defining 
the white collar services which will be subject to competition. 
There has been considerable uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which CCT will apply to white collar services. This has been 
particularly evident in relation to the debate over the application of 
CCT to finance62 and computing63 . The Government has not had a 
clear conception of the extent to which white collar services should 
be subject to CCT. Some of the confusion surrounding the application 
of CCT to professional and administrative services may have its 
roots in the statutory mechanisms used to implement it. The 
abandonment of the powers contained in S8 of the 1 992 Act meant 
57 Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) 
(Construction and Property Services) Order 1994 S.l. 2888 
58 See e.g. Computing moves up on competition list 16/4/93 LGC 1; 
Ministers issue details on CCT for finance and IT, 28/10/94 MJ 5 
59 See e.g. Financial timetable 29/7/94 LGC 13; CCT for finance is 
increased to 35%,28/10/94 LGC 5 
60 See e.g. KPMG cautious on CCT extension, 16/9/94 LGC 2 
61 See e.g. Hunt, 1992-3 HC Debs Vol 225 col 719w on reorganisation in 
Wales. See Part II chapter 1 for a discussion of the regulations 
delaying the application of white collar CCT 
62 Skewed sampling used to propose 75% finance CCT, 5/8/94 LGC 2; CCT 
for finance increased to 35%, 28/10/94 LGC 5; Finance CCT: 35% of 
what? 11/11/94 LGC 15; CIPFA warns of rise in finance exposure, 
17/3/95 LGC 3 (from 35% to 70%) 
63 See e.g. Consultants cautious about defining size of IT for CCT, 15-
21/7/95, on the report CCT for white-collar services: the IS/IT service, 
KPMG, 1994 
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that both the definition of the professional and administrative 
services subject to CCT, and the establishment of a competition 
framework, would have to be conducted using the powers provided by 
the 1988 Act. The decision to use the powers in the 1988 Act rather 
than those which had been sought specifically for the purpose of 
establishing a white collar tendering regime may well have delayed 
the process of extending CCT. However, while S8 of the 1992 Act 
may have provided a mechanism for establishing tendering regimes 
for specific white collar services, it also provided that those 
services would have to be added to the list of defined activities for 
the purpose of the 1988 Act64. Thus, irrespective of which 
statutory regime was used, a service would always have to be 
defined using the powers contained in the 1988 Act. Therefore, it is 
likely that the Government had simply failed to appreciate the 
complexities of submitting white collar services to competition 
when it enacted the 1992 Act. Some assistance for this proposition 
may be drawn from contrasting the approach of the 1988 and 1992 
Acts. Whereas the services initially subject to CCT under the 1988 
Act were fairly extensively defined in a schedule to the Act65 , and 
the matter had obviously been given considerable thought prior to 
the legislation being brought before Parliament, the structure of the 
1992 Act militated against this happening for white collar services. 
The 1992 Act may have embodied the commitment to extend CCT to 
white collar services, but the skeletal form of its CCT provisions, 
and the fact that professional and administrative services would 
still have to be defined under the 1988 Act's provisions, obviated 
the need to consider the precise definition of those services until 
after the 1992 Act had reached the statute books. Therefore, while 
the 1992 Act represented a strong commitment to white collar CCT, 
the practical implications of that commitment did not require to be 
considered until after it had been enacted. The delay in issuing 
regulations defining the white collar services subject to CCT may 
therefore be ascribed to the fact that, unlike the six services 
initially subject to ceT under the 1988 Act, the Government failed 
to address the complexities of CCT for professional and 
administrative services, particularly those regarding the definition 
64 S8(2)(a) of the 1992 Act 
65 See Schedule 1 
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of services, until after the 1992 Act had been passed. Once again 
ideological commitment appears to have outstripped the 
consideration of practical issues. 
The extension of CCT has not been confined to white collar 
services, however. In November 1994 three new blue collar services 
were added to the list of defined activities for the purposes of the 
1988 Act: supervision of parking, vehicle management and security 
work66. It is significant that almost six years had elapsed between 
the addition of management of sport and leisure facilities to the lis t 
of blue collar services subject to CCT under the 1988 Act, and the 
addition of these three services to the list of defined activities. The 
delay in extending CCT to new blue collar services may be attributed 
to two factors. First, it must be remembered that work under the 
1980 Act, and the original six services under the 1988 Act were, 
according to the Government, by far the most significant blue collar 
services: once management of sport and leisure facilities was 
subjected to CCT, few significant blue collar services remained 
outwith the ambit of CCT. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
emphasis placed on white collar CCT focused attention away from 
the extension of CCT to new blue collar services: indeed, even after 
proposals emerged for the application of the 1988 Act's provisions 
to these three blue collar services, it is remarkable how little 
debate there was on the issue in comparison to the volume of 
comment on plans to extend CCT to anyone of the white collar 
services. The delay in the extension of CCT to new blue collar 
activities can be attributed to a combination of these two factors. 
The last interesting development regarding the extension of CCT is 
the decision not to bring corporate and administrative work67 within 
the ambit of CCT. There were essentially two reasons for this 
decision68. First, the fact that local authorities were themselves 
exposing many of their support services to competition, particularly 
where the users of these services were subject to CCT themselves 
66 Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 
1994 S.L 2884 
67 This term essentially encompasses a diverse range of support 
services such as printing and building facilities management. 
68 See 1994-5 HC Debs Vol 250 co1s 879-880w 
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and thus wished to keep overheads down: this had resulted in the 
private sector being extensively involved in the provision of these 
services. Secondly: 
" ... our objective of increasing competition in corporate and administrative support 
services is already being met through these means, and that extension of CCT to take this 
work would not bring sufficient additional benefits."69 
While this statement does not address the issue of definability, it is 
of interest in ascertaining the criteria presently applied to the 
extension of CCT to white collar services. It would appear from this 
statement that whether extensive use is made of competitive 
tendering on a voluntary basis, and in particular, the extent to which 
the private sector is involved in delivering a service is an important 
factor in determining whether a service will be brought within the 
ambit of CCT. Secondly, it appears that CCT will not be extended if 
it does not bring "sufficient additional benefits". In the light of 
previous Government statements regarding the benefits of 
competitive tendering, and in view of the fact that this statement 
refers to the use of market forces to keep overhead costs down, the 
"benefits" referred to are almost certainly the realisation of 
savings. If this is indeed the case, it is apparent that the realisation 
of savings has been the one constant in determining whether to 
extend CCT: this again raises the question why the Government set 
aside the PA Consulting report advising that there were few savings 
to be realised from white collar CCT prior to seeking the powers 
contained in the 1992 Act, and subsequently extending CCT to 
professional and administrative services. 
Having examined the extension of CCT, it now remains to examine 
how the model of competition pursued by the Government has 
developed since 1992. 
The development of the model of competition. 
Central to the development of the model of competition pursued by 
the Government has been the Secretary of State's exercise of his 
69 Ibid. 
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powers under S9 of the Local Government Act 1992 to prescribe the 
behaviour of local authorities as anti-competitive. The statutory 
prohibitions of anti-competitive conduct, and the primary and 
subordinate legislation which attempts to define the circumstances 
in which those prohibitions will be violated, will be discussed in 
detail below7o. However, several salient features of the regime 
regarding anti-competitive practices must be discussed here. 
The first thing to note about the prohibition of anti-competitive 
conduct is that it only applies to local authorities71 , and does not, 
for example, prohibit private contractors from engaging in anti-
competitive conduct. However, the general prohibitions contained in 
the 1980 and 1988 Acts did not define what would constitute anti-
competitive conduct. To this end, the Secretary of State was given 
powers to regulate a variety of matters by S9 of the 1992 Act, and, 
most importantly, was endowed with the power to issue guidance 
defining what would, or would not, constitute an anti-competitive 
practice. The Guidance72 reveals much about the model of 
competition which the Government wishes to impose on authorities. 
There are two particularly notable aspects to the Guidance. The 
first is the extent to which the Guidance seeks to redress the 
balance between the private sector and local authorities. Several 
aspects of the Guidance appear to go beyond simply ensuring fair 
competition and represent an attempt to assist the private sector 73, 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the treatment of the 
application of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 1981 74, Even before the issue of the 
Guidance the Government believed that TUPE would not generally 
apply to CCT75. When TUPE does apply, employees of a DSO or DLO 
which loses a contract to a private contractor must be transferred 
to that contractor on the same terms and conditions as they enjoyed 
70 See Part II, chapters 3, 4 
71 See e.g. 1980 Act S9(4)(aaaa); 1988 Act S7(7) 
72 See Doe Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department 
Circular 13/93. Welsh Office Circular 40/93 
73 See infra, Part II chapter 4 for a discussion. 
74 1981 S.I.1794 
75 See e.g. 1992-3 HC Debs Vol 212 col 670w, Vol 218 col 834 
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while employed by the local authority. However, as contracts are 
generally won by cutting pay and conditions76 , the likelihood of 
private contractors winning CCT contracts decreases if TUPE 
applies. Consequently, the Guidance attempts to preclude local 
authorities from pointing out that TUPE should be taken into 
account, and attempts to circumscribe closely the effect which it 
should have on the tendering process. This desire to ensure as far as 
possible that TUPE is not taken into account during the tendering 
process extends to the revision of the EC legislation on which it is 
based. Since it has become obvious that TUPE would generally apply 
to contracting out77, the Government has attempted to ensure that 
any revision of the Acquired Rights Directive78 would specifically 
exclude contracting out79• The emphasis placed on attempting to 
evade the effect of a measure intended to protect the terms and 
conditions of workers illustrates two things about the model of 
competition which the government wishes to construct. First, as the 
alternative to the application of TUPE is that private contractors 
will inevitably seek to win a contract by undercutting the pay and 
conditions of workers, this lends support to the argument that the 
Government is primarily concerned with seeing contracts awarded to 
the lowest bidder. TUPE is concerned with the primarily social goal 
of safeguarding workers rights: if it does not apply to contracting 
out, then competitive tendering exercises can be determined on 
primarily economic criteria. If this is the case, private contractors 
will seek to undercut the pay and conditions offered by both local 
authorities and their other competitors. In such circumstances 
issues of quality become secondary to price. Secondly, the 
Government's attempts to have the Acquired Rights Directive 
amended in order to exclude contracting out illustrates that the 
Government, as far as pOSSible, is committed to seeing that it alone 
76 See Walsh, Competitive Tendering for Local Authority Services: 
Initial Experiences (1991) para 12.18 et. seq .. See also Walsh and Davis 
Competition and Service: The Impact of The Local Government Act 
1988, Chapter 14 
77 Rask v ISS Kantineservice, Case C- 209/81 [1993] IRLR 133; Dr. 
Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol and Others [1992] IRLR 366 
78 Dir. 77/187 
79 See Davis, 1993-4 HC Debs Vol 239 col BOw. See also: Germans bid to 
remove contracting-out from ARD, 15-2117/94 Municipal Journal 6; 
Dobson, It's TUPE Jim, but not as we know it, 9-15/12/94 MJ 20 
91 
determines the model of competition, and will attempt to remove 
what it considers to be disruptive influences which lie outwith the 
competitive process which it seeks to dictate. 
The second major point concerning the Guidance is that the legal 
propriety of many of its provisions can be called into question. In 
defining conduct as anti-competitive, the Government has quite 
often contravened not only provisions of the 1980 and 1988 Acts 
which can only be amended by statutory instrument made in 
accordance with the provisions of those Acts, but has also 
contravened the provisions of other statutes 80, and the EC public 
procurement regime; these matters will be discussed in detail 
below81 . Given that the Guidance is permeated by provisions of 
questionable legal propriety, this would indicate that the 
Government has concentrated on merely exercising the power 
contained in S9 of the 1992 Act to define conduct which it perceives 
to be inconvenient to the private sector as anti-competitive without 
having due regard to the constraints of the wider scheme of 
legislation within which that determination must operate. Once 
again this illustrates the Government's ideological commitment to 
pursuing its own model of competition without fully considering the 
practical, or legal, consequences of doing so. 
As has been noted above, however, the provisions of the 1992 Act 
must be viewed in their legislative context. The Local Government 
Act 1 992 set in motion the process of local government 
reorganisation in England, a process which has been continued by the 
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994 and the Local Government 
(Wales) Act 1994. These statutes have been central to attempts to 
redefine the role and structure of local government. As has been 
noted above the Government has recently attempted to redefine the 
role and institutional structure of government by reference to 
economic, as opposed to political, criteria: the 1992 and 1994 Acts 
are one manifestation of this process. A number of issues must be 
addressed in discussing local government reorganisation. First, the 
80 For example, one provision relating to the duties of councillors 
contravenes S33 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
81 See Part II chapter 4, which is dedicated to examination of the 
Guidance. 
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role envisaged for local government and the extent to which market-
based techniques have played a part in determining the institutional 
structure of local government must be discussed. Secondly, the place 
of competitive tendering in the model must be considered. 
The Enabling Authority and Local Government Reform 
Central to the process of local government reorganisation which 
has been taking place since 1992 is the concept of the enabling 
authority82. However, what is meant by the "enabling authority"? 
The current debate on the enabling authority can be traced to the 
pamphlet written by the late Nicholas Ridley when Secretary of 
State for Environment entitled The Local Right: Enabling not 
Providing 83. There Mr. Ridley (as he then was) identified two major 
objectives of the local government policy of successive 
Conservative Governments since 1979: placing constraints on local 
authority expenditure and enhancing the standard of local 
government services which the public required. The two objectives 
could be pursued by local authorities concentrating on the public's 
requirements and wishes, improved accountability, the elimination 
of waste, duplication and unnecessary functions, and by improving 
value for money84. In order to achieve the latter: 
"Competition is vital to ensure value for money"85 
The pamphlet was primarily concerned with the future of local 
government. In outlining his vision of local government in the future, 
Ridley said: 
" ... I can foresee a much more diverse pattern of provision in the future by a variety of 
different agencies working alongside local authorities. The role of the local authority 
will no longer be that of universal provider. But it will continue to have a key role in 
ensuring that there is adequate provision to meet needs, in encouraging the various 
82 See Heseltine, HC Debs Vol 202 cols 37-8 
83 Centre for Policy Studies, 1988 
84 The Local Right: Enabling not providing, p 7 
85 Ibid. See also p8 
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providers to develop and maintain the necessary services, and where necessary in 
providing grant support or other assistance to get projects started, and to ensure that 
services are provided and affordable for the clients concerned. 
"For other services, principally those of a regulatory kind, there may be less scope 
for diversity of providers, or for direct competition with the private sector. In these 
cases the impulse for competition and improved value for money will have to come from 
within the authority, from the stimulus provided by comparisons with other 
authorities, and from the investigations of auditors. "86 
Local authorities, in Ridley's view, should move from being direct 
providers of services to being a guardian of the interests of service 
users, ensuring that services are provided, and stimulating the 
activities of other bodies to provide services87. Competitive 
tendering has an important part to play in this process: 
" ... there is no reason whatsoever why the management of these services has to be 
'political' .... the emphasis shifts from the council as monopoly provider and manager to 
the council as enabler and monitor, and casts the spotlight on its role as the maintainer 
of high standards. "88 
The concept of the enabling authority espoused by Ridley is thus one 
of a minimalist authority which seeks to utilise competitive 
tendering and agencies from outside the public sector, be they profit 
making or voluntary organisations, as much as possible to perform 
its functions89.By utilising competitive tendering it seeks to ensure 
value for money and, as a corollary to that its judgement should 
reflect objective commercial criteria, not the use of political value 
judgements. In that respect, Ridley's conception of the enabling 
authority coincides with his oft~quoted ideal of a council being a 
body which would "meet once a year to award contracts, have lunch, 
and go away again for another year"90. 
86 Ibid. pp 16-7. See also p18 
87 See also p25 
88 Ibid. p21 
89 Compare this with the concept of local government service 
provision contained in Forsyth, Reservicing Britain, Adam Smith 
Institute, 1981, discussed above Chapter 3 
90 Ridley, speech to a fringe meeting of the Conservative Party 
Conference 7/10/86 
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There are, however, several other views of what constitutes the 
enabling authority91, most notably that of Clarke and Stewart92 . 
There are several points of similarity between Ridley's concept and 
that of Clarke and Stewart, whose work is probably the classic 
alternative approach to that of Ridley. Clarke and Stewart accept 
that the assumption that local authorities should automatically be 
service providers can no longer be adhered t093 .1t is also accepted 
that the assumptions that local authorities should be self-sufficient 
in performing their responsibilities, provide a uniform service, and 
that service delivery should be provided around the traditional model 
of professional expertise available to authorities, can be 
challenged94.The assumptions upon which this model is based, and 
particularly acceptance of the principle that services need not be 
provided directly, but via a variety of agencies is compatible with 
Ridley's concept of the enabling authority. 
While points of similarity exist between the two models, they 
diverge on two very important points. The first is that Clarke and 
Stewart's model is much more community-based than Ridley's. 
Whereas Ridley envisaged the enabling authority as a form of 
competitive council which generally contracts for services in 
accordance with objective commercial criteria, Clarke and 
Stewart's model draws much more on European experience. In this 
regard it is similar to yet another model of the enabling authority 
which emphasises the role of active citizenship and empowering the 
local community to playa more active role in its own affairs95.ln 
leaving the local community to make decisions about its own needs 
and the means by which they are fulfilled, value judgements would 
inevitably be made, which may not always be compatible with 
91 See e.g. Brooke, The Enabling AuthOrity [1991] 69 Public 
Administration 525; Brooke, Enabling Optimism 18/8/89 LGC 24; Gyford, 
The Enabling Council- A Third Model (1991) 17(1) Local Government 
Studies 1 
92 See e.g. Choices for Local Government (1991); The Future for Local 
Government: Issues for discussion [1990] 68 Public Administration 249; 
Conflicting views of an Enabling Authority 14/7/89 LGC 17 
93 Choices for Local Government pp.-9, 10-1 
94 Ibid. p8 
95 See Gyford, op. cit. fn 63 
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Ridley's pursuit of value for money via the application of objective 
commercial criteria. 
The second point of divergence between Ridley's model and Clarke 
and Stewart's model of the enabling authority is the latter's 
commitment to: 
"The possibility of establishing the enabling role in the fullest possible sense. Enabling 
the community to meet its needs and problems in the most effective way can be given 
expression in a power of general competence. "96 
As there are fundamental differences between this model and 
Ridley's, and given that central to Clarke and Stewart's concept of 
the "enabling authority" is the existence of a power of general 
competence, then what they are really discussing is not the 
"enabling authority" but the enabled authority, which is empowered 
to make a variety of choices as to the nature of service delivery by 
virtue of that power of general competence. 
It is not surprising that Clarke and Stewart's concept of the 
enabling authority has played little, if any, part in the present 
administration's attempts to restructure local government in 
England, Scotland, and Wales. The Government's commitment to a 
model of the enabling authority akin to Ridley's was evident in a 
statement made to the Commons in April 1991 by Michael Heseltine 
which identified why a review of the two-tier structure of local 
government required to be re-examined: 
" ... the Government are committed to developing the concept of enabling authorities. 
Councils will increasingly be able to take advantage of competition between those seeking 
to provide a service. "97 
The concept of the enabling authority which Heseltine espoused here 
owes much to his predecessor given the prominent part played by 
competition. In accordance with Ridley's concept it would be the 
96 Clarke and Stewart, op. cit. p26. The possibility of a power of general 
competence had, interestingly, been discussed some years earlier in 
Loughlin, The Restructuring of Centra1- Local Government Relations 
(1985) 11(6) local Government Studies S9 
97 1990-1 HC Debs Vo1189 co1801. See also co1808 
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legal conduit for service provision, rather than the direct provider 
of services. 
The Local Government Act 1992 marks the first legislative 
attempt to give effect to the concept of the enabling authority. 
However, unlike the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994, and the 
Local Government (Wales) Act 1994, which established unitary 
authorities, the 1992 Act established the Local Government 
Commission in order to determine the future structure of local 
government in England. However, while the process of local 
government reorganisation may have differed in England, the 
approach taken by the Government is still revealing. It was apparent 
that the Government wished to move away from attempting to define 
the structure of local government by reference to its role and the 
functions it is required to carry out, and instead wished to see 
considerable emphasis placed on the manner in which those 
functions can be performed. The application of political criteria in 
order to determine what should be the role of local government, and 
the functions which it should possess, are increasingly being 
replaced by economic criteria regarding the performance of those 
functions. Baroness Blatch, Government Spokeswoman in the Lords, 
stated that: 
"There must be proper justification for the inevitable upheaval and costs involved in 
reorganisation. Any change to structure should be both worth while and cost effective. 
"The Local Government Commission should consider the costs and benefits of change and 
the economy and effectiveness of service arrangements. It will be able to obtain advice 
from other expert organisations, in particular the Audit Commission, to assist it in its 
work. The Audit Commission will be able to advise the Local Government Commission on 
the likely impact of any proposed structural changes on the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of service provision. "98 
The Government's position was stated more succinctly by Michael 
Heseltine when he stated in the Commons that, in the draft guidance 
to the Local Government Commission, "we have placed considerable 
weight on the need to demonstrate that there is an economic case 
98 1991-2 HL Vol 532 col 712 
97 
for change"99. Mr. Heseltine further emphasised the role of the Audit 
Commission in the process of reorganisation100. 
It would therefore appear that it was the Government's intention 
that local government should be reorganised in accordance with 
economic criteria, primarily those of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. The aim of the process of reorganisation was stated 
by Michael Heseltine during the Second Reading debate on the Local 
Government Bill: 
"The Bill is about preparing local government for the 21st century. It involves the 
extension of competitive tendering, which will continue the disengagement of local 
authorities from direct service provision and will promote their strategic and enabling 
roles. "101 
It is clear from this statement that the Government's ideal is a 
contracting authority buying its services, in which competitive 
tendering plays a crucial role. Hence the emphasis on the use of 
economic criteria to determine the shape of local authorities after 
reorganisation; they are, quite simply I intended to be not only the 
optimal size for efficient service delivery, but also the optimal size 
for the operation of competitive tendering and purchasing of 
services. The pursuit of value for money, and the use of competition, 
was not merely to be used to determine the manner in which local 
authorities perform their functions, but was also to be used as a 
factor in determining the structure of those authorities. 
The enabling authority was also intended to be a unitary 
authority102. This aim was achieved in Scotland and Wales by 
primary legislation103. However, Part II of the Local Government Act 
1992 essentially placed the task of determining the future structure 
of local government in England in the hands of the Local Government 
991991-2 HC Debs Vol 202 col 37 
100 Ibid. col 19 
101 Ibid. co137 
102 See e.g. Shaping the Future - The New Councils, Scottish Office 
Environment Department, Cm 2267, Foreword, p4 
103 See Local Government Etc (Scotland) Act 1994; Local Government 
(Wales) Act 1994 
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Commission. The Commission did not recommend the establishment 
of unitary authorities across England, as the Government would have 
desired, but instead recommended the retention of a two tier system 
of local government for the greater part of the country, and the 
creation of unitary authorities in the minority of areas which it 
considered. However, the Government, having had its desire to see 
the adoption of unitary authorities across England stifled by the 
very body which it had created for that purpose, waited until the 
Commission had completed its review and, in effect, rejected the 
recommendations which the Commission had made, announcing that 
new Commissioners would be appointed to re-examine the future 
structure of local government in relation to a number of significant 
areas of population104. This not only prolongs the process of local 
government reorganisation, but illustrates the Government's 
commitment to this model of local government. 
As has been noted above, the redefinition of government is not a 
process which has been confined to local government, and must be 
viewed in the context of wider initiatives to reform the role and 
structure of government in recent years. 
Conclusions 
Government policy on the extension of CCT has shown little 
consistency or innovation since the 1988 Act was passed. Having 
initially appeared to step back from imposing CCT on professional 
and administrative services on account of the fact that it considered 
that insufficient savings would be realised, and that such services 
were not sufficiently definable, the desire to extend compulsory 
competitive tendering to professional and administrative services 
became almost an obsession from 1991 onwards. However, once 
again, it would appear that ideological commitment outstripped 
practical consideration of the issues involved. In spite of local 
government professionals, and, more importantly, the Government's 
own consultants pointing out that there would be problems in 
defining the white-collar services which would be subject to 
competition, and expressing scepticism about the savings to be 
104 The review roller coaster starts again, 3/3/95 LGC 1 
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realised, the Government committed itself from mid-1991 onwards 
to the extension of CCT to white collar services: in doing so it 
departed from its previous policy. To this end it sought the powers 
contained in 58 of the Local Government Act 1992 in order to 
establish tendering regimes for various professional and 
administrative services: these powers were never brought into 
force, however. The Government has thus had to rely on the powers 
contained in the Local Government Act 1988. The considerable delay 
in defining the first white collar services which will be subject to 
CCT would tend to indicate that the Government has failed to fully 
appreciate the complexities involved in doing so. Moreover, the 
Government's concentration on the extension of CCT to white collar 
services has resulted in blue collar services being relatively 
neglected: almost six years elapsed between management of sports 
and leisure facilities being added to the list of defined activities 
contained in the 1988 Act and the addition of the next manual 
activity. The Government's commitment to extending CCT to new 
services, particularly white collar services, has been increasingly 
obvious: however, the criteria it has applied in doing so have often 
lacked coherence, and the neglect of blue collar services also raises 
major questions about the coherence of the policy of extending CCT 
to new services. 
The other major element of the Government's policy on CCT has 
been the construction of the model of competition to be applied. This 
has largely been achieved, since 1992, by the issue of Guidance 
pursuant to S9 of the 1992 Act. However, as will be seen105, the 
model of competition expressed in the Guidance is largely designed 
to remedy practices which are perceived to be prejudicial to the 
prospects of private sector contractors winning contracts. Moreover, 
in attempting to remedy the perceived imbalance between the 
private sector and local authorities, the Government has sought to 
impose a model of competition by means of subordinate legislation 
issued under 59 of the 1992 Act106 which is often at variance with 
the statutory regime which it is apparently intended to ensure 
105 See Part II Ch. 4 
106 This provision, and the web of subordinate legislation 
surrounding it, will be discussed below: see Part II, Chapters 3,4 
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compliance with, and which often contravenes EC legislation which 
the Government is under a duty to implement. It would thus appear 
that the Government is more committed to imposing its own model 
of competition than it is to ensuring that its actions comply with 
the parameters of the legal regime which it has established, and 
with its own wider legal obligations. 
It has become increasingly obvious, however, that the use of 
competitive tendering is but one element of a set of policy 
initiatives which is intended to result in not only the way in which 
services are delivered being reviewed, but also the scope of 
government and the structure of governmental agencies being 
redefined. The process of local government reform in recent years 
has seen the Government imposing unitary enabling authorities in 
Scotland and Wales, although attempts to do so in England have 
proved less successful. A corresponding process in central 
government has seen the Government attempt to divest itself of 
those functions which it considers to be unnecessary, privatising 
others which it does not believe need to be provided by government, 
the increased use of market testing, and the progressive creation of 
Executive Agencies. The process of restructuring both central and 
local government has been justified by reference to the criteria of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness: the government has been 
attempting to ensure value for money in the provision of services. 
However, one must be cautious about defining the role and structure 
of government by reference to potentially inappropriate economic 
criteria: governmental agencies do not operate in a political vacuum, 
and greater recognition must be given to the fact that they exist to 
give effect to political policies. 
Hitherto this study has been concerned primarily with the 
development of Government policy on competitive tendering and 
contracting out, and has sought to consider those developments in 
the context of wider initiatives to restructure the institutions and 
role of both central and local government. However, while the 
development of the legislation establishing compulsory competitive 
tendering for local authority services has been considered, the 
provisions of the statutory scheme have not been considered in great 
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detail. Therefore, the next Part of this study will be devoted to a 
detailed evaluation of the relevant provisions of Parts I and II of the 
Local Government Act 1988 and Sections 8 to 11 of the Local 
Government Act 1992. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 
A MATTER OF TWO REGIMES: THE SERVICES SUBJECT TO CCT, 
As was seen in Part I the legislation relating to compulsory 
competitive tendering in the United Kingdom has evolved ov(~r a long 
period and~ at times, i development has appeared to lack 
collerence. In til Part we mu n ow turn to a Bed I egal a n a lysis 
of the provisions of the Local Government Act 1988 and the Local 
Government A 1992. This requ not only an examination of the 
provIsion of th e tu an d relevant delegated legislation, but also 
an assessment of the compatibility of the c legislation, ncl 
practice of compul my competitive tendering, with the EC public 
procu rem rE~gime and, in particular Oir. 92/50 wh icll co~ordin ates 
the procedures for the award of public contra 
The intention of this research is to concen on cornpetitive 
clering for st~rVicE~s, Th ere will be no Ion of CCT for works 
of construction and main nan which within the arnb of 
Pa III of th(~ Local Government, Planning and Land A 1980. 
Moreover, there will be no consi ration of the requirement of S135 
the Local Govermrlent A 1972 and S89 of the Loca! GoverrHTH::~nt 
(S and) A 1973 that local authorities ould make on In 
ttl r ncling rs for competitive n nng as rega the 
supply of and the execution of wo . Til pro ha 
e increasingly obsol a the ability of local auth to 
blish til r own procedures for the award of co h 
eroded by the prmnulgation of new procurernent regimes both 
domestic and Eu n level. Thu insofar as the ex on of works 
concerned, awa pro res will regulated by Pa III of the 
Local GovernrnE~nt, Planning and Land A 1980 ane! Oi 93/37, 
while the procurem nt of supplies will be regul tee! mo 
significantly by Oir ve 93/36 ,which ablishes a parall 
r me those regulating blic work and E~ If, for 
'1 Dir. 93/36 has now been transposed into national law by the Public Supply Contracts 
Regulations 1995 S,\. 201, The Public Works and Services Directives have been 
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example, building maintenance work is proposed to be retained in 
h the award of such work clearly now falls within the scope of 
the 1980 Act2 , In all other i nces originally envisaged as falling 
within the 1972 and 1973 Acts, however, provided that the relevant 
threshold values are exceeded, clering will be regulated by the 
relevant European Community awards procedures as transposed into 
domestic law3 : the absence of tutory provisions akin to those 
contained in the 1980 A and the Local Government Act 1988, 
aimf~d at regulating award procedu places consideration of that 
part of the topic of public procurement in local governrnent outwiUl 
th e scope of til research. 
Secondly, this cha r intended to be devoted the general 
scope of the dornestic legislation and blishing the extent 
which the EC procurement directives apply: while this will entail a 
detailed examination of Part I of the 1988 Act and sections 8 to 11 
of the 1992 Act, thorough consi tion of the broad framework 
the dering regime will be fer to a subsequent chapter4, It is 
necessary to blish at is stage the extent which the public 
procurement regime applies in the same clrcu nees as the 1988 
and 1992 A in til tile legal opri of the domestic 
tendering regime can be assess rnore thoroughly and effectively 
against the objective ndards by the EC regime. Moreover, as 
the prohibition of anti~comp tive conduct contained in the 
domestic Ic~gislation ea all of thE:~ dering rn 
th con is clearly of such a fundamental n re th it rTler 
ex nsive consideration in i own rightS. Similarly, the powers 
reservee! to the ry of 5ta by 513 and 514 of the 1988 Act 
will be considered in a sa, primarily due to the 
th these provisions are intended to a the behaviour of local 
authorities not only during the dering but also during the 
period of performance of the work award€:~d to Dire Services 
transposed by the Public Works Contracts Regulations '1991 S.I. 2680 and the Public 
Services Contracts Regulations 1993 S.1. 3228 
2 See Part I Chapter 3 for a discussion 
3 Part II of the 1988 Act, relating to non-commercial considerations, will also be of 
relevance: see chapter 6, infra 
4 See e.g. Chapter 2 for an outline of the tendering regimes 
5 See Chapters 3 and 4 for an explanation. 
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Organisations6. The non-colnrnercial considerations rQgmle 
contain in Part II of the 1988 A must also be considered 
length in a subsequ chapter7 as provisions are intended to 
permeate all aspects of local governrnent procurement and are thus 
of considerable relevance. The final chap in til Part will be 
dedi to examining tile contra which rE:~sult frorn the award 
procedur and the question wlletller we are witn ng the 
ce of a public, or administrative, law of contra 
Given that much of the I I analysis which is follow IS 
essentially an assessment of the cornpatibility of the dom c 
legislation rding cornpu!sory corn dering with th(~ EC 
Services Di it is fi necessary to ascertain wrlether til 
Directive applies in the peculiar circum nces of, and the 
activities covered by til e Local Governrnent 1988 and 1992. 
CIRCUMS~TANCES OF eel "? 
The EC Din,-~ctive which sibly of m relevance In a ng 
the provision of dom lation on cornpulsory competitive 
tendering is DiL 92/50 rating the nation procedures 
r the award of public s ce con a ; the scope of this 
Directive correspon cI the services rr:;gul by e Local 
Government A 1988 and 19928 . liowever, there is one apparent 
difficulty with the application of e public procurement Dil" 
to CCT as blish by the 1988 an d 1992 A A problem arises 
as a result of til scll erne of th e dornestic legisl ati on, i cll 
a pts to Emsure that "local and other public authorities underta 
certain activities only if they can do so competitiveli '9; the various 
require competitive dering only where it pro d to 
perforrn in~hou or another authority's OSO. Tht~ er 
6 See Chapter- 5 
7 See Chapter 6 
8 Tile extent to wliicll tile scope of tile activities regulated by the Directive and the 
relevant domestic le9islation cOITespolld will be discussed below. 
9 See the long title at the Local Government !\cti 988. The relevant legislative 
pmvisions will be discussed in detail below. 
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is by far the most common situation'l 0, The received wisdom is that 
since the work is to be performed in-house no contract exists11 , The 
European directives, however, are based on the existence of a 
contract, the preamble to Directive 92/50, for example declaring, 
that: 
" ... the provision of services is covered by this Directive only so far as it is based on 
conti-acts; whereas the pmvision of services on other bases, such as law or 
regulations ..... is not covered" 
The requirement that there should be a contract thus raises 
questions about the scope of the Directive's application where work 
is awarded to a DSO following the application of the relevant CCT 
legislation. The question which has occasionally been posed by some 
commentators is whether there can be an II awardll of a contract for 
the purposes of the Directive when no contract exists in domestic 
I a w? 12 
Two questions must be asked in examining the obstacle to the 
appli cation of th e directives wh i ch th is analysis osten sibly 
represents. First, one must examine the Directive and ask whether 
they impose their own concept of what constitutes a public services 
contract, and whether the arrangements arising from the CCT 
legislation can satisfy this corlcept? Secondly, contrary to the 
received wisdom, can an agreement that an in-house service unit 
should perform work constitute a contract as a matter of domestic 
law? 
10 The most recent INLOGOV report into the progress of CCT, Competition and Service: 
The Impact ofthe Local Government Act 1988 (1993), reveals that the vast majority of 
work subject to the 1 988 Act's proVisions was reta ined in-house, with only 22.2% of 
all work tendered for being won by "external" contractors. See in particular Chapter 7 
of the report. 
11 See, for example, Harden, Defining the Range of Application of the Public Sector 
Procurement Directives in the United Kingdom, '1992 P.P.L.R. 362 at pp 369-37'1, 
Cirell and Bennett, Problems Begin To Emerge Under Competitive Tendering, 21 July 
1989 Loc. Govt. Chronicle '14 
'12 See for example Cirell and Bennett, Clash of Regimes 25/9/92 LGC '12; Cirell and 
Bennett, Compulsory Cornpetitive Tendering: Law and Practice (2nd Ed.) 21.33-34; 
Harden, Defining the Range of Application 01' the Public Sector Procurement Directives 
in the United Kingdom ['1992] 'I P.P.L.R. 362 at pp 370-1 
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While the preamble to the Services Directive states that it applies 
only insofar as the relevant activity is performed under a contract, 
the corpus of the Dire defines what will constitu a con ct 
for its purposes. Article 1 (3) of the Services Directive (92/50) 
states that: 
"public services contracts shall mean contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in 
writing between a sel'vice provider and a conti-acting authol-ity " 
The definition of a "contracting authority" includes a local 
authority 13. The Directive, therefore, requires the existence of 
several essential elemen for an agreeillent fall within their 
scope. 
Fi there must ex a con act for pecuniary inter Two 
obsf~rvations can be made regarding til condition. First, it is 
In esting to note that the regulations nsposing the Directive 
into national law do not speak of "contracts for pecuniary in 
but ratlH~r of "for consideration (wll the nature of 
the consideration)1t 14. One must, however, ask wh precisely IS 
meant by II pecuniary interest". If all that is envisaged is a simple 
tran of funds from one accounting entity to another, then the 
1988 Act's provisions may provide a solution wlli will fy 
this elenl of the The 1988 requ til not only rnu 
a DSO which wishes perform work oduce a writ n bid 
indicating its desire to do so 15, and perform the work in accordance 
with tile i! specification as the dering 
process 16, but also that, by virtue of S9(2) and (4), it is required to 
keep accoun rei ng to the performance of each description of 
work. The effect of the legislation to identify a DSO as being a 
ra accounting entity the local authority for which it 
perforn1 the work: the leg lation rw ta th creation of 
client and contra r respon bi!ities. Til e ration of client and 
'13 Article 1 (b) , see also S.L 1993 3228 Reg. 3 as regar-ds the definition of "local 
authority" once the Directive is transposed into national law. This encompasses all of the 
bodies defined as 10c<-11 <-1uthorities by S'I of the Local Government Act '1988 
14 See S.1. 1993 No. 3228 Reg. 2(1) 
'15 S7(6) 
'16 S7(8) 
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contractor as a result of the 1988 Act in particular has been well 
documented 17. In effect the legislation, and the practice which has 
evolved 18, means that a iocal authority transfers funds to its DSO 
for the perfonnance of work or services subject to CCT19. If all 
that is required by the II pecuniary interest" is an allocation of 
funds to the entity perforrning the work, then th should suffict!. 
This, however, leaves the two other elemen of the test to be 
satisfied; namely the requirement that the con ct should be in 
writing, and that there must be a con cting authority and a 
II service providE~r". The 13 will be dealt with first. 
The Directive In question operates when til ere exi a 
II contracting authority", which, as we have seen, includes a local 
authority, and a II ce provider". Tile definition of a II service 
provider" for the purpose of Dir. 92/50 can dealt with quite 
succinctly. Article 1 (c) that: 
"service provider shall ITlean any natural or legal person, including a public body, 
wllich offers services." 
Does a DSO bidding for work under the LOCal Government Acts 1988 
and 1992 fulfil this definition? Certainly a DSO derives such 
personality as it POSSE;sses from i parent authority, or 
alternatively it rnay have becorne part of a local authority 
controlled company form under the provisions of Part V of the 
Local Government and Housing A 1989, in which case it will bE; a 
distinct legal person 20. Where a DSO has n been b!ished as a 
company by virtue of the 1989 Act's provision the conventional 
view is that DSOs are fonned fadlita the performance of til r 
parE;nt authority's functions and that th r ex ce can therefore 
'17 See in particular INLOGOV, Competitive Tendering for Local Authority Services: 
Initial Experiences (1991), Competition and Service: the Impact of the Local 
Government Act 1988 ('1993). 
-I 8For example the creation of autonomous DLO trading accounts; see INLOGOV (1991 ) 
para 8.25-28, (1993) chapter 8 
'19 This position is further emphasised in Scotland by the provisions of S 163 of the 
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994 '''1hich regulates the surpluses of DSO and DLO 
accounts. There is as yet no equivalent provision in England or Wales 
20 Note that S33 of the 1988 Act provides that where DSOs are formed into companies 
the parent authority must take" reasonable steps for the purpose of securing competition 
for the carrying out of that work" 
108 
be justified by reference to the powers contained in S111 of the 
Local Government Act 1972 and S69 of the Local Government 
Scotland Act 197321 " DSOs would therefore appear to possess some 
form of lega! personality, derivative though this may be. It 
moreover, if n a" public body" per least part of a public 
body. The other element of this definition, namely that thE~ service 
provider should II offer sE~rvi easily fied. A OSO exists 
solely provide servi and as a consequence of the 1988 and 
1992 Acts, is compelled to offer its servict~s periodically to a 
contracting authority (albeit its parent authority) in the course of a 
tendering It is noteworthy that a local authority can fulfil 
the definition of a contracting 
OSO, fulfil the definition of a 
OiL 92/50. 
authority and sirnultaneously, via its 
ce provider for the purposes of 
One may also wish to constru an argulTlent based on the Public 
Services Con tracts Regulations22 , which tran Oir. 92/50 into 
national law. Regulation 4( 1) defines a provider as being: 
" ...... 21 pel"son-
(a) who sought, or who seeks, or would have wished, 
(i) to be the person to whorn a public services conti-act is awarded, ... 
... ard 
(b) is a national of a rnernber state." 
Further light is shed on the definition of "contractor" by regulation 
21 (9), which sta that: 
"For the purposes of this regulation an "offer" includes a bid by one part of a contracting 
authority to provide sel-vices to anotiler part of a contracting autilority when the former 
part is invited by the latter part to compete with the offers sought from other persons" 
The latter regulation would appear to be conelu as whether an 
in~house operation can make an offer to perform work, and 
consequently be awarded a con ct, but has caus difficulties to 
those commen who find themselves trapped by the orthodox 
2'\ This 3t-gument is favoured by eirell and Bennett, op. cit. 0.3 
22 1993 S.1. 3228 
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view that if work is retained in-house it cannot represent a 
contra it has even been contended that while an in-house 
operation may submit an offer there may be no award because there 
can be no contract; in d work would be technically withdrawn 
from competition and no award n ce would be n although 
it is almost sinlUltaneously (and inconsistently) submitted by the 
same authors that as the courts would have to apply a purposive 
interpretation of the regulations, it would be held that an award 
would have been made23 . 
This position fails to take into account one important factor. Much 
stock has been put on the fact that an "award" is fin by reg. 2(1) 
as meaning II to accept an offer made in relation to a proposed 
contract" 24: confusion consequently exists as to the effect of the 
regulations upon the award of work in-house as this is not perceived 
to fulfil the cia c contractual model. How!:Ner, such an analysis 
fails to take account the pI' wording of Reg. 2(1), which does 
not dE~fine an award in of a concluded contract, but instead 
refers to a II proposed contractll. As a "proposed contract' is merely a 
putative contract, and possesses no legal form, the fact that it 
lacks certain of the essentials of a concluded contract is irrelevant. 
Thus the award of work in-house can constitu an "award", even 
though the received wisdom is that it cannot constitu a contract. 
Consequently, as Reg. 21 (9) declares that, for the purposE~s of Reg. 
21 (which deals with the cri a for the award of a public works 
contract), an offer includes a bid by one part of a contracting 
auth ty for e works of another pa then an II award" can be ma 
as the acceptance of such an offer will result in a "proposed 
contract ll , t;ven if all of the t~SS als of a concluded con ct are 
not fulfil! It therefore arguable that, as a OSO, likE~ any in-
house operation, possesses no legal ality distin from i 
parent authority25, it will derive such personality as it possesses 
23 Cirell and Bennett, Compulsory Competitive Tendering: Law 2lnd Practice (2nd Ed.), 
21.34-5, discussing the Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991 S.I 2680, the 
provisions of which are practically identical. It is also pointed out at 2·1. 35 that an 
award notice would be required by virtue of regulation 22(4) on the grounds that no 
contract is awarded. 
24 Op. cit. 2 '1.3 3-4, discussing the identical provision of the Works Regulations 
25 See Kershaw v City of Glasgow D.C. 1992 SLT 71 at 72 K; Woodland v South Somerset 
D.G. 2/95 unreported 
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from the organisation which it performs work for, and is part of, and 
may thus fulfil the definition of a service provider contained in Reg. 
4, by virtue of the that it has II sought ... to the person 
whom a public works contract is awarded". 
Tile final element of Uw is to as In whether the 
regarding the application of Oir. 92/50 is til the" contract" should 
be II in writing". If we a that th e arrangemEm a local 
authority and its OSO are capable of bf~ing a form of agreenlent 
which fulfil the other e!emen of th(~ then t!lis element is 
relatively easily s sfied. The pra ce of cornpulsory competitive 
tendering in the UK is that the eCI tion of the work to be put 
out nder is essentially a dra ft of the contra for the 
performance of that work26. Thus once the tendering procedure is 
compl all that rernain clone is rill in to spaces I€~ft 
blank on the draft contra 
su , and the pr 
such items as the identity of tlH~ 
for exarnple. This is no less the 
case where the successful bid has been rnade by a DSO as where a 
private contractor has succeecled27. The respective rights and duties 
of the client authority and the can ctor (be it in~housf~ or sel 
from til e private sector) are thus 
pra ctic(~" 
out in writing as a In 
It would ere appear that the law and ce of 
r of 
competitive ten ring have In a m<1llrler which would bring 
the: situation where work awa in·house In a nee til 
the 1988 anel 199? A within the 
Oil' Til on th E~ result of a 
of til corresponding 
31 an lysis of til e 
Oir which ultimately allen the wisdom at an 
agreement between a local authori and one of i In hOllse 
agencies cannot, as a m of la a contI' ct. It !l as 
the case that corn men oned the t the 
Oi appli on by reliancf! on tilt! pnn pie til n ral or 
I al s cann con th wh(:;n acting in til 
26 Indeed, where 2l DSO is to per-form the work, S7(8) of the Local Gover"nment Act 
1988 requires that" in carrying out the vvork the authority comply with the detailed 
specifications of it" . 
27 Information qleaned from interviews conducted Iftlith officers of Strathclyde R.C. 
- " 
1/12/93, 30/3/95, ;'-md of Stirling D,C. 19/4/94, 10/5/95 
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same capacity 28, However, has too much faith been placed 111 this 
principle? Does it apply in every conceivable situation? 
The generally accepted position is that there must be either at 
If~ast two parties to a contract, or that a man may only contract 
with himself if he is endowed with two distinct legal capacities29. 
If this classic exposition of domestic law is accepted 
unquestioningly, then one can indeed cast aspersions upon whether a 
DLO or DSO can conclude a contract with the same local authority 
from whicll it derives its limited legal personality. However, there 
is authority which supports the proposition that, for certain 
purposes at least, a contract may be concluded between distinct 
parts of a broader institutional structure. 
The case of Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. v Toepfer 30 gives 
support to the proposition that in appropriate circumstances two 
distinct parts of the same legal entity may enter into an agreement 
which can be characterised as being a contract. This case carne 
before the courts when the Board of Appeal of the Grain and Feed 
Traders Association referred this arbitral award to the High Court 
(Queens Bench Division) by way of a special case in order to 
determine inter alios whether a contract did exist where, in the 
course of a series of transactions culminating in the sale of soya 
bean meal to Toepfer, two of Bremer's offices had entered into 
agreements with each other on the basis of GAFTA's standard form 
of contract. It was averred that the two offices in question, namely 
those situated in Harnburg and Munich, were autonomous and were in 
the habit of trading with each other as if they were distinct legal 
entities. In the course of the transaction at issue one office had 
bought soya bean meal and sold it to the other office. The question 
therefore arose as to whether each office could fulfil the definition 
of "subsequent sellers" for the purposes of the relevant GAFTA 
standard form of contract. It was held that they could. 
28 See foot note 11 
29 See fot- example l~ow/~y Holmes & Co \I Barber and another, [1 977J 1 /1\11 ER 801 
(Executor contracted witll Ilimself in an individual capacity), Lee v Lee's Air Farming 
Ltd [1960] 3 All ER 420 (Held that a man acting as a company's governing director 
could contract with ilirnself as an individual) 
30 [1980] 2 lIoyds L.R. 43 . 
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At first instance Donaldson J (as he then was) opined that the 
existenCE: of a genuine arms length trading 
two offices was crucial 31 . Furthermore he 
nsaction between the 
that: 
"It is certainly the case that neither" the law nOI" the COUI"ts no!", for that mattel", any 
merchant, would recognise an a~Jreement as a 'contract' if that agreement was made by an 
individual with himself. The idea of an individual bargaining with himself at arTn's 
length is a physical, commercial and legal absurdity. But it is not so absurd when one 
comes to consider an al"tificial per"son, \;vilo Illay have mOI"e them one directing mind. NOI" 
is it so absurd in the context of organisations, such as trade unions, which have rnany 
sections and branches." 3 2 
In applying this reasoning the circu nees of the case and the 
terrns of the contract, Donaldson J concluded that: 
.. My concern is with a contract between sellers ;:lIld a buyer who are distinct legal 
entities. The problerT1 is whether that contract contemplates that thel"e may be a string 
of contracts including 'contracts' between the Municll office and the HamburfJ office. I 
think that it does, so long as those contracts are what the trade would regard as genuine 
arm's length U"ading transactions. That is tile case here ... " 3 3 
The Court of Appeal appears to have appli a slightly different 
approach from Donal on J, with Megaw LJ E~mpha sing til 
orthodoxy that a rnan cannot contract with himself34. However, 
Megaw, Lawton and Browne LJJ did a with Donaldson J th the 
agreenH~n b f~en the 0 offices were genuIne trading 
nsactions35 . In his ding judgem Megaw LJ th 
" ... vvllatever might be the olTlinary meaninG of the INord 'contl"Gct', and whatevel" mi9ht 
be the meaning in other contexts of the words 'first buyer' or 'subsequent seller', 
nevel"theless, against the background of a l"eCo~lnised practice Wllich was found by this 
trade arbitration tribunal, the sellers were to be treatecl in this contract as 'subsequent 
31 [1978] 1 Lloyds I~.R. 643 at p650, 6S'1 
32 [1978] 1 Lloyds L .. R. 643 at pp 650·1 
33 Ibid. pGSl 
34 [1980] 2 Lloycls U\. 43 at p44, p47. 
35 See Megaw LJ ,ibid. pp 4'}, 47; Lawton LJ pSO; Browne LJ p 50,51 
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seller-s ' fm tile purpose of that clause. Tilat was the decision of the Board of Appeal. That 
was the view which was taken by the learned judge in the Commercial Court... 1\ 36 
In spite of Megaw LJ's earlier adherence to the classical contractual 
model (which is arguably variance with certain elements of the 
judgement of Donaldson J which the Court of Appeal purported to 
uphold) he nevertheless accepts in II opinion that an agreement 
between two pa of the same organisation can, in limi d 
cIrcum ances, be a !!contract l'. However, it can only be 
characterised as such if it can deriw; authority from some higher 
legal order (in the in nt case this was achieved by reference to 
tile GAFTA standard form of con ct which was the cornrnon ba 
for all transactions), if the transactiorl between both parts of the 
organisation is a "genuine ding transaction!! (i.e. eacll part of the 
organ tion tlH~ other as if it is a rate business entity 
and tra with it on the same ba as it transa with truly 
distinct legal persons)37, and if the existence of sllch agreernen IS 
recognised by the blished practise of the bu ness or trad(:~ in 
qu on. The major limitation on such "contracts", however, is that 
they can only be viewed as contracts as regards third parties: they 
are not enforceable as between the two pa of the single legal 
entity, presumably beca use, by adh eren ce to til e classi ca I 
contractual analysis to which Megaw LJ refers, questions of 
frustration of contract a due to the fa that there is only one 
legal person involved in the agreernent38, 
Both the "genuine trading transa on" test, re rred by 
Donaldson J and which the Court of Appeal concentrated upon, and 
the postulation of Donaldson J th autonornous pa of the same 
artificial lega! person could en a contract with each other, 
ale capable of providing su pportfor tile proposition that tile 
arrangemen resulting from the operation of CCT legisl on can be 
characterised as being contra I as a ma of domestic law and 
thus fall within the scope of the public procurenH'!nt eli The 
"genuine trading nsa on" will be fi 
36 Ibid. p48 
37 See fn 33 
38 Ibid. p44 
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The agreements reached betweE~n local autlloritiE~s and their DSOs 
would appear to fulfil the three elemen of the genuine trading 
transaction t for a variety of reasons. First, such agreemen 
derive their authority from a higher legal order; namtc~ly thE~ 
statutory scheme within which CCT conducted. DSOs must now 
enter into agreements to perform work on the same basis as 
external contractors do on account of the fact that a ent 
reached on the basis of a common specification 39. This would appear 
to overlap with the second and third elemen of th test, namely 
that there should be a genuine trading nsaction, and that the 
existence of such transactions should be part of n~cogn a 
practiG~. There is much evidence relating to the development of the 
client~contractor split in local authorities as a necessary corollary 
to the derrlands of the CCT legislation 40. However, the client" 
contractor split during the course of tile competition process is now 
required by statute41 : thus the question of ascertaining accepted 
bu sin ess pra ctice42 no Ion gel' arises as statu tory regu la ti on 
n ~C!eessarily supers(~des th e prior, extra a tu tory, pra eti ee in 
setting the mllmnum standards of acceptable behaviour. As a 
consequence of the blishm(~nt of the client-contractor split, and 
th e Secre ry of I s powers to police anti··cornpetitive 
concluct43 , local authorities rnust deal with their DLOs as if they are 
separate legal entiti(C!s up to tile point at which it decided that the 
in·"llOuse team should perform the work. Thus the arrangemen 
a ing from the tion of the CCT legislation are genuine arms-
length trading transactions recogrll by the legislative scheme 
elf due to its formal ration of the client and con ac r 
39 See Chapters 2, 4, infra, on this point. Indeed it would appear that the aim of the 
guidance on antkompetitive conduct is to ensure that this is achieved; see chapter 4. 
40 See especially Walsh, Competitive Tendering for Local /\uthority Services: Initial 
Experiences, DoE 1991, chapters 7,8, 9 ; \Nalsh, Davis, Competition and Service: The 
Impact of the Local Government Act 1988, DoE 1993, Chtlpters 1-4, 6. 
4"] See Local Government (Direct Service Organisations)(Competition) Regulations 
1993, 1993 S.I. 848, reg 4. The precise implications of this regulation will be 
discussed infra 
421t would appear however that as a matter of practice local authorities do apply a more 
stringent client-contractor split than the regulations require; intervielN INith officers 
of Stirling DC 19/4/94,1 0/5/95 
43 On anti-competitive conduct see CHs 3, 4; Ch 5 will discus the Secretary of state's 
powers regarding the policing of such conduct. 
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functions: if work is awarded to a DLO other than in the course of a 
genuinE~ arms~length transaction then the award will be considered 
to be anti~competitive, and the S<:'!crE"'!tary of Sta may attack the 
award of the work to the DL044. The clien contractor split, 
however, continues after the award of work, as is evidenced by the 
fact th the client side of the authority is continually involved in 
monitoring the DLOls performance of the contract45 , Agreemen 
between local authorities and their DSOs can therefore be 
characterised as 11 genuine trading transactions l1 , primarily bE~cause 
of the manner in which the statutory scheme prescribes that they 
rnu st been tered in to. Su ch tra nsa cti ons ca n th ere fore be 
characterised as being II contracts", at lea as far as third parties 
are concerned, and thus will in principl(~ fall within the scope of the 
public procuremE~nt directives. 
The second test, postulated by Donaldson J, but not directly 
addressed by th(~ Court of Appeal, is quite attractive due to i 
simplicity and tile ease with which it fits the pattern of CCT; the 
Court of Appealls failure to consider th arguably rnarginal 
its value, however. Basically Donaldson J postulated that where one 
was considering the activities of two autonornous parts of an 
artificial legal person, both of whi conducted their affairs at 
anTIS length from the parent organisation, it may be ble for a 
legally enforceable contract to be fanned between the autonomous 
arms of the organisation in the course of business. In considering 
the position of local auth one undoubtedly ted with 
an artificial legal persoll, each one bE:!ing either a creation of 
statu or, in a few the grant a royal cha . Moreovt~r, a 
was noted above, the cliE~n contractor plit has certainly resulted 
in local authorities having 11 more than one directing rnind" regarding 
those ces subject to CCT. The fact is til as a result of CCT, 
DSOs in particular, have found themselv~~~s forced to operate at arms 
length from th r parE~nt authority not m use of the overt 
requiremen of the CCT 1t11E~ re rding the condu of the 
competition but also because of e WI implications of 
44 See Ch 3 infra for a discussion of the relevant Regulation 
45 See Walsh and Davis, Competition and Service: The Impact of the Local Government 
Act 7988, eh 9 fOI- an insight into the pmcess of contract monitoring. 
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the statutory scheme. Thus the establishment of trading accoun 
ane! the requirernent to rneet financial targets46, have resulted in 
DSO man realising til til rnu develop bu ness tegies 
for the survival of th ir particular Organisation in the harsh 
environment of CCT47. Moreover, the parent authorities often go 
further than the tutory scherne c!enl,mds, by endeavouring to deal 
with their DSOs as if they are s ra b ness enti n only in 
the period pr ng the award of work, but also during the cours(:'! of 
its performance48. In ngly local authorities and their DSOs deal 
with each other as if they are arate business entities. It would 
therefore appear that the nsa on rE~sulting from the tion 
of the CCT legi ation fall within the param rs discuss by 
Donaldson .J and can thus be:'! chara 
contractual. 
as being po ntially 
As a matter of domestic law it would thus appear that 
nsactions 
a re of a con tra al n atu reo There 
dire ives, in principle, are ca ble 
substance of the CCT legislation mu 
prOVISions or the relevant di 
be evalua 
ce provi 
procurement 
, and the 
agam the 
Ha g blish that as a rna r of n pie CCT I ation 
fal within the s of the EC public p ocurenlent dir , it 
now remains to examine the t tlH~ subj rna of 
thc~ UK's CCT legislation and th directives coinci 
Til e a iviti E:!S of local govern men t 10!gU I a ted by th e Local 
Government A 1988 and 1992 II into 0 oad categories; the 
provision of ally rnanual (or II blue collar") and the 
46 L.ocal Government Plan nina and Land Act 1980 SS 10-16, Local Government Act 
1988 SS9, 10 
47 See on this point Walsh and Davis, op. cit., Ch 8, particularly 8.13-21 
48 See, for example, Walsh and D3vis, Ch 10, on the operation of contract default 
systems, where only limited evidence was found of authorities treatinq external 
contl-actor-s and DL.Os differently 
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prOVISion of professional, technical and administrative (or "white 
collar") services. It is worth noting that the statutes in question, 
and the relevant delegated legislation, do not merely attempt to 
define the description of the activity subject to competition, but 
also set out to define the circumstances in which competition is not 
required, which is primarily achieved by the prescription of de 
min imis limits. It now remains to compare th e scope of the 
domestic regime with its European counterpart. 
Definition 
The Local Government Act 1988, which extended CCT to cover local 
authority services, initially subjected seven "defined activities" to 
competition; refuse collection, cleaning of buildings, other cleaning, 
schools and welfare catering, other catering, ground maintenance, 
and vehicle maintenance49. However, this list was not intended to be 
exclusive, as S2(3) grants the power to the Secretary of State to 
make an order adding a new defined activity to those listed in S2(2). 
Such an order may only be made by statutory instrument, the draft 
of which must be adopted by each House of Parliament50, and may 
make such supplementary~ incidental, consequential or transitional 
provisions as appear necessary to the Secretary of State5 1, 
including provisions amending or adapting any provision of the 1988 
Act for the purposes inter alios of fining the activity added to 
S2(2)52, Moreover, prior to such an orcler being made the Secretary 
of State must consult II such representatives of local government as 
appear to him to be appropriate".53, To date (1 st June 1995) this 
power has been u to add tile management of sports and leisure 
49 See S2(2)(a)-(g) 
50 S '15(1) 
5'1 Sl.5(7) 
52 S15(8) 
53 S2( 4), Given tile wording of this provision, consultation rnust conforl'll to tile 
paral1letel-s set by R v Sec. of State for the f1eafth ex. p. U. S. Tobacco International 
[1992] 1 All ER 212, Agricultural Training Board v /l,yfesbury Mushrooms Ltd [1972] 
1 All ER 280, R v Sec. of State for Social Services ex. p. Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities [1986] 1 All ER 164 
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facilities54, and supervIsion of parking, vehicle management and 
security work55. It is also worthy of senne note that, while the 52 
provides a mechanism for adding s ces to the list of defined 
activitie and while a varie of exernption may be granted 
r arding those services56, no m an m is provided for the 
removal of a 
S2(2). 
from the I of defin activities contain In 
While the activities which are subject: to the r Iremen 
I of the 1988 Act are enumerated in S2(2), the content 
defined activity s out in Schedule L Many of til e 
of rt 
of each 
defined 
activities ar to a great extent, self-explanatory, and, as they havE~ 
been extensively discuss E~!sewhere57, th requirc~ only brief 
examination here. Refuse collection is defined as b ng, essentially, 
the coli of h old and comm I but not 
Wh ile bu ildin g clE~~a ning in clu window dean ing (both inside an d 
out) and the cleaning of the interior of ildings, the cleaning of th(~ 
exterior of a building or of dwellings, c(:~rtain "rf~sidential 
es blishments" or of lice (:'!s blishmen excluded59.0tJH:~r 
cleaning includes, rnost significantly, stre cleaning, errll)tying of 
litter bin the removal of litter (ex t de ! vehicles, scrap 
m and "derelict s"), emptying of gullies and clE:~aning of 
stre signs60. Schools and welfare catering is, in essen the 
preparation and provision of mea and ance in schools (except 
those special or dential schools 
premises), residential hornes and 
where meals are pr on the 
which pr re meals on the 
care cen es (except thost~ 
, and meals on wh 
SE~ rvi ces 61 . G th e range of institutions exclud~~d from a nibil:, 
"other catering" In essenc(~, the pr ion of mea and 
54 See the Local Government Act 1988 (Competition in Sports and Leisure Facilities) 
Order '1989 S.1. no. 2488, inserting S2(2)(ee) and Schedule 1 paragraph 8 into the 
'1988 Act 
55 Local Government ,L\ct 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 1994 S,I, 
2884 inserting, respectively S2(2)(ff), (gg) and U), and Schedtlle 1 paragraphs 6.A, 
7Aand W 
56 See below for a discussion of these exemptions 
5/ See e,g. CifTei and Bennett, CCT: Lavv and Practice 7.1-36 
58 Schedule 1 paragt"aph 1 
59 Schedule 1 paragraph 2 
60 Schedulel, paragraph 3 
61 Sclledule 1, paragraph 4. 
119 
sustenance in canteens62 . The most significant activities which 
constitute ground maintenance are: cutting and tending grass ; 
planting and tending hedges, plants, shrubs and flowers (but 
excluding landscaping); anel weed control 63 . Repair and maintenance 
of vellicles is fairly se!f.·explanatory64, although it is significant 
that repair of accident damage65 , and the repair and maintenance of 
police vehicles are exempted66 
The managerTlent of spo s and leisure facilities, the fir 
activity to be added to the list of defined activities after the 1988 
Act was pa , covers facilities which provide a wide range of 
sporting and recreational activities, from the obvious such as 
swimming pools, gymnasia, pitches provided for am games, golf 
cou and bowling gre to th e less obvious such as 1\ for 
flying, ballooning, or parachuting"67. Facilities are exempted, 
however, if they are pa of an educational blishment, or where 
educational institutions have had exclusive use of the fa lity for at 
least 600 hours in the previous financial year68 The functions which 
fall within this defined activity are also exten and include 
arranging for instruction in, or supervision of, a sport or physical 
recreational activities, taking bookings, collecting fees, and 
arranging security, ca ring, cleaning and maintenance. The othE~r 
blue collar activities which have been added since 1989 an! ightly 
more ightforward. Sup ion of parking ba cally covers the 
giving or fixing of parking tick ,fixing and removing wheel 
clam , and the removal ntion, and release of vehicl 
Security work is dE'lfined a ing the operating of patrols, or 
entrance checkpoin on any premises occupied by 3 defined 
au thority, a !tll ough libraries, tnU E~U!nS, art ga lIeri police and 
clential ishmen and dwellings are exclu from the I t 
62 Schedule 1, paragraph 5 
63Par-agraph 6 
64 Paragraph 7('1) 
65 Paragraph 7(2) 
66 Paragraph 7(3) 
66Paragraph 8(1) 
68 See Schedule 1, paragrapll 8(3), (5) 
69 Paragl-apll 6;.,\ 
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of premises?O, Finally, vehicle management consists of arranglllg for 
there to be su fficient rnotor vehicles meet an auth ority' s needs, 
that the vehicle fleet is cleaned, fuelled, repaired and rnaintained, 
and ensuring that those vehicles and tlH::ir drivers are properly 
licensed, rE~gistered and insured, and til the vehi es me 
tory safety requirements?1, 
Tilere are several other provision of the 1988 Act which are of 
some inter Firstly, whE!re work falls within rnore than one 
defined activity, S2(5) declares that \I it shall be ea as Iling 
only within such one of them as the autl! carrying out the work 
decide". Secondly, S2(7) provides that, if in thf~ opinion of a 
authority, work which does not II within a defin activity cannot 
be carried out effi ently separa Iy from a defined activity, the 
authority may deci to treat that work as if it falls within a 
particular defined activity, Both of these provIsIons give 
considerable discretion to an authority when packaging its work in 
preparation for a tendering exercise72. 
Exemptions 
The 1988 Act provides that In work will fall ou tsi the 
of the cornpetitive ten Ing regime which it blishes. Thus, as 
one rnight an ex on made rding work in dec! 
allevia ,a or eradica the or tial effe of a 
disaster73 . Work Iling within a defined activity which forms only 
an incidental part of an employee's functions74 is also exempted 
from the Act' provisions. In addition, S2(9) provides that: 
"The Secretaly of State may pmvide by onJel' tilat any activity specified in the ordel', if 
carrieel out by 21 defined <luthor-ity or authorities so specified, shall not be treated as a 
defined activity so long as conditions so specified are fulfilled" 
70 Paragraph 10 
71 Paragraph 7 A 
72 For a discussion of their importance, see eh 4 on anti-competitive practices 
73 S2(8), c1'. Reg. 9(1 )(3) of tlle Local Govermnellt (Direct Labour Organisations) 
(Cornpetition) Re9ulations '1989 S.1. 1588 
74 S2(6). Tile effect of this provision is to place essentially JanitOrial Sel"VICeS outside 
the scope of the ,I\ct 
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Such an order may only be made by statutory instrument, and, unlike 
orders adding new defined activities, is subj to annulment 
procedure75. Such II rn make di t provision for different 
cases or descriptions of caSE:~ (whether for different area different 
defined authorities or kind of authority, different fined activit; 
or otherwise)" 76, An order issued under the provisions of S2(9) and 
515(5) thus potentially of some im nce as it may result in 
some varkltion of thE~ scheme of the Act in relation to a particular 
activity, defined authority or location 77, The provisions of S2(9) and 
515(5) are of particular importance, however, becaus(~ th provide 
the authority with a wider range of exemptions intended to ea 
the cheme of competition established by the A 
significant pieces of del ted legislation which have 
The most 
ed 
under these provisions are the Local Governrm~nt Act 1988 (Defined 
Activities) Orders78. The exemptions orders specify three tuations 
in which work ostt~nsibly falling within a dE~fined activity shall be 
treated as being outwith the of a defined activity. Fi if 
work falling within a defined activity carried out by an employee 
who is requlr as a condition of h employment to live in 
particular accommodation for the better forrnance of his duti 
that work will fall outwith the scope of the defined activity79, 
However, for this exemption apply, th(: work falling within any 
given defined activity rn form only part of the employee's du 
Secondly, the rt:pair and mclin ance of a fire service vehicle IS 
exernp d from the df:finition of repair and rnain nance of 
vehicles80, Thirdly, work shall not be treated as falling within a 
defined activity if it ca out pursuant an t nlade 
under certain statutory provisions81 ; and the Secretary of State has 
agreed thE:! whole or of 
75 S15(2) 
76 S15(5) 
77 See e.g. l_oc211 Governrnent l\ct 1988 (Defined Activities) (Exemption) (GI"eater 
Manchester Fire ancl Civil Defence Autllority) Order 1993, 1993 S.1. no. 365, 
I"egal"ding otller catering 
78 England; 1988 S.I.13 72, Scotland; 1988 S.1.141 5 
79 See 1988 S.1.1372, reg. 4 
80 Ibid. reg. S 
81 E.g. the Employtllent and Training Act 1973 
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Also to be considered are the exemptions ternporarily arising out 
of reorga n isa lion. In England til e Inajority of blu e~collar services 
are subject to a ,nora riurn on cornplying til tile 1988 /\ct's 
provls s for eigh rnonth fter n tion if the work is 
cornpl in less than a year, or ha an annual value of less an 
£200,000, or where the da for receiving replies to an invitation to 
der falls on or before til e date on wll ian order ng 
reorgan ation cornE~S in foru::82, although those unaffected by 
reor-gan ation mu cornply with the Act' Ion by 1 April 
1996. In relation parking sup(~rvision, vehiclf~ rnanagement and 
security work, 11Owf:ver, there mply a mora urn of eigb 
rnonths dating from tlH~ day on which reorganisation comes into 
force83 , In tland and Wales it has been indicated that CCT 
rnor ia will apply on similar conditions a reorganisation 84 
Thresholds 
The real significance of the Exemptions Orders, however, lies in the 
fa that they have been the principal me8ns by which the financial 
tllr 01 CCT of I authority ces are Sa cally, tile 
orders s the threshold for the defined activities contained in 
52(2)85, The wording of the Regulations is significant, Regulation 
3(1) stating that: 
"r\jone of the activities mentioned in S2(2) of the Act shall be treated as a defined 3ctivity 
so long as the condition mentioned in pan:lgl-apil (2) is fulfilled" 
Given that the w ng en 
inc!u in 52(2), any activities 
will automatically ubj 
IS 0 to the 
by S2(9) and S15(5) a di 
es all of tile fin a cti ti (~ 
added the I con ined tiler n 
f! same exemption unl as 
he uses the discretion given to him 
ent threshold for an inclivi al 
activity, although, at present, ;]11 blue collar activities are subj 
82 Local Government Changes for England (Direct Labour and Service Organisations) 
Regulations 1994 S.1. 3167 Ergs 12, 14 
83 Local Government /\ct 1988 (Defined ,l\.ctivities) (Competition) (Supervision of 
Parking, Management of Vehicles, and Security \/lfork) (England) Regulations 1994 S.I 
3165 
84 See Local Government (Exemption From Competition) (Scotland) Order 1995 S.I. 
678; also L.ocal Government (Wales) Act 1994 S52 
85 See e.g. 1988 S.I. 1372 
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to the same threshold86. At present, however, Regulation 3(2) 
specifies that: 
" .... the amount estimated by the authority as the gross cost of carrying out the activity in 
question through their direct labour or-ganisation or a similar organisation in the 
immediately preceding financial year does not exceed £ 100,000" 
ThE; calculation of the figure of £ 1 00,000 shall include the portion 
of the auth ority' s administrative costs as are attributable to the 
carrying out of the function87, but shall exclude the. cost of 
functional work88, and the cost of the work covered by the other 
exemptions established by the Exemption Orders, and discussed 
above. However, perhaps the most significant point to note about the 
threshold set by for competition under the 1988 Act is that it is set 
with regard to the value of work carried out in the II irnmediately 
preceding financial year", not, as with work under the 1980 Act, the 
estimated cost of the work to be performed. 
Interaction with Directive 92/50 
The question which must be posed, however, is: to what extent do 
the blue-collar services subjected to competition by the 1988 Act 
coincide with the services falling within the scope of Directive 
92/50 relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the award of 
public service contracts? 
Directive 92/50, lists the services to which it applies in Annex 1 A 
and Annex 1 B. The division of the lists resul in the services listed 
in Annex 1 A bEc'!ing, essentially, subje to all of the directive's 
requirernents regarding tendering procedur while those listed in 
Annex 1 B need only at present comply with the directive's 
requirements regarding common technical specifications and the 
publication of award notices. The reason for this 
between services is set out in the preamble: 
distin ction 
86 The Secretary of State has, however, lIsed his powers to set different thresholds for 
white-collar activities: see below 
87 Ibid. reg. 3(3)(a) 
88 Ibid. reg. 3(3)(b) 
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" ... the full application of the Directive ITlust be limited, for a transitional period, to 
cOlltl-acts for sel-vices wllere its pl-ovisions will enable tile full potential for incl-eased 
cross-frontier trade to be realised; whereas contracts for other services need to be 
monitol-ed fOI- a certain pNiod befme a decision is taken 011 full application of this 
Directive ... " 
The Directive's limitation of its full application to those services 
which are rnost likely to be the subject of trans~cornrnunity 
competition must, however, ewed at the la three IS 
after the d;:l by which Mem Sta should haw:: irnplernented the 
Directive (i.e. by 1 July 1996) At present, however, it is only 
necessary to identify that cornman ground exi between the 
subj the 1988 Act and Directive 92/50, 
Taking each defined activity lis In the 1988 A III turn it 
would appear that there is a con ble identity of subj rna 
the 1988 A and the Oi Refuse colon would 
appear to fall within the f! of category 16 of Annex 1 A, 
"[ ]ewage and refuse di posal services; sanitation and other 
services u • It probable that the constituent elemen of U other 
cleaning" (str cleaning) for exanlpl can be characterised as a 
sa ni tation, or a U similar u service) a 0 fa II with in categ 1 6. 
Cleaning of buildings will "within thE:: seo or category 14 of 
Annex 1.A) U [b]uilding cleaning and property rnanagement 
Catt~ring for the purpOSt:s of ca ring and wei [t\ and other 
ca ng, 011 the other hand) are both Annex 1 B services, falling 
within category 17, "[h]otel and r urant ser . Ground 
rnain anC(~ ha the ITl difficult to categ as it 
tempting to placE~ it within catego 1 r:, as II urban planning and 
landscape , although it is more lik(c;ly fall within 
tile categories of U nature alld landscape PI' on services" 89 or 
U other environmental on services not ere 90 
con inecJ in category 14: irr of which it IS) in principle, an 
Annex 1 Ace. R('!pair and rnain anee of ides, however, 
would appear to II squarely within 1. The rnanagement of 
sport and I re ser ces a rently n a ot1!em. if one 
89 CPC nO.9406 
90 CPC no 9409 
125 
exammes the definition of management of sports arid leisure 
activities con ined in Schedule 1 of the 1988 Act, it is apparent 
that the management of such facilities may encompass arranging 
the performance of activitif!S such as catering, which is an Anm~x 1 B 
and cleaning, Wllich is an Annex 1 A service. However, one 
must bear in mine! that paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 1 tes that 
II without prejudice to HIe term, Iinanagingi inclu arrangingl for 
the provision of a number of services ancillary to the running of the 
facility in question. It nlust rerrH:~mberE~d that wh is subj to 
competitive tendering is the right to manage a sports or leisure 
facility, not the right to provide catering or cleaning on such 
prernises. Consequently, as it is in essence the right to rnanage the 
facility whicll is being competed for, this is an Annex 1 B service, 
falling within category 26, recreational, cultural and sportirlg 
servIces. 
Of the three most recently add(~d blue-collar serVices, vehicle 
rn a nag e men t may e i til (~ r f a II wit h in g r 0 u P 2 0, 0 r g r 0 u p 2 7 , as 
II administrative tran and communication related services" 91 as 
it represents II other supporting services for road transport l ! 92: in 
either case it would appear be an annex 1 Bee. Security 
services clearly II within category 23 of Annex 1 B, Supervision of 
parking is more difficult to ca rise exactly: do(~s it fall within 
gory 20, supportin g an cl a uxilia ry tra nsport service wh iell 
inclu II parking 93, or 27, other both of 
which ar(~ AmH~x 1 B 
It is convenient n t til ge the peculiarities of e 
isation of the covered by the Dire 92/50, Each 
ca gory is based on the United Nations Cornmon Product 
Classification (CPC) and ha a CPC nUlnblc~r, with the excE~ption of 
category 27, II other services", an Annex 1 B category whi 
presumably exists catch those dering exer which do not 
fall within the subje ma of any other category. A the 
preatTlble the dire IV rela s, it is lik Iy that thE~ CPC 
9"1 epe no 7449 
92 epe no. 91134 
93 epe no 7443 
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classification will be replaced in the future by Community 
n()rnenclaturE~. However, pr(~sent, tht:! CPC classification of each 
s(=!rvice category does result in an sive range of activities 
being regulated by the di s provisions: each series of epc 
numbers includes, as one commentator points out94, a 'not elsewhere 
covered' classification, which effectively makes the categorisation 
of servicE:s a generic, n 
The final issue regarding the interaction of the directive and the 
1988 Act rela to the financial tllresholds. Article 7(1) 
that: 
"This Directive shall apply to public service contracts, the estimated value of which, net 
of VAT, is not less than ECU 200,000." 
The sum of 200,000 ECU "slJ;~1l include tile rnatE~d 
rernuneration of the service provicler" 95 , and the valuation method 
must not be adopted with a view to avoiding tile Directive's 
application: likewis a con act may not be split up in ordE~r to 
avoid the Directive's application96. The provisions regarding 
valuation of contracts are fairly complex97: the circumstances in 
which con must be aggregated for the pu of calculating 
wht~ther the 200,000 ECU limit will be surpassed, and in which a 
lirnitecl amount of work can n for e of su eh 
calculations arc~; closely clf~fin by provision rnirror those 
contained in the Works Directive (93/37)98. The basis for 
calculating the estimated value of contra which do not fy a 
I price is out in de 7(5), which til en a fixed 
m contra of less than 48 month III duration, the t 
contra valu for i duration mu be ken. Wher(~, however, the 
contract is of indeterminate duration, or for a m of rnore than 48 
94 See Trepte, Public Procurement in the EC, pl05 
95 Article 7(2) 
96 Article 7(3) 
97 See Article 1 generally. For an explanation of tile provisions see Browll, Getting to 
GI-ips with ,t\9gregation undel- tile E.C. Pul11ic ProclJl-ement Rules, [1993] 2 P.P.L .. R. 69, 
especially pp 75-6. 
98 See A.rticle 7(4) 
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months, one must multiply tIle monthly instalm(~nt by 48 In 
calculating the estimated contract value. 
There are two things which one must note about the interaction of 
thE~ financial thresholds contained in the 1988 A and Directive 
92/50. The fi is that tile pecuniary levels are different. The 
threshold set for cornpetition in the 1988 Act's defined activities is 
£ 100,000, while the DirE!ctive se a lirnit of 200,000 Eeu 
(approximately £ 150,000). Secondly, rnatters are apparently 
complicated by the fa th tllf~ threshold for 1988 Act work 
on thE~ basis of the gross cost of performing an activity in the 
inHnedia Iy preceding financial year, while the threshold for 
application of the Dir ive~'s provi::;ion is calculated on the 
estirna d value of the contract to bE'! awarded. The domE!stic 
legislation thus looks backward in tim while the Directive looks 
forward. Does til crea 
the two regimes? 
grave difficulti(~s for the interaction of 
While the two regimes may have a different temporal focus on this 
rna r, at a practical level, therE~ should bE~ few, if any, real 
difficulties. It should be noted that the Services Directive does not 
compel competitive tendering, but in d objective andards 
for the award of contra relating to a range of servio:;s as long as 
they exceed a ibed value. Tlw Ing eXE~r in question 
will either be volun ry, or compelled, as is the case h by a 
rnember c legislation. In view of the'! ct that it 
tlH~ value of the over I duration which of irnportan 
the UK regulations spE~cifying th rninimum and rnaxirnum duration of 
con cts resulting frOlll e tion of the 1988 A s 'cion 
are of considerable relevance99 . The regulations the minimum 
duration of m contra at: 4 years, the rn significant 
on being refuse collection, contI' for which mu be of a 
mlrllmum of 5 rs III dura tion. I f on e rela til e du ration of 
contra for these ces the finan al til old of 200,000 
99 See e.g. the Local Government Act 1988 (Defined ,~ctivities) (Specified Periods) 
(England) Regulations 1988, 1988 S.I. 1373. The equivalent Scottish provisions are 
contained in '1988 S.1. '14"14. See also the Local Government Act "1988 (Defined 
Activities) (Competition) (Supervision of Parking, Management of Vehicles and 
Security Work) (England) Regulations '1994 S.1. 3165 
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Eeu contained in the Directive, then, to avoid the application of the 
directive's provi ons, the annual valuE~ of the work in question 
would have to be less than .50,000 FeU (about f 38,000) for most 
serv or 40,000 EeU (about £ 30,000) for refuse collection. 
Moreover, one rnlJ remernber that while the directive 11 
cornpel tendering, the reginle blish by the 1988 A does if 
the gross valLie of performing the acti ty in the previous year 
exceeded £100,000. Even if Wt~ allow for the financial savings of 
CCT, which are presently calculated to avera 6.5%100, a local 
authority which barely ex the threshold of f 'I 00,000 for 1988 
Act work would still, as a result of the R(~gu!ations fying the 
perlnitted duration of contra letting a services contract with 
a total value of over t: 350, 000: r in excess of e figure of 
200,000 EeU I uir to en ure the Dir e's application. An 
examination of the practical irnport of both r irnes then:!fore 
illu th III of differ threshold limits and a different 
poral focus, where work subj to on by the 1988 
A it will inevitably fall within the scope of Dir. 92/50. 
Defin iti ons 
The final set of services subjected to CCT are those of an 
admin a o onal 0 n I nature. Two tues are of 
relevance to con deration of these services: the Local 
m 1988 and nHi1ent 1992. 
The g p nt 
rding til e appli 
S8 of the Local 
for the purposes of 
chnical and 
inextricably link 
declares th 
any examln of tile 
on of CCT collar oule! b(~ 
ment A 1992, siblyen d 
regulating cornp ition administrative, 
ion al (!rvict~s. Til e pro ion S 0 f S8 are 
those 1988 Act, 58(2), for exam pi 
"This s8ction applies to work which-
-100 See Walsh and Davis, Competition and Service: The Impact of the Local Government 
Act 7988, at 13.5 
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(a) by virtue of an order under S2(3) of the 1988 Act, falls within a defined activity 
for the purposes of Part I of that Act; and 
(b) consists in, or involves, tile provision of professional advice or of oU,er 
pmfessional services or tile application of any financial or technical expertise" 
It is significant that S8(2) provides that white collar services must 
be defined activities for the purposes of the 1988 Act before S8 of 
the 1992 Act can be us(~d to shape the tendering regime for each 
particular service: this is indeed necessary due to the skeletal form 
of the 1992 Act, which, for example, has no equivalent of the 
provisions contained in S13 and S14 of the 1988 Act which, among 
other things, enable the Secretary of State to investigate 
allegations of deficiencies in the tendering process and to take 
action against errant local authorities. 
Several of the other provisions of S8 b(~ar some similarity to 
those contained in the 1988 Act: orders under this section must be 
made by statutory instrument approved by resolution of each 
Housel 01, can only be made following consultation with the 
appropriate representatives of local government102, may make such 
incidental, consequential, transitional or supplementary provision as 
the Secretary of State II thin ks necessary or expedient", and may 
make II different provision for different cases, including different 
provision for different localities an d for di fferent authorities" 103. 
While S8 may initially have been intended specifically to address 
the complexities of extending CCT to administrative, technical and 
professional services, the fact is that this section has not yet been 
brought into force. In view of that fact it is necessary to give some 
brief consideration to the provisions of the 1988 Act which may be 
used to extend CCT to white collar services. 
To an extent, it is necessary to discuss the prOVIsions of S2 of Ule 
1988 Act once more irrespective of whether S8 of the 1992 Act is 
brought into force or not: if S8 is brought into force, it requires that 
a service must also be a defined activity for the purposes of the 
'10'1 S8(4) 
'102 S8(3) 
103 S8(S) 
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1988 Act, but if it is not in force, the only rlleans of subjecting a 
service to CeT would be to include it in the list of defined activities 
an cl ttl us brin g it within the scope of th c 1988 Act ' :) rcginH~. 
HowevE~r, at present, due t.he absence of any order bringing 58 into 
for we must concen te on the latt{~r scenario. Basically, if tlH~ 
ry of State relies SOIE!ly on thE! provisions of the 1988 Act to 
extend CCT whi collar the procedure which he rnu 
follow identical to that for bringing a bluec~collar service within 
til e 1988 Act' provisions: th e S ry of S would have 
con ult such repn~sen tives of local government as he thinks 
appropriate' 04 before obtaining tile assent of each House of 
Parliament to an order which adds a new defined activity to the list 
contained in S2(2)' 05, Thus the procedure for extending CCT to wh ite 
collar services is essentially the same whetlH~t or not S8 of the 
1992 Act brought into WIl however, of thE; t of the 
regulations t~d in such circurnstances? 
If the ry of Sta were limited to u ng the 1988 A In 
ding the range of defined activitiE;S, he is ernpowered by S15(7) 
to make such supplemen ry, incidental, consequential or 
transitional provisions as he considers appropri 106, ane! may 
inc!u in any order un S2(3) provision for arnending or 
adapting the A for the purpo~3e:,:; of defining the scope of the 
defined activity l07, In addition the ry of may provide 
by or that an activity carried out by an authority or authorities 
fj til n shall n as a fin a ivity unless 
In conditions 8rf~ fulfill such or make provisicJIl for 
eli ent a n authorities or kin of fin auth ti 
or different defined activities100 . The legis!ative framework is thus 
capable of providing the authority iell could ilor 
the exernption (lnd Finan a! thr old of each white collar 
dded til e I fin eel es con In In 
S2(2). When one also rs III mind th the various powers givf~n to 
the of by OilS 6,7,8 and 15(6) of the 1988 
'\ 04 S2( 4) 
'105 SS 2(3) ('lnd 15(1) 
'106 Compare this to SO(5)(a) of the 1992 Act 
, 07 51 5 ( 8 ) ( a ) 
, 08 S2(9) and S 15(5), c.L s8(5)(b) of the Local Governrnent I~ct 1992 
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Act109 would enable him to issue cornpetition reguiationsfor each 
defined activity (irrespective of whether it is a blue or a whi 
collar activity) one mu qu on the n for enacting S8 of 
the 1992 Act: if brought into force it would achieve nothing which 
could not be accomplished under the 1988 Act. n the only 
provision apparently unique to the 1992 Act 1 the" double envelope" 
procedure in nded ensure that nders meet a qualitative 
threshold 110 could be achieved by delegated legislation issued under 
til e 1 988 Act 1 11 . 
At present three white-collar services have been added to the list 
of defined activities s out in S2 of the 1988 Act: housing 
management112 1 legal servi 13, and construction and property 
related servi 14. The definition of housing rnanagernent is a wide 
ranglllg on which encom sses a wide variE~ty of hou ng function 
such as applications for nanCi rent collection, arranging for 
repairs to housing stock, 0 ting security systems, and taking 
steps to remove unlawful occupan 115. 
The definition of I(~gal services is a particularly complex on 
which takes a different approach to d(:;fining the scope of the defined 
activity. First, legal services are defined in relation to whom legal 
advice will be given: namely a defined authority, its mernbers, 
cornmittees, sub~committees, any group which repo to an 
authority, and any officer or depa t of an authority116 1 as well 
as advio~ to any other person in relation to a ned authority's 
discharge of its function:;117. Secondly, the range of other legal work 
'109 These provisions, which relate to the tfmdering process will be discussed in the 
next chapter 
110 S8(1) of the 1992 ,1\ct 
'Ill See SS7(4),8(2)(b) and 15(6), disclissed infra Ch2 
112 S2(2)(h) and Schedule 1 pan:lgr'aph 9, inset"ted by thf~ Local Govemment ,D..ct 1988 
(Competition) (Defined Activities) (Housing Mana~jement) Order 1994 S,1. 1671 
113 S2(2)U) and Scheclule 1 paragt"aph 11, inserted by the I~ocal Govemrnent Act 1988 
(Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 1994 S,!. 2884 
114 S2(2)(k) and Schedule 1 pat"agt"apll 12, insel"ted by the Local Government ,D..ct 
1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) (Construction and Property Services Order 
1994 S.I. 2888 
115 Schedule 1 J paragraph 9 
116 Schedule 1, paragraph 11 (2)(a) 
117 Paragraph 11 (2)(b) 
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which fulfils the definition is out. This is extensive, and, as one 
might expect, includes such as civil and criminal litigation, 
conveyancing, can tracts and insu ran ce-rela ted work, as well as 
work in relation to bylaws and priva and local IE!gislation 118. 
Finally, the staff whose work falls within the defined activity ar(~ 
s au. solicitors, barrister advoca ,legal executives and 
licensed conveyancers, as well as "any person under their 
t11anagernent or control" 119, a classification which bringsUH~ work 
of gE~neral clerical staff within the ambit of the defined activity. 
Sorne parallels can be drawn between the definition 6f legal 
services and the definition of con on and property services. 
with legal services, an important part of the definition of 
construction and property rela to the giving of ae!vinc: 
certain pE~rsons and bodies120. Many of the otller functions falling 
within the definition of con etion ane! property services are 
fa ir Iy 0 bvious: a reh it(~ctu re, en gin eerin g~ va lu ati on ~ property 
management and surveying121, although, perhaps less obviously, 
various elements of the dE~VeloprTl and main an 22 of roads 
and land which the authority responsible for, occupi or wishes 
to acquire an intt:rest in 123, are included. 
Exemptions 
with other 1988 A servl work wi!1 not be trea d as 
falling within a defin activity if it forms only It of the duties 
of an employee of a defined authority. However~ whereas 52(6) of the 
1988 Act provides ttl In relation blue~collar activities work 
will be trea d as exernpt if it is "in ciden tai" an employee's 
duties, the Secretary of has u his powers to s fy the 
proportion of an employee's work which be treated as exelnpt 
for the purposes of S2(6). For housing rnanagernent, work II be 
exempted if it up less than 25 per. cent. of the working time of 
an employee who normally works 1l1Ott! than thirty hours a week, or 
1"18 Paragraph 11(2)(c)-(f) 
119 Paragraph 11 (3) 
120 Schedule 1, pal"agl-aph 12(3)(a), (b) 
121 Paragraph 12(2) 
122 ParClgraph 12(3)( c )-u) 
123 Pal-agrapll 12(5) 
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50 per. cent. of any other employee's tirne 124. In relation to both 
legal services 125 and construction and property related services1261 
work will be deerned to be exempt if it takes up less tJIZHl 50 
cent. of an employee's tirne. 
The other important category of exemptions are those arising fronl 
the various rnoratoria arising from local governmt~nt reorganisation. 
The effect of local government reorganisation upon the competition 
In senne respects most profound in England, due to tht~ 
ggered implemen tion of reorgan tion. This is m obvious in 
relation to legal services127 and con uction and property 
services128, which ovide that authoritit?!s subj to uctural 
change effective from 1 April 1995 need n cornply with the 1988 
Act's provisions two years following the date on which 
reorganisation becomes effective, although those local authorities 
n subject to reorganisation mu comply with the legislation by 1 
April 1996. In Scotland and Wales the requirements of the 1988 Act 
regarding whi collar services trw complied with between 1 
April 1998 and 1 April 1999 129. As regards housing management) the 
effect of reorgan tion aim identical, although the relevant 
regulations are couched in slightly different . In England tllE~re 
is a nlOratorium of two rs provi certain requiremen are III 
as to the value of the work or the ze of an authority's housing 
stock130. In Scotland thf.'! 1988 Act's r irernen m be compli 
with regarding 30 per. cent. of the con valuf: by 1 April 1998) 
and the r ning 70 by 1 April 1999. 
124 Local Government ,l1,ct 1988 (Competition) (Defined ,L\ctivities) (Housing 
Management) Order 1994 S.1. 1671, Reg. 3 
125 Local Government /\ct 1988 (Competition) (Defined /\ctivities) Order 1994 S.1. 
2884, Reg. 3 
126 Local Government ,l\ct 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) (Construction and 
Property Services) Order 1994 S.1. 2888, Red 3 
127 Local Government ,.'\ct 1988 (Competition) (Legal Services) (England Regulations) 
1994 S.1. 3164, Reg. 3 
128 Local Government 1988 (Competition) (ConsUuction and Property Services) 
(England) Regulations 1994 S.I. 3166, Regulation 3 
129 See e.g. letter frorn Scottish Office Environment Department to local authority chief 
executives, 27tll Jallual-Y 1995. Cf. Local Govemrnellt (Exemption fmrn Competition) 
(Scotland) Order 1995 S.1. 678; also Local Government (\fIJales) Act 1994 S52 
130 See the Local Governmel1t 01anges for England (Direct Laboul' and Service 
OrClanisations) Re9ulations 1994 S.1. 3167, Reg. '12 
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Thresholds 
The Secretary of State has also used his powers to tailor the 
competition thresholds for white collar services. Que to the 
vagaries of local governrnent IEJorganisation, thresholds h as yet, 
only been for local authorities in England, although ther0: no 
reason to su til either the th 01 or the scherne of the 
necessary subordina legislation will be different in Scotland or 
Wales. 
The de ITJIIlIiIIIS th old for housing management CCT in England 
and Wales has b(~en at £500,000 by virtue of an arnendrnent to 
til e existing eXf~rnptions regulation regula tin 9 bl ue~colla r work131 , 
Tile t to which legal, con ction and prop ces ar(-! 
subject to CCT is ca!cula d by reference to cornplex rrnulae 
contained in the relevant competition regulation:." f-Iowever, at the 
risk of over"Osirnplifying the ma r, the r ulations essentially 
provi that the rnin tllr old r CCT for legal services 
will be t~ither 55 per. cent. of I value of the I al work 
pE~rform el, or f300,000, whichever IS the grr:a r132. For 
con on and prop s ces it will 35 pE'~r. cent. of the 
I value of the work form orE 4.s0,000, if til IS a grea 
figure133. As usual these figures are calcu ted on th b of work 
performed in the p ous r. 
There are few problems in relating the subject matter of the white-
collar ces 92/50. I. I Sf: ces lis uarely 
in category ? 1 in nex 1 R, Hou ng ell i II:; within 
category 14 of Annex 1 A, building cleaning and pr ty mana en!: 
s , whi!E~ con u on and prop when examin 
saddles ca gory 14, and catego 12, which relates to 
13"1 See e.g. Local Government Act 1988 (Defined Activities)(Exemptions) (England) 
Order 1988 S.I. 1372, Regulations 3('1 A) and 3(?A), as inserted by the Local 
C:;overnment Act '1988 (Defined Activities) (Exemptions) (cng"::md and Wales) 
(Amendment) Order 1994 S.1. 2296 
132 Lncal Gnvernment "Act 1988 (Cnmpetition) (Legnl Services) (England) Regulations 
1994 S.1. 3164 
133Loc<'l1 Government Act 1988 (Cnmpetition) (Constructinn and Property Services) 
(Engl<'lnd) Regulations '1994 S.1. :~ '16b 
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architectural, engineering and relatE~d serVices, both of which are 
contained in Annex 1 A. 
Given that the de minimis limits for white-collar services are 
considerably higher til an those set for blu e-colla r a ctivities it is 
almost inconceivable that a contract for white collar services 
resulting from a tendering exercise will not exceed Directive 
92/50l s 200,000 ECU de minirnis limit. 
The range of activities subject to CCT by virtu(~ of Part I of the 
Local Government Act 1988 is particularly extensive. Moreover, tht~ 
1988 Act endows the Secretary of State with a variety of powers to 
facilitate the expansion of the range of activities subject to CCT. In 
the past year in particular those powers Ilave been used to bring a 
number of services within the list of defined activities contained in 
the 1988 Act. Significantly, the recently added defined activities 
have extended the activities subject to CCT beyond blue-collar 
services and into professional services for the first tirne. This 
illustrates both the potential for expanding CCT, and the flexibility 
of the regime established by the 1988 Act: it has proved capable of 
achieving all of the tasks for which S8 of the Local Government Act 
1992 was enacted, thus showing how unnecessary that provision 
was, 
It is notable that those matters which are exempted from the 
operation of CCT are, in general, of a fairly insignificant nature. 
However, while the regimes established by th(~ 1988 Act have sought 
to ernbrace as many of the activities of local government as 
possible, local govern ment reorganisation has proved to be a very 
disruptive influence, The moratoria on the application of CCT during 
reorganisa tion bas far reaching effects: in particular the staggered 
process of reorganisation in England, and the basis 011 which work is 
exempted from ttl e application of th e I egisla ti on will almost 
certainly ensure that no two local authorities are affected in 
exactly the same way. Whilf~ the moratoria in Scotland and Wales 
may only result in a temporary, easily ascertained, suspension of the 
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1988 Act's provisions, and a delay in tile implementation of CCT for 
the most recently added s , In Fngl(llld its will linger 
long after the process of review and reorganisation has en 
completed. 
Finally, it must b(~ real that til clom c legislation can no 
longer be view in isolation: one mu always have regard to 
potentially relevant Fu n legislation. In ating the dering 
regirnes blished by the 1988 A it rwcessary to evalua 
their legal propriety again the s ndards s by the Sees 
Directive, But does the Directive apply? It would appear that there 
is no difficulty in Sll ng that the arrangem n~~-;ulting horn the 
operation of the 1988 Act lis within the scope of the Directive. 
However, there is one signi nt fa which a rs limit the 
utility of the Services Directiv in evaluating national ndering 
regime: the ct th th(~ Dire apply in full to 
all ces, although the application of the Oi in full will be 
reviewed in du e course 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE TENDERING PROCEDURES 
As was illustrated in chapter 1 tile activities of local 
autllorities subject to cornpulsory competitive tendering can be 
divided into two catE~gories; blue-collar services, and white-collar 
services. Tendering for white-collar services, in the absence:; of the 
provisions of S8 of the 1992 Act being brought into force, is 
conducted in accordance with the 1988 Act's provisions, with some 
arnendments. It thus possible to use tile provisions of the 1988 
Act as tht~ b 
regIme. 
for consideration of the frarnework of tht~ tendt~ring 
However, the 1988 A 
regml but, ostensibly 
thE! other for" functional 
distinction, and the impa 
this distinction, briefly. 
does not establish one simple t(::;ndering 
blishes two: one for "works contracts", 
work". It is necessary to con der til 
of recent legislative developmen upon 
The distinction betwt~en works contra and functional work 
originated in the I Government, Planning and nd A 19801, 
and was 
provides: 
ined by tlH~ Local GovernnJ(~nt Act 1988, S3 of which 
11 (2) 'Works contract' means a contract constitutin~J or including an agreernent Wllich 
provides fOI- the carrying out of work by a defined authol-ity. 
(3) But a contract is not a works contract if it constitutes or includes an a~Jreernent 
providin~J for a defined authol-ity to dischal-ge the fUllctions of a Ministel- of the C!"OWIl, 
another defined authority .... 
(4) 'Funct iOllal work' Irlea IIS-
(a) work carried out by a defined authority, other than work carriecl out under a 
1 See Ss 5, 8 
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The statute essentially provides that a works contract is an 
agreement for one authority to perform work for another authority, 
while functional work is that carried out by a local authority in 
pursuance of own, or another authority';::; functions, or those of (l 
Minister of the Crown. 
Soon after the 1988 Act came into operation, however, problems 
arose regarding the ability of local authorities to perform work for 
(~ach other. While the tendering procedures established by the 1988 
Act, and its precursor, tht! 1980 Act, rna provision for authorities 
to bid for each otl1 work, in the opinion of the Audit Comm on 
this did not endow councils with the right to perform work for (~(lch 
other. Indeed, an authority which did perform work for anoUler 
authority would bt~ acting in bre<1ch of the prohibition on local 
authority trac!ing 2 unless it could show that it was utilising surplus 
capacity in the activity in question3 . Tfle Audit Commission's advice 
stimulated some debate on the validity of cross-boundary contracts4 
and criticism of the Commission's practices in issuing legal advice5 . 
It would appeal, however, til In authority corrtra are n 
particularly common, thE~ service m often the subject of a works 
contract being ground maintenance6 . 
The controversy surrounding works contra may, however) 
soon be of only h c In legislation ren works 
con a ,and the works con act/functional work d tinction 
01 in Scotland and Wal while Government Mini have 
indicated that they would be willing to allow Engli:,h local 
auth con wiHI ea other a on 7 
2 See Local Government Act 1972, S152; Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947, 
S195(a) 
.3 I\udit Commission Technic8.1 Rele8.se 23/90- Cross Bounchry Tendering: Loc8.1 
Authorities Doing Work for One Another 
4 See e,g. Fr8.ser, Pmver to \Vork for Felch Other, 1()lS/90 LGe 20; l'"Torris, Ne\v 
Lmvs Upset Calm in Cross-Border Contract Situation, 1/6/90 LGC 19 
5 See Taylor, Commission's /\dvice Should Stick to LegelJ Specifics, 23/3/()O LGe 21; 
Cirell.'I3ennet, Ovcrsteppi ng the j\.lark, 30'3/90 LGC 20. The issue of the Audit 
Commission's legal ad\'ice is 8.1so discussed in R8.dford, Auditing for Chc'tllge: 
Loc8.1 Government 8.nd the Audit Comrnissiol1 [J C)C)1] 54 i\ILR 912 
() See Walsh and Davis, Competition ::md Service: 'l1112 lmpact of the Local 
Gm~emme/Jr Act 1 ()88 , p8.r8.gr8.ph 8.2 8.lld telble 8.2 
-; See Public \vork totalling £1.1 bn put out to tender 8.,2 \}-! Fl' 10 for comments 
m8.de by Tony G8.1dry 
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The status of inter-authority contracts in Scotland and Wales 
has thus been radicCllly affected by S58 of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1994, and S25 of the Local Governrnt~nt (Wales) Act 
1994. Both are couched in similar tt:~rms. Section 58, for exampl 
provides that: 
"(1 )Subject to the provisions of this section, a local aut!lority (a 'contracting 
authority') may agree witll any other local authlxity (a 'supplying authority') that the 
supplying auHlOrity shall carry out for the contracting authority any activity or service 
which the contracting authority is required to, or Illay le~Jitimately, carry out. 
(2)An agreement uncler this section-
(a) tllay provide for activities or services to be carried out by two 01' mOl'e autliOl'ities 
jointly; and 
(b) may inclucle sucll ternlS as to payment as tile authorities concerned consider 
appropr-iate" 
The relationship between authorities en ged by this section 
clearly contractual in natur in view n only of the wording of 
S58(1)8 and the provision n~garding payrnent for work performed 
contained in S58(2)(b)9, but also of the fact that S58(5)1O protects 
the status of legation agreemen under S56 of the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1973) which penni one local authority 
to en an agreernent with another authority for tile discharge of 
its functions. 
The SCOPf! of S58 and S25 is WortllY of some n The contra 
to which it may conCf~rn "any activity or service which tlH~ 
contracting authority required to, or may legitirnately, carry 
out" II, Til e work 
and will 
the activities subj 
falling within 
inc!u work 
to CCT by 
8 See S2 5( 1) of the \1\,7elshA"ct 
9 See S25(2) of the \!Velsh'\ct 
the ambit of S58 is thus v 
formed under the 1988 A as 
those enactmen are ilTlplicitly) 
10 "This section is vvithout prejudice? to any other power under or by virtue of 
which a local authority' may arrange for the Cl1Tj'ing out of any of their 
activities or sec'lices by another authority". Curiollsly there is no equivalent 
provision in the Welsh legisbtiol1 
] 1 S75( 1) encompasses "services wliich tll(0 contral'ting council requirp for r1F::' 
purpose of, or in connection with, the discharge of any of their fUllctions" 
at the very least, activities 
legitirnately carry out" 12, Thu 
w h i chloe a I aut h 0 r i t: i e s 11 rn a y 
S58, and also 525, ostf~nsibly 
ernpower local authorities (!nt(~r into 
for the perforrnance of work subject to CCT. 
n til at S58( 4) 13 raises til e possibility 
pia on the exercise of the S57(1) power: 
acts with (':!ach other 
Howew!r, it should 
of limitations being 
"The Secretary of State may by re~JlIl3tions make sLich provision as he thinks fit in 
relation to the exel-cise by local authorities of the power conferred by tilis section and, 
\.Ivitllout prejudice to the ~Jenerality of the foreqoinq, SUCII regulations may include 
pl-ovisioll 
(a) prohibiting or restricting to such extent as rnay be prescribed the use of tile power 
in relation to sllcll activities or sel-vices, or such class 01- classes of activities or 
services, as may be so prescribed; 
(b) specifying, either generally 01" in I"elation to SUdi activities 01" services, 01" such 
classes of activities or services, as may be so prescribed, vvhicll authorities rnay enter 
into agl-eements undel- this section." 
It has been indicated th 
"Tile Government clo not ... consider that work subject to compulsory competitive 
tendering Silould fall witl,in the powers granted to local autllOI"ities under [SS8], given 
that there is a clear private sector market for such work. As such, therefore, the 
Secretary of State would intend to make requlations excludin';:j CCT contracts fwrn the 
1 ,1 new arrangements ... " -r 
If the pow(~rs con ined in S58(4) and 525(4) arE~ U III til 
Inanner) how will the opel<ltion of tlw 1980 and 1980 /'\ 
a ffe d? 
Ro 
autl! 
S58(1) and S25(1) 
to (~n In conlrac 
vid(~ ex au til ority r local 
with each other. T!l(;~ corollary to 
tile use of t.l1e S ry of un 
and (.5), exclude work lIing within the ~;COP(~ of the 1988 Act 
12 S25(3)(c) m8kes this explicit 0)' requiring cornp1i8nce with the provisions of 
the 1988 Act '.",here a contract relates to it. 
13 See also S2 5( 4) and (5) of the Welsh statute, 
14 1993·4 HL Vol. 556 cols 2024·5. See also Welsh districts vO\,,1 to fight cross· 
trading 1'I.::'strictions, 28 April· S I\Ta,;,r1 CJCJS I'\Tunicipal JOl1mcd 1--1 
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from the ambit of S58(1) and S25( 1) is that local authoritif~s will be 
prohibited frorn entering contracts with each other for activities 
subject to CCT. As authorities will thus lack the capacity to en 
into contracts with each other for the performance of such work~ the 
provisions of the 1988 Act establishing tendering regimes for 
works contracts will be rendered ineffective. 
What, however, would be the effect of S58 and S25 upon the 
works contracts regirne if the Secretary of State chose not to use 
his powers to exclude CCT contracts from its ambit? This 
necessitates consideration of S58(3): 
"Anything requiring to be done by a supplying autllority under an agreement under this 
section s[lall be treated as one of their statutory functions." 15 
In view of the wording of S58(1), which declares that II the supplying 
authority shall carry out LQ!. tile contracting authority" the work 
subject to the contract, it would appear tl1at the works contracts 
regime established by the 1988 Act is rendered inoperable. The fact 
that the autllority which undertakes the contract acquires a 
statutory function by virtue of performing the work "for" the other 
autllority would imply that, as it performs the work II forI! tJlf~ 
contracting authoritys the supplying authority acquires no gr(::atE~r 
powers or duties than are already possessed by the contracting 
authority. Thus, as a corollary to the work becoming the function of 
the authority by virtue of S58(3), it must first have been one of the 
functions of the contracting authority. Indeed, this is made explicit 
by S25( 1) of the Wt~lsh legislation, which refers to such contracts 
as relating to "the discharge of any of [the] functions" of the 
authority which lets the contract. 
However, S3 of the 1988 Act, excludes agreements to discharge 
the functions of another local authority from the definition of a 
w or ks contra ct: work perform ed under su ell agreemen ts will 
constitu functional work 16. As S58 of the Local Government 
15 S2 5( 6) is couched in almost identical terms 
16 See above for 8. discussion of the definitions of ,,,orks contracts and 
functional work 
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(Scotland) Act 1994, and S25 of the Local GovenHTlE~nt (Wales) Act 
1994, effectively declare that any contra for the perforrnance of 
work by one local authority on behalf of another is, in effe a 
contra for the discharge of thE~ "contracting authority's" fun on 
it would appear to be the case that, as rega work un the 1988 
into th e Act, inter~authority contra will henceforth fall 
functional work regime" 
It would thus appear that as a result of S58 of the Local 
Gov(~rnrnent (Scotland) Act 1994, and 525 of the local 
Government (Wales) Act 1994, 
Local Government A 1988 
authority con a can now 
contra contain eel in th at 
the works contra regime of the 
i::; rendered inoperable: no intt~r~ 
sa fy the definition of a works 
atute. Inesp ive of whether the 
Secretary of Sta u:;es his powers to excluck~ CCT con a from 
the ambit of these provisions, the works con a regirnt:s and the 
works contract/functional work distinction con ined in th 1988 
Act is fr tc:d by the wording of 557 and S25. The only differenC(~ 
between the situations is that, if the Secre ry of 5ta 
util the powers con ined in S57(4) and S25(4) and(5) in the 
manner in which tbe Government has indicated that til will be 
u in uthority contra relating to activities subj to CCT 
will be prollibi outright, wh(~reas if the decision ken not to 
use those pow thOSE! in uthority contrac: will fall in the 
functional work rE~glm(~" 
In ngly, S168 of tlH~ legislation iilse 515A 
In the Local Govetnrneni ( otland) A 1975, which III kes 
prOVISion rding the appli on of surpluses and fi from 
DLO and D50 fun ,thus ensuring that the argument that in 
authority contra viola tile prohibition on rnunici ding is 
no longer a valid one. However 1 til provl~;lon of on ly aca dernic 
inter if the ry of Sta uses his pow(~rs under S57(tQ) 
eff(~ctively prohibit such contra 
In vIew of the fa that, in Scotland and Wales at lea tlH~ 
work con a regimes of the 1988 Act has been rendc"'!r(-!d 
obsol and bearing in mind that Government Mini (~rs have 
1 1·-" .~l 5 
expressed a desire to revIse the position on inter-authority 
contra in England, something which would no doubt occur during 
the cours(:=! of the CCT moratorium during reorganisation, it would 
appear that thf!re is little merit in discu ng the works contrac 
regimes further at t, (~specially if it becomes apparent in the 
course of time that thE.~ revision of the position in England follows 
the sam(~ pattern as that in Scotland and Wales. It therefore remains 
to discuss thf~ functional work regime con ined in the 1988 Act. 
TENDERING UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL WORKS REGIME 
As the works contI' regime of the 1988 Act would appear to 
become inoperable in Scotland and Wales 0I1C(~ tllf~ rel(~vant 
provisions of the 1994 A corne into for and would appear to 
face an uncertain future once the moratorium on CCT in England 
ends, we are left to consider tIlE:; import of tile functional work 
regim(~. The functional work regime is actually the device by which 
local authorities are compelled to expose work to competition if 
they wish to perform it via th own OSO. As such they form the 
central part of the 1988 Act and merit extensive consideration. 
The functional work regime bl hed by the 1988 A 
requirE~s that x condition mu be fulfilled fore an 8uthority' 
OSO can perform work: a notice rnu be published a ing the 
work to be ndered for; ailed fication mu have 
prepar and IH~ available fOI insp ion by potenti81 ten the 
local authority mu III a fied nurnber of s who have 
expressed an in t in performing the work; the DSO must prepare 
a INri n bid indicating their w h carry out the work; in 
aW<:lrding the work to DSO e local authority is prohibited !rmn 
doing anything antj.~competi . and in carrying out the work e 
local authority mu adhere to the detail specification. Each of 
these conditions will be cliscu although the prohibition of an 
competi practices will only be dealt with in a cursory manner, 
as the n 0 ella arc devo d to consi ration of Ulis 
condition. First 1 h owev(~r) th e pecu Ii a rities of til e sell erne of 
ons 6 9 of the 1988 Act will discu briefly. 
Section 6(1) of the 1988 Act declares til 
"A defined authol-ity may not carry out functional work falling within a defined activity 
unless each of the six conditions is fulfilled" 
This elaborated upon by S6(2): 
"Tile conditions mentioned in subsection (1) above are those set out in section 7 below, 
which has effect subject to section 8 below" 
TflUS S6 of tile 1988 Act prohibits tbe performance of work un 
conditions contain in are fulfilled. Section 8 elaborates the 
content of several of tllose conditions, while botb S7 and S8 endow 
th~! Secretary of Stat(::! with powers to 
((~rtain conditions. 
SE:~ction 6(3), moreover, provides that: 
ue regulations regarding 
"Tile section applies only if the works falls vvithin a defined activity, is of such 
description, is pmposed to be can-ied out by such defined authol-ity or authorities, and is 
pmposed to be carried out on or after such date (not precedin9 1 st April 1989) as the 
Secl-etal)!' of State may by I-egulations specify and I-e~julatiolls undel- this section Illay 
describe work by reference to a specified proportion of work of a particular 
description." 
It has been contended by some cornm however, til a t, ce 
the operation 01 S6 is predica e of regulation and 
I:Iwt the relevant d(~l ted legislation blishes both the t 
to which authorities were requi to phase in CCT bE~tween Augu 
1989 and January 1992'17 and the duration of contra 18, it is 
arguable that: 
17See Local Government .'\ct (Defined Achv1ties) (Competition) (England) 
Regulations 1988 S,L 1371, upon vvhicll this contention is hased, 
18 See Local Government Act 1988 (Defined ,L\ctivities) (Specified Periods) 
(England) Regulahons 1 <-)88 S.L 1373, upon vvhich this contention 1S also hasecL 
" ... S6 cannot effectively apply to any future work without further l-e9ulation by the 
seuetary of state. 
"This would mean the six conditions on which CCT is founded woulel not apply to any 
retendering of blue collar activities" 'I 9 
This argument is based on a construction of S6 which is untenable. 
Section 6(1) of the 1988 Act prohibi the carrying out of any work 
unk~ss the six conditions are fulfilled, and S6(3) that those 
restrictions will only apply to work "after such date" .. "as the 
ry of may by regulations s cify.!! The ulations 
introducing a phased progrClmme of competition specify tlH~ da by 
which the six conditions mu be complied with by authoriti(~s. 
Following those da the authorities mu comply with the six 
conditions if thE;Y wish to continue carry out work falling within 
the defined activities. The regulations ecifying thc~ p(~rmitted 
duration of con cannot used as the ba for any argument 
to the effect that tll(~ regulations mu b(~ renewed following the 
completion of the fi round of CCT because the of those 
regulations do not simply cify the duration of contracts; instead 
they regulate one of the conditions set out in 57 of the 1988 Act20. 
Clearly, as the sole intention of the regulations is to prescribe 
further tlH~ param of one of the condition there is nothing in 
them which can ken as threa mg the remaining provisions" 
Moreover, simply because the regulation c s upper and 
lower Iimi for e duration of con IS n n 
the promulgation of new regulations regal ng su quent rounds of 
competition: once can 3 arising frorrl the fi round of 
cornpetition have expired, a local authority is still in the position 
that it may not carry out functional work falling within fined 
activity (at a da now clearly som time after 1 April 1989) 
unless it con formr) with e x conditions con In in S7" 
Ta king til ose con dition (lS til e basis of discussi on, tlH~ 
franH~work of the tendering n~girnes bllshed by the 1988 A 
will n ow be exarninecL 
19 Cirel1/Bennett, The Machine Grinds On, 22/1 /93 LGe 20 
20 See e,g, tlle Local Gmrernment /\ct 1 C)RR (Defined Activities) (Specifierl 
Periods) (England) Regul::1tions 1988 S.L 1373, regulation 3 
1: PUBLICATION OF A TENDER NOTICE 
The act which formally initia a ten derin 9 proceclu rf~ 
on 7(1) of the 1988 Act 
the 
publ tion of a tt~nder n 
th 
II The first condition is that, before cZlrIying out the work, tIle authority published, in at 
least one newsp8per cit-culatin~J in the loc81ity ill which the WNk is to be can-ied out and 
in at least one publication circul8ting 8mong persons who carly out work of the kind 
cClilcemed, a notice containing tile illattel-S rnentioned in subsection (2) below," 
on 7(2) elabora on tIle t of such notice:;: 
II The matters are~ 
(a) a brief description of the work, 
(b) a statement that during a pel-ioel specified in the notice any person tTlay inspect a 
detailed specification of the vvork free of charge at a place and time specified in the 
notice, 
(c) a statement that during thi1t perioel zmy person will be supplied witll a copy of the 
detailed specification on I-equest and on payment of slich c[large as is specified in tile 
notice, 
(d) a statement that any persall who may wish to carry out the work should notify the 
authority of that fact within a pel-iod specified in the notice, and 
(e) a statement that the 8utliority intend to nl8ke, in aCCOrcl81lCe witll the notice, 811 
invitation to cany out the wode" 
The der n 
num of i 
In 
ks. 
1988 A 
first, and primary, 
thus rulfi a 
to in form 
the p the cornrnencement of a r(~ 
it m IClpa TIm, it n(~c:essl1 a brief 
ption of thf~ work as UI by S7(2)(a). ,In ddition 
publication in the local and trade pres r uircd S7(1), 
authorities rnu a blish a n r n in tl18 Official Journal 
of the European Cornrnuniti if the service IS one of those 
currently listed in Annex 1 A22. The in ation dernan by the 
21 S D' c· 7 it:; (1 1\ ' ~l '1 r:: '] -, i '" II 1(~ l' 1 '1. tl t t ,ee ~ 1[,-, I ' ", ,'-ITtlt es ",), ' .. , ant I,nnex ,', ,'" lIC 1 preSCrI (les 11e con en 
of such notices 
22 The interrelationship of the cnrrent CCT services and tbose listed in Directive 
92/:')0 is considered ahove, Chapter 1 
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Directive is mud! more extensive than that required by the 1988 
Act23 . However, the contents of the tender notice required by 57 
also reveal significant features of the tendering process. 
The Contents of the Tender Notice 
The potential tenderer obviously needs to be informed of the 
precise nature of the work which he rllay wish to bid for. For this 
reason, the authority is required by S7(2)(b) to include in the notice 
the whereabou of the detailed specification for the work which 
may be inspected free of charge24, and must simultaneously be 
prepared to supply the specification to a prospective tenderer for a 
fee25 . While these provisions are intended to ensure that the 
potential tenderer is informed of tt1e details of the work to be 
performed, they also illustrate that, while the issue of the tender 
notice marks the formal commencement of the tf:}ndering proo:~ss, it 
is clear that tile loca! authority must undertake a considerable 
amount of work prior to the notice's publication. The detailed 
specification must be prepared weI! in advance of the issue of the 
tender notice26. However, as most of the elements of the second 
condition reI 
detail below. 
to the specification, it will be discussed in grea 
The remaining contents of the tender notice set: out In S7(2) are 
In some respects the most interesting. Taking the last one first, 
S7(2)((~) requires that: the authority mu include in tile notice a 
statement to the effect that it will invite tE:~nders from those who 
notify it of their desire to carry out the work. Section 7(2)(e) is of 
considerable importance in determining the nature of the tendering 
procedure and the provisions of Direct.ive 92/50 against which it 
must be evaluated. Article 1 (d) of the directive declares that: 
23 The requirements of the notice published by virtue of DiL 92/50 ,A/ill be 
discussed belOYv 
24 The Local Government Act 1992, s9(3)(c) permits the Secretary of State to 
prescribe the periods during which the specification must he available for 
inspection. As yet no regulations have been issued. 
25 S7( 2)( c) 
26 On the prep8ration of specifications see e.g. CirelliBennett, The Tender Trap, 
17/G/94 LGC; Learn to listen, 20/1/95 LGC 20; Ins and outs of specif':>,ing, 3/2/95 
LGC 20. For an appreciation of the preparations for white collar competition see 
Kite/Cook, Countdown to Competition, 17/9/93 LGC 18, and in relation to legal 
services see Oakshott, The Legal Cballenge, 15~21 July' 1994 },U 28 
"restricted procedures shall mean tllose national procedures whereby only those service 
providel"s invited by the authority Illay submit a tender." 
As S7(2)(e) envisages that tenders will be invited, tlH~ ng 
proO:>.dure must be ag8inst the rninimurn ndarcls for 
cted procedures by Di 92/50 
Titlle limits for notification of intc~rest by potential contractors 
Finally S7(2)(d) p that tile notice Inu specify a period 
during which potential tenderers can notify the authority of tl1 r 
to carry out the work. Th element of the noti and of the 
ng procedure has been furtlwr regula cL Section 9(1)(c:) of 
the Local Governm 1992 provi that tl1t~ ry of S 
may by regulations fy tllE~ maxirnum nd rninirnUtTl time pods 
during which p tial reI's mu notify local uthorities of 
their in in securing the contract Consequently, regulation ?(2) 
of the I.ocal Government (Dire SE~rvices Organisations) 
(Competition) Regulations 1993 that e od specified in 
the notice during which rers can declare their 
intert~st "shall be a period of n less than 37 days commencing on 
the cia on which the notice publishedll • Til time period is 
consistent with the of Di 92/5027; although; strictly 
speaking, tlw e would n ir the application of thi 
time limit those ces which II within Annex 1 B and are thu 
n subj e full ng m TIH~ lation however, 
do not a tl1aXImUrn perl S7(4)(a) eff(~c:tiv Iy does so by 
requIring th III r, whi can only 
con have notifi th author of til i III mu 
issued t rno SIX 1110ntl1::; a r the publication tile ndN 
noticpn. There arE~ In liarities in the w ng of the 1991 
Competition Regul ons rn lirnit til eir e: til wi II be 
discussed b ow29, 
i7 See Article 19(1 L 
78 This m~ximum limit does nor ~rrly to h~g81, or construction ::md property, 
services: see the discussion of the in\rit8ti0l1 to tender below 
29 See chapter 3 
It may be convenient at this stage to consider the esstmtials of tile 
ten der notices required by Directive 92/50. 
The RequiremE~nts of the Services Directive Reqardinq Tender 
Notices 
Tender notices published in the Official Journal must indicate, 
amongst otlwr things) whether the contract is to be awardt:cI by 
open, restri ed or negotiated procedure30. As the UK's CCT 
I egisl ati on cen tres on a r rictecl procedu re, we may limit 
con ration to those provisions regarding notices issu d for 
cted procedures. Amongst other things notices mu specify 
the name, address, telephol1 telex and number of the 
contracting authority31, the range of potential contractors who will 
be invited to tender32, tile final date for dispatcll of invitations to 
tendE~r, information required from the derer about his financi I 
and chnical abiliti tile criteria for the award of the contract33 
where it is to be awarded to the m economically advan geous 
tender, and, perhaps most crucially, tile ption of thf2 work to 
be de red for. 
The n 
E~xclLl vely 
ement of the ten 
the specification. 
ng procedures rela s aim 
TIH~ second condition s out in the 1988 A which mu 
fulfill before a loca! authority m un ke work falling within 
a defined a rela to the availability and con nt of the 
specificcltion. on 7(3) til 
"(8) tile place, time and charge specified in the notice are reasonable, 
eb) befort1 canying out the work, tile authority IIlade a detailed specification of the work 
available for inspection, and copies of it available for supply, in accordzlllce with the 
notice, alld 
30 Directive 92/50, Article IS( 2) 
31 Directive ')2/50, }'\nnex III. C 
32 Directive 92/50, Article 27(2) 
~y, 
-X) Directive 92. 50, Article 3G(2) 
lS0 
(c) the detailed specification includes a statement of the period during which the work is 
to be can-ied out" 
The second condition complernen the fir~:;t: whereas tile first 
condition seeks to prescribe Uw con ten ts of the tender noti the 
second condition imposes further requirernen as to the 3vailability 
and con n of the e fication, and the period for notifying 
111 Section 7(3)(a) mply requ that the place and timE~ 
which the specification is available for inspection are reasonab!e34, 
while S7(3)(b) requires that the detailed specification is indeed 
available at the time and place rnention in the notice: til ensures 
that the con ined in the notice are given 
to by imposing a arate, though related, duty regarding the 
availability of the specificatione 
The statement as to the proposed duration of the work 
In S7(3)(c) we are presented with a provision relating not to the 
availability of the specification, but I content. By virtue of 
S7(3)(c)) the specification must inclu a "statement of the period 
during which the work to be cani out". It noting that 
where Oi 92/::)0 applies in entir the nder notice 
published in the O.J.E-C. should include this infonnation35. This 
aspect of th e specification is further regulated by S8( 1), which 
states: 
"If the Secretary of StClte so provides by regulations, tile second condition shall not be 
treated as fulfilled if the periocl stated by virtue of sectioll 7(3)( c) above" 
(8) exceeds a period specified in the re~Julations; 
(b) is less than another per-ioel so specified," 
It mu be ernph til the dura of 
se by regulations issued uncler this powf:r: i 
State issues regulations which that in order 
the condition set by S7 the authority awarding til 
inclu a ment in the cificJtion relating 
not 
rv of 
J 
fulfil one of 
con must 
the con 
3-:t See Associated Provincial Picture HOLlses Ltd F IVedneshmT Corpon'ltiol1 [194Rl 
1 KB 2::n, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for t]JP Civil Servicer19W'l1 
AC374 
35 Article 17 ,Annex HI C 
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duration which falls within the parameters set by tile regulations36. 
In e this gives a local authority orne discretion rding the 
duration of the con but i a duty to ded 
duration in the specifi OIL This ernph the importance of the 
specification to the ten ring pro and the at tile 
specification mu be pre well in advance of the notice which 
marks the forma! commencement of the dering procedure. 
Factors which must be taken into account durinq the preparation of 
the specification 
One thing which se s 7 nd 8 of the 1988 Act empll 
the cen irrlpor ce of the fi on. \I\fh rnay 10 gilt 
of in view of the apparent chronology of the conditions in S7 
of the 1988 A is that the specification is prepared in advance of 
the CCT ng initia The fication perlla the 
rnost important documen t in th e course of the compt~titivp. tE:mdering 
process on account of f~ tllat the pra for tile il 
specification be, in essence, a draft of the conUact37. The rnost 
cogent description of til detailed fication is that proffered by 
one legal officer who bed it as being simply copy of the finzJl 
contract with hi nk aces where the of til work and the 
name of the n to whom the vvork is awar d will bE-~ filled 
j n38. Whenever this course IS !lowed the specification must 
necessarily address a milltitu of issu , It will s fortll) for 
example, the conditions on ieh the con II en 
define the k perfornwd, the process vema of the 
con act and i subj m r, mat rs of general 
admini tion such as default and contra inon ring 
payment calculation, transfer of undertakings and equal 
opportu n itie~:; cia USt~S, perform a n ce bon and d pr mitl e til e 
geographical area in which e The content 
of a e fication IS therefor cornplex and very nicaL This 
ra two im I1t p n about their ration: clocurnen 
3b See e.g. the Local Government .~ct 1988 (Defined Activities) (Specified 
Periods) (England) Regulations 1988 SJ. 1373; Local Government Act 1988 
(Defined Activities) (Specified Periods) (Scotland) Regulations 1988 S.L 1414 
37rnterview ,.vith officers of Strathclyde RC, 1/12/93, 3C)/4/9:'); interview with 
officers of Stirling ])C19/4/94, 10/:')/95 
38 Intervie\'\' with officers of Strathclyde RC legal services, 1/12/93 
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some cornplexity need long and thorough preparation, and the 
nical na rc of 
authority rnernbers 
G 
which is 
cifi OIlS r ce~~ the opportunity for local 
e process. 
fi on IS tlH~ tTl a of defining tlw work 
for and the geographical location in i it 
IS be performed39, considerable care must be taken in packaging 
til e work. Numerous on 11 ave be ken rding e 
au til ority' s servi co requ irernen Fi it nee quanti the 
ce \Ivhich it provi Til p one of e great 
of CeT, 
often did not 
as it was prt~viou Iy the cas(~ that authorities 
a the e t or of the work wllich 
was being 
the level of 
forrned40. Consequently the authority n to eva!u ate 
accura p 
nature of the 
for example) 
refuse coli 
use 
which it n 
re til e specifi cati on, 
inclu in 
an authority wish 
provi in order 
Secon clly; at 
fication mu 
ex 
cornpetition in til e one ckage, or 
S2(7) til 1988 A 
it m 
cleaning and 
it wish 
t work s 
Iling within 
outwith the 
fined wll en it wou Ie! oth erwise fa II 
of CCT. Til e pr ration of a p fication 15; 
therefore, a long41 and involved ocess" 
The personnel involved in preparinq the specification 
The second ficatio It 
rent fairlv J rly 
"The introduction of competition has lar~lely been an officer led becnuse of the 
detailed wOI-k that has been involved, and the speed with which it has been clone. Tile 
39 1n some instances the speclfication rnay divide a local authority's area into 
several parts and permit potential renderers to tender for all of the DSO's vvork, 
or simply the work to be perfonned in one or more of the authority's constituent 
parts. The guidance on anti-competitive practices addresses the issue, and ,;vill 
be discussed in Chapter 3. However. the indicalions are that neither local 
authorities nor tendei'ers are totally happy "vith tendering for \,Ivol'k packaged 
in this way: interview with officers of Stirling DC 1 '-)/ -L '-)4 
-10 Interview with officers of StrathdyJe RC 1/12194; see also \Valsh, Competitive 
Tendering for Local Authority Services: Ini tial E;\.periences, 1991, at 14.3, 14.8 
U It was recently esLimaled lhat it would lake nine months to prepare a 
specification tor legal services CCT: see Oakshott, The Legal Challenge, 15-21 
July 1994 Ivlunicipal Journal 28 
1S3 
continuing management of competition is also likely to be led by officers ..... with 
members only becoming involved at the level of general oversigllt and wilen particular-
problems and issues arise." 42 
Two years later it was commented that: 
liThe pattern of member involvement had changed over the course of this research with a 
significant I-eduction in membel- involvement. The involvernent was ilighest in the early 
stages when authorities were considering how they should deal with the issue, and when 
cleal- policy had not been developed. Tl1ere was also interest in tile process of setting 
specifications and lettin~l tenders. The central mechanisms established for rnember 
involvement, such as panels and sub-committees of the Policy Committee, tended to 
persist, but with a reducing role,,43 
It was considered unlikely tl18t there would be a resurgence of 
member interest in subsequent rounds of CCT as the process of 
dealing with CCT has become institutionalisecl in local 
authorities44• In some cases, officers have even made conscious 
attempts to reduce member involvement45 . It is obvious, however, 
that members are finding themselves increasingly marginalised in 
the course of the CCT process, including the preparation of 
specifications. The preparation of specifications is thus a process 
increasingly left in the hands of officers. Typically, preparation of 
specifications is conducted by a local authority's legal advisors and 
the head officer of the service unit whose work is being exposed to 
competition 46. The head officer of the service unit, in his role as 
head of the client unit 47, may assume the role of II client agentll, 
essentially an expert adviser wllose role is to ensure tllat the 
specification adequately reflec the needs of the authority in 
relation to tile service In question, In the course of the 
42 VValsh, Competi tive Tendering for Local Authority Services: Initial 
Experiences, 1991, at 14.12 
43 VValsh and Davis, Competition and Service: the Impact of the Local 
Government Act 1988,1993, CIt 3.22 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 3.25 
~(i Intervi ew wi th officers of Strathclyde RC, L 12./93, 3 G.. 3/'9 5; Stirling DC 
19/.'+,/9.::1,10/5/95 
47 The formalisation of the client./contractor spli t \vill be discussed in chapter 3 
specification's preparation48 . Tile authority may also consult i 
011 11 fd rtm<::nt on trW rt:lating to the workforce) and 
onally al consultan may engaged where it i It 
that their expertise is relevant and useful49 , The process of 
pr ring a tender cifi on mu an officer I 
on with a number of 0 and en ng involved in 
compilation. 
The impact of the FC public procurement regime on thc:! content of 
specifications 
The technical n re of tlH! fication 
by til e uirenH~n t th at can mu rn 
irnposE~d by European Cornmunity law50. Thus 
specifi ons mu not 1 for exampl con vene 
discrimination on the n of nationality 
of the Fe Treaty) the free movmn of 
rther empha 
th f! con 
the con n of 
the prohibition of 
in Article 6 
Iring 
the use of local labour, or by ng fru f~ a 
of a contractor front another member ate to bring his own 
workforce 51 , the e movement of by imposing a 
on on the use of goods prochJ in otll er membE":r III 
contravention of Arti e 3052, or restri the right to fleedom of 
es blishrnent cont<1ined in Article 52 and tlH~ right to fret~ 
movement of ces in con vention of Article 59 53 . In addition 
specification must conform to the paran1E! by the Er: public 
procurement me. 
"-18 This practice is followed by Shrling DC, for example; interview of 1 ()/4 i 94 
49 Intervievvs \vith officers of Str:lthc1yde R~l i12ic)3, ,~O/3/c)5; Stirling DC 
IO/5 i (}') 
50 On the impact of the EC public procllnC'ment H\l~ upon the of 
specifications see g~'ner::tll)' Bi cst3ff, /\pp1 the LC, Rules 011 Standa 
zemel Specifications in Public and Utilities Procun"ment, (1 ()94) :\ P,P,LK 153 
-">1 Rush PortugUt'S:l LeLl \' Office d'fmmigr;lliol1, C1Sl':) C IUS'! [1 c)'X)] 
EC.RJ 417 
52 See e.g. Du Pont de Nemours Sp/\ v Unila Sanitaria Locale No,2 Di Carrara, case 
,~ ") '1 ! 0 (' ['1 () CI 0] F(~ n 0 0 C) ['1 CI () '1 ] ~ ,~" 'IT n -:> '\. 1 . 1 " t, ,; D, 1 ". 'c; '1 . T T ' t· \,",,, 00, ')j, ~,.d'l.()')J, ,jj .) \"l' .,i'l.,; ... "a''.'')la (")11 l)IUI tau.] \ 1'11[-l, 
Sanitaria Locale Ri\'!124 de tvlontemndo, C:lse C<351 i~~8 
53 Comnllssion v ltaly, case [3,88, [ll)':HJ 1 C)\ILR US; CC)lnmlSSlon v italy, (~ase C 
272/91, unreported 
lSS 
The provIsions contained in the Services Directive regarding 
technical specifications54, have as their airn a desire to ensure that 
sp fications are non~discriminatory and ensure Community-widE! 
competition" Directive 92/50 declares til at: 
"Without prejudice to the le9ally binding national technical rules and in so far as these 
al-e compatible with Community law,.. technical specifications shall be defined by the 
contracting authorities by reference to national standards implementing European 
standards 01- by reference to European technical approvals or by reference to cOlllmon 
kl:" technical specifications." ,) ,) 
There are a of definitions surrounding the J\rticl(~s relating 
technical specifications" Basically a tE~cllnical specification IS 
defin as b ng all of the technical criptions included in the 
der doclHTlents which define the work or activity which is to be 
performed, and must include matters such a for exampl the 
levels of quality; performan safE:~ty, the rules relating to costing; 
and II all other technical conditions whicll the con ng authority 
is in a position to prescribe"·56. J\ specification referring to a 
n ationa I n dard impl emen tin g a Eu ropean an dard will 
applying the relevant ciefinition.57, a specification approved by a 
reeogn national ndardising body for and contirlUOU 
applicati on, cornplian ce th wh iell is in til eory n cornpu Isory, 
which in rn implemen e ndard approved by the nt 
European body.58, J\ fication referring a European technical 
approval is essentially a spe fication based on a VO!H8ble 
technical assessmt!nt of tllP fitness USfc~ of a proehl based on 
the fulfilment of essential requiremen for building 
on the cheua and use of the produ . this approval shall be 
made by the body designated for this pu by the Member State.59. 
This form of specification obviously rel,l to con ction related 
54 See Directive 92! 50, Article 14 cmd Annex II. 
55 Directive 92/:')0, ,'\rticle 14(2) 
56 A mwx II ( 1 ) . 
57 See Annex II( 2) and (3) 
;~8Th~ bodies \~'hich may set the European standards are: the European 
"om llnttee f(?1' St8nd~1n.ilsatlon (CEN), the European Committee for 
Electrotechnlcal Standardisation (CeneJec), or the Ellropean 
TelecomnHll1lcatlons StClndards Institute (ITSI): see\11ne\: II(3) 
59 See Annex Il( 
services and construction work, A specification may refer to a 
common chnical Spt~cificationj which is one laid down III 
accordance with a procedure recogn by the Member States 
ensure uniform application throughout the European Union and 
published in tile Official Journal of the European Communities60 . 
TIl(! ClreLi nces in which authoritie~; rn depart frorn the 
use of s ndar implementing European standa ,technical 
approval and cornman chnical specification in drafting a 
specification are closely defined ane! lirni d, There arQ four 
clrcu nc(::s out in tllE~ Service~; Directive: if the approvals, 
stan rds or common chnical sp fications do not fa Ii 
con fonn i ty; or con form ity with th e sta n cia rds t(~ eh n ica lIy 
impossible61 ; where adherence would confli th 0 er Fe 
legislations particulnrly that on type approval for 
teleeommun tions inal equipment, and ndardisation in the 
fields of information technology and teleconHT1unicatioll , although 
an auth ty iell avails itself of these rogation's must 
reasons for doing so in the contra notice publisht~~d in the O.J.E.C 63 ; 
if the u e of the n reb would result in the procurement of 
equ ipmen t in compa tiblt=} with th at a Irea ely in us e, or en ta il 
disprop ona or nical clifficultie ,and if the proj 
In qu on is of a genuinely innovative nature65 . 
Howev{~r, til Dil ve also re 13 at auld ha n 
where no European ncl r ,t nical approval, () cornmon 
t p n i e a I s p fie a t ion 1ft h i is tIl e can i c a I 
cification may be fineo by reference to n tiona! ehni 
stand i are r cognisecl as complying with tllf} basic 
requirt!nwn listed In EC Dir on chn I harmonisation, and 
the res id in those elir rticularly Dire 
(i) See Annex II( 5) 
61 ,\rticlcl '"I ( 3)(::1) 
62 Article 1 3)( 
63 DirectivE:' C)):')O, .\rtidt-' 11) 
64 Article 1·~(3)(('). Ho\.vever this ch:'rogalion is permitted ir is LXI.II 
of a C.h"~lTly defmed, , strategy to change over to Europe8n st:md8rds 
t_(:;'_(h1']] (81 c:!pprovals 01' common technical fications ' 
v) A rtkle 1 .3)( d) 
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89/10666, or by reference to national technical spE~cifications 
relating to the design and method of calculation and execution of 
works and use of materials67 , or by reference to other documents, by 
wh i ch is mea nt, in order of preferen ce: nation a I sta n dards 
implementing international ndards accepted by the country in 
which the contracting authority is situated; other national technical 
standards and technical approvals of the contracting authority's 
state; and any other standard6s, 
Furthermore, unless the subject matter of the contract 
necessitates doing so, specifications generally may not mention a 
particular make of product, or the source of a process I this 
would favour or eliminate particular tenderers69, although for the 
sake of precision and clarity trade marks, patents, or the specifics 
of a product's origin or production may be enumerated provided the 
particular description is accompanied by the words 1\ or equivalent". 
The process of preparing a specification would thus appear to 
be both very legalistic, and also very much dependent on the skills of 
the officers acquainted not only with the practice of their 
department but also with the wieleI' practice of the trade or 
profession which is the subje of the tendering exercise. The 
It~galistic nature of the process of drafting a specification is 
emphasised by the myriad provisions of the Directive regarding 
technical specifications. 
The specification is thus not only a docurnent central to 
tendering procedures conducted by virtue of the 1988 Act, but is 
also a far more complex, and more heavily regulated, document than 
the references to it in the Act would suggest. 
66 Article 14(S)(a) 
67 Article 14( S)(b) 
68 Article 14( 5) 
69'\I~t1· 'Ie 1 '(. {oO \ (~ 1 C .. 0 1 1 
"'I. C .... ,,),. L)~e a ~o 011111115510n v Net ler ands Case C-3 5 9.,93, a case under 
the old supplIes dIrectIve, Dir. 77'()2, for ~ln example of a situation where 
reference to a particular product \vas held to be unlawful 
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3: INVITATION TO TENDER 
Tile tl1ird condition prescribed by the Local Government Act "1988 IS 
contained in 57(4), which declan~s that: 
" ... if any person notified the authority in accordance with the statement under the 
subsection 2(d) above, the authority rnade an invitation to calTY out the wOI"k in 
accordance with the following rules-
(a) the invitation was made by the authority bGfol"e canying out tile wOI"k, and not less 
than 3 nor rnore than 6 months after complying with the first condition [i.e. publication 
of a tendel" notice]; 
(b) if rnore than three persons who are not defined authorities notified the authority, at 
least thr"ee of them were invited: 
(c) if less them four persons who are not clefined authorities notified the autllority, each 
of them was invited; 
(d) if a defined authority or defined authorities notified tile authority, SUCll one or more 
(if any) of theni as the authority decided was invited." 
The 1988 Act, however, endowed the Secretary of te th two 
powers to regula cific elemen of th condition further. The 
fi con ined in 57(5), perm a variation of tile number of 
persons who mu invited nder; an d will be discuSSE~d below, 
The second provision is con ned in S8(2) which til 
IJlf tile Secretal,)! of State so pmvides by I~cgulations, tht; thin! condition shall not be 
treated as fulfilled unless-
(a) the contents of any invitation incluclecl prescribed matters (\lvhicri rnay relate to the 
time allowed for responding, the rnethod of I'esponding, or othe;rwise), and 
(b) if any response was made to any invitation, before cCirrying Ollt the work the 
authority coniplied with prescr"ibe requin::~ments as to responses (which may include 
requirements to disregard certain responses, requirements about the keeping or opening 
of l"eSpOnses, or othenNise); 
and I prescribed' Iler0 means pr-escribeci by the regulations" 
The r co ed III S8(2)(a) has been u In or r to specify 
th od during which con rnu reply to an In on 
t' all a period of n less than 40 days, comrnenclng on 
lSc) 
e on 
appear r 
e 1Il 
til co 
was time limit would 
re 
rt~e es a tion to th of the process. The 
fi rela to s of time linti Mnd how the UK a 
European leg lation intera on tllis ma . The second e 
requ mn g cansi dera ti on rega r th e requ irernen t In dorn c 
legislation that a given number of con should invited to 
. Thirdly, how are ose con who are in su t 
In relation 
It mu 
In .Liv t J 
once again, however, th 
ubj un 
provisions of the 1988 the provIsions Directive 92/50 do not 
apply in ttl r entir e ces falling In th ca 0 a 
most notably, s ools and wei re catering, other catering 
(b cally the provision of meals In can 72, and man 
orts and leisure facilities. 
be addressed, the time limits applicable 
til 
1988 
less than 
the ten 
a t til 
the can It atively brif~ e 
requires til the invitation to ten should be m not 
ree, nor more than ,monUls a the pu 
notice73 . There are a number of interesting poin 
n it ca la rn the of bl 
the notice, not from e end of e period during which 
con a can notify the authori of r in ane! tllu 
concurrently the od during which can can n fy 
the period (:luring which m III 
til r i mu be not be than 37 days74, an authority using 
e nllllirnum rioel of 37 cia r r ceiving notification 
and the minimum of ree months from the publi 
n In ng II have nm cid 
whi contra rs to issue invitations Secondly, Dire Ive 
70 Local Government (Direct Servi ce Organisations) (Col11l'pti lion) RegubliollS 
] C)93 S.L i'\48, Regulation :2( 3) 
71 See Article 1 9( 3) 
72 See P0.rt II, Chapter 1 011 this distinction 
73 S7 \ (0.) 
7:+ S7\L)(d) as amended by 1993 S.L 8-!-8, Regulation 2(2) 
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92/50 does not specify a time limit corresponding to that contained 
in the 1988 Act. While Directive 92/50, for example, sets a 
minimum time limit of 40 days for the receipt of tenders after the 
invitation to tender has been issued? 5, it does not attempt to 
specify when tenders should be invited by reference to the tender 
notice's publication, although if one adds the minimum period for 
notification of interest (37 days) and the minimum period for 
responses to an invitation to tender (40 days) which it sets, the 
combined figure of 77 days is significantly different from the 
minimum of three months which must elapse between publication of 
a tender notice and the issue of invitations to tender set by S7( 4 )(a). 
Thirdly the Secretary of State has sought to use the Guidance on 
anti-competitive practices to constrain the exercise of the 
discretion which authorities enjoy regarding time limits by virtue 
of the provisions of the 1988 Act?6. As the Secretary of State has 
attempted to regulate this aspect of local authorities' activities by 
defining certain conduct as anti-competitive, this matter will be 
addressed below77 . Finally, it should be noted that the time limits 
for the issue of an invitation to tender set by S7( 4 )(a) will not apply 
to CCT for legal services78, or construction and property services79• 
However, as the Local Government (Direct Service Organisations) 
(Competition) Regulations 1993 apply, which specify that 
contractors must be allowed a minimum of 37 days from the date of 
the tender notice's publication to notify their interest80, and a 
minimum of 40 days for replies to invitations to tender81 , the 
minimum period which may elapse from publication of a tender 
notice to receipt of tenders is, theoretically, 77 days, which is 
compatible with Directive 92/50, even though legal services are 
75 Article 13(3) of Directive 93/37; Article 19(3) of Directive 92/50. In certain 
circumstances this period may be reduced to 26 days: see Article 14(4), Article 
19( 4) respectively. 
76 See DoE Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department Circular 
13/93, Welsh Office Circular 40/93, paragraphs 14-16 
77 See Ch 4 
78 Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 1994 S.L 
2884, regulation 3(3) 
79 Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities)(Construction 
and Property Services) Order 1994 S.l. 2888, regulation 3(3) 
80 1993 S.l. 848, regulation 2(2) 
81 Ibid., regulation 2(3) 
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listed in Annex 1 B, and thus not subject to all of the Directive's 
provisions 
Although this matter has been mentioned above in adverting to 
the discrepancies in the temporal limits set by the 1988 Act, the 
minimum period for receiving replies to an invitation to tender must 
be discussed briefly. The Secretary of State has used his powers 
under S8(2)(a) of the 1988 Act to specify the minimum period for 
receiving replies to an invitation to tender as 40 days82. This is 
compatible with the EC services directive83 
The number of invitations to tender which should be issued 
The next issue to be considered is the requirement in the 1988 
Act that a given number of contractors should be invited to tender. 
Section 7 of the 1988 Act essentially provide that at least three 
potential contractors who are not defined authorities must be 
invited to tender, as must any local authority which has expressed 
an interest in tendering. However, S7(5) of the 1988 Act reserves to 
the Secretary of State the power to issue regulations altering the 
number of contractors who must be invited to tender. As yet these 
powers have not been exercised, and the adoption of the figure of 
three tenderers appears to fail to give effect to the provisions of 
the Services directive, which requires that in a restricted procedure 
the number of potential contractors invited to submit a tender by a 
contracting authority should be in the range of five to twenty, or 
such number as will ensure adequate competition84. However, the 
Secretary of State has attempted to use his powers under S9 of the 
Local Government Act '992 to specify in the Guidance on anti-
competitive practices that a different number of tenderers should be 
invited. Consequently it is more convenient to discuss the precise 
legal status of the confused domestic requirements relating to the 
number of tenders to be invited in the course of discussing the 
Guidance85. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Directive 92/50, Article 19(3) 
84 Directive 92/50, Article 27(2) 
85 See Chapter 4 
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An analysis of the available figures relating to eeT in England 
would, however, appear to indicate that the requirements of the 
Directive and the 1988 Act are in many instances purely academic86. 
The available data indicates that, taking the years 1989 to 1992 as 
a whole, on average 4.4 potential contractors expressed an interest 
in being awarded a contract, and 2.3 contractors were invited to bid. 
However, it must be emphasised that, in spite of 2.3 contractors 
being invited to bid, on average only one external bid was received 
for each contract. The study in question found that there had been a 
decline in the number of contractors expressing an interest in being 
awarded eeT contracts between 1989 Q 90 and 1991-2. In the former 
year there had been, on average, 5.2 contractors expressing an 
interest in being awarded each contract, 2.5 invitations to tender 
issued for each contract, and 1 external bid received. In 1991-2, 
however, the corresponding figures were: 3.7 expressions of interest 
per contract, 2 invitations to tender, and 0.95 bids received. It 
would appear that there are rarely a sufficient number of 
expressions of interest to enable use of the range of five to twenty 
invitations to tender set out in the Services Directive87 . There 
would appear, however, to be, on average, a sufficient number of 
expressions of interest in being awarded each contract to satisfy 
the requirement that at least three contractors should be invited to 
tender. Why, therefore, does it appear that only 2 invitations to 
tender are issued for each contract? This leads to consideration of 
the third issue: the selection of the contractors invited to submit 
tenders. 
Selection of those contractors who will be invited to submit tenders 
Before issuing invitations to tender it is the practice to issue a 
questionnaire to all potential contractors who express an interest in 
being awarded work. Such questionnaires will cover a number of 
areas. First, they will generally seek information about the 
contractor: for example, whether it is a company, firm, or sole 
trader; the names of directors or partners; whether partners or 
directors, or their relatives, have recently been employed by the 
86 Walsh and Davis, Competition and Service: The Impact of the Local 
Government Act 1988, table 7.2 
87 Directive 92/50, Article 27(2) 
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authority; if a company is a member of a group of companies, the 
name of other companies in the group. Secondly, technical references 
and resources: these questions will generally relate to the 
performance of the contractor in similar contracts, the employment 
profile and qualifications of staff, quality assurance, and technical 
references provided by previous clients. Thirdly information as to 
the contractor's financial status: for example, the name of the 
person responsible for financial matters, the name and address of 
bankers, and whether a reference may be obtained from them, the 
provision of accounts and annual reports, whether there is any 
outstanding claim or litigation against the company, the VAT 
registration number, and details of employers liability and third 
party insurance. Fourth, questions will be asked about the 
contractor's compliance with equal opportunities legislation such as 
the Race Relations Act 1 976, the Sex Discrimination Act 1 975, and 
the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944. In addition, questions 
may be asked about the contractor's health and safety record, and 
the size of contract which the contractor is interested in obtaining. 
Only if satisfactory replies are given to these questions, and the 
appropriate references obtained, will an invitation to tender be 
made, although, as was pointed out above, not every invitation to 
tender results in a tender being submitted. 
Domestic legislation does not always regulate tender 
questionnaires in an obvious way: the non-commercial 
considerations regime contained in Part II of the 1988 Act limits 
the scope of questions regarding the terms and conditions of 
employment, or industrial relations, amongst other things88, while 
the Guidance on anti-competitive practices states that 
questionnaires should not be unnecessarily detailed, and should only 
seek information relevant to the work in question89 . However, many 
of the questions contained in the questionnaires can rely on the EC 
public procurement regime for their authority. 
88 See S17. The non-commercial considerations regime will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 6 
89 DoE Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department Circular 13/93, 
Welsh Office Circular 40/93, paragraph 6. See Chapter 4 for a discussion 
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The Services Directive's provIsions on selection of tenderers 
Directive 92/5090 provides that potential contractors may be 
excluded from participation in certain circumstances, and that the 
suitability of contractors to perform work may be assessed by 
reference to certain financial and technical criteria. Articles 29 to 
35 of the Services Directive concern the criteria for qualitative 
selection, and relate the circumstances in which potential 
contractors can be excluded from participation in a tendering 
procedure. 
Thus a contractor who is bankrupt or is the subject of 
bankruptcy proceedings, has been guilty of professional misconduct 
by a judgement which has the force of res judicata, been guilty of 
grave professional misconduct proved by any means which the 
contracting authority can justify, has failed to fulfil his obligations 
under the social security laws, or has failed to pay taxes in 
accordance with the laws of either the country in which he is 
established, or the country in which the contracting authority is 
situated, may be excluded from participation in the award 
procedure91 . In addition, a potential contractor may be asked to 
prove his membership of a trade or professional organisation, if that 
is required by his country of origin in order that he may perform a 
work or service92. 
A contractor may be asked to show proof of his financial and 
economic standing by means of at least one of the following: bankers 
references, presentation of balance sheets or a statement of 
turnover in the previous three years93 , although this list is not 
exhaustive, and other sources may be used94. The Directives also 
permit evaluation of contractors' technical and professional ability, 
which may be assessed by seeking evidence, among other things, of 
the educational and professional qualifications of those in 
90 Article 23 
91 Directive 92/50, Article 29 
92 Article 3 ° 
93 Article 31 
94 See Construction et Enterprises lndustrielles (CEl) and others v Societe Co-
operative "Association lntercommunales pour les Autoroutes des Ardennes" and 
others, Cases 27-29/86, [1987] ECR 3347, [1989] 2 CMLR 224, at paragraphs 8-10 
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managerial positions, and of those involved in service provIsion, by 
listing the services performed in the last three years, a statement 
of average manpower over the previous three years, and an 
indication of the amount of work which may be sub-contracted95. 
Directive 92/50 also requires that authorities seeking quality 
assurance certification from contractors must accept either 
certificates based on the relevant European standards, or evidence 
of equivalent quality assurance measures supplied by contractors9 6. 
It should be noted that it is for the contracting authority to set the 
level of financial and economic standing which it finds acceptable 
for potential contractors to participate in a tendering procedure97 
A contractor who is guilty of serious misrepresentation in 
respect of the information given, or fails to supply information, may 
be excluded from participation in the awards procedure98, and 
authorities may invite potential contractors to supplement 
certificates or documents submitted during this process, or to 
clarify them99. The various provisions of the Directives appear, on 
examination, to be sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional to 
be directly effective. 
It would appear that a substantial correlation exists between 
the questions commonly asked by local authorities in the course of 
evaluating which potential contractors to invite to submit tenders, 
and the provisions of the Directive regarding criteria for qualitative 
selection. Thus, in spite of the fact that several services subject to 
CCT under the 1988 Act are not as yet subject to the provisions of 
the Services Directive in its entirety, the practice adopted in 
selecting which potential contractors to invite to tender generally 
seems to be consistent with what is permitted by the Directives. 
95 Article 32. These provisions were held to be directly effective in Gebroeders 
Beentjes BV v The Netherlands, Case 31187, [1988] ECR 4635, [1990] 1 CMIR 287, 
paragraphs 38-44 
% Directive 92/50, Article 33 
97 CEl and others v Societe Co-operative "Association Intercommunales pour les 
Autoroutes des Ardennes" and others, Cases 27,28 and 29/86, [1987] ECR 3347, 
[1989] 2 CMLR 224 at paragraphs 11- 18; Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The 
Netherlands, Case 31187, [1988] ECR 4635, [1990] 1 CMLR 287 at paragraph 17 
98 Article 29(g) 
99 Article 34 
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However, by virtue of S9 of the Local Government Act 1992 the 
Secretary of State possesses powers to regulate the qualitative 
evaluation of potential contractors by defining certain practices as 
anti-competitive: the compatibility of the Secretary of State's 
powers with the Directives will be discussed below100. 
Once a decision has been taken as to which of the contractors 
will be invited to tender, the unsuccessful contractors who have 
notified the authority of their interest in being awarded the 
contract must be notified of the authority's decision forthwith101 . If 
the contractor who has been excluded from the award process makes 
a written request, S20 of the 1988 Act provides that he must 
receive a written statement of the reasons why he has not been 
invited to submit a tender. Similarly, Article 1 2( 1) of Directive 
92/50, where it applies, provides that a contractor whose 
application to participate in an award procedure has been rejected 
must receive reasons for the rejection of his application within 1 5 . 
days of the receipt of his written request for them. 
The issue of tender documents accompanying invitations to tender 
There is one further important aspect of the issue of an 
invitation to tender which must be addressed. When an invitation to 
tender is issued it will normally be accompanied by a range of other 
documents relating to the tendering process and contract in 
question, which are generally referred to as the "contract 
documents". The contract documents will almost invariably contain a 
range of additional conditions relating to the tendering process 
which, if accepted by potential contractors will normally lead to the 
establishment of contractual obligations between the authority and 
the tenderer as regards the conduct of the tendering process 
itself102. Thus an authority may stipulate in the contract documents 
the conditions on which it will consider tenders, that the 
100 See, in particular, Chapter 3 on anti-competitive practices, and 
Chapter 4 on the Guidance 
101 1988 Act, S20: this provision is contained in Part II of the 1988 Act and 
will be discussed at length in Chapter 6, which is devoted to the non-
commercial considerations regime 
102 See e.g. Ettrick and Lauderdale D.C. v Secretary of State for Scotland 
1995 SLT 996; Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough 
Council [1990] 3 All ER 2S 
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submission of a tender will indicate acceptance of those conditions, 
and state that a failure to comply with the conditions will justify 
rejection of the tender103 . However, it must also be realised that 
the stipulation of tendering conditions generally will also impose 
contractual obligations on local authorities to comply with the 
conditions for the conduct of the tendering process themselves104. 
Perhaps more importantly, certain provisions of the Guidance on 
anti-competitive practices, particularly those relating to the 
packaging of work, may impinge upon the freedom of local 
authorities to stipulate certain tendering conditions105. 
Part I of the 1988 Act does not directly address the content of 
the contract documents, although the Guidance on anti-competitive 
practices issued pursuant to S9 of the 1992 Act does106. However, 
the Guidance only concerns itself with the level of detail of the 
schedules of rates contained in the tender documents, and not with 
the substance of tendering conditions. Significantly, however, S20 
of the 1988 Act requires that where a tender has either not been 
accepted107, or has been unsuccessful108, the tenderer should be 
informed of the fact forthwith, and must be supplied with a written 
statement of reasons if he requests them in writing. This would 
certainly enable a potential contractor to ascertain if his tender has 
been rejected for a failure to comply with the tendering conditions, 
or whether his tender has simply been unsuccessful on its merits. 
Where it applies in its entirety Directive 92/50, however, does 
stipulate some of the matters which must be contained in the 
contract documents. Thus tender documents must state the criteria 
which a contracting authority intends to apply in selecting the most 
economically advantageous tender109, and indicate the minimum 
103 This was essentially the situation at issue in Ettrick and Lauderdale DC 
v Secretary of State for Scotland, op. cit.: see Chapter 3 for a discussion 
104 See Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council op. 
cit. 
105 See Chapter 4 for a discussion 
106 DoE Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department Circular 
13 193, Welsh Office Circular 40/93 paragraphs 21-2 
107 S20(2)(b)(ii): discussed infra, Chapter 5 
108 S20(2)(b)(iii): See Chapter 5 
109 Article 36( 1) 
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specifications to be respected by tenderers who may submit 
variations on the specification where the contract is to be awarded 
on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender llO. 
Moreover, a contracting authority may ask a tenderer to indicate the 
share of the contract which he intends to subcontract to third 
parties1l1 , and may state the relevant authority from whom 
information about employment protection legislation may be 
obtained1l2 . Like S20 of the 1988 Act, the Directive also requires 
unsuccessful tenderers to be informed in writing of the reasons why 
his tender has been unsuccessful when they make a written request 
for that information l13 
While this may explain the process by which potential 
contractors are invited to submit tenders, and the potential 
implications of the issue of an invitation, it does not explain the 
role of the local authority's DSO in competing for the work. 
4: THE IN-HOUSE BID 
The 1988 Act provides by S7(6) that: 
"The fourth condition is that before carrying out the work the authority, through their 
direct labour organisation or a similar organisation, prepared a written bid indicating 
their wish to carry out the work" 
Section 8(3) of the 1988 Act contains provIsions regarding the 
calculations involved in preparing the DSO bid. In addition S8( 4) of 
the 1988 Act states that: 
"If the Secretary of State so provides by regulations, the fourth condition shall not be 
treated as fulfilled unless before carrying out the work the authority complied with 
requirements prescribed by the regulations as to the bid (which may include 
requirements about the preparation, keeping or opening of the bid, or otherwise )," 
110 Article 24( 1) 
111 Article 2S 
112 Article 28 
113 Article 12( 1) 
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This power has not as yet been used 
Although these provisions appear to deal with comparatively 
innocuous matters such as the method of costing DSO bids, they 
actually represent the essence of CCT. It must be remembered, to 
borrow the formulation adopted in the long title of the 1988 Act, 
that the statutes examined here are intended "to ensure that local 
and other public authorities undertake certain activities only if they 
can do so competitively". The 1988 Act only applies if a DSO 
participates in the tendering process. If a DSO is not willing to 
perform the work, the authority will be forced to award a contract 
to a private sector contractor, and awards procedures will fall 
within the remit of the Public Services Contracts Regulations 
1993114, 
It is convenient to note at this point that, as with decisions 
regarding the invitation to tender, and the acceptance of tenders, 
when work is awarded to a DSO, the unsuccessful tenderers should 
be informed of the decision not to enter into a contract with them 
"forthwith"115. Where an unsuccessful tenderer requests it in 
writing, he should receive a written statement of the reasons why 
his tender has been unsuccessful from the authority. There is a 
similar duty imposed on authorities by Article 1 2( 1) of Directive 
92/50, where the Directive applies in its entirety. 
5: THE PROHIBITION OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
Section 7(7) of the 1988 Act prohibits conduct in the course of 
reaching the decision that a DSO should carry out work "having the 
effect or intended or likely to have the effect of restricting, 
distorting or preventing competition". The prohibition of anti-
competitive practices was handicapped by the failure of either the 
'988 Act to define what constituted an anti-competitive practice, 
although S8( 5) did permit the Secretary of State to issue 
regulations requiring documents to be prepared certifying that the 
requirements regarding invitations to tender have been complied 
114 1993 S.L 3228 
115 1988 Act, S20; discussed at length in chapter 6 
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with in order that it can be shown that the authority have acted 
competitively. This power has never been used. Only by an 
investigation of the notices issued by the Secretary of State using 
his powers under 514 of the 1988 Act was it possible to gain some 
indication of what constituted an anti-competitive practice 116. 
However, this failure was addressed by S9 of the Local Government 
Act 1992, which contains several regulation-making powers, and 
authorises issue of the Guidance on anti-competitive practices. Due 
to the central importance of this issue, and of the impact of S9 of 
the 1992 Act, the next chapter will be devoted to discussion of anti-
competitive practices. 
6: THE DUTY TO COMPLY WITH THE SPECIFICATION 
Section 7(8) of the Local Government Act 1988 states that: 
"The sixth condition is that in carrying out the work the authority comply with the 
detailed specification of it mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) above." 
Unlike the other conditions, this one does not relate to the 
tendering process, but to the performance of work. However, it must 
be remembered that S6(1) prevents an authority from carrying out 
work subject to the 1988 Act unless each of the six conditions 
contained in S7 is complied with: by requiring that the specification 
must be complied with after work is awarded to a DSO, authorities 
are prevented from frustrating the purpose of CCT by submitting a 
tender in accordance with the specification and then, once awarded 
the work, performing it on a different basis. This condition ensures 
that an authority which subsequently abandons the specification may 
be subject to the Secretary of State's supervisory powers contained 
in 5s 1 3 and 14. Therefore, S7 (8) emphasises the continuing 
importance of the specification not only during but also after the 
completion of the tendering process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The 1988 Act establishes a fairly complex set of conditions 
which must be complied with in order that a local authority may 
116 The use of these powers will be discussed below, chapter 4 
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perform work falling within one of the services subject to CCT. An 
extensive range of powers is reserved to the Secretary of State to 
regulate the tendering process further. However, it is interesting 
that the final condition set out in S7 of the 1988 Act does not relate 
to the tendering procedure, but requires compliance with the 
specification in the course of performing the work: while this is 
intended to prevent authorities subverting the purpose of the 
tendering procedure, it would not, for example, prevent alterations 
which are anticipated by a specification. 
There are, however, a number of points where the 1988 Act 
diverges from the Services Directive, where the latter applies in its 
entirety: most notably in relation to the number of contractors who 
should be invited to tender, and certain time limits. However, at 
other times it becomes apparent that the domestic and EC regimes 
are not in conflict, but complement each other, in the sense that the 
EC regime prescribes additional requirements to the CCT regime. 
Thus, in relation to the preparation of specifications, the EC regime 
prescribes what must, or must not, be taken into account in order 
that the specification is as objective as possible, and does not 
discriminate against contractors from other Member States. Also, 
the Services Directive's provisions regarding the criteria for 
qualitative selection provide an additional, helpful layer of 
regulation which indicate the criteria which authorities may refer 
to in selecting which contractors to invite to submit tenders. 
Perhaps the most important provision in the domestic 
legislation is the prohibition of anti-competitive practices. As a 
result of the powers given to the Secretary of State by S9 of the 
Local Government Act 1992, a considerable web of regulation now 
surrounds this condition, which, as we shall see, seeks not only to 
define what will constitute anti-competitive conduct, but which 
also affects several of the other conditions contained in S7. It is to 
this central provision which attention will now be directed. 
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e rting point for any examination of the ue of anti~ 
competitive pra 57(7) the I Government A 19 
However, while S7(7) prohibited such practices) it did not define 
what would constitu an anti-competitive practice: the only way 
divining wh would be considered an anti-competitive practice was 
to examine the circurnstances in which the ry of 5tate u 
his powers to issue notices under 19A and 19B of the 1980 Act 
regarding the parallel prohibition of anti-com titive practices 
contained in that and Ss13 and 14 of the 1988 Acfl. As the 
government's increasing cornmitment to the introduction of 
competition for the provision of both central and local government 
ces became particularly evident in the early 1990s with the 
publication of the Citizens Charter White Paper2 and of the Treasury 
White Paper "Competing for Quality "3) it was felt th neither the 
1980 or the 1988 A endowed the SecI' ry of 5 te with 
suffi ent powers tackle effe vely e anti comp tive 
practices of local authorities4. In order to address this perceived 
deficiency of the tendering procedure the 1980 and 1988 Acts, 
of the Local Government Act 1992 was enacted. 
on 9 the Local Government A 1992 provi m in 
of a 
competitive condu 
Secr ry of 
ng the vagueness surrounding the concept of an 
tially, grants exten to e 
Issue del ega d legislation prescribing 
condu as being competitive or anti-competitive. The general power 
e regul ons IS can n in S9(1), which 
1 See e.g. !\hclure. /'\ Tender Process, 26·/.::1/91 LGe 12, \vhich examined the 
circumstances in which the Secretary of St::=tte h::=tci used his povvers under S] ,3 
of the 1988 ,Act to investigate allegedl,Y anti-competitive practices, The S}'stem 
of issuing notices under SsJ 3 and 14 of the 1988 Act will be eX3mined in 
chapter 5. 
2Cm I S99 
3Cm 1730 
4 S II"j 1-Lee .Ill. P,,) 
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"The Secretary of State lYlay by re~Julations Iiiake provision, for the PUllioses of olle or 
rnore of the conditions mentioned ill subsection (2) below, for conduct described in the 
regulations to be regarded, in accordance with the requlations and in such circumstances 
as may be so described " 
(a) as conduct livhich has the effect of restricting, preventing or distortil19 competition 
or is likel.y to Ilave that effect; 01' 
(b) as conduct which does 110t have that effect and is not likely to have that effect." 
The power granted herE! i v bro although it mu t be 
E::rnpha at the regulations issued under this SEc::' on may, 
theor eek not only to prescribe coneiu as ant 
com but define what not anti-competitive: there 
I alwa the possibili j therefore, that regulation m y b 
prornulga d with the positive purpose of blishing good 
tendering practice, rather t.han for the pu e of prohibiting cer in 
condll !,!owever, it rn re tl1 the power con ined 
In S9(1) only those II conditions" enu In (2)., 
f:~ conditions In (2) are the prohibition of an 
competitive pra con In III the 1980 Act, and, rnore evant 
f r purposes of the present d cussion, the prohibitions 
con 111 In 4(5) and 7(7) of the 19 A How was 
n legislative developmen in Scotland and Wales 
have ren the works con regimes con in e 1988 
A unworkabl nd it is ble proposed on of the 
In uthor con a Ii have the rn 
In nel5 , sequently, con deration the prohibition of an 
competitive practices can be limited to that relatin~J to functional 
work; namely (7) of e 1988 on 7 ( on e f 
e conditions t local Gluth ty awarding ilvork 
II ... that the authority, in reaching the decision that they should carry out the work and in 
doing allythin~J else (wllethel' 01 not by this ) in connection with the work 
before I'('?acllinq the ciecision, did not act in a manner havinq the effect or intended or 
likely to have the enect of l-esUicting, distorting or preventing competition." 
5 See chapter 2, supra 
1 
I ,! 
Several things mu be noted about S7(7). First, it must be 
emphasised that it is this prOVISIon which prohibi anti~ 
competitive practices. Neither S9 of the 1992 Act, nor the 
regulations issued pursuant thereto, prohibit anti-competitive 
conduct: they merely seek to define what will or will not constitute 
it. Secondly, the prohibition is couched in curious terms: it only 
prohibits anti-competitive conduct where a local authority awards 
the work subject to CCT to its DSO, and does not apply where work 
is awarded to an external contractor6. Third, the conduct need not 
actually be anti-competitive, but merely intended, or likely to have 
that effect. Fourth, there is a temporal restriction on which conduct 
can be anti-competitive: local authorities can only act anti-
competitively either "in reaching the decision that they should carry 
out the work", or "in doing anything else in connection with the work 
before reaching the decision II , Thus a decision or action taken after 
the work has been awarded cannot be anti-competitive. At the other 
end of the scale, it is arguable that in spite of the prohibitionls 
sweeping reference to the period II before reaching the decision II , that 
a practice cannot be anti-competitive if it pre-dates one of the 
stages of the tendering process. Thus, condu may be anti-
competitive if it is relates to any stage in the process from the 
publication of the tender notice, until the decision is taken as to 
who is to perform the work. However, the specification, which IS 
prepared prior to publication of a tender notice, is also capable of 
falling foul of the prohibition, as its preparation is obviously one of 
the essential stages of the tendering process?, and its preparation 
something which is done II in connection with the work fore 
reaching the decision" as to who will undertake the wOIK It is 
unlikely that any action or decision which precedes the framing of 
the specification could be anti-competitive, however. As the 
preparation of a specification is effectively the first step in the 
tendering process, activities and decisions which are ken 
beforehand, and do not relate directly to it cannot be anti-
competitive, because they do not form part of the competition 
ocess. The prohibitions con ined in the 1988 Act thus set 
6 See on this point the observations of Lord IvlcC]uske.y in Kershmv v City of 
Gl8.sgow DC 1992 SLT 71 
7 See S7( 2) J.nd (3) of the] 988 Act, discussed J.bove, chapter 2 
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ra to which regul ons eel under S9 of the 1992 A 
mu con 
The Matters Which May Be Addressed in the Requlations 
The con of th e lations wI! i til e S 
e by virtue (1) IS subj to the provisions S9(3) of 
the 1992 A which th 
"Without prejudice to the ~lellerality of subsection (1) above 01 to any power confelTed 
by section 8 of the 1988 Act (re~1Ulations with respect to fulfilment of conditions), 
regulations under this section may --
(a) prescribe the mattei's which are to be taken into accou or disregarded, in the 
course of any evaluation rnade for the purpose of deciding who should undertake or carry 
out particular work; 
(b) prescribe the rnanner in which, or extent to which, any matter described in the 
regulations is to be so taken into account or disregarded: 
(c) prescribe maximum and minimum periods for the periods which L~re required, by 
virtue of paragraphs Cb) and Cd) of subsection (2) of section 7 of the 1988 Act, to be 
specified in a notice published for the purposes of subsection (1) of that section 
(periods for inspection of specification and for notifying an authority of a wish to 
tender); 
(d) prescribe a maxirnum and minimurn period for the period whidi is to elapse, in a 
case where a notice I,as been so published, between-
(i) the announcement of the decision as to who should carry out the work in question; and 
(ii) the beginning of the period during which the work is to be catTied out; 
(e) make provision for the issue by the Secretary of State for guidance as to how conduct 
resUicting, distorting or preventing competition is to be avoided in tt,e doinq of anything 
under or for tile of ... Part I of the 1988 .Act; and 
(f) requite the extent (if any) to wliich there has been a contravention of guidance 
issued by the Secretary of State under the regulations to be taken into account in any 
detetTnination of whether or not a condition mentioned in subsection (2) above has been 
fulfilled. " 
e r lation~making given til e ry of by 
(3) can divi d in broad ca les, However, it should be 
n at e In (3) are "without prejudice to the 
generality of" (1). This emphas the importance and 
S9(1), and the fa th (3) out several particular In nces 
1 
In whidl the 5 ry of may e regulations. The various 
ca ries of regulation-making powers will now be con de In 
turn. 
Requlations reqardinq evaluations as to who should perform work 
The fi category of regulations are those issued under 59(3)(a) 
and (b), which permit the 5ecretary of to prescribe, first, th e 
m to be taken into account" in the course of any evaluation 
made for the purpose of deciding who should undertake or carry out 
particular work", and secondly, the manner and e t to whi 
m ined in the regulations are to be ken into account. 
These powers, which are very broad in their and essentially 
a to the ges at which ders are invited, and at which the 
decision is taken as whom will be awarded the contra 
perform the work. Obviously, the invitation to der falls within 
the remit of 59(3)(a) as an evaluation has be made regarding the 
ability to perform the work of those who have expressed an interest. 
If anything, the decision as to who will carry out the work is a more 
obvious example of the activities which may be subject to 
regulations issued under these provision as that decision 
reached after not only an evaluation of the nderers' ability to 
undertake the work, but also an evaluation of the relative m 
all of enders which have been submitted. However, the 
regulations issued pursuant to 59 require local authorities give 
effe til e client-con tra ctor splitS dl! rin g the competition 
process: it arguable til the regulations cting tllis are not 
referable to either 59(3)(a), as they do n relate to II matters which 
are to be taken into account", or 59(3)(b), as tl1E~y do not 
the" manner" in which a matter may be ken into account in the 
course of an evaluation, but in d to personn involved in those 
evaluation and thus referable to the general regulation-making 
power contained in 59(1). What the 5 of Sta cann 
regul however, either by the power contained in 59(1) or those 
con ined in 59(3) are the circumstances in which 
termin while this will involve an evaluation as 
carry out work, it lis outwith th e temporal lim 
contra are 
to who ould 
by 57(7) of 
8 See the Local Government (Direct Service Organisations) (Competition) 
Regulations 1993 S.L 848, Regulation 4. This regulation vvill be discussed below 
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the 1988 Act, which prohibi anti~cornpetitive a during the 
competition process, n a which ke place a the conclusion 
the dering procedure required by each Act, 
Limitations placed upon the prospective use of the Secretary of 
Statel s powers by the Services Directive 
In spite of the apparently of the powers gran d 
the Secretary of by S9(3)( a) and (b) of the 1992 Act, doubts 
mu arise about the circumstances in which these powers can 
validly exercised, In particular, one must question the extent to 
which it is possible for the Secretary of State to use this power 
regul validly the evaluations which local authorities undertake in 
the course of deciding which potential contractors may be invited 
submit ten and in the course of evaluating the relative rnerits 
of tenders prior to awarding contra Both are areas which are 
subject to regulation by the Services Directive, and it IS agam its 
standards the parameters of the Secr ry of Sta IS powers 
e regulations must be evaluated, 
With regard to evaluations made for the purposes of deciding 
which potential contra should be invited submit a tender, the 
provisions of the Directive which are of grea relevance are 
A cles 29 35 of Directive 92/50, which relate to the criteria 
for qualitative selection of ten was noted in Chapter 2, 
ese provisions permit contr ng authorities assess financial 
and professional probity, hon technical and economic nding 
and eral ability to carry out the work at issue. While all of these 
articl 
cou 
with the exception of Article 33 of Directive 92/50, are 
ISSlve it would appear that Arti 29 to 35 
of the Services Directive are directly effective, Articles 20 and 26 
of Directive 71/305, the original Works Directive9 , were held to be 
directly effective in the case of Been \I The 
therlands'IO. Article 20 provided that: 
"Contracts shall be awarded on the basis of the cl-iteria laid down in Chaptel" 2 of tliis 
Title,. .. after the suitability of the contractors not excluded under Article 23 has been 
9 Nmv superseded trv Directive 93/37 
10 Case 31/87 [1988] ECR"-l635, [199Cl] 1 ClvlLR 287. See paragraphs 38~~4 
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checked by the contracting authorities in accordance with the criteria of economic and 
financial standing and of technical knowledge or ability t-eferred to in Articles 25 to 28." 
In considering the interaction of Articles 20, 26 and 29 1 1, and the 
question of whether or not they are directly effective, the ECJ 
opin th 
" ... the rules in question provide inter alia that in checkin~1 the suitability of contractors 
the awarding autilol-ities ntust apply criteria of econornic and financial standing mid 
technical knowledge and ability, and that [the] contract is to be awarded either solely on 
the basis of the lowest price or on tile basis of seve I-a I criteria relating to the tender. 
They also set out the requirements regarding publication of the criteria adopted by the 
awarding authorities and the references to be produced. Since no specific implementation 
measure is necessary for compliance with these requirernents, the resulting obligations 
for the Membel- States are tllerefme unconditional and sufficiently precise." 1 2 
By extension, this reason ing a ppli cable to th e correspon din 9 
provisions of Directive 92/50. Due the two-tiel- application of 
Directive 92/50, there are three provisions corresponding to Article 
20 of Directive 71/305. The first, Articie 8, declares th 
"Contracts which have as their object services listed in Annex 1 A shall be awarded in 
accordance with ttle provisions of Tit les III to VI." 
e second, Articie 9 simply declares th services subject to Annex 
1813 need only conform to the rules on specifications contain In 
Article '14 and contract award notices contained in Article 1 6. As 
ose ces subject to Annex 1 A, which the Directive 
applies its entirety, Article 1 ° performs exactly same role as 
A cle 20 Di ve 71/305, and ensures that e criteria for 
qualitative selection con ineel in Articl 29 35 are eli 
ve. 
11,'\rticle 29 related to the cri teria for awarding a contract 
12 See Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The Netherlands at para .c~3 
13 See chapter 1 for a discussion of the CCT services subject to }\nnex 1 B 
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While there is obviously a du on the governrnen Mernber 
implement the Dir ves 1 it should be remembered til 
duty is n simply encumbent upon al government: a duty 
Impos on all relevant national authorities give effect e 
pr ions of a Dire ve15 . Thus the that the easury has 
issued the Public Services Contra Regulations 1993 16 give 
ef Directive 92/50, does n Ifil the obligation to 
implement the Directives: the Department of the Environment, Welsh 
and Scottish Offices mu also take steps to ensure that ng 
legislation is amend comply with the Dire v if 
necessary, Conversely, the relevant national authorities mu 
re in from enacting legisl on whi Incom tible w e 
Dire ives17. Therefore, the ry of State's ability to use his 
powers under of the Local Government Act 1992 to regul tile 
evaluations wldcll ke place in the course of deciding whom to 
in vi su bmit nders is severely restri Arti cI 3 (1) f 
Directive 92/50 provi th 
"Ill awarding public service contracts ... contracting autllorities sllall apply pn.x~edures 
adapted to the provisions of this Directive." (Emphasis added) 
While the Directive is addressed to the Mem r S e 
pu implernentation, the rights and dLi contain therein 
are actually incumbent upon contra ng au oriti ha been 
n d, local authorities must con I'm with the criteria on 
quali tive selection of potential con The elevant 
OVISlons of e Oil' while directly are couched in 
perm ter and thus grant some el'nent of di on 
con ng au orities with to their use. G the topics 
which are covered by these Artie! decisions as the evaluation 
n I lity form work are a m for the 
local authority_ The ry of could use his un 
of the 1992 A to require til local uthorities have rd 
14 E.g. Article 44 of Directive 92/50 provides that J'vTemher States must 
irnpJement the directive by 1st J11ly 1993 
15 Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-\Vestfalen, case 1--1/83, [198--1-J ECR 1891, [Jli8CiJ.2 
ctvILR 430; Gehroeclers Beentjes v The Netherlands 8t p8ra 39 
16 1 ()(B S.L 3228 
17 Cost8 v [NEt, case ()()~L [lC)(i--ll [CR 58:'1, [1 (!CA] CI\ILRA25 
1 
the provIsions of the Directives concerning qualitative selection of 
tender but could not prescribe the precise criteria which 
authorities should apply, or the weight to be given to individual 
criteria: those are decisions which the Directives leave to the 
authority18, Indeed, any attempt to prescribe which criteria must be 
taken into account would be incompatible with the Directives' 
provisions unless it related to an Annex 1 B service, or to work 
falling below the Directive's threshold, and consequently could not 
survive judicial scrutiny. 
Similar considerations would apply to any attempt by the 
Secretary of State to use his S9 powers to regulate the evaluation 
of tenders by local authorities. Article 36 of Directive 92/50 states 
that: 
"( 1) Without prej udice to national lavvs, regulations or administrative provisions on 
tile ,-emuneration of certain services, tl18 criteria on which tile contracting autliol-ity 
sllall base the award of contracts may be: 
(a) where the award is to be made to the most economically advantageous tender, various 
criteria relating to the contract: for example, quality, technical tllerit, aesthetic and 
functional cllaracteristics, technical assistance and after-sales service, delivel)' date, 
delivery period or period of completion, price; or 
(b) the lowest price only. 
(2) Where the contract is to be awarded to the most economically advantageous tender, 
the contracting authority shall state in tile conti-act documents 01" in the tendel- notice the 
award criteria which it intends to apply, where possible in descending order of 
importance." 
Given the similarity between the terms of Article 36 and Article 29 
of Directive 71/305, it may fairly be assumed that Article 36 is 
directly effective, and thus, given the doctrine of the supremacy of 
EC law, whenever there is a conflict between Community and 
domestic law, Community law prevails, and authorities will have a 
duty to give effect to it. Therefore, where Community and domestic 
18 See e.g. Gebroeders Beentjes, op. cit. paragraphs 24-5; CEl and others v 
Societe Co-operative" Association Intercommunales pour les Autoroutes des 
Ardennes" and others, cases 27,28 and 29/86, [1987] ECR 3347, [1989] 2 ClvlLR224 
at paras 11- 18; General Building and IV[aintenance Pic v Greenwich LBe [1994] 
92 LGR 21 at pp 40-42. 
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legislation regul the same as e former prevails it will be 
Commu nity, n clom law whi e pram ers 
ble aviour, and thus prescribes the limit of discr on 
which public bodies enjoy. The import Article 36 and A cle 29 
of Directive 71/305 is til e same: the contracting auth ority is given 
the discretion to decide on what grou nds a ten der will evalu a 
and, consequently, a con awarded. A duty is placed on the 
contracting authority to choose whether it will award a a 
e nderer submitting tile low nder, or to the tenderer 
submitting the m economically advantageous tender: if e la 
chosen the authority mu inform potential contractors in advance 
of th e criteria wh ich wiil 
importantly, Article 36(2) illu 
applied in evaluating ten Most 
th at th e decision as to w h i ch 
cri ria to use is the contracting authority's: it mu noti 
potential con of the "award criteria which it intends to 
apply" (emphasis added). The that the decision as to whi 
a to apply in a ng the most economically advantageous 
tender is one which lies within the dis on of con acting 
authorities was emphasised by the European Cou of Justice in 
Commission v Italy19, where it was held that the con acting 
authority awarding th e contract m 1\ exercise its discretion on the 
basis of qualitative criteria that vary according to the con ct in 
estion" 20 rather than in accordance with a formula laid down by 
islation. Thus local authorities are given the dis on by e 
Directives decide which cri ria to apply, as it is their 
judgement, and in tion, which important, n the es the 
S ry of a Consequently, the SecI' ry of ,In 
principle, cannot use his powers un S9 of the 1992 A 
prescribe e crl ria whi local authorities rnu take In 
accou in evaluating which potential con ctor award a contr 
th is impermissible as it would r resent substituting the 
criteria which he important for those which the author 
relevant, as the Directives demand. The ry IS 
thus limited to using h powers to give authorities e option 
lq(~ 7-'4/Q~ [·l(\Qr::]r:(~R·l(I,-'r::·[lCI'~7]·l(~1\/IIR~4- S 'to, 1 Ir 
... ase~I·C<", .~~J(L) c~ . A)_l, ..• 01 . ~j\ ~\.J ).ceepal leu ar) 
l'aragraph 25, discussed infra in relation to the Competition regulations 
ZO Ibid. 
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u ng either the criteria of pnce alone, or most econornically 
advan geous tender in a manner t with the Directive. 
The Secretary of s ability to use his power under S9 of the 
1992 Act to regu! under the aegis of anti-competitive condu 
the matters which may be taken into accou for the purposes of any 
evaluation as to who should undertake work is thus much 
constrained by the provisions of the Services Directive. In essence, 
the Seer ry of State may only use these powers where the 
proposed contra a service presently listed in Annex 1 B of 
Directive 92/50: as regards Annex 1 A services regulations should 
simply that the choice of criteria is the local authority's to be 
exercised in accordance with the principles established by the 
public procurement regime. 
Regulations regarding time periods 
The second category of regulations which the Secretary of State 
may issue under S9 pertains to various time perio " The 
provision permitting the setting of time limits is S9(3)(c) which 
permits the Secretary of State to minimum and maximum limi 
firstly, for the period required by S7(2)(b) of the 1988 Act during 
which the specification is to be available for public in on, and 
secondly, for the period required by S7(2)(d) during which potential 
contractors can notify authorities of th r interest in tendering fo 
a contra These provisions are ightly peculiar, a while all of 
the other paragraphs of S9(3) rei to the general prohibition f 
n competitive practices con ined in the 1988 Act, S9(3)(c) 
rc~la only to two specific elernen of one of the ng 
conditions specified in the 1988 Act. Instead of clarifying the 
tendering conditions which prohibit anti-competitive condu 
regu I a tions issu ed under th is provision effect a su bsta ntive 
amendment one of the tendering conditions contained in the 1988 
Act. What lirni tions exist as to 
contained in S9 (3)( ? 
In rei on the power to 
periods fOI the time during which 
vailable for public inspection under 
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e exercise of th e power 
fy mlnln1Unl and maximum 
the specification rnu 
(2)(b) of the 1988 Act, the 
ry of Sta enjoys considE!rable freedom of action. The only 
other legislative provision which has any bearing on the ex 
h is powers i til e r uirement ou t in S9 (4) th at statutory 
in rumen issued under S9 be laid be re both Houses of 
Parliament, and are subject to the annulment procedure. There is no 
corresponding requirement in the Services Directive regarding the 
availability the public of specifications again which this 
provision can be evaluated. 
The position regarding the ry of Statels power under 
S9(3)(c) to specify the minimum and maximum lim for th(~ period 
during which potential mu inform authorities of their 
inter in tendering is slightly more complex. The Services 
rective r uires that potential con actors should be given at 
least 37 days from the date of publication of the tender notin: in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities to notify contracting 
authorities of their inter in being awarded the con 'I 
Directive 92/50, however, does not attempt to set an upper limit for 
this stage of the tendering Thu as rega services d 
in Annex 1 A of the Services Directive, the Secretary of State may 
not a period of less than 37 days as the minimum for the 
notification of in For those services listed in Annex 1 B the 
Secretary of State may the minimum he deenls necessary, and 
for all services his ability to a maximum limit for this period is 
unrestrain either by any statutory limitation other than (4)( IS 
requirement til the subsequent invitation to tender must be issued 
n more than six months after publication of the tender n or 
the provisions of Directive 92/50. However, as will be seen, the 
ry ha a minimum limit which is con n 
with the ces directive for all services subj CCT, although 
til not necessary in all cas and has refrained as 
using this power to a maximum time limit for this ge of the 
proces 
21 Directive 92/50, Article 1 9( 1 ). 
22 See discussion of the Loc31 Covernment (Direct Services Org3nis3tiol1S) 
(Competition) Regulations 1 C)C)~ S.L 8-18, infra 
18-1-
By virtue of S9(3)(d) the ry of may also prescribe 
a rnaximum and minimum period for the time b en the 
announcement as to who will perform the work tendered for, and the 
commencement of that work. It is interesting n precIs 
whi period is regulated: the period between the announcement of 
who is to carry out the work, and its commencement As the period 
regulated by S9(3)(d) begins with the announcement of who is to 
carry out the work, it mu be remembered that where a service 
lis within Annex 1 A of Directive 92/50, there is a requirement to 
publish a contract award notice in the Official Journal23 . It is 
probable that the announcement of who will perform the work most 
relevant to a period prescribed under this power is the publication 
of the con award notice, as, temporally speaking, this is th(? 
la element of the award procedure regulated by the Directive. 
Where the work involved is an Annex 1 B service, the period 
prescribed in regulations issued under this provision will obviously 
run from the date on which the result of the tendering procedure is 
intimated to those who have submitted a tender: it should be noted 
at there is no publication requirement in these circumstances, so 
the intimation to those who have tendered for the work of th r 
success or ilure will represent tile relevant announcement. 
The period regulated by S9(3)(d) is of in for another 
reason: it falls outwith the mporal limi of the prohibition of 
anti-competitive practices contained in 57(7) of the 1988 A 
which only prohibits anti-competitive conduct up the point 
whi the decision is taken as 
dered for. Section 9(3)(d) rela 
who to carry out the work 
to the period immediately after 
that de on is ken. However, we mu remember the various 
lation-making powers con ined in (3) define condu as 
anti-competitive are II without prejudice the generality" of the 
power r la anti-competitive conduct contained in S9(1), 
which in turn tes that the regUlation-making powers are to 
ex for the purposes of the prohibitions on anti-competitive 
conduct, and thus emphasise the relevance of the mpor! 
I i Oil. Therefore, it would appear that, in this specific ins nc 
Parliament provided the S ry of State with the power 
23 Directive 92,50, Article Hi, 1 7( 2), Annex III E 
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prescribe time-limits a the con on the ten ring 
although it would appear that a violation f those limi rn n 
e 01'1 ibition of an petitive practices. 
Regulations permittinq tile issue of quidance on avoiding anti-
competitive conduct 
e third category regL!iations which the ry of 
may issue by virtue of S9 are those regarding the Gu nce on an 
com condu Section 9(3)(e) provides th the 
may issue regulation whi make provision e f 
guidance on how to avoid anti-competitive conduct, and may 
mul neously declare the extent to whi contravention of 
gUI nce may be taken In account in the course of "any 
determination" regarding whether an authority has a d an 
comp tively24. Th illu es, first, til the Guidance is n 
nding, but can only be issued rsuant to the appropria 
regulation and secondly that e Guidance may carry considerable 
prescriptive force. The I ram of some concern becau 
while the regulations by virtue of which it is issued may be subject 
to some degree of scrutiny, and may annulled by a eitht~1 
House of rliament25 , the Guidance itself may in prescribe 
what will con tute anti-competitive condu without bei g 
bje any effective scrutiny prior 
(3)(0 provi til regulations may p t i 
contravention of the Guidance may ken In account in the 
course II any ination" a to wh er an uthor has d 
ti~comp tively: thus illu rating that eon avention the 
Gu idan ee will not on Iy b of relevan ce the exerc 
s under S13 and S14 the 1988 
also an a ion for brea of tu ry ty btough 
ggne 
therefore 
ieh it i 
24 S9( 3)( f) 
2S S9H) 
2Cl See Ch 5 
ctor 2G. The Hnpo nee of the Guidance cann 
d , e regulations rsu a 
eon e n eha will 
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(Competition) Regulations 1993 
Having examined and evaluated the various regulations-making 
powers entrusted to the Secretary of State by 59 of the 1992 Act in 
particular, and the possible ways in which they could be used to 
regulate the tendering pro it now remains to consider the 
actual manner in which they have been used. The Local Government 
(Direct Services Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 199327, 
which came into force on 10th May 1993, regulate four aspects of 
the tendering process: first they set time periods relating to several 
ges of the ndering process; secondly they require the 
observan ce of th e elien tf contra ctor split; third th e regu la tions 
specify the manner in which bids are to be evalua d; finally the 
regulations permit the issue of guidance on anti-competitive 
conduct. ch of these categories of regulations will be examined in 
turn. 
Time periods 
The first thing the regulations do is to set mlnlnlUm periods for 
the time during which potential contractors may notify local 
authorities of their interest in tendering for a contract, and for the 
period during which potential contractors can respond to an 
invitation to tender. The terms of the regulation in question merit 
closer examination, however. Regulation 2 provides that: 
"(1) This regulation applies where neitller the Public Works Contracts Regulations 
1991 1101- Council Directive 92/50/EEC relating to the co-ol-dination of procedures for 
the award of public service contracts apply to the procedures relating to the invitation to 
telldel' fOI' tile work and Ule award of a contract for the performance of the work to any of 
the contractors. 
(2) The period which, by virtue of section 7(2)(d) of the 1988 Act, is required to be 
specified in a notice published for the purposes of subsection (1) of that section (period 
for giving notice of a wish to carry out work) shall be a period of not less tllan 37 days 
commencing on the date on which the notice is published. 
27 1993 S.L 848 
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(3) The invitation to tender for the work shall specify as the period within which 
cOlltl-actol-S al-e allowed to I-esponcl to the invitation a period of not less than 40 clays 
commencing on the date of the invitation." 
The first point of interest that regul on 2(1) res that til 
regulation only applies 111 ituations where the public 
procurement regime not apply. Thus regul on 2 only the 
minimum peri where a service fal within Annex 1 B of Directive 
92/50. It mu be emphasised, however, th lation 2(1) 
n th the Regulations as a wh do not apply whenever the 
public procurement regime applies: only regulation 2 itself is 
apply in that situation. Moreover, the di nction 
the two situations becomes academi when one real 
e ry of Sta has used his power to ecify periods 
which are alrnost identical to those contain in the Directive28 e , 
only differences being at no provision is mad as in the 
Di an expedited procedur<~ in cases where a tement 
r ng the authority's intended procurement requirements for the 
financial r has been publish in the Official Journal of e 
ropean Communities29, and that no provision is made for cases of 
ur~Jency3U, although those procedures would only apply to Annex '1 A 
In these rcumstances the ry of could have 
osen omit regul on 2( 1) and simply used his powers adopt 
time peri r all services whi are consl nt with til 
Dire ve, thus irnul neously giving e his duty as a 
"relevant authority" implement the Di and voiding the 
ai confusion whi regulation 2(1) esen 
The e other two pa ph 2 IS I 0 
worthy of n it ollid be n ed that regulation 2(2) 
sp fies a period 37 days as the minimum nnissible r 
fication i for e purposes of S7(2)(d) of the 1988 Act. 
Secondly, regulation 2(3), which specifies a minimum period 
the ad during which potential contractors can respond 
28 See Directive 92/50, Article 19(1) [notific3tiol1 of interest], !\rticle 19(3) 
[reply to invit3tion to tender]. 
29 Sec DirC'ctive 92./50, Article 19(-:1) 
~) SC'e Directive ()2 iSO, Article 20. Note, hmvever, tbJt CEes of emergency 3rc 
from competition: see S2(6) 
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an invitation to der, is of some In as it IS n 
under any of the provisions contained in 59(3), t In d ed 
un tlH~ of 58(2)(a) of the 1988 A which permit the 
issue of regulations which specify that: 
"the contents of any invitation included prescribed matters (which may relate to the 
time allowed for responding, the method of responding, 01- otherwise)" 
Regulation 2(3) 
provision contain ed 
therefore qui singular 
in the Regulations which 
validity. 
In that it IS the only 
n rely on 59 
e 1992 A for 
The next stage of the tendering for whi a time limit 
by the Regulations the evaluation of tenders. Regulation 
5(b)31 does not set a time limit in the same manner as the other 
regulations, but in cl states that it will be anti-competitive for 
au oritiE~S to announce who will perform the work later than 90 
days after the final date submission Til !ation 
would appear to rely \Ja!,'r!",ty 011 59('1'\ Af tho 19 Q 'J fj,(-+' '-1" v-'\..../; J ~~ \ J \".,1 \.... \ • .P i ,_ v L (\ J L, u'::::-"-
S9(3)(c) and Cd) rei to different stages of the tendering process, 
and 59(3)(a) could only apply if the \II/ords /I matters which are 
account... the course of an evalu onll are construed to 
mean n(Jt only the criteria which are to f)e taken account, t 
Iso e expedition \Nith which evaluation is to earn 
given that auth c()nsiCferal}le care determine til 
II each of the III a nee of the publication 
of the tender noti however, and consequently n rna 
uated II in the course of" the ng !t ould 
n that the length of the period during which ders are 
E\/alua 8 rna r on ich the ces Dire 
Th ere is some 
ons of the Guidance on an competlt!\/e con 
imn!ic:rlhnn nf VJhi 
.. --!- .. -- -- -- - -. - - _. -_. appears be the n for a Ion 
ad for 
31 Note tlBt this regulation explicitly- states that it onlv apT,lies to functional 
work. 
32 See Chapter 4 
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Regulation 3, the final provision of the Regulations which specifies 
time limits, relies on S9(3)(d) of the 1992 Act for its authority. 
Regulation 3 states that: 
"In a case where a notice has been published for the purposes of section 7(1) of the 
1988 Act the period which is to elapse between the announcement of the decision as to 
who should carry out the work described in the notice and the beginning of the period 
during which that work is to be carried out shall be not less than 30 days, and not more 
than 120 days." 
There are a number of points to note about this regulation. First, 
unlike regulation 2, in setting minimum and maximum periods 
regulation 3 does not attempt to distinguish between the situations 
where the EC Services Directive does and does not apply, probably 
because this time period is not addressed in the Directive. Secondly, 
it should be noted that, although regulation 3 specifies this 
particular time period, regulation S(c) specifies that "doing anything 
which results, or is likely to result, in the contravention of 
regulation 3" will represent anti-competitive conduct. This 
illustrates the peculiar nature of this time period. It must be 
remembered that S7(7) of the 1988 Act only prohibits anti-
competitive conduct up until the point at which a decision is reached 
which results in the DSO performing the work exposed to 
competition. The conduct of the authority thereafter is not affected 
by the prohibition. As the purpose of S9 of the 1992 Act is to permit 
definition of the conduct which will be anti-competitive, 
regulations issued under its provisions are also subject to that 
temporal limitation. As the cumulative effect of regulations 3 and 
S(b) is to require that the work tendered for should be commenced 
not less than 30, nor more than 120 days, after the announcement of 
who is to carry out the work is effectively to define the 
commencement of work outside of that time period as anti-
competitive, the temporal limitation contained in the general 
prohibition is violated, as the date of commencement of the work is 
by its very nature a matter which generally occurs after the 
decision as to who is to perform the work. It must be emphasised 
that the Secretary of State is entitled to use his powers under 
S9(3)(d) to specify the period during which work should be 
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commenced, as the powers contained in S9(3) are "without prejudice 
to the generality" of the general power contained in S9( 1) to issue 
regulations defining conduct as anti-competitive, and that 
consequently the power contained in S9 (3)( d) can be viewed as 
simply a power to specify a time limit33 . Thus, while he can specify 
this power by virtue of S9(3)(d), what the Secretary of State cannot 
do is specify that violation of that time period is anti-competitive: 
that violates the temporal limits of the general prohibition on anti-
competitive conduct, and is ultra vires. Consequently the 
permissible time limits for commencement of work awarded under 
the 1988 Act are left without an effective statutory sanction. 
The client-contractor split during the competition process 
The second category to be considered is represented by the 
requirement contained in regulation 4 that the client and contractor 
roles of the local authority should be separated during the tendering 
process. It is interesting that regulation 4(2) provided that this 
separation of roles should only pertain to functional work, although, 
in view of the process of revision which is rendering the works 
contracts regimes unworkable34, this is a point of purely academic 
interest. Regulation 4(3) essentially sets out three situations which 
will represent a failure to distinguish between the roles of client 
and contractor, and thus contravene the prohibition of anti-
competitive conduct. The first is set out in S4(3)(a), which defines 
as anti-competitive the situation where "any individual" performs 
work, or is responsible for performing a "relevant operation" , while 
concurrently being involved in the preparation of the DSO bid. It 
should be noted that the regulation refers to "any individual", which 
will mean an officer or employee of the authority, or even a 
consultant engaged by the authority to assist in the CCT process, 
and, in spite of suppositions to the contrary, a member35 . As the 
33 Indeed, the formulation adopted in the Regulations implicitly gives some 
support for this proposition: regulation 3 sets the minimum and maximum time 
limits, whereas it is stated elsewhere that actions in contravention of the time 
limits will be anti-competitive 
34See chapter 2 
35 See Cirelli Bennet, Regulations at last but much mystery remains, 16/4/93 
LGC 10 where it is opined that because the DoE climbed down on a proposal to 
expressly forbid members to have client and contractor side responsibilities, 
regulation 4 is not capable of applying to members. This ignores the fact that, 
in the absence of any definition, the words "any individual" must be construed 
191 
letter sent to local authorities accompanying the Regulations works 
on the assumption that regulation 4 does not apply to members, it 
would appear that the Secretary of State's advisers have failed to 
appreciate the import of the regulation's wording. Thus the 
Secretary of State's belief that Regulation 4 cannot apply to 
members is a misdirection in law. The Guidance, however, does 
attempt to extend the client/contractor split to members, although 
the approach taken there is legally impermissible36. However, 
regulation 4(3) does permit certain officers and employees of the 
authority to have responsibilities, or to perform work, relating to 
both the client and the contractor side of the tendering process. The 
persons to whom this paragraph of the regulation does not apply are: 
the head of the authority's paid service [e.g. the chief executive], or 
in his absence, his deputy37; the statutory or non-statutory chief 
officer (or in his absence his deputy) who is directly accountable to 
the head of the paid service for the discharge of the relevant 
operation38; and any person employed by the local authority to 
provide legal, financial, or "other professional advice" in relation to 
the business of the local authority39. There are six "relevant 
operations" which can be carried out by these officers, but not by 
other officers or employees who are concurrently engaged in 
preparing the DSO bid. They are: selecting any publication in which a 
tender notice is to be published for the purposes of S7 (1) of the 
1988 Act; selecting those potential contractors who will be invited 
to submit a tender; sending tender documents to those potential 
contractors who are invited to submit a tender; calculating or 
estimating any prospective cost40; receiving, opening or evaluating 
the in-house bid and the potential contractor's tenders, and; deciding 
whether the work is to be carried out by the DSO or by a contractor. 
The list is extensive, although, significantly, it does not include 
in accordance with their ordinary meaning, and therefore is capable of 
including members. However, the real reason why members are excluded from 
the operation of this regulation lies in a procedural defect: see fn 35 and 
discussion of the Guidance. 
36 See discussion of paragraph 13 of the Guidance, infra, Ch 4, which will 
discuss the relevance of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
37 Regulation 4(3)(a)(i) 
38 Regulation 4(3)(a)(ii) 
39 Regulation 4(3)(a)(iii) 
40 The issue of "prospective cost" will be discussed below 
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preparation of the specification. There is a cogent practical reason 
for this omission. The specification is prepared in advance of the 
tender notice which marks the formal commencement of the 
tendering process. However, regulation 4(3) only defines conduct as 
being anti-competitive if it involves a person being "concurrently" 
involved with a "relevant operation" and the OSO bid. As the OSO bid 
can only be submitted after the specification is made available, it 
would be impossible to fulfil the requirement that the activities be 
-- -- -
performed "concurrently". It would also appear impossible for a 
person to be concurrently involved in preparing the OSO bid and to be 
involved in selecting the publications in which tender notices are to 
be published for the purposes of S7(1) of the 1988 Act. The issue of 
the notice marks the initiation of the tendering procedure, and the 
pOint in time at which the specification becomes available, and the 
OSO, like other tenderers, cannot submit its bid without first 
consulting the specification to see what exactly must be tendered 
for. As there is therefore a clear temporal distinction between the 
point at which a decision is taken as to which journals to publish 
the tender notice in, and the preparation of the OSO bid, it is 
impossible for a person to be concurrently involved in both 
activities. The corollary to this is that it is possible for an officer 
to be involved in the client side's preparation of a specification, and 
to transfer to the contractor side and be involved in preparation of 
the DSO bid. 
The two remaining paragraphs of regulation 4(3) essentially 
provide that: 
"(b) giving to the direct service organisation information about the work in addition to 
the information contained in the notice published under section 7(1) of the 1988 Act, 
without giving the same information to each of the persons who gave the local authority 
notice that he may wish to carry out the work; 
(c) giving to the direct service organisation information about the work in addition to 
the information contained in the tender documents, without giving the same information 
to each of the contractors." 
will be anti-competitive. These two paragraphs attempt to ensure 
that the client and contractor roles are further separated, with the 
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DSO placed in the same posItIon as other potential contractors. The 
separation of client and contractor roles contained in these 
paragraphs reflects the peculiarities of the wider statutory 
framework. Regulation 4(3)(b) is limited effectively to the period 
between the publication of the tender notice and the issue of 
invitations to tender. Regulation 4(3)(c), however, proscribes 
conduct as anti-competitive in relation to the stage of the process 
after invitations to tender have been issued: namely the period 
during which tenders are being prepared. The import of the two 
paragraphs is essentially the same: if information is given to the 
DSO during either of these stages, it must also be given to potential 
contractors, as a failure to do so will represent anti-competitive 
conduct. 
The Services Directive addresses the issue of giving additional 
information to tenderers, declaring that: 
"Provided that it has been requested in good time, additional information relating to the 
contract documents must be supplied by the contracting authorities not later than six 
days before the final date fixed for receipt of tenders. "41 
This provision applies to "the contract documents" in general, and 
thus governs the supply of information relating to all contract 
documents from the tender notice onwards, and encompasses the 
specification and related documents. There is little problem with 
regulating the period between the issue of the tender notice and the 
issue of the invitation to tender which regulation 4(3)(b) governs. In 
relation to the period after invitations to tender have been invited, 
to which regulation 4(3)(c) relates, the Directive only requires that, 
if requested at least six days before the final date for receipt of 
tenders, additional information relating to the contract documents 
must be provided. The Directive does not state whether the 
information need only be supplied to the tenderer who requests it, or 
if all tenderers are to be given the same additional information as a 
result of a request. However, if we remember that the fundamental 
aim underlying the Directive is to provide greater transparency in 
public procurement procedures by the adoption of objective 
41 Directive 92/50, Article 19( 6) 
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procedural standards, then a requirement that, in reply to a request 
regarding the contents of the tender documents by one tenderer, all 
other tenderers should be supplied with the same information, would 
represent an objective measure providing greater transparency in 
the award procedure: all of the tenderers would be placed in the 
same position and the procedure would be rendered more transparent 
by virtue of the greater availability of information. However, this is 
not what regulation 4(3)(c) seeks to achieve: it only requires 
additional information to be given to other tenderers if it is 
provided to the DSO first. Admittedly, the reason for this lies in the 
fact that the Secretary of State is issuing regulations under S9 of 
the 1992 Act to define the circumstances in which local authorities 
act anti-competitively in the course of a tendering process which 
results in work being awarded to their DSO. However, it is 
inescapable that S9( 4 )(a) of the 1992 Act also empowers the 
Secretary of State "to make such incidental, consequential, 
transitional, or supplementary provision as [he] thinks necessary or 
expedient". This power could have been used to ensure that an 
objective and transparent procedure consistent with the Directive 
was established, on the grounds that such a provision would 
supplement the provisions of the other paragraphs of this regulation, 
and could be deemed necessary in order to give effect to the 
obligation to the duty to legislate in a manner consistent with the 
relevant European legislation. 
The provisions of regulation 4 are described by officers as being 
far less severe than they might have been42. Indeed, the impact of 
regulation 4 is in some cases little felt on account of authorities 
voluntarily effecting a more strict division of client and contractor 
side responsibilities between officers43. It should be remembered 
that the development of client and contractor roles is an inherent 
part of CCT, permeating not only the tendering process, but also the 
performance of the work after it has been awarded, and that 
authorities have thus been operating client- and contractor-side 
42 Interviews with officers of Strathclyde RC, 1112/93, 30/3/95 and with 
officers of Stirling DC, 19/4/93 
43 Interview with officers of Stirling DC 19/4/94 
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operations with varying degrees of success since 198844. 
Consequently it is unsurprising that authorities do not regard the 
requirements of regulation 4 as particularly onerous, for although 
the process of developing client and contractor roles is not complete 
in all authorities45 , authorities are by now sufficiently acquainted 
with the concept to have developed a body of practice which exceeds 
the requirements of the regulation. 
The Evaluation of Tenders 
The third category of regulations concerns the evaluation of 
tenders. Regulation 5 contains the general principle which 
essentially provides that a failure to assess tenders in accordance 
with the provisions of the Regulations will constitute anti-
competitive conduct. Regulation S(a)46 merits closer examination. 
It states that: 
"For the purposes of the conditions mentioned in section 9(2)(b) and section 9(2)(d) of 
the 1992 Act, the following conduct is to be regarded as conduct which has the effect of 
restricting, preventing or distorting competition, or is likely to have that effect, 
namely-
(a) conduct in the course of any evaluation made for the purpose of deciding who should 
undertake or carry out the work, which consists of, or involves-
(i) calculating the amount of any prospective cost after the opening of the bid and 
contractors' tenders for the work; 
(ii) giving to the direct service organisation an opportunity to explain or provide 
further information about the bid, without giving an equivalent opportunity to each of 
the contractors; 
44 For an examination of the early experiences of authorities with the 
client/contractor split in general see Walsh, Competitive Tendering for Local 
Authority Services: Initial Experiences, 1991, Chapters 7, 8. For a critique of 
the operation of the client/contractor split see, Realising the Benefits of 
Competition: the Client Role for Contracted Services, Audit Commission, Local 
Government Report No.4, 1993, which advocates a strengthening of the client 
role, particularly by involving consumers of services in redressing several 
perceived problems, in order that the benefits of competition may be realised 
more effectively 
45 Walsh and Davis, Competition and Service: The Impact of the Local 
Government Act 1988, at 15.5 
46 Regulation 5(b) was discussed above in relation to time limits for the 
tendering process. 
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(iii) taking into account the matters mentioned in regulation 6 in a manner, or to an 
extent, other than as prescribed in these Regulations; 
(iv) taking into account any costs, other than prospective costs, which the local 
authority would, or could, incur as a consequence of a decision to accept one of the 
contractors' tenders for the work" 
Like regulation 4, the reference to S9(2)(b) and S9(2)(d) ensures that 
this regulation, and consequently the other regulations regarding 
tender evaluation, only apply to functional work. To understand the 
import of this regulation, one must first understand what is meant 
by "allowable" and "prospective" costs. 
"Allowable" costs 
The Regulations identify two "allowable" costs. The first, 
relating to the cost of employing disabled persons as defined in the 
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 194447, is "the amount, if any, 
by which the relevant costs exceed the amount of grant aid paid, or 
to be paid, to the local authority by the Department of Employment 
in aid of the employment of disabled persons, which, if the bid were 
successful, would be attributable to the employment of disabled 
persons in relation to the work"48. To be a "relevant cost", the cost 
must, firstly, be one which results from the employment of a 
disabled rather than an able bodied person, and secondly, be ascribed 
to the performance of work by disabled persons if the DSO bid is 
successful49. Thus the allowable cost is simply the difference 
between the Department of Employment grant relating to the 
employment of disabled persons, and the actual cost of employing 
the disabled. The second allowable cost concerns the employment of 
traineesso. Regulation 10(3) identifies two different sub-classes of 
allowable costs regarding the employment of trainees. The first 
sub-category defines an allowable cost as being the amount by 
which the "relevant costs" exceed the amount of aid given by the 
Secretary of State by virtue of arrangements under S2 of the 
Employment and Training Act 1973, or under arrangements made by 
47 Regulation 9(1) 
48 Regulation 9 (2) 
49 Regulation 9( 1) 
50 Trainees are defined as "persons employed under the terms of any relevant 
arrangements"; regulation 10(1) 
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Scottish Enterprise or Highlands and Islands Enterprise under S2 of 
the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 199051 . The second 
sub-category relates to all other arrangements which local 
authorities make for the employment of trainees or apprentices, and 
states that a cost will be allowable where "relevant costs" exceed 
the value of the sum of the amount of any grant aid, and the costs 
which result from employing trainees as opposed to persons who are 
not trainees52. The "relevant costs" of employing trainees include 
the management of training arrangements (including recruitment, 
setting up projects, and placements)53, all the necessary overheads 
of training arrangements54, provision of instruction and the 
registration of qualifications55 and the provision of financial 
support for trainees56. The allowable costs in relation to the 
employment of trainees are thus quite extensive. 
"Prospective" costs 
The Regulations also refer to "prospective costs". The 
calculation or estimation of prospective costs is expressly stated 
by regulation 1 1 as being conduct which is not anti-competitive. 
This is the only instance of the Secretary of State using his power 
under S9(1) and S9(3)(a) of the 1992 Act to define conduct as not 
being anti-competitive. There are three prospective costs: 
redundancy costs, payments made to employees during the period of 
notice of dismissal where a contract is won by the private sector, 
and the costs of terminating contracts for hire and other contracts. 
Regulation 12 provides a formula for the calculation of prospective 
redundancy costs, which may be used where a local authority which 
has pursued a general policy of exercising its discretion to award 
compensation to eligible staff within the meaning of the relevant 
Regulations57 would make staff redundant on the acceptance of a 
contractor's tender to perform the work. Regulation 13 permits the 
51 Regulation 10(3)(a) 
52 Regulation 10(3)(b) 
S3 Regulation 10(2)(a) 
54 Regulation 10(2)(b) 
5S Regulation 10(2)(c) 
S6 Regulation 10(2)( d) 
S7 See Regulation 1 for a definition of the multitude of Regulations which must 
be adhered to 
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payment of salary and wages in lieu of notice to members of staff 
made redundant as a result of the DSO losing its contract to perform 
work to be treated as a prospective cost. Regulation 14 states that 
where a local authority would terminate a contract entered into for 
the purposes of its DSO regarding the lease or maintenance of any 
building or land, hire or maintenance of plant, equipment or "other 
things"58, or the purchase of goods, the amount attributable to early 
termination of the contract will be a prospective cost. However, 
where a local authority decides to take into account prospective 
costs, it must compare them with the present value of savings59 
Conduct which will be anti-competitive during the evaluation of 
tenders 
Regulation 5(a)(i) defines "calculating the amount of any 
prospective cost after the opening of the bid and the contractors' 
tenders for the work" as anti-competitive conduct. This provision 
relies for its validity on S9(3)(a) which permits the Secretary of 
State to prescribe "the matters which are to be taken into account, 
or disregarded, in the course of any evaluation made for the purpose 
of deciding who should undertake" work. The "matter" which is to be 
taken into account are the variety of prospective costs prescribed by 
the Regulations. The object of Regulation 5(a)(i) is procedural 
fairness: if a local authority was permitted to calculate prospective 
costs after the DSO bid and the external tenders which have been 
received are opened, there is the danger that it will adjust the 
assessment of the DSO bid accordingly once the implications of each 
tender for the authority's workforce and contractual obligations is 
known. If local authorities were allowed to calculate prospective 
costs after opening other tenders, questions could clearly be raised 
about the objectivity of the tendering process. Moreover, if the 
Services Directive's requirements regarding the content of tender 
notices, and the content of contract documents60 are followed, this 
provision would appear to be consistent with the requirement that 
the criteria on which the most economically advantageous tender is 
58 There is no attempt to define what may be encompassed by this phrase 
59 Regulation 8(2)(b) 
60 Directive 92150, Article 36(2) 
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awarded should be known in advance6'. However, the flaw with this 
provision, is that the Secretary of State is using his powers to 
specify what one of the criteria to be taken into account should be, 
in this case the prospective costs specified in the Regulations, and 
the way in which that criterion should be taken into account. Article 
36(2) of the Services Directive, however, requires that a 
"contracting authority shall state in the tender notice or in the 
tender notice the award criteria which it intends to apply"62. Quite 
apart from the duty placed on authorities to publicise the criteria 
used to assess the most economically advantageous tender, Article 
36(2) also illustrates that authorities have a discretion to select 
those criteria: it is a matter of what the authority intends, not what 
the Secretary of State demands. However, the criteria selected 
should reflect the true cost of providing the service, and not be 
framed in a discriminatory manner which is solely intended to 
eliminate certain tenderers, or to favour a DSO. Moreover, given that 
Article 29 of Directive 71/305, which is basically reproduced as 
Article 36(2), was held by the European Court of Justice to be 
directly effective63, it would appear that Article 36(2) is directly 
effective, and that in promulgating regulation 5(a)(i) the Secretary 
of State has enacted legislation incompatible with the Directive. 
This contention is further supported by Commission v Italy 64, where 
an Italian law which required contracts to be awarded to the 
contractor who submitted "the tender which equals the average 
tender or is the closest to it" was held to be incompatible with what 
was then Article 29 of Directive 71/305. The Court of Justice 
observed that: 
"In order to determine the most economically advantageous tender, the authority making 
the decision must be able to exercise its discretion in taking a decision on the basis of 
qualitative criteria that vary according to the contract in question and cannot therefore 
rely on the quantitative criterion of the average price."65 
61 Directive 92150, Article 36(2) 
62 Directive 92150, Article 36(2) emphasis added 
63 See e.g. Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The Netherlands, Case 31/87, [1988] ECR 
4635, [1990] 1 CMLR 287, paragraphs 42-3 
64 Case 274/83, [1985] ECR 1085; [1987] 1 CMLR 345 
65 Ibid. para 25. Emphasis added 
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The criteria to be applied would therefore appear to be a matter 
within the discretion of the local authority where the public 
procurement Directives apply in their entirety, subject to the 
requirement that the criteria selected should be objective and non-
discriminatory. Consequently the Secretary of State is unable to 
specify the matters which should be taken into account, or the 
nature of the calculations involved. 
For the same reasons regulation 5(a)(iv), which defines as anti-
competitive taking into account any costs which may arise from a 
decision to accept a contractor's bid other than prospective costs, 
also represents an impermissible restraint on the discretion of 
authorities to select award criteria given to authorities by the 
Directives. However, it should be remembered that, in relation to 
those services which fall within the ambit of Annex 1 B of Directive 
92/50, these regulations will remain valid. 
The position on asking DSOs for further information regarding their 
bid 
The second matter defined by regulation 5 to constitute anti-
competitive conduct in the course of evaluating tenders is the 
situation where the DSO is given an opportunity to explain the 
content of its bid, without contractors being given an equivalent 
opportunity to explain the content of their tenders66. This provision 
is obviously aimed at ensuring the procedural fairness of the 
tendering process, although significantly there is no corresponding 
duty to give the DSO or other tenderers an opportunity to elaborate 
on their tenders when a single tenderer is allowed to explain their 
bid. This failure is attributable to the fact that S7(7) of the 1988 
Act only envisages the possibility of anti-competitive conduct when 
work is awarded to a DSO: consequently S9 of the 1992 Act is only 
intended to permit elaboration of the circumstances in which 
authorities may act anti-competitively in awarding work to their 
DSO. Unlike regulation 4(3)(b) and (c), regulation 5(a)(iii) relates to 
a matter which is not regulated by the procurement Directives. 
66 Regulation S(a)(ii) 
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Comparison of tenders 
The third matter defined as anti-competitive by regulation 5 is 
"taking into account the matters mentioned in regulation 6 in a 
manner, or to an extent, other than as prescribed in these 
Regulations"67. To understand what is defined as anti-competitive 
conduct by regulation 5(a)(iii) one must first examine regulation 6, 
which states that: 
"In the course of any evaluation made for the purpose of deciding who should undertake 
or carry out the work the local authority shall take into account in the manner 
prescribed in these Regulations-
(a) the particulars of the bid referable to the amount which would be credited to the 
direct service organisation for the performance of the work, and the particulars of each 
contractor's tender referable to the fees and expenses which would be payable to the 
contractor for the performance of the work; 
(b) where the local authority requires the contractor to provide particulars of a bond or 
guarantee in relation to the performance of the work, the cost quoted by each contractor 
or (sic) providing a bond or guarantee which meets the requirements of the invitation to 
tender for the work; 
(c) the present value of savings; 
(d) the total amount of allowable costs included by the local authority in the bid; 
(e) the total amount of prospective costs calculated or estimated by the local authority" 
The first paragraph of regulation 6 essentially requires that the 
relative cost of performing work via the authority's DSO and 
external contractors should be assessed and compared in the manner 
prescribed by the Regulations. As regulation 6( d) and (e) require that 
the amount of allowable and prospective costs relevant to a local 
authority DSO's bid must be calculated in a manner prescribed by the 
regulations, consideration of the nature of those calculations need 
not detain us, as the regulations concerning prospective and 
allowable costs were examined above. However, regulation 6(b) and 
(c) merit closer examination. 
Regulation 6(b) provides that, where a local authority requires 
contractors to provide a performance bond, the cost of providing the 
bond must be taken into account in the manner prescribed by the 
67 Regulation 5(a)(iii) 
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regulations. This necessitates examination of regulation 7, which is 
of central importance not only to any examination the Regulation's 
treatment of performance bonds, but also in examining the 
requirements regarding the assessment of the DSO bid and 
contractors' tenders referred to in regulation 6(a). Regulation 7 
states that: 
"Having regard to the bid and each contractor's tender for the work, the local authority 
shall-
(a) calculate or estimate-
(i) the amount, excluding the total amount of allowable costs, which the local authority 
would pay to the credit of the direct service organisation, if it accepted the bid, and 
(ii) the total amount of fees and expenses which the local authority would be bound to 
pay to the contractor if it accepted his tender; 
(b) identify which, if any, of the contractors' tenders meet the following qualification, 
namely that the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (a)(ii) is less than the value of the 
sum of-
(i) the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (a)(i), and 
(ii)the notional premium." 
This regulation requires the local authority to, first, calculate the 
amount which would have to be paid to the DSO account, and to 
potential contractors, if their respective tenders were to be 
accepted, and secondly, to identify which contractors' tenders 
amount to less in value than the sum of the DSO bid and the "notional 
premium". The "notional premium" is most likely to be the cost of 
providing a performance bond68. Thus the notional cost of providing a 
performance bond is added to the value of the DSO bid, and, if the 
total which may be paid to a contractor is less than that amount, the 
contractor's tender will be treated as being a "qualifying tender". 
The qualifying tender 
The evaluation of each "qualifying tender" is regulated by 
regulation 8(2), which provides that in evaluating qualifying 
tenders, authorities shall: 
H(a) take into account the present value of savings; 
68 Regulation 1, 6(b) 
203 
I,' 
(b) where the local authority decides to take into account any prospective costs, compare 
the present value of savings with the total amount of prospective costs." 
I n effect, regulation 8 establishes a two stage process of 
evaluation. Having assessed which contractors' tenders prima facie 
present a cheaper option than the DSO bid with the "notional 
premium" added on, authorities must then compare the "present 
value of savings" presented by the potential contractor's bid with 
the total amount of prospective costs which would arise from the 
DSO losing the work in order to determine whether awarding the 
work to the DSO or to an external contractor would represent the 
less expensive option. Regulation 6(c) requires that local authorities 
must evaluate the present value of savings in accordance with the 
provisions of the Regulations. It is provided by regulation 8( 1) that 
the Schedule to the Regulations shall have effect for the purposes of 
calculating the present value of savings. The Schedule prescribes the 
manner in which a number of calculations which are required to be 
made in the course of evaluating tenders, and provides arithmetical 
formulae which must be adhered to69. It regulates the calculation of 
the notional premium which falls to be added to the DSO bid in any 
one year, the assessment of the difference between the DSO's bid 
(from which is deducted allowable costs, and to which a proportion 
of the notional premium is added) and a contractor's tender in each 
year of the contract, the manner in which differences are to be 
determined in constant prices, and, perhaps most significantly, 
calculation of the average annual difference as a net saving, and the 
calculation of the present value of savings available over a ten year 
period. 
The chain of anti-competitive practices and attendant 
calculations introduced via regulation 5(a)(iii) is indeed a lengthy 
one. Once again, however, one can question whether regulation 
5(a)(iii) and the calculations prescribed by subsequent regulations 
and the Schedule are valid in all circumstances. The Secretary of 
State is not only attempting to define the method by which the 
relative merits of tenders should be assessed, but is also specifying 
69 On the permissibility of this see the discussion of Commission v Italy, Case 
274/83, above fn 65 
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the criteria which mayor may not be taken into account in 
evaluating those tenders. As has been noted above, where a service 
exposed to competition is listed in Annex 1 A of the Services 
Directive, Article 36(2) of Directive 92/50 gives authorities the 
right to select the criteria which will be used to evaluate the most 
economically advantageous tender. Thus the legitimate application 
of regulation 5(a)(iii), related regulations and the Schedule is 
limited to those services which fall within Annex 1 B of Directive 
92/50. 
Regulations Authorising the Issue of Guidance on Anti-Competitive 
Practices 
The final category of regulations to be considered are those 
relating to the issue of guidance. Regulation 1 5 provides: 
"(') The Secretary of State shall issue guidance as to how conduct restricting, distorting 
or preventing competition is to be avoided in the doing of anything under or for the 
purposes of ... Part I of the 1988 Act. 
(2) In any determination of whether or not the conditions mentioned in section 9(2)(b) 
and (d) of the 1992 Act have been fulfilled there shall be taken into account the extent of 
any contravention of the guidance issued under paragraph (1 )." 
Regulation 15(1) obviously derives its validity from S9(3)(e) of the 
1992 Act, which permits the Secretary of State to make regulations 
which provide for the issue of guidance on anti-competitive 
practices. However, regulation 15(2) is the more interesting element 
of this regulation, and the implications of its wording should be 
carefully noted. First, the references to S9 (2)(b) and S9(2)(d) 
effectively limit the scope of the guidance to functional work70, 
although the effect of the revision of the legal position of inter-
authority contracts upon the works contracts regimes renders this 
distinction of little consequence71 . Secondly, regulation 1 5(2) 
represents the exercise by the Secretary of State of his power under 
S9(3)(f) of the 1992 Act to make provision as to the extent to which 
contravention of guidance may be taken into account in determining 
whether an authority has acted anti-competitively. In exercising 
this power, the Secretary of State has reserved the right to take 
70 The Guidance on anti-competitive practices re-iterates this at paragraph 2 
71 See Chapter 2 
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"into account the extent of any contravention of the guidance", thus 
ensuring that the severity of any contravention of the guidance may 
be taken into account by the Secretary of State before he decides on 
the exercise of his powers of sanction under S14 of the 1988 Act72. 
Finally, the formulation adopted here raises the importance of the 
guidance: as the "extent of any contravention" is to be taken into 
account in determining whether a local authority has acted anti-
competitively, the guidance must be considered whenever there is 
anti-competitive conduct, and, where it has been contravened, the 
extent of that contravention must be taken into account. The 
Guidance, therefore, is effectively a legislative instrument carrying 
considerable prescriptive force. This is what makes the Guidance so 
objectionable in principle: while the regulations pursuant to which 
it is issued are subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, the Guidance 
itself is free from any form of scrutiny prior to its issue. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The prohibition of anti-competitive practices contained in the 
1988 Act is perhaps the single most important aspect of the 
tendering regimes established by that statute in view of the fact 
that the prohibition relates to the conduct of authorities at every 
stage of the tendering process, although the fact that the prohibition 
is limited to local authorities and that the statutes do not outlaw 
such conduct on the part of other participants in the tendering 
process is objectionable. Given the central importance of this 
prohibition it is curious that no attempt was made to attempt a 
legal definition of what would constitute anti-competitive 
conduct73 : consequently between the passage of the 1988 Act and 
the issue of the Competition regulations in 1993 the most effective 
means of ascertaining what would constitute such conduct was to 
observe the circumstances in which the Secretary of State used his 
powers to issue directions under S14 of the 1988 Act. With the 
passage of the 1992 Act the Secretary of State acquired the power 
to define the conduct which would violate the prohibition of anti-
72 See chapter 5 for a discussion of these powers. 
73 There was, however, some extra-statutory guidance on anti-competitive 
practices: see DoE Circular 1191 
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competitive conduct contained in the 1988 Act. However, while the 
powers to specify time limits for periods in the course of the 
tendering process are largely unobjectionable, it would appear that 
the power to regulate the period between the award of the contract 
and the beginning of work conducted under the 1988 Act may create 
a time period which should be observed, but does not create one 
which falls within the temporal limitations of the prohibition of 
anti-competitive conduct, and the power to regulate the various 
evaluations made in the course of the tendering process may well 
conflict with the various discretions enjoyed by authorities under 
the relevant EC directive, where it applies. 
The Regulations cover a wide variety of matters. Some, such as 
the formalisation of the client-contractor split, are relatively 
unobjectionable. The time-limits set for the tendering process are 
broadly consistent with the Services Directive, although they make 
no provision for cases of emergency. However, perhaps the most 
contentious part of the Regulations are the various provisions which 
specify the matters which may and may not be taken into account in 
evaluating tenders and deciding to whom work should be awarded. 
These provisions, and the related calculations may be authorised by 
domestic legislation, but are certainly incompatible with the EC 
procurement regime. Finally, the Regulations, in accordance with the 
power contained in S9(3)(e) of the 1992 Act, authorise the issue of 
guidance on anti-competitive conduct to define more specific 
instances of conduct which will violate the prohibition. 
Having examined and evaluated the various regulation-making 
powers contained in S9 of the Local Government Act 1992, and the 
regulations issued pursuant to those powers, it now remains to 
examine the last element of the tendering regime, the Guidance on 
anti-competitive conduct. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STATUTORY GUIDANCE ON ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
The Guidance on anti-competitive conduct' was issued on 14th 
June 1993, pursuant to S9 of the Local Government Act 1992 and 
regulation 1 5 of the Local Government (Direct Services 
Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 19932 , and replaces the 
earlier extra-statutory guidance3 . However, the Guidance makes 
clear at an early stage that: 
"Neither is this guidance, nor the Regulations, intended to be exhaustive. Authorities 
should consider all aspects of conduct, whether covered by the Regulations and this 
guidance or not, from the point of view of avoiding anti-competitive conduct. "4 
Two points should be noted in relation to this assertion. The first is 
that, while the Regulations and Guidance do not purport to be 
exhaustive, they are extensive: as was illustrated aboveS, the 
Regulations make a comprehensive attempt to regulate the timing 
and conduct of the tendering process, and the evaluation of tenders, 
whereas the Guidance addresses a wide variety of more specific 
topics, ranging from pre-tender questionnaires, to the duration of 
contracts and annual price review, to the use of assets where work 
is contracted out. The second thing worthy of note is that, as the 
Guidance and Regulations do not purport to be exhaustive, "all 
aspects of conduct" being relevant to the determination of whether 
conduct is anti-competitive, there is still a considerable degree of 
uncertainty regarding what conduct will violate the prohibition 
contained in S7(7) of the 1988 Act. Consequently, the Secretary of 
State's exercise of his powers under S14 of the 1988 Act will still 
1 DoE Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department Circular 
13/93, Welsh Office Circular 40/93. For convenience the Guidance will be 
referred to by its DoE reference. 
2 1993 S.l. 848 
3 Paragraph 3. The earlier guidance was contained in DoE Circular 1191, 
Welsh Office Circular 10/91, and Scottish Office Environment Department 
Circular 6/91 
4 Paragraph 4 
5 See Chapter 3 
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be of considerable importance to those wishing to ascertain what 
may constitute anti-competitive conduct6 . 
Irrespective of the fact that the Guidance and the Regulations are 
not exhaustive, the Guidance itself raises a number of issues which 
must now be addressed. 
HOW USEFUL IS THE GUIDANCE? 
In some respects the Guidance on avoidance of anti-competitive 
conduct is of significance not for what it says, but because of what 
it fails to say. While it is accepted that the Guidance is not 
exhaustive, some issues are, in effect, not dealt with. There are two 
particularly glaring omissions. 
The first omission which is worthy of consideration is evidenced by 
paragraph 5 of the Guidance: 
"When entering into a tendering process authorities should also pay due regard to their 
obligations under the EC Public Procurement Directives, and ensure that those 
obligations are met. With reference to the EC Services Directive, which comes into effect 
on 1 July 1993, Her Majesty's Treasury will issue separate Regulations and guidance to 
incorporate this into UK law." 
As the EC Public Procurement Directives are now an integral part of 
domestic law, it would have been prudent of the Secretary of State 
to give some guidance to local authorities on how the Directives 
affected specific elements of the CCT process. Given that a failure 
to have regard to their obligations under the Directives may 
constitute anti-competitive conduct, the content of those 
obligations is of considerable importance, and it is therefore 
reasonable to give some guidance as to how the failure to take 
account of the Directives' provisions would give rise to a violation 
of S7(7) of the 1988 Act. The vague requirement contained in 
paragraph 5 that authorities should have regard to their obligations 
under the Directives is somewhat incongruous, however, in view of 
the fact that in many respects the framework of CCT regulation 
6 The exercise of these powers will be discussed in chapter 5 
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provided by the 1988, and 1992 Acts, related delegated legislation, 
and, indeed, several of the provisions of the Guidance itself cannot 
bear scrutiny when evaluated against the provisions of the Services 
Directive. This would indicate that the Secretary of State has failed 
to appreciate his own obligations to implement the Directives, and 
to refrain from legislating in a manner inconsistent with their 
provisions. 
The second major omission relates to circumstances where work i s 
not awarded to the lowest bidder. The only paragraph of the Guidance 
dealing with this controversial topic is paragraph 35, which states: 
"The Secretary of State believes that a decision to reject a lower bid in favour of the DSO 
will only in very limited circumstances be consistent with the duty of the authority 10 
avoid anti-competitive conduct, and would expect authorities to have specific and well-
founded reasons for such a decision." 
This element of the "Guidance" fails to provide any guidance on the 
matter, although there are certain legal implications which must be 
considered further? If anything, it is only a statement of the 
Secretary of State's position on this issue, indicating that when he 
uses his powers under S13 of the 1988 Act to seek information 
regarding the failure of an authority to award work to a potential 
contractor who submitted a lower tender, only very good reasons 
will deter him from exerCising his S 14 powers8. A number of 
questions are left unanswered by this assertion. What will 
constitute the "very limited circumstances" in which it is 
permissible to reject a lower bid in favour of the DSO's tender? Are 
there any circumstances in which rejection of the lower bid will 
always be impermissible? If the intention of the Guidance is to 
define the parameters of anti-competitive conduct, then this is a 
missed opportunity. Local authorities need some indication of the 
circumstances in which they can, and cannot, reject lower bids: on 
such a crucial matter, simply stating what the Secretary of State's 
7 See below on the implications of this paragraph for authority's ability to 
select its own award criteria 
8 The use of these powers will be considered fully in chapter 5 
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powers are, and what his attitude to their exercise is, will not 
suffice. 
Having examined the matters which the Guidance fails to address, 
it now remains to consider the salient points of the matters which 
it does deal with. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE GUIDANCE: THEIR FOCUS AND LEGAL 
PROPRIETY 
The Guidance on anti-competitive conduct runs to 70 paragraphs 
and tackles a wide variety of issues relating to the tendering 
process and the award of work. However, an examination of its 
provisions raises questions about the focus of certain elements of 
the Guidance, and, perhaps more importantly, about the legality of 
several provisions. The salient points of the Guidance will now be 
examined. 
Tender questionnaires 
The first provision which requires examination is paragraph 6, 
which states that: 
"When selecting contractors to be invited to submit tenders authorities should avoid the 
use of unnecessarily detailed pre-tender questionnaires and should only seek 
information which is relevant to the work in question." 
This paragraph does not attempt to define what will constitute an 
"unnecessarily detailed" questionnaire, it only states that 
authorities should avoid their use on the grounds that using 
unnecessarily detailed questionnaires, or seeking information which 
is not relevant to the work subject to the tendering exercise in 
question, will be anti-competitive. However, two things must be 
remembered when considering questionnaires issued for the purpose 
of selecting tenderers. First, at a practical level, one must bear in 
mind why the questionnaires are issued: their purpose is to ensure 
that invitations to tender are only issued to those who are capable 
of performing the work which is being exposed to competition, and 
to make sure that those potential contractors who have expressed an 
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interest in being awarded the contract, but are manifestly 
unsuitable, or incapable of performing the contract, are weeded out 
at the earliest possible opportunity. If pre-tender questionnaires are 
insufficiently detailed there is a possibility that contracts will be 
awarded to contractors who are unable to perform their contractual 
obligations, and that consequently the contract will have to be 
terminated, and a second tendering process initiated. If that occurs, 
the taxpayer suffers as a result of the poor quality of service, and 
the expense of holding a second tendering exercise. If the legislation 
is truly aimed at ensuring value for money for chargepayers9 , then it 
is logical to have a detailed questionnaire in order to ensure that a 
suitable contractor is selected at the first attempt. Secondly, in 
determining which questionnaires are "unnecessarily detailed", or 
ask questions which he considers not to be relevant to the work in 
question, the Secretary of State does not enjoy a free hand. As was 
illustrated above 10, the matters normally addressed in pre-tender 
questionnaires generally can rely for their validity on the provisions 
of the EC Services Directive regarding criteria for the qualitative 
selection of tenderers, which are directly effective. Thus, to the 
extent to which the Directive applies 11, there are a wide variety of 
topics, relating for example, to the probity, financial standing, and 
technical ability (including certain matters relating to the 
workforce), which an authority may quite legitimately include in a 
questionnaire issued for the purposes of selecting tenderers. As a 
corollary to this, it would be impermissible for the Secretary of 
State to attack questions relating to such matters as being 
"unnecessarily detailed" or irrelevant to the work at issue, and 
consequently anti-competitive, as that would represent a violation 
of the rights given to authorities by the Directive. 
Packaging of work 
The next provisions of the Guidance which must be considered are 
the five paragraphs relating to the packaging of contracts. Paragraph 
7 states: 
9 See Part I for an examination of this aspect of the topic 
10 See chapter 2 
11 1988 Act services which fall within Annex IB of Directive 92/50 are not 
subject to the full application of the Directive, including the criteria on 
qualitative selection 
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"Authorities should bear in mind that existing Direct Service Organisation (DSO) or 
historic working practices may not be the most efficient or cost effective way of 
packaging a contract. It follows from the duty of authorities to avoid anti-competitive 
conduct that work put out to contract should be packaged in such a way as to bring it 
within the scope of as wide a range of contractors as practicable. For example, packaging 
large amounts of work over a wide geographical area may deter competition from small 
locally based companies." 
In fairness, it would be naive to suggest that all DSO practices are 
scrupulously competitive and that the manner in which work is 
packaged by authorities always represents the most efficient 
solution. However, true competition is a two-way process. If both 
public and private sector are competing for work, the process should 
be fair to both. In effect, that means that while it may not be valid 
to assume automatically that work should be packaged in a way 
which gives effect to historic DSO arrangements, it is equally valid 
to say that to package work in a manner which is calculated to 
favour a section of the private sector will not automatically 
represent the most competitive solution. However, that is what this 
paragraph of the guidance would suggest to be the case. This 
paragraph illustrates most pointedly the fundamental flaw in the 
prohibition of anti-competitive conduct contained in the 1988 Acts: 
the assumption that conduct can only be anti-competitive if it 
involves favourable treatment of the DSO resulting in work being 
awarded to it. It is inescapable that any distortion of the 
competition process to favour either the public or the private sector 
will not represent a truly competitive solution. Why, therefore, 
should the whole scheme of the legislation be predicated on the 
supposition that a local authority can only act anti-competitively if 
it awards work to its DSO? 
Paragraph 7 of the Guidance is at pains to point out that, as far as 
ground maintenance, building cleaning and jobbing maintenance are 
concerned "many potential contractors are likely to be small 
companies." In addition to this paragraph 8 deals with the situation 
where both large and small contractors may wish to bid for work: 
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"The fact that there exist large, regionally or nationally based contractors is not 
necessarily sufficient justification for packaging work into large contracts, as this may 
deter smaller companies from tendering. Where authorities believe that economies of 
scale may be available, they can test this belief by allowing bidders to put in separate 
bids for the entire contract or for individual packages within it." 
The emphasis on the position of "smaller companies" is once again 
notable. However, paragraph 8 has several, wide ranging, practical 
implications. The first observation concerns the experience of one 
authority which had exposed work to competition on both a broad 
geographical basis, and, subsequently, by placing work in smaller 
packages, found that the private sector was equally dissatisfied 
with each solution: smaller contractors complained that they were 
prejudiced by work being exposed to competition on an authority-
wide basis, while larger contractors complained when work was 
split into smaller packages in order to attract small companies 12. 
One officer of the authority in question was sceptical about the 
prospect of ever satisfying the private sector on this issue. 
There are further ramifications of following the course set out in 
paragraph 8. In stating that companies should be allowed to bid for 
either the whole contract or parts of it there are ramifications for 
the way in which specifications are drafted, as they would have to 
recognise the severability of smaller packages from the larger 
whole, and for the tender evaluation process, as the relative merits 
of DSO bids and the tenders of the companies bidding for the whole 
contract, and the smaller parts of it, would have to be considered, 
thus making tender evaluation an increasingly complex process. 
Moreover, DSO bids would have to be prepared in such a way as to 
state the cost of carrying out each part of the work, and the work in 
its entirety, in order to reflect the specification, and to enable 
comparison with other bids. Thus the effect of paragraph 8, if its 
wording were to be strictly adhered to, would be to increase the 
costs of tender preparation and evaluation. If the costs of 
competition are increased then, logically speaking, there is the 
danger that the relative financial benefits of CCT will be reduced. 
12 Interview with officers of Stirling DC 19/4/94 
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The wording of the second sentence of paragraph 8, which implies 
that it should be left to potential tenderers to decide whether to 
tender for an entire contract or individual packages within it, has 
considerable ramifications for the preparation of tender documents. 
As the case of Ettrick and Lauderdale D. C. v Secretary of State for 
Scotland 13 illustrates, it was, prior to the issue of the Guidance, 
permissible for local authorities to list a range of items comprising 
the entire contract, and to state in the tender documents that it 
reserved the right to accept a tender in relation to either individual 
items, or for the contract as a whole. A contractor which then chose 
to submit a tender would be deemed to have accepted these 
conditions and be bound by them, thus allowing the local authority to 
accept or reject either elements of a tender, or the entire tender, 
and, indeed, where the tender did not comply with the tendering 
conditions which it had stipulated, to refuse to accept it. However, 
the second sentence of paragraph 8 alters the balance: it must be 
remembered that the Guidance carries considerable prescriptive 
force and that contravention of it may be indicative of anti-
competitive conduct14. As this sentence implies that it should be 
left to potential contractors to decide which parts of a contract to 
submit a tender for, the initiative now lies with tenderers: 
tendering conditions which stipulate the situations in which 
contractors may bid for different elements of a contract may 
contravene paragraph 8 and thus may be anti-competitive. 
Packaging different descriptions of work in one specification 
The third element of the treatment of packaging work which must be 
considered is that of the packaging of different descriptions of work 
in a single specification. Two paragraphs of the Guidance are of 
considerable importance to consideration of this issue. The first is 
paragraph 9, which indicates that: 
"Where separate defined activities are combined in a single contract (such as refuse 
collection and "other cleaning"), tenderers should be given the option to bid for each type 
of work separately where this may secure a better competitive response and result in 
better value for money. The considerations that might lead an authority to rely on ... 
13 1995 SLT996 
14 Local Government Act 1992 S9(3)(f); Local Government(Direct Service 
Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 1993 S.l. 848, Regulation 15(2) 
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ifi:, ".'_-__ _ 
Section 2(7) of the 1988 Act ought to be balanced against its duty to avoid anti-
competitive conduct. " 
This paragraph represents an attempt by the Secretary of State to 
place constraints on the exercise of two distinct discretionary 
powers given to local authorities by defining certain aspects of 
their exercise as anti-competitive conduct. 
The first sentence of paragraph 9, in providing that, where 
different defined activities are combined in one contract, 
contractors should be allowed to submit bids for each particular 
activity raises some problems. The first point to note is that this 
represents a violation of the discretion given to authorities by 
Article 24(1) of Directive 92/50: 
"Where the criterion for the award of the contract is that of the most economically 
advantageous tender, contracting authorities may take account of the variants which are 
submitted by a tenderer and meet the minimum specifications required by such 
contracting authorities. The contracting authorities shall state in the contract documents 
the minimum specifications to be respected by the variants and any specific 
requirements for their presentation. They shall indicate in the contract notice if 
variants are not authorised" (Emphasis added) 
Article 24( 1) thus permits authorities either to set a minimum 
specification which tenderers must comply with, or to preclude the 
possibility of a variation on the specification being accepted, 
provided that the authority in question has indicated its intention in 
the tender notice. Thus, as regards Annex 1 A services, authorities 
enjoy some discretion regarding packaging of work, as the import of 
this Article is dependent on the content of the specification, and to 
decide the extent to which tenders which are variants on the 
specification will be accepted. Therefore, if the specification 
combines two defined activities under the 1988 Act, and the 
contract notice precludes the possibility of tenders which are 
variations on the specification, a local authority may validly reject 
tenders which pertain to one part of the work only. The content of 
paragraph 9 thus represents an attempt by the Secretary of State to 
legislate in a manner inconsistent with Directive 92/50 by defining 
conduct as being anti-competitive for the purposes of S7(7) of the 
216 
1988 Act. The position regarding those services which fa" into 
Annex 1 B of the Directive is obviously different, as Article 24 (1) 
does not apply in those circumstances. However, given the nature of 
the 1988 Act services which fall into Annex 1 B, it is relatively easy 
to dispose of this issue. Where services such as schools and welfare, 
and "other catering" are concerned it is it likely that the 
combination of these two similar services would draw objections 
from contractors. As regards other services, it is unlikely that, for 
example legal services would be packaged with construction and 
property services: the only other services which could realistically 
be packaged together are refuse collection and "other cleaning", 
given that it encompasses street cleaning. 
The second point to note about the first sentence of paragraph 9 
concerns the latitude given to local authorities by the 1988 Act 
regarding the packaging of work. Section 2(5) of the 1 988 Act states 
that: 
"Where work would (apart from this subsection) fall within more than one defined 
activity it shall be treated as falling only within such one of them as the authority 
carrying out the work decide." 
The discretion given here is very wide and, subject of course to the 
constraints of reasonableness and improper purpose, it is difficult 
to see how it can be limited. Certainly if the general prohibition of 
anti-competitive conduct is to be equated with the prohibition on 
the use of powers for improper purposes, then circumstances may 
arise from an authority's use of this power which would justify a 
finding of anti-competitive conduct, and the issue of a S14 notice. 
However, one must bear in mind that, while the discretion contained 
in S2(5) is wide, but reasonably well-defined, the concept of anti-
competitive conduct is one which is, in spite of the delegated 
legislation issued under S9 of the 1992 Act, fairly vague, and, 
because of S9 of the 1992 Act, one which is subject to redefinition 
by the Secretary of State. While S7(7) imposes a duty to avoid anti-
competitive conduct, it is not a concrete one. Consequently if, as is 
evident here, the Secretary of State wishes to limit the effect of a 
statutory discretion, Parliamentary approval should be sought for 
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doing so: what is in effect an amendment of a statute should not be 
effected by a redefinition of what will constitute anti-competitive 
conduct. 
The second half of paragraph 9 asserts that an authority should 
balance the exercise of its power under S2(7) of the 1988 Act 
against its duty to avoid anti-competitive conduct. Section 2(7) of 
the 1988 Act states: 
"If a defined authority carry out work which (apart from this subsection) would not fall 
within a defined activity, and which in their opinion cannot be carried out efficiently 
separately from a particular defined activity, the work shall (if they so decide) be 
treated as falling within that defined activity." 
This subsection gives considerable discretion regarding the 
packaging of work. While the judgement involved in the exercise of 
the discretion is clearly a subjective one as to what is or is not 
efficient, this does not absolve authorities from the constraints of 
unreasonableness and improper purpose, which would prevent 
attempts at absurd packaging of contracts. However, one must 
question the efficacy of paragraph 9. The purpose of S2(7) is to 
permit authorities to subject work to the CCT process in 
circumstances where they are not required to do so, in order to 
maximise the efficiency of service provision. Can a local authority 
be acting anti-competitively when it is seeking to expose more work 
to the rigours of competition than it is legally required to? A 
determination that a local authority was acting anti-competitively 
in those circumstances would require careful explanation of its 
logical basis in order that not only its legal propriety, but also its 
compatibility with the present administration's policy of subjecting 
as many of the activities of government as possible to competition, 
could be appreciated. 
The Guidance's treatment of packaging continues in paragraph 10, 
which states that: 
"Authorities should avoid packaging which brings together unrelated areas of work into a 
single contract, or includes specialist areas of work in a single contract, if such 
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packaging is likely to restrict competition by deterring contractors working only in one 
of the fields or specialist activities concerned." 
This paragraph can be viewed as an extension of the principle 
contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 that work should be packaged in 
order to make it attractive to as wide a range of contractors as 
possible. The reference to packaging unrelated areas of work in a 
single contract also indicates that this paragraph is an extension of 
the position stated in paragraph 9 regarding authorities' powers to 
include work which would not otherwise be subject to CCT in the 
tendering process. However, the example given in paragraph 10 that 
specialist activities such as management of golf courses should not 
be packaged with similar general activities such as management of 
sport and leisure facilities, is revealing. Here the Secretary of State 
is seeking to address services which are related. However, by 
suggesting that it may be anti-competitive to package specialist 
services with those of a more general nature, even though both fall 
within the same defined activity, the Secretary of State is seeking 
to ensure that local authorities will split the work falling within 
defined activities into a number of constituent contracts. This 
marks a severe restriction of the discretion authorities enjoy to 
package contracts as they wish which also would result in the 
tendering process becoming more bureaucratic. 
Reference to the EC public procurement regime in packaging work 
The final provision of the Guidance relating to the packaging of 
work is paragraph 11. This directs that, in packaging work, 
authorities should have regard to the duties imposed on them by the 
EC Public Procurement Directives. Once again there is no indication 
as to what the import of the directives is. The duty to have regard to 
the Directives is somewhat incongruous given the Secretary of 
State's failure to do so. Indeed, the final lines of paragraph 11 are 
the cause of some concern on this issue. The suggestion that 
authorities "may wish to seek the advice of the relevant trade 
associations and the local Chamber of Commerce or other expert 
advice on the most appropriate form of packaging", may itself 
represent a breach of the EC public procurement regimes1S. If an 
15 See Cirell/Bennet, CCT: Law and Practice, 16.31 
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authority were to restrict itself to consulting the local Chamber of 
Commerce and UK trade associations, it is possible that taking into 
account those views alone may result in the contract being packaged 
in a manner which would favour UK suppliers and thus represent a 
restriction on the free movement of services, in violation of 
Articles 59 and 62 of the EEC Treaty. In addition, as regards all 
services falling within Directive 92/50's remit, such a pattern of 
consultation may violate Article 3(2), which declares that: 
"Contracting authorities shall ensure that there is no discrimination between different 
service providers." 
To take the extreme position, if a local authority consulted with and 
implemented the advice of the Chamber of Commerce in its locality 
alone, the resulting packaging of work may favour service providers 
in that locality. Consequently suppliers not only from other Member 
States, but also from other parts of the United Kingdom, would 
experience discrimination. It is thus safer to avoid consultation 
with those in the locality, and UK trade associations, in order to 
avoid the suggestion that the EC's prohibitions of discrimination are 
being violated by the manner in which work is packaged. 
Contract duration 
While the paragraphs of the Guidance relating to the packaging of 
contracts indicate a desire on the Secretary of State's part to alter 
the balance of the competitive process in a way more favourable to 
smaller private sector companies in particular, they are not the only 
provisions capable of having that effect. In relation to the duration 
of contracts, paragraph 1 2 declares: 
"Within the framework established by the Regulations, authorities should have in mind 
the appropriate length of contracts .... For example, a contract with a short duration 
might not allow contractors sufficient scope to amortise their setting-up costs" 
The second sentence raises a fundamental question: who is 
compulsory competitive tendering intended to benefit? The classic 
argument for competitive tendering has traditionally been that the 
test of the market results in financial savings which can be passed 
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on to chargepayers16. The emphasis has always been on the pursuit 
of value for money for the benefit of chargepayers, not DSOs or 
contractors. Applying the test of whether or not value for money is 
obtained for chargepayers, it would not matter how frequently the 
work had to be retendered, as long as the benefits of doing so are 
passed on to them. Therefore, the fact that contractors incur costs 
in setting up contracts is irrelevant: if the rhetoric is to be 
believed, CCT is intended to be for the benefit of chargepayers, not 
service providers. It may be trite to argue that contracts of short 
duration will deter potential bidders, but that misses the point: if 
the test of the market is an objective one and affects all bidders 
equally, the most effective solution should, theoretically, be found. 
There are also legal objections to the content of paragraph 12. It 
must be remembered that, as regards tendering exercises conducted 
under the 1988 Act, authorities retain a discretion to award 
contracts for a period which conforms to the minimum and maximum 
limits set by the relevant delegated legislation 17: contracts which 
conform to the maxima and minima set in those regulations will 
prima facie be competitive and consistent with the policy and 
purposes of the 1988 Act. 
The client-contractor split 
The next paragraph of the Guidance to be considered relates to the 
client-contractor split. As was discussed above, regulation 4 of the 
Local Government (Direct Service Organisations) (Competition) 
Regulations 199318 provided a legal basis for the client/contractor 
split in the course of the competition process. In spite of 
suggestions to the contrary19, the wording of regulation 4 appears 
capable of encompassing the activities of elected members as well 
16 This matter is discussed in Part 1. See also e.g. 1983 Conservative Party 
Manifesto, p36. 
17 See e.g. the Local Government Act 1988 (Defined Activities) (Specified 
Periods) (England) Regulations 1988 S.l. 1373; Local Government Act 1988 
(Specified Periods) (Scotland) Order 1988 S.l. 1414. See Chapter 2 for a 
discussion. 
18 1993 S.l. 848 
19 See e.g. Cirell/Bennett, Regulations at last but much mystery remains, 
16/4193 LGC 10 
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as the officers and employees of authorities20. Paragraph 13 of the 
Guidance relates specifically to the position of members with 
regard to the client/contractor split. It declares that: 
"Councillors should ensure that their responsibilities as members of the Council as a 
whole override any specific responsibility they may hold for supervising, monitoring, 
or overseeing the activities of a OSO. Elected, or co-opted, members of an authority with 
responsibility for the preparation of a OSO bid should always ensure that, when serving 
on committees or sub-committees dealing with the relevant operations set out in 
Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations, they follow the principles set out in the National 
Code of Local Government Conduct in carrying out those duties. Whilst involvement in 
overseeing the activities of a OSO is not strictly a 'private or personal interest' in terms 
of the Code, members should treat any such involvement as if it were and disclose it, or 
if they think appropriate, withdraw from committee discussion of tender matters." 
The first problem with paragraph 1 3 is that regulation 4(3) does not 
prescribe the "relevant operations" for the purpose of regulation 4. 
Instead, regulation 4(3) defines the conduct which is proscribed, for 
example, giving the DSO information extraneous to that contained in 
the tender documents without giving the same information to other 
tenderers21 . The "relevant operations" referred to in the Guidance 
are those matters defined in regulation 4( 1) which are not to be 
carried out by individuals holding c1ient- and contractor-side 
responsibilities concurrently. It therefore appears that the 
Secretary of State has misdirected himself in law as to the content 
of the Regulations, and thus rendered this paragraph of the Guidance 
absurd, meaningless and inapplicable. 
The second major problem with paragraph 1 3 is that it seeks to 
declare that certain conduct should be treated as being tantamount 
to a contravention of the National Code of Local Government conduct. 
It must be remembered that the National Code is now issued 
pursuant to S31 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, 
which empowers the Secretary of State to issue22 or revise a 
20 See the discussion of regulation 4 above for an explanation of the 
reasoning underlying this proposition. 
21 The precise import of Regulation 4 is considered above, chapter 3, in the 
course of the examination of the Competition Regulations. 
22 S31(1) 
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code23 . However, before issuing, revising or withdrawing a code, the 
Secretary of State must consult with the appropriate 
representatives of local government24. In addition S31 (5) of the 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989 provides that the Secretary 
of State must lay revisions before both Houses of Parliament for 40 
days and are subject to a negative procedure. As paragraph 1 3 seeks 
to extend the effect of the National Code in order that certain 
conduct may be treated as anti-competitive, it is tantamount to 
being a substantive revision of the National Code. However, in order 
to be valid, a revision must be issued subsequent to consultation, 
and to being laid before each House for 40 days without being 
annulled. Neither of these conditions has been fulfilled. Therefore 
paragraph 1 3 cannot be a valid revision of the Code due to severe 
procedural improprieties25. At best, paragraph 13 represents a 
statement of good practice, but an attempt to introduce a C\ient-
contractor split at member level by this means is legally 
incompetent by virtue of its failure to follow the procedure set out 
in the 1989 Act. 
While one can attack paragraph 1 3 on the grounds of a misdirection 
in law, and of a procedural impropriety, one can also question the 
need for this provision. It must be remembered that the instance 
occurring in this paragraph is not the only occasion on which the 
Secretary of State has misdirected himself in law as to the ambit of 
regulation 4 of the Competition Regulations: since their issue, the 
Secretary of State and others have contended that regulation 4 does 
not apply to members, although this contention cannot be supported 
by a construction of the regulation. Consequently, as regulation 4 
does apply to members, paragraph 13 is not only ultra vires, but has 
always been unnecessary. 
Time periods 
The next issue addressed by the Guidance is the timing of the 
stages of the tendering process. Paragraph 1 4 simply restates that 
the Competition Regulation's provisions regarding the timing of the 
23 S31(2) 
24 S31(3) 
25 See Lord Diplock, Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
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tendering process do not apply where the EC Public Procurement 
Directives apply. However, the other two paragraphs relating to this 
issue merit further consideration. Paragraph 1 5 states that: 
"Minimum or maximum periods of time are not intended to be adopted mechanistically. 
Authorities should in each case give consideration to, and adopt periods of time for, the 
various stages of tendering, within the minimum and any maximum periods prescribed, 
which are appropriate for the tender and type of work in question. The Secretary of State 
will expect authorities to give reasons for the timetable they have adopted for a tender, 
if required to do so." 
It is difficult to see how the conduct of an authority which 
ostensibly falls within the parameters of paragraph 1 5 could be 
anti-competitive. While local authorities are under a duty not to do 
anything anti-competitive, by virtue of S7(7) of the 1988 Act, both 
the system of regulation put in place by this statutes and the 
relevant EC Directive give authorities considerable discretion in 
relation to determining the timing for each stage of the tendering 
process. Thus, for example, both the Competition Regulations26 and 
the Services Directive27 set a minimum period for receipt of 
tenders after an invitation has been issued of 40 days, but do not set 
a maximum time limit. 
Two issues arise as a direct result of the discretion given to 
authorities by the UK legislation in particular. The first relates to 
the manner in which the discretion is exercised, and the 
circumstances in which an over-rigid policy results in a decision 
being ultra vires. The classic statement of principle on this issue is 
that of Lord Reid in British Oxygen Co. Ltd v Minister of Technology 
28, where he commented: 
"There are two general grounds on which the exercise of an unqualified discretion can be 
attacked. It must not be exercised in bad faith, and it must not be so unreasonably 
exercised as to show that there cannot have been any real or genuine exercise of the 
discretion. But, apart from that, if the Minister thinks that policy or good 
26 1993 S.l. 848 regulation 4(3) 
27 Directive 92/50, Article 19(3) 
28 [1971] AC 610 
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administration requires the operation of some limiting rule, I find nothing to stop 
him ... " 
Thus it was held permissible to adopt a rigid policy as long as the 
public body taking the decision was still prepared to consider the 
possibility of departing from the policy where circumstances 
required29. Consequently, so long as an authority has displayed a 
propensity to consider the adoption of different time periods its 
actions cannot be characterised as being an abnegation of the 
discretion entrusted to it. However, the implication of this 
paragraph of the Guidance is that, even if a discretion is exercised 
in accordance with the established principles of administrative law 
and the parameters of the statutory framework, the Secretary of 
State may seek to impugn it by defining its exercise as anti-
competitive. 
Secondly, and very much related to the first point, is that one must 
always bear in mind the context and purpose of the discretion 
entrusted to authorities30. The various discretions granted to local 
authorities to determine the length of each stage of the tendering 
process must be viewed in their context as an integral part of the 
tendering process. Each of the periods set out in the legislative 
scheme is there for one reason: everything beyond the minimum and 
maximum periods is automatically assumed not to represent the 
most competitive solution, whereas conduct within those limits is. 
This is nowhere more obvious than in tendering procedures 
conducted under the 1988 Act, where the various time limits are 
actually the constituent elements of several of the conditions which 
must be fulfilled before a local authority can undertake work 
through its OS031. Consequently if conduct falls within those limits 
it is consistent with the policy and purposes of the Act; namely 
ensuring that authorities carry out work "only if they can do so 
competitively". If the parameters set in the statutory scheme were 
capable of being anti-competitive, different ones would have been 
29 See also on this point Elder v Ross and Cromarty District Licensing Board 
1990 SLT 307 per Lord Weir at pp 311]-312A 
30 See Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 
997 
31 See Ch. 2 
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set. Therefore, if the periods used by authorities in each tendering 
exercise are within the bounds set by domestic or, more 
importantly, EC legislation, they are prima facie valid and 
competitive. It is impermissible for the Secretary of State to attack 
the decision of an authority as anti-competitive where that conduct 
lies within the limitations of what has been statutorily indicated to 
be competitive conduct. To accept otherwise would be tantamount 
to accepting that ostensibly intra vires acts could be successfully 
challenged, something at variance with the binding authorities32. 
Indeed, for the Secretary of State to suggest that an authority would 
be acting anti-competitively in such circumstances would itself be 
a negation of the purposes of the legislation33, as it would imply 
that the statutory scheme, and the discretion given to authorities by 
it, does not represent a competitive solution. Moreover, one must 
appreciate the legal position of the Guidance relative to other 
components of the statutory scheme. The Guidance is issued 
pursuant to the powers contained in S9 of the 1992 Act for the 
purpose of defining what will constitute anti-competitive conduct: 
it is sub-delegated legislation which cannot effect a substantive 
amendment to the 1988 Act, but only define such conduct as will 
violate the prohibition contained in S7(7). Consequently, its 
provisions must be consistent with the policy and purposes of the 
1988 Act, and in any conflict between the two, it is what 
Parliament has prescribed to be competitive in the 1988 Act which 
will prevail. However, it must be admitted that if an authority used 
its discretion in a manner which was manifestly unreasonable, or 
for an improper purpose, that would be an abuse of discretion which 
resulted in the negation of the purposes of the legislation, and 
consequently be anti-competitive. 
Where services fall within Annex 1 A of the Services Directive, the 
timing of the periods during which potential contractors can notify 
authorities of their interest34, and during which those invited to 
32 See e.g. Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 
147 
33 On the need to construe delegated legislation in accordance with the 
policy and purposes of the statutory framework within which it operates 
see e.g. Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v Automobile 
Proprietary Ltd [1969] 1 W.L.R. 697: In re Toohey; ex parte Northern Land 
Council (1981) 38 A.L.R. 439 
34 Directive 92150, Article 19(1) 
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submit tenders can do s035, are identical. Thus, where local 
authorities are under a duty to comply with the procurement 
Directive, it will force upon authorities a measure of the conformity 
in the timing of the stages of the tendering process which the 
Secretary of State seeks to impose by this paragraph of the 
Guidance. 
Contract documentation 
The paragraphs of the guidance relating to contract documentation 
appear to be quite uncontroversial3 6, being limited to a restatement 
of authorities' duty to make available the specification37, 
emphasising the role of the specification in defining the work to be 
performed38, and the standard of performance39. However, one can 
take issue with paragraph 20: 
"The authority should be prepared to consider proposals from contractors for providing 
the service which involves a different method of operation from that of the DSO. 
However, the Secretary of State accepts that, for some services, it may be necessary to 
specify the nature of the work in terms of the process to be followed or the type of 
professional or technical input which a contractor would be expected to offer, provided 
such requirements are set out in general terms." 
We must remember that local authorities enjoy a discretion by 
virtue of the Services Directive to preclude variations on the 
specification, or to set a minimum specification which must be 
respected by those tenderers who wish to submit variations on the 
specification40. Therefore, where the Directive applies, a finding of 
anti-competitive conduct based on a failure to consider contractors' 
proposed variations in accordance with paragraph 20 would be 
invalid, as it would represent an attempt to negate the discretion 
given to authorities by the Directive. 
35 Directive 92/50, Article 19(3), (4) 
36 See, however, CirrellBennett, CCT: Law and Practice, 16.36-37 
37 Paragraph 17 
38 Paragraph 18 
39 Paragraph 19 
40 Directive 92/50, Article 24(1) 
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Contractual requirements 
The next salient point of the Guidance is the treatment of contract 
requirements contained in paragraphs 23 to 25. Paragraph 23 states 
that: 
"The contract, which sets down the binding obligations of the parties, should not impose 
unduly or unreasonably onerous conditions on the successful tenderer. An authority will 
be properly concerned to ensure that the contract binds the contractor to provide the 
service or carry out works as specified. However, authorities should bear in mind that 
unduly or unreasonably onerous contract requirements may deter potential 
competitors. " 
Paragraph 24 continues to say that, where possible, authorities 
should use standard form contracts recognised in the trade or 
profession subject to the tendering exercise, while paragraph 25 
states that any default system should apply equally to DSOs and 
private contractors. 
To the extent that specifications are a draft form of the contract, 
requiring only the contract price and the name of the contractor be 
filled in to transform it into a contract, the Secretary of State can 
regulate the proposed contractual obligations under his power to 
define conduct as anti~competitive. However, one must bear in mind 
that these paragraphs refer to contractual terms. For the contract 
for performance of work to be concluded the name of the contractor 
and value of the contract must be known. These two essential items 
can only be known once the tendering procedure has been concluded. 
Therefore the Secretary of State cannot attack the actual terms of a 
concluded contract as anti-competitive, as this would be a violation 
of the temporal restriction contained in the prohibitions of anti-
competitive conduct. He may define a condition proposed in the 
course of the tendering process as anti-competitive, but in those 
circumstances where the contracts are prepared separate from the 
specification, and especially where they are prepared after the 
decision has been taken as to who should perform the work, any 
attempt by the Secretary of State to define contractual conditions 
as anti-competitive is clearly impermissible. 
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Invitations to tender 
The next issue to be considered is the Guidance's treatment of the 
issue of invitations to tender. The first provision to be considered is 
paragraph 52: 
"Authorities need not necessarily restrict the number of contractors invited to tender to 
the minimum required under ... Section 7 of the 1988 Act, where more have expressed 
interest. These provisions do not prescribe a level of competition at which an authority 
may assume that it has fulfilled the conditions in ... Section 7(7) of the 1988 Act. 
Rather, they prescribe only minimum levels of competition and, in order to avoid anti-
competitive conduct, authorities should not exclude contractors solely on the basis of 
adhering to these minima." 
The Guidance then proceeds to indicate, in paragraph 5 3, that the 
number of contractors who should be invited to submit tenders 
should be between four and six, if the authority is to be considered 
to be acting in a manner which is not anti-competitive. These are 
perhaps the most objectionable paragraphs of the Guidance, as they 
evidence considerable disregard of the provisions of both domestic 
and EC legislation. 
As a matter of domestic law, one must remember that S7(4)(b) 
and(c) of the 1988 Act requires authorities to invite at least three 
potential contractors to submit tenders. This limit has been set by 
Parliament as an integral part of the statutory scheme. Parliament 
considered that an authority which invited at least three potential 
contractors to submit tenders would be acting competitively and in 
accordance with the minimum standard of competition prescribed by 
statute. The attempt of the Secretary of State to suggest that a 
local authority following the scheme of competition prescribed by 
Parliament may be acting anti-competitively is clearly ultra vires 
and noxious to the established constitutional principles regarding 
the relationship between the legislature and executive. The 
reprehensible nature of the Secretary of State's action in issuing 
this paragraph is compounded by the fact that Parliament endowed 
him with the power to alter the number of potential contractors 
invited to tender41 , but, instead of using this power to alter the 
41 S7(5) of the 1988 Act 
229 
statutory scheme in accordance with Parliament's wishes, he has 
chosen a course which effectively calls into question the 
competence of Parliament's view of what will constitute a minimum 
acceptable standard of competition. 
The Secretary of State's definition of what will be anti-
competitive conduct also fails to have sufficient regard to the 
provisions of the Directive. The Services Directive requires that 
where a contract is to be awarded by restricted procedure, 
authorities should indicate in the contract notice the range of 
potential contractors which they intend to invite to tender, which 
range must be at least five and at most twenty, depending on the 
nature of the work to be performed, and the number of tenders 
invited must be sufficient to ensure genuine competition42. The 
1988 Act does not give effect to this requirement, and the Secretary 
of State has clearly failed to use the power given to him by S7(5), 
which allows him to specify that a number of potential contractors 
other than three must be invited to submit a tender, to amend the 
statutes in a manner which would make them consistent with the 
Directives. Moreover, the approach taken by the Guidance is 
inconsistent with the Directive. Firstly, the Secretary of State 
attempts here to specify the permissible range of tenderers, 
whereas the Directive sees this as a matter of the contracting 
authority's discretion, provided that it acts within the parameters 
set out in Article 27(2) of the Services Directive. Secondly, the 
range of contractors who must be invited to submit a tender 
prescribed here by the Secretary of State is too narrow: the lower 
limit of four tenderers prescribed in paragraph 53 falls below the 
minimum indicated in the Directives, while the maximum which the 
Secretary of State considers competitive, six, falls far short of the 
maximum prescribed by the Directives, twenty. Moreover, it would 
appear that the Guidance does not represent one of lithe most 
appropriate forms and methods to ensure the proper functioning of 
the directives"43 as, in spite of the prescriptive force which it 
carries, the fact that it is sub-delegated legislation, and subject to 
42 Directive 92150, Article 27(2) 
43 Royer, Case 48/75, [1976] ECR 497 at p 518 
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arbitrary change by the Secretary of State, means that it does not 
accord with the principle that: 
"each Member State should implement ... directives ... in a way which fully meets the 
requirements of clarity and certainty in legal situations which directives seek ... Mere 
administrative practices, which by their nature can be changed as and when the 
authorities please and which are not publicised widely enough cannot in these 
circumstances be regarded as proper fulfilment of the obligation imposed by Article 189 
[of the EEC Treaty] on Member States to which the directives are addressed"44 
Therefore, the Secretary of State could not attempt to implement 
the Directives' provisions by means of amending the Guidance. 
The situation which authorities are thus presented with is one 
where the Secretary of State has attempted to imply incompetently 
that adherence to the provisions of domestic legislation may be 
anti-competitive, in circumstances where neither the domestic 
legislation nor the Guidance which casts aspersions upon it will 
survive scrutiny against the standards set by the relevant Directive, 
which the Secretary of State has also failed to implement. Given 
this confused state of affairs, authorities must rely on the relevant 
provisions of the Services Directive, which are sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional to be directly effective45 . However, if the 
Secretary of State were, for example to determine that a local 
authority had acted anti-competitively by inviting only three or four 
tenderers and thus failing to have regard to the provisions of the EC 
procurement regime in accordance with the duty contained in 
paragraph 546 of the Guidance, authorities would have a valid 
defence, as the Secretary of State would be attempting to rely on a 
Directive which he had failed to properly implement. This would be a 
violation of the Community law principle of venire contra factum 
proprium47. 
44 Commission v Belgium, Case 102179, [1980] ECR 1473 at 1483. See further 
on this point Toth, The Oxford Encyclopcedia of European Community Law, 
Volume 1 pp 177-9 
45 See on this point Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Commune di Milano [1989] ECR 
1839, [1990] 3 CMLR 239 at paras 30-1 
46 See above 
47 See e.g. Unil-it, Case 30/75, [1975 ] ECR 1419 at p 1428 
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The issue of invitations to tender to inexperienced contractors 
The remaining paragraph of the Guidance's treatment of the 
circumstances in which invitations to tender should be extended is 
paragraph 54, which states that: 
"Neither should authorities exclude contractors from bidding solely on the grounds that 
they have no experience of providing municipal services or carrying out public works in 
the United Kingdom. Prior to the introduction of CCT there was little private sector 
provision of some of the services concerned, but companies have demonstrated that they 
can respond to the opportunities and undertake new services successfully." 
The Secretary of State is correct in stating that it is impermissible 
for authorities to withhold invitations from contractors who have 
never provided services or performed works for local authorities in 
the United Kingdom: where a company is established in a Member 
State of the European Union that would amount to a violation of 
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty's prohibition of restrictions on the free 
movement of services at the very least. However, Article 32( 1) of 
the Services Directive provides stating that the ability of service 
providers may be evaluated "with regard to their skills, efficiency, 
experience and reliability", with Article 32(2)(b) permitting 
authorities to establish a service provider's level of technical 
ability by requiring evidence of the services which it has provided in 
the preceding three years, along with details of the value of those 
services, the period during which they were supplied, and whether 
the services have been supplied to the public or private sector. In 
addition, evidence of performance may be sought from those to 
whom services have been supplied. The contents of the Services 
Directive represents an objective minimum standard for the 
assessment of the technical ability of potential contractors, and as 
has been noted, these provisions are directly effective48. The 
Secretary of State therefore cannot seek to place undue restrictions 
on the ability of authorities to examine the technical ability of 
potential contractors, and must appreciate that as a matter of 
European law, the level of technical ability which will be acceptable 
48 See Gebroeders Beentjes BVv The Netherlands, Case 31/87, [1988] ECR 
4635, discussed in chapter 3. 
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is for contracting authorities to determine49. Consequently, 
authorities are acting within their powers in refusing to extend an 
invitation to those potential contractors who have no experience of 
performing work of the kind which is the subject of the tendering 
exercise, subject to the limitation that an undertaking which has no 
experience of performing work itself may not be excluded from 
participation in the tendering procedure if it can show that it can 
acquire the necessary skills from other agencies, or subsidiaries50. 
References as to a contractor's experience 
As an extension to the paragraphs regarding the invitation to 
tender, the Secretary of State states in paragraph 55 that where 
references are sought from other authorities, contractors should be 
informed from whom the references are sought, and "should ensure 
the additional choice of referees is such as to ensure a fair and 
balanced view of the work of the contractor." As no attempt is made 
to define what will constitute a "fair and balanced view", it is 
difficult to see what is meant by this vague phrase. Indeed, it is 
reprehensible that authorities may theoretically be penalised for 
contravention of such a vague definition of anti-competitive 
conduct. Where the Services Directive applies it is obvious that the 
references will, in effect, relate to all relevant work carried out in 
the preceding three years51. Thus a realistic picture of the 
contractor's ability will be presented. It is equally obvious that, in 
situations where the Directive applies, potential contractors should 
be aware before notifying authorities of their interest in being 
awarded a contract that references may be sought from those public 
authorities for which they have performed work. In such 
circumstances, it is clearly superfluous to inform potential 
contractors of a matter of which they should already be aware. 
49 Ibid. at paragraph 17. For a fuller discussion of this issue see chapter 3 
50 See Ballast Nedam Groep NY v Belgische Staat, Case C-389/92, 14/4/94 
51 Article 32(2)(b). It is interesting to note that this provision permits a 
potential tenderer to be asked which services were provided to the public 
sector: in this case certificates relating to the work should be issued by the 
relevant contracting authority. What, however, happens where 
performance has been unsatisfactory? 
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Tender evaluation: treatment of redundancies 
The next matter contained in the Guidance which merits 
consideration is contained in the paragraphs relating to tender 
evaluation. It is curious that paragraphs 46 to 51 are almost 
exclusively concerned with the circumstances in which redundancy 
costs are to be taken into account. Paragraph 46 declares: 
"The Regulations allow authorities to take into account, for the purposes of tender 
evaluation, certain redundancy costs for those who would otherwise continue to be 
employed by the DSO if it were successful. Authorities should not, however, take 
redundancy costs into account as a matter of course, but should make a case by case 
assessment of whether it would be appropriate to do so." 
Several legal issues arise from this particular paragraph. First, the 
Secretary of State is of the view that authorities should not 
automatically take redundancy costs into account in evaluating 
tenders. The Local Government (Direct Service Organisations) 
(Competition) Regulations 1993 give local authorities the discretion 
to take redundancy costs into account as a prospective costS 2, 
although, when taken into account such costs must be calculated in 
accordance with the provisions of the Regulations53 . Like any 
discretion, an authority may validly adhere to a policy regarding its 
exercise, provided that they admit the possibility that a situation 
may arise justifying departure from itS4. Indeed, regulation 12 of 
the Competition Regulations 1993 requires that the authorities who 
avail themselves of this discretion should already follow a policy of 
exercising their discretion to use certain statutory redundancy 
schemes, and paragraph 48 of the Guidance itself makes further 
allusion to the redundancy poliCies pursued by local authorities. In 
view of this situation, paragraph 46 of the Guidance creates 
unnecessary confusion. 
While the Competition Regulations 1993 clearly state that it is not 
anti-competitive to take prospective costs such as redundancies 
52 1993 S.l. 848, regulations 8(2), 12 
53 Regulations 5,6,7,8,12 
S4 See e.g. British Oxygen Company v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 
234 
into account55, the Guidance implies that an authority should not 
avail itself of the discretion to take redundancy costs into account 
too freely, or this may constitute anti-competitive conduct. This is 
an absurd situation, the relevant delegated legislation giving 
authorities the power to do something which will not be anti-
competitive, and the sub-delegated legislation stating that in 
certain circumstances the exercise of that discretion will be anti-
competitive. This inconsistency of approach is more reprehensible in 
view of the close proximity in the issue of the Regulations and the 
Guidance: five weeks separated each event. However, if the 
Secretary of State were to rely on this element of paragraph 46 and 
determine that an authority acted anti-competitively in applying its 
general policy and taking into account redundancy costs apparently 
as a matter of course, a local authority could rely on regulations 
8,11 and 12 and contend that the Secretary of State, in attempting 
to constrain its discretion to take into account redundancy costs, 
had misdirected himself in law as to the precise import of the 
Regulations, given that they specify that taking into account 
redundancy costs is not anti-competitive. Finally, it is interesting 
that the Secretary of State has sought to use the Guidance in an 
attempt to constrain authorities' discretion to take into account 
redundancy costs in the course of tender evaluation, but has ignored 
the cost of paying employees money in lieu of notice. 
Tender evaluation: other issues 
The remaining paragraphs relating to evaluation of tenders are 
fairly mundane in their content: paragraph 47 states that the number 
of redundancies assumed should be referable to the work concerned, 
and costs should be calculated on the employment characteristics of 
each employee made redundant in accordance with the council's 
redundancy policy; paragraph 48 states that where support staff 
will be made redundant, the redundancies must be referable to the 
loss of the work; paragraph 49 states that authorities should be 
able to give the Secretary of State an account of their redundancy 
policy and the basis on which redundancies are made, and paragraph 
51 states that where the DSO's employee's representatives are 
allowed to make representations about proposals, the employees of 
SS See regulation 11 
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other tenderers should be given an equal opportunity to make 
representations. Paragraph 50 states: 
"Authorities should inform contractors when inviting tenders if they intend, where 
appropriate, to take account of any extraneous cost items in evaluating tenders, and of 
the cost items to be taken into account, although they need not inform them of the 
magnitude of these costs." 
To an extent this provision is superfluous. Where the Services 
Directive applies, and authorities award contracts on the basis of 
the most economically advantageous tender, authorities must inform 
potential contractors of the constituent criteria both in the contract 
notice56, and the contract documents57. This paragraph can 
therefore be viewed as extending this requirement to other 
situations, although it also means that the Secretary of State will 
be able to monitor, via the complaints of potential tenderers, the 
extraneous costs used by authorities which do not accord with the 
requirements of the Competition Regulations. 
Rejecting lower tenders 
Apart from addressing the issue of which costs may be taken into 
account in the course of tender evaluation the Guidance also 
attempts to prescribe the basis on which work should be awarded. 
Paragraph 35 states that a decision to reject a lower tender in 
favour of the DSO bid will only be consistent with the duty to avoid 
anti-competitive conduct in "very limited" (though undefined) 
circumstances, and that the Secretary of State would expect 
"specific and well-founded reasons" to be produced for such a 
decision. Once again this provision appears to be at variance with 
the discretion given to authorities by Article 36 of Directive 92/50, 
where applicable, to select the criteria in accordance with which 
the most economically advantageous tender will be selected. It is 
implicit in the award of contracts on the basis of the most 
economically advantageous tender that the contracting authority 
may always reject an ostensibly lower bid in favour of a higher one, 
56 Directive 92/50, Articles 15(2), 17(1),36(2), Annex 3 
57Directive 92/50, Article 36(2) 
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it being for the contracting authority, not the Secretary of State, to 
establish the relative importance of price as one of the criteria58. 
If, however, the Secretary of State seeks to contend that he is 
seeking to provide that local authorities should not award contracts 
on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender, but 
instead solely on the basis of the lowest price, one must admit that 
he may do so when the Directive does not apply. However, where the 
Directive does apply, two objections to this suggestion may be put 
forward. First, the Directive gives authorities the discretion to 
choose whether to use either the criteria of the most economically 
advantageous tender, or lowest price: it is their decision alone, and 
the Secretary of State may not determine which they should use. 
Secondly, the approach taken in paragraph 35 comes perilously close 
to infringing the provisions of the Services Directive regarding the 
exclusion of abnormally low tenders59. Contracting authorities may 
reject tenders which appear to them to be abnormally low60, but 
before doing so must give the tenderer in question the opportunity to 
explain the elements of the tender which appear to be low, and to 
take that explanation into account before reaching its decision. 
However, this paragraph of the Guidance, while it may contain the 
saving provision that authorities may explain their conduct to the 
Secretary of State, also may be used by the Secretary of State to 
justify the determination that a local authority had acted anti-
competitively in rejecting a tender which appeared to it to be 
abnormally low. However, the decision to reject an apparently 
abnormally low bid is clearly a decision for the authority, not the 
Secretary of State. To suggest otherwise would be tantamount to a 
material departure from the provisions of the directives, and 
impermissible. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See Article 37 
60 See on this point Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Commune di Milano, Case 103/88, 
[1989] ECR 1839, [1990] 3 CMLR 239 at paras 25-7; Impresa Dona Alfonso di 
Dona Alfonso & Figli S.N.C. v Consorto per 10 Sviluppo Industria1e del 
Commune di Monafalcone, Case 295/89 at para 18. 
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Transfer of undertakings 
The penultimate aspect of the tendering process addressed by the 
Guidance which will be considered here is its treatment of the 
transfer of undertakings. In principle the Acquired Rights 
Directive61 , which protects the employment rights of those 
employees transferring from one economic entity to another, is 
capable of applying where a service is contracted out62. However, 
the United Kingdom has been reluctant to accept this63 , and in spite 
of a general readjustment of Her Majesty's Government's position64, 
the Department of the Environment has been particularly reluctant 
to admit that TUPE applies in principle to CCT exercises, as is 
evidenced by the Guidance's provisions regarding this issue. 
The six paragraphs of the Guidance relating to TUPE outline in 
abstract terms the effect of the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 65, stating that the 
Secretary of State's view is that it is an essential part of the 
competitive process that authorities should not preclude 
consideration of any option for service delivery by placing prior 
restrictions on the arrangements proposed by contractors66. 
Consequently the Secretary of State is of the view that, in essence, 
if authorities seek to require that successful contractors must act 
in accordance with the obligations of the TUPE Regulations regarding 
the transfer of staff, they would be acting anti-competitively67. 
However, paragraph 43 states that: 
"The Secretary of State accepts that authorities may wish to refer prospective 
contractors to the TUPE Regulations. In doing so, however, they should refer to the 
Regulations in neutral terms, and should not express a view on the likelihood of the 
Regulations applying or otherwise, lest this may have the effect of distorting, 
restricting or preventing competition." 
61 Directive 77/187 
62 See e.g. Rask v ISS Kantineservice A/S, Case C-209/81, [1993] IRLR 133. 
The principles relating to transfer of undertakings will be discussed at 
length in relation to the non commercial considerations regime; see Ch 6 
63 See e.g. Lyell rejects ruling on EC jobs law, FT 22/1/93 
64 See e.g. HC Debs Vol 224, Cols 359-60w re the Home Office's position. 
65 Paragraph 40 
66 Paragraph 41 
67 Paragraph 42 
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Paragraph 44 leaves prospective contractors the opportunity to 
submit tenders on the basis of a transfer of undertakings existing if 
they considered that the Regulations apply, and requires local 
authorities to provide such information as a tenderer may require to 
do so, a requirement which may place a DSO at a disadvantage, 
particularly where the tenderer subsequently changes his mind as to 
the applicability of TUPE68, while paragraph 45 states that the 
Secretary of State considers that it would be inappropriate, and thus 
anti-competitive, for an authority to take into account redundancy 
costs where a contractor submits a tender on the basis that TUPE 
applies, an approach which may conflict with the Competition 
Regulations. The tone of the Guidance is clearly hostile to the 
application of TUPE. 
In view of the general dissatisfaction with the Guidance's 
treatment of TUPE, an "issues paper" was issued by the DoE in 
January 1994 containing proposed amendments to the paragraphs of 
the Guidance relating to TUPE69. However, while this document may 
propose various amendments to the Guidance, and may be a more 
accurate statement of what the Government's position on the 
application of TUPE is, it must be emphasised that it is only an 
issues paper: it did not effect a substantive amendment of the 
Guidance, and has no prescriptive force. Consequently, the 
paragraphs of the Guidance regarding TUPE are still effective, 
although the more accurate statement of the Secretary of State's 
position for the purposes of determining that an authority has acted 
anti-competitively for the purposes of invoking his powers under 
and S1 3 and 14 of the 1988 Act may well be the "issues paper". It 
should be borne in mind that the prohibition of anti-competitive 
conduct contained in the 1988 Act is so broad that it is possible for 
the Secretary of State to determine that conduct which has not been 
defined as such by virtue of the exercise of his powers contained in 
S9 of the 1992 Act will violate the prohibition. The situation 
regarding the Secretary of State's position on the application of 
68 See Arrowsmith, Developments in Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
( 1994) 3 P.P .L.R. CS 153 at p 17 0 for a discussion of the ways in which 
paragraph 44 places DSOs at a competitive disadvantage 
69 Issues Paper: Handling of CCT Matters in Relation to TUPE, DoE 1994 
239 
TUPE, however, offends against the principle of legal certainty: 
authorities and potential contractors are faced with the choice of 
acting in accordance with the provisions of the Guidance, which have 
statutory force, and are widely known, or acting in accordance with 
the "Issues Paper", which is perhaps not as widely available and has 
no statutory force, as it contains a series of proposed amendments. 
Central to the "Issues Paper's" proposals for the revision of the 
Guidance's provisions on TUPE is a revised paragraph 43: 
"The Secretary of State accepts that authorities may wish to refer prospective 
contractors to TUPE when inviting tenders. Whether the regulations apply in any 
particular case will depend on the nature of the work involved and the contractor's 
detailed proposals for carrying it out. Authorities should therefore not prejudge whether 
or not the regulations apply. 
"They may, however, wish to indicate their preliminary view of the likelihood of the 
regulations applying. In doing so they must make clear that the applicability of the 
regulations depends ultimately on a consideration of any proposals submitted by a 
contractor and that contractors may put forward proposals with different TUPE 
implications. Otherwise, authorities' expressions of view may have the effect of 
distorting, restricting or preventing competition. Any preliminary view must be adopted 
in good faith and based on careful consideration of the activity in question" 
Basically this paragraph states that it is permissible for authorities 
to state that they feel that prima facie TUPE may apply, but that 
they must simultaneously admit the possibility that, on examination 
of contractor's proposals, it may subsequently appear that TUPE does 
not apply. Consequently, contractors must be allowed to put forward 
proposals with a variety of TUPE implications: the submission of 
TUPE and non-TUPE bids by contractors may significantly extend the 
tender evaluation period70. In addition, it is proposed that 
authorities may seek an indemnity against costs which may arise 
from the discovery that an evaluation that a contract was not 
subject to TUPE had been erroneous, and that the Competition 
Regulations 1993 would be amended in order that indemnities 
70 See Latimer, The Chester Report, 2-8 December 1994 M] 27, where it is 
estimated that the submission of TUPE and non-TUPE bids could extend the 
tender evaluation period by at least three weeks 
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offered by local authorities may be an allowable cost. The proposed 
changes also intend to require that successful tenderers should 
offer comparable pension arrangements where there is a transfer of 
undertakings. The proposed alterations have satisfied neither 
potential contractors nor local authorities, and have been criticised 
as "riddled with inconsistencies which may expose local authorities 
to legal risk"?l. 
The Secretary of State's position on this matter is clearly aimed at 
precluding as far as possible local authorities from pointing out that 
TUPE probably applies to transfers which would take work from 
local authorities to the private sector, whose preferred method of 
winning contracts and maintaining profits is to reduce the pay and 
conditions of employees. The Secretary of State consequently fears 
that the mere prospect of TUPE applying will dissuade potential 
contractors who wish to win contracts by undercutting wage rates. 
However, in failing to countenance the possibility that authorities 
can express any more than the vaguest view that TUPE may apply, 
the Secretary of State is acting in contravention of the provisions of 
Article 28 of the Services Directive, which provides: 
"( 1) The contracting authority may state in the contract documents, or be obliged by a 
Member State to do so, the authority or authorities from which a tenderer may obtain 
the appropriate information on the obligations relating to the employment protection 
provisions and the working conditions which are in force in the Member State, region or 
locality in which the services are to be performed and which shall be applicable to the 
services are to be performed and which shall be applicable to the services provided on 
site during the performance of the contract. 
(2) The contracting authority which supplies the information referred to in paragraph 
1 shall request the tenderers or those participating in the contract award procedure to 
indicate that they have taken account, when drawing up their tender, of the obligations 
relating to employment protection provisions and the working conditions which are in 
force where the service is to be carried out. This shall be without prejudice to the 
application of the provisions ... concerning the examination of abnormally low tenders." 
These provisions merit some consideration. It is clear that Her 
Majesty's Government would rather not have authorities refer 
71 Maclure, Guide still seeking TUPE trail, 28/1/94 LGC 8 
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potential contractors to information regarding employment 
protection legislation, as is evident from the terms of the Guidance, 
so authorities are forced to rely on the discretion which they are 
given to refer potential contractors on their own initiative to "the 
authority or authorities from which a tenderer may obtain the 
appropriate information relating to" employment protection 
provisions. The appropriate national authority is probably the 
Department of Employment, which could inform a tenderer of which 
employment protection legislation is currently in force. However, 
the first paragraph refers to the employment protection provisions 
"which are in force in the Member State, region or locality", thus 
opening the possibility that the authority itself may inform 
potential contractors of the relevant legislation in its "locality" if 
another authority refuses to do so. Moreover, authorities, having 
informed potential contractors of where to obtain information on 
the relevant legislation, are then under a duty to request tenderers 
to indicate that they have taken account of the obligations relating 
to employment protection, and significantly, "the working conditions 
which are in force in the place where the service is to be carried 
out"72, in preparing their tenders. Presumably, the corollary to this 
is that tenderers who refuse to do so may be excluded from 
participation: certainly it would appear that where tenderers fail to 
take into account employment protection legislation or local 
working conditions the provisions of the Directive relating to the 
treatment of tenders which appear to be abnormally low may be 
invoked73 • However, what is clear is that, where the Directives 
apply, local authorities which direct potential contractors to a 
competent source of information on the applicability of employment 
protection legislation will actually be under a duty to request 
tenderers to take account of all relevant employment protection 
legislation in preparing their tenders. As TUPE is obviously an 
employment protection provision, authorities are therefore under a 
duty to request tenderers to submit bids which take account of TUPE. 
The Secretary of State's position is inconsistent with this, and 
72 Article 28(2) 
73 Ibid. See also Arrowsmith, Developments in Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (1994) 3 P.P.L.R. CS153 atp172 
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cannot, therefore bear legal scrutiny, where the Service Directive 
applies in its entirety. 
Treatment of assets 
The final issue contained in the Guidance which will be considered 
here is the treatment of assets. The general principle is contained in 
paragraph 56: 
"Assets are in some cases an important input to the operation of a service- for example 
refuse vehicles or works depots. The Secretary of State considers that authorities may 
be in breach of their duty to avoid restriction, distortion or prevention of competition if 
they refuse to make key premises or other assets available to external contractors in the 
event of being successful in competition. Making available assets will ensure that 
contractors who would not be in a position to compete for work without such facilities 
are not excluded from competition." 
Consequently, the Secretary of State considers that where contracts 
are to run for a year or more, depot space should be made available 
to contractors74; that the possibility of redeveloping a depot if the 
DSO does not win is not a valid reason for refusing access, and that 
authorities should make clear when inviting tenders the terms, 
condition and period during which depot facilities and vehicles will 
be available to contractors 75, which terms are not to be onerous 
compared to the terms imposed on DSOs76. In view of the approach 
taken in these paragraphs, the content of paragraph 57 appears 
rather incongruous: 
"It is for authorities to decide in the circumstances of each case the assets which it would 
be appropriate to make available in order to facilitate a good show of competition 
(subject of course to conditions in leasing agreements which prohibit such novation)" 
The confusion is compounded by paragraph 61 which states that it is 
"not normally appropriate for an authority to require contractors to 
take on particular premises or other assets, and thereby to rule out 
bids involving alternative arrangements". In addition, the Secretary 
74 paragraph 58 
75 Paragraphs 5 9, 60 
76 Paragraph 62 
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of State, explains that in evaluating tenders, authorities are to take 
account of the benefits of an asset which has been released by the 
DSO's failure to win a contract77, the credit given to those tenders 
where the asset is not required being based on the open market 
disposal of an asset 78, with the net costs of cancelling leases being 
a permissible prospective cost79, although, where an asset will be 
disposed of for a sum less than the authority paid for it, the sum 
which will be received must be taken as a benefit, rather than the 
difference between the original and resale value being calculated as 
a loss, for tender evaluation purposes80. However, as has been noted 
above81 , where Directive 92/50 applies in its entirety, and 
authorities choose to award contracts on the basis of the most 
economically advantageous tender, they, not the Secretary of State, 
enjoy a discretion to select the criteria for tender evaluation and 
may thus theoretically frame the criteria in such a way as to take 
into account the actual losses incurred on disposal of assets. 
It would therefore appear that almost any conduct, from not 
offering assets to the contractors who may win work, through 
failing to make clear the basis on which assets are made available, 
to requiring that contractors should take over assets, may be anti-
competitive. This section of the Guidance therefore appears not to 
define what will be anti-competitive, but instead to raise the 
possibility that virtually any course of conduct available to an 
authority may be anti-competitive in the circumstances. 
The treatment of assets, however, is an issue which straddles the 
temporal watershed between what can and cannot be defined as 
anti-competitive by the Secretary of State, as, while he may 
regulate the basis on which many issues which relate to the basis 
on which assets are, or are not, made available, he cannot proscribe 
the actions of local authorities which occur after a decision has 
been taken as to who should perform the work. In this respect, one 
must consider paragraph 66: 
77 Paragraph 63 
78 Paragraph 64 
79 Paragraph 69 
80 Paragraph 68 
81 Chapter 3 
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"In the event of the DSO being unsuccessful in tendering for a contract involving the use 
of certain assets, and the successful contractor not requiring them, authorities have 
expressed the view that it is in their interests to retain those assets to facilitate future 
rounds of competition. It is for individual authorities to decide whether they wish to 
retain unwanted assets. However, the Secretary of State considers that the charge, or 
credit, for that asset should reflect the full value of assets, unencumbered by 
restrictions imposed by an authority's wish to retain them for further use. To do 
otherwise may restrict, distort or prevent competition by discouraging contractors who 
may be able to offer better value for money by using cheaper capital assets." 
The conduct addressed here can only occur after a decision has been 
taken as to who will perform the work which has been tendered for: 
only then will an authority know that it has an asset which it does 
not require, and which a successful external contractor does not 
need in order to perform the work. In view of that fact, the 
Secretary of State has acted ultra vires in defining the conduct 
described in paragraph 66 as anti-competitive, as the prohibition of 
anti-competitive conduct contained in S7(7) only proscribes conduct 
up until the point at which a decision is taken as to who is to 
perform the work. 
A WORD ON WHITE-COLLAR GUIDANCE 
With the advent of eeT for white-collar services the Government 
intend to issue guidance for white-collar services. This is another 
aspect of the topic which reorganisation has an impact upon: there i s 
obviously less urgency to promulgate guidance for white-collar CeT 
in Scotland, where white-collar contracts need not be entered into 
until 1998, than in English Metropolitan Districts, where contracts 
must be issued during 1996. The approach taken, however, has been 
quite confusing. Draft guidance on eeT for legal and housing 
management was first issued on 10 June 1994. The legal status of 
this document, which was not in circular form, was undeniable: even 
if it had been intended to, it could have no prescriptive legal force 
due to the fact that it was issued before either housing management 
or legal services had been added to the list of defined activities 
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contained in S2 of the 1988 Act82. However, in December 1994, after 
all of the services concerned had been added to the list of defined 
activities, a document entitled Guidance on the avoidance of anti-
competitive behaviour: legal, construction and property and housing 
management services was issued by the DoE. The pronouncements 
contained in this document appear so authoritative, that at least one 
commentator was convinced that this document performs an 
equivalent role to Circular 10/9383 . However, this is not, and cannot 
be, the case. First, when asked, the DoE will admit that this 
document is not the definitive guidance on this issue, but only a 
draft, although it will simultaneously be pointed out that local 
authorities will be expected to comply with its provisions84. 
Secondly, quite apart from the DoE's admission, this document does 
not fulfil the role of the statutory guidance authorised by S9(3)(e) 
of the Local Government Act 1992. Section 9(3)(e) permits 
regulations to "make provision for the issue by the Secretary of 
State" of guidance on the avoidance of anti-competitive practices, 
while regulation 1 S( 1) of the Local Government (Direct Service 
Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 199385 states that the 
"Secretary of State shall issue guidance". There is, however, nothing 
in this document to indicate that it has been issued by the Secretary 
of State, or enjoys official sanction: whereas both Circular 1 0/93, 
and the earlier, extra-statutory, Circular 1 /91, were published for 
the DoE, Scottish, and Welsh Offices by HMSO, and bore the 
signatures of ministers or under-secretaries, this document bears 
no crest or signature to indicate its origin. Nor, like its predecessor, 
does it appear in the list of government publications. The only 
indication in the document that it may have emanated from a 
government department is that the final paragraph states where 
enquiries should be directed to. What, however, is the legal import 
of this document? 
82 Housing management became a defined activity on 23rd June 1994 
by virtue of the Local Government Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined 
Activities) (Housing Management) Order 1994 S.l. 1671; legal services 
was added to the list on 10th November 1994 by the Local Government 
Act 1988 (Competition) (Defined Activities) Order 1994 S.l. 2884 
83 Dobson, Battling through the moral maze, 24/3/95 LGC 18 
84 Telephone conversation with civil servants of DoE Division G3, 
6/7/95 
85 1993 S.l. 848 
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The "guidance" on white-collar CCT certainly cannot be statutory 
guidance as described in S9(3)(e) of the 1992 Act, or in the 
regulations issued pursuant to it. It therefore does not equate to the 
role which Circular 10/93 fulfils. Whereas Circular 10/93 is 
statutory guidance, and the extent to which there is a contravention 
thereof may be taken into account in determining whether an 
authority has acted anti-competitively, the "guidance" issued in 
December 1994, given that it lacks statutory authority, cannot be 
relied on in making such a determination. As it is, in effect, extra-
statutory guidance, a contravention of it could not have the same 
effect as contravention of Circular 10/93. However, while 
contravention of this extra-statutory guidance may not have the 
clearly defined and understood effect as contravention of one of the 
provisions of Circular 10/93, it does not mean that an authority wi" 
not be acting anti-competitively if it does one of the things 
prohibited in the extra-statutory "guidance". The reason for this 
proposition is quite simple: neither the regulations nor the Guidance 
issued pursuant to S9 of the 1992 Act is intended to define 
exhaustively what will constitute anti-competitive conduct. Thus an 
authority may fail to fulfil the duty contained in S7(7) of the 1988 
Act to avoid anti-competitive conduct even though it has done 
something which has not actually been defined as anti-competitive 
in regulations or Guidance, and may be subject to sanction by the 
Secretary of State using his S 1 3 an S 1 4 powers, or to an action for 
breach of statutory duty. The difference is that the statutory 
Guidance not only defines matters which are anti-competitive, but 
by virtue of the 1992 Act, also carries considerable prescriptive 
force, as contravention of it will be prima facie anti-competitive, 
whereas the extra-statutory nature of the guidance on white-collar 
CCT issued so far means that it may define matters which appear to 
be anti-competitive, but lacks the prescriptive force of the 
statutory Guidance. 
This, however, may be of little consequence except in two 
situations, given that the Secretary of State would still be able to 
allege in a S 13 notice and a S 14 direction that it appeared to him 
that the conduct some aspect of a white-collar tendering exercise 
had been anti-competitive, although he would have to explain more 
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fully why he thought so rather than identifying a paragraph of the 
white-collar "guidance" which it appeared to him had been 
contravened. The two situations in which the extra-statutory nature 
of the white-collar guidance may cause difficulties are fairly 
obvious. First, difficulties may arise if there is a divergence 
between the statutory and extra-statutory guidance. In such a 
situation, if the Secretary of State issued a S 13 notice alleging 
that, contrary to the white-collar guidance, an authority had acted 
anti-competitively, but the course taken by the authority had been 
permitted by the statutory guidance, then the authority would have 
the advantage of the Secretary of State: the statutory Guidance, 
with its prescriptive force, must necessarily prevail over the extra-
statutory guidance, thus providing the defence of statutory 
authority. However, it is unlikely that such a situation would arise, 
given that both the statutory and extra-statutory guidance both 
represent the model of competition which the Secretary of State 
wishes to pursue. The second situation where a difficulty may arise 
is where an aggrieved contractor raises an action for breach of 
statutory duty against a local authority on the ground that it has 
acted anti-competitively: it must be remembered that contravention 
of guidance issued pursuant to S9 of the 1992 Act may be taken into 
account in the course of making "any determination" concerning 
whether a local authority has acted anti-competitively86, thus 
ensuring that contravention of statutory guidance would be prima 
facie anti-competitive for the purposes of such an action. Where 
extra-statutory guidance is concerned, it would carry no 
prescriptive value before a court, thus forcing the aggrieved 
contractor to illustrate precisely why the actions of an authority 
had been anti-competitive. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A substantial web of regulation has grown up around the ill-
defined prohibition of anti-competitive conduct contained in 7(7) of 
the 1988 Act. The purpose of all subsequent legislative measures, 
which invariably derive their authority from S9 of the Local 
Government Act 1992, has been to attempt to define the 
86 1992 Act, S9(3)(f); 1993 S.l. 848, regulation 15(2) 
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circumstances in which authorities will and will not be acting anti-
competitively. However, the attempts of the Local Government 
(Direct Service Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 1993, and 
particularly the Guidance on anti-competitive conduct issued 
pursuant to those regulations, often do not bear close legal scrutiny. 
A wide variety of the issues addressed by the Guidance, particularly 
in relation to tender evaluation, violate the provisions of the EC 
Services Directive in the circumstances in which it applies in its 
entirety. Moreover, the Guidance can be represented as an invidious 
instrument of regulation which, at various times and in relation to 
various issues, manages to violate the provisions of Directive 
92/50, important constitutional principle, the domestic statutes 
from which it derives its authority, and even the regulations 
pursuant to which it is issued. In such circumstances, the inference 
which one is forced to draw is that the Secretary of State has 
chosen to pursue his preferred model of competition without due 
regard for the legal constraints within he must operate. 
The Guidance reveals much about the model of competition which 
the Secretary of State wishes to pursue. The insistence that 
authorities should not reject a lower tender without good reason, 
the attempt to restrict the application of TUPE, which would 
adversely affect the ability of tenderers to undercut DSOs by forcing 
them to offer the same working conditions, as far as possible, and 
the attempt made to restrict the ability of local authorities to take 
into account redundancy payments in the course of tender evaluation 
illustrate that the Secretary of State sees the essential criteria for 
the award of a contract as being the price. He wishes to see the 
lowest bid succeed and in doing so he will attempt to restrict the 
ability of authorities to take into account factors which they may 
otherwise legitimately consider. However, these are not the only 
provisions which attempt to ease the path of private sector 
tenderers seeking to win CCT contracts: the paragraphs relating to 
packaging of contracts, for example, also appear to be intended to 
have that effect. This apparent willingness of the Secretary of State 
to assist private sector contractors by defining certain conduct as 
anti-competitive may well be at variance with the wider purposes 
of the statutory scheme: 
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"The purpose of the Act is not, as I understand it, primarily to secure to contractors 
opportunities of bidding for and obtaining contracts for the performing of functional 
work for local authorities. The purpose is rather to secure that local authorities will 
only undertake such activities ... if they can do so competitively ... "87 
The purpose of S9(3)(e) and (f) of the 1992 Act is to facilitate the 
definition of the conduct which will contravene the prohibition of 
anti-competitive conduct set out S7(7) of the 1988 Act. The 
particular purpose of those prohibitions is to ensure that local 
authorities do not act anti-competitively: to ensure that local 
authorities do not favour their DSO to the prejudice of other 
tenderers, not actively to assist private sector tenderers. Yet 
certain provisions of the Guidance appear more concerned with 
assisting the private sector than restricting authorities' ability to 
act anti-competitively. 
87 R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Knowsley, 
31/7/91(unreported) per Ralph Gibson LJ 
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CHAPTER 5: 
PROCEDURES FOR REDRESS OF BREACH OF THE 1988 ACT'S 
PROVISIONS 
Having examined the mechanics of the tendering process, it now 
remains to consider the procedures which exist for seeking redress 
of a failure to comply with the 1988 Act's provisions. Chief amongst 
these are the powers given to the Secretary of State by S 1 3 and S 1 4 
of the Local government Act 1988. The powers given to the 
Secretary of State by these provisions do not relate to the 
competition process alone: as will be seen, these powers may be 
used to sanction local authorities for their DSOs' inadequate 
performance of their obligations regarding the work awarded 
following a tendering process. However, this is but one avenue of 
redress and some attention must also be paid to the remedies 
available to aggrieved tenderers seeking redress for a breach of the 
tendering procedures 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
CAN EXERCISE HIS POWERS UNDER THE 1988 ACT 
The procedures which may ultimately lead to a sanction being 
imposed upon an authority by the Secretary of State may only be 
used in the circumstances recounted in S13 of the 1988 Act. Section 
13(1) states that: 
"If it appears to the Secretary of State that in the financial year beginning in 1989 or in 
a subsequent financial year a defined authority-
(a) have (as a bidding authority) entered into a contract to carry out work and have done 
so in contravention of section 4 above, 
(b) have carried out work as regards which the conditions set out in section 7 above 
have to be but, in the circumstances, have not been fulfilled, 
(ba) have decided to carry out work as regards which (if the work is carried out in 
accordance with the decision) those conditions will have to be but, in the circumstances 
in which it is proposed to carry it out, will not be fulfilled, 
(c) have carried out work in circumstances where section 9 above has not been complied 
with for the year concerned in relation to the defined activity within which the work 
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falls or in relation to an account required by that section to be kept for the year 
concerned as regards the activity, 
(d) have carried out work in circumstances where section 10 above has not been 
complied with for the year concerned in relation to the defined activity within which the 
work falls, or 
(e)have carried out work in circumstances where section 11 above has not been 
complied with for the year concerned in relation to the defined activity within which the 
work falls or in relation to a report required by that section to be prepared for the year 
concerned as regards the activity, 
he may serve on the authority a written notice falling within subsection (2) below" 
There are two preliminary points to note about the powers contained 
in S13(1) of the 1988 Act. First, the powers contained in S13 and 14 
of the 1988 Act, can only be exercised if "it appears to the 
Secretary of State" that an authority has failed to comply with one 
of the provisions listed in S13(1) or S19A(1) respectively. It is 
worthy of note that the statutes establish no procedure for 
informing the Secretary of irregular conduct in relation to any of the 
activities listed: the legislation is silent as to the means by which 
he is kept informed'. Second, S 1 3 (1) limits the exercise of these 
powers to use in the "financial year beginning in 1989 or in a 
subsequent financial year". 
The list of activities contained in S 1 3 (1) extends not only to the 
conduct of the tendering process, but to a variety of matters 
regarding the performance of work carried out by DSOs. The precise 
scope of matters which the Secretary of State may exercise his 
powers in relation to will now be considered. 
1: Failures to comply with tendering conditions 
The first set of circumstances where the Secretary of State 
may exercise his powers is where there appears to him to be a 
contravention of the tendering conditions. Section 13(1 )(a) refers to 
contraventions of the works contract regime contained in the 1988 
Act. However, legislative developments will render these regimes 
obsolete in Scotland and Wales, and it is likely that legislative 
1 The relevance of this element of vagueness will be discussed below 
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changes will be effected in England2 : it is therefore unnecessary to 
discuss these provisions further. 
More importantly, S13(1)(b) and (ba) permit the Secretary of 
State to exercise his powers whenever it appears to him that there 
has been a failure to comply with the provisions of the functional 
work regime contained in the 1988 Act. The wording of S13(1) is 
noteworthy. The Secretary of State is allowed to initiate the 
procedure contained in S 1 3 not only once work has commenced but 
also as soon as the decision has been taken as to who is to perform 
the work3 . The apparent failure of an authority to comply with any 
of the provisions of S7 of the 1988 Act4 will allow the Secretary 
of State to initiate the S 13 procedure. Thus, for example, anti-
competitive conduct will be investigated using the S13 power. One 
peculiarity must be noted, however. As S13(1 )(b) refers to a failure 
of an authority to comply with the conditions contained in S7 of the 
1988 Act with regard to work which it has carried out, one must 
remember that the conditions contained in S7 do not relate solely to 
the conduct of the tendering process: the final condition "is that in 
carrying out the work the authority comply with the detailed 
inspection of it" prepared for the purposes of the tendering processs. 
Thus, as regards work performed under the 1988 Act the Secretary 
of State may exercise his powers to address not only failures in the 
conduct of the tendering procedure, but also failures as regards the 
performance of work by a OSO. 
2: Failure to keep the required accounts 
The second set of circumstances in which the Secretary of State 
may use his powers relates to the failure of a local authority to 
maintain accounts regarding the work which it has performed in the 
manner prescribed by the legislation6. Section 13(1 )(c) authorises 
the issue of a notice to an authority when it appears that it has 
failed to maintain accounts for each defined activity in accordance 
with S9 of the 1988 Act, and related delegated legislation. 
2 See Ch2 
3 See S13(l)(ba) 
4 For the precise content of these provisions see Chapter 2 
5 S7(8) 
6 See Part III, chapter 1 for a discussion of this duty 
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3: Failure to achieve financial objective 
The third reason why the Secretary of State may wish to 
exercise his powers is where it appears that a local authority has 
failed to achieve the financial objective which it is required to 
meet 7. Local authorities are required to achieve annually a financial 
objective specified by the Secretary of State in relation to each 
category of work, by virtue of S1 0 of the 1988 Act: the practice has 
been to specify a rate of return on capital employed. Consequently, 
where it appears that in any given year an authority has failed to 
meet its rate of return in relation to a particular activity, the 
Secretary is empowered by S1 3(1 )(d) to issue the appropriate notice 
to a local authority. 
4: Failure to comply with requirements regarding annual 
reports 
Finally, by virtue of S1 3(1 )(e) the Secretary of State may issue 
notices to authorities which fail to comply with their various duties 
regarding the issue of annual reports under S 1 1 . 
THE CONTENT OF A SECTION 13 NOTICE 
Having examined the circumstances in which the Secretary of 
State initiates the procedure which may ultimately result in 
sanctions being imposed on local authorities, the content of the 
notices which mark the formal initiation of the procedure must be 
considered. Section 13(2) of the 1988 Act declares that: 
"The notice is one which-
(a) informs the authority that it appears to him that in a financial year identified in the 
notice they have acted as mentioned in one of the paragraphs (so identified) of subsection 
(1) above, 
(b) identifies the work concerned and states why it appears so, 
(c) contains the requirement mentioned in subsection (3) below." 
A S 1 3 notice must therefore do three things. First, it must identify 
which of the provisions listed in S 1 3( 1) the Secretary of State 
believes has been contravened. Secondly, it must identify the work 
7 See Part III, chapter 1 for a discussion of this duty 
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to which the notice relates, and why it appears to the Secretary of 
State that there has been a contravention of the statutory duty. 
Effectively, therefore, the Secretary of State must give reasons for 
issuing the notice. It is possible to issue several notices relating to 
the same work in the same financial year, and such notices may 
identify the same apparent contraventions, or may be issued in 
regard to the apparent contravention of one of the other statutory 
duties listed in S13(1)8. 
Finally, the notice issued by the Secretary of State must 
require: 
" ... that the authority submit to him within such time as is specified in the notice a 
written response which-
(a)states that they have not acted as mentioned in the paragraph concerned of subsection 
(1) above and justifies the statement, or 
(b) states that they have acted as so mentioned, and gives reasons why he should not give 
reasons why he should not give a direction under section 14 below."g 
The final element of the notice must inform the authority to which 
it is issued of the date by which the Secretary of State must receive 
what is effectively its defence to the notice, and also inform the 
authority of the two defences available to it. 
At this stage the authority which has been served with the 
notice has three choices: it can decide not to reply to the notice, and 
thus let the Secretary of State take whatever course of action he 
desires; it can reply to the notice, stating that it has not acted in 
the manner alleged; or it can admit to acting as alleged in the 
notice, and seek to explain its conduct in the hope that it can evade 
one of the sanctions contained in S 1 4, in which case it has been 
opined that the Secretary of State should give due consideration to 
the possibility of not issuing a S14 notice lO. In practice, however, 
the authority will have deliberated over what course of action it 
will take for some considerable time prior to the issue of a S13 
8 S13(5) of the 1988 Act 
9 S13(3) 
10 See Ettrick and Lauderdale D.C. v Secretary of State For Scotland 1995 
SLT 996 at p 1000 E-F 
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notice. It would appear that the practice adhered to is for the 
Secretary of State, once it appears to him that one of the 
appropriate statutory duties has not been complied with, or when he 
receives a complaint to that effect, informally makes the substance 
of the complaint known to the authority in question, and asks it to 
comment. Once the reply to this extra-statutory inquiry is received, 
the Secretary of State will consider it, and decide if it is necessary 
to exercise his statutory powers. If he decides to use them, he will 
issue a S 13 notice: if not, he will inform the authority of his 
decision not to exercise his powers". This extra-statutory 
procedure has two advantages. First, and most relevant to the 
present discussion, it informs authorities in advance of potential 
problems, and allows them to consider in advance the courses of 
action available to them if a S13 notice is issued. Secondly, it would 
appear that the use of this extra-statutory procedure allows the 
Secretary of State to "sift" alleged contraventions of statutory 
duties and to decide if a complaint is unjustified, and when it is 
appropriate to use his powers. It appears that minor, explicable, 
contraventions of the statutory regime, for example, failure to meet 
the prescribed rate of return on capital employed due to an innocent 
accounting error, will receive an informal, extra-statutory letter of 
admonition, as opposed to the full weight of the sanctions available 
to the Secretary of State 12. 
What happens, however, following the issue of a S13 notice? 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH DIRECTIONS MAY BE ISSUED. 
The circumstances in which the Secretary of State may use his 
powers to give directions to local authorities are enumerated in 
S14(1). Section 14(1), for example, states: 
"Subsection (2) below applies where-
(a) the Secretary of State has served a notice on an authority under section 13 above, 
11 See CCT and Local Government in England: Annual Report for 1993, DoE 
1994,p7 
12 Interview with officers of Stirling DC, 19/4/94 
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(b) the time specified in the notice has expired (whether or not he has received a 
written response to the notice), and 
(c) it still appears to him that the authority have acted as mentioned in the paragraph 
concerned of section 13(1) above." 
A notice can thus only be issued under S14(2) of the 1988 Act if a 
number of conditions are fulfilled. First, the Secretary of State 
must have served a S13 notice on the authority prior to the issue of 
the S 14 notice. Authorities must be informed of the case against 
them, in other words13. Therefore, if the Secretary of State were to 
issue a S 14 notice without first issuing a S 13 notice, there would 
clearly exist a procedural impropriety14 sufficient to render the 
Secretary of State's determination invalid. Similar issues would 
arise if the Secretary of State issued a S 14 notice on different 
grounds from those contained in the S13 notice: as the authority 
would have had to address its defence of its actions to the matters 
contained in the S 1 3 notice, it would be procedurally improper for 
the Secretary of State to issue a S 14 notice on other grounds which 
the authority had not had the opportunity to deny or explain. This is 
emphasised by the second condition to be addressed, the requirement 
contained in S14(1)(c) that the Secretary of State may only exercise 
his powers of sanction "if it s till appears to him that the authority 
have acted as mentioned in the paragraph concerned of section 
13(1)" [emphasis added]. The use of the word "still" implies that the 
category of default addressed by the S 1 4 notice should conform to 
the category and situation identified in the S 1 3 notice. The final 
condition imposed by S 1 4( 1) is that, before S 1 4 notice is issued, the 
time period specified in the S13 notice must have expired. This 
means that any notice issued prior to the expiry of that time period, 
even if it was obvious that the local authority in question was not 
going to respond, would be ultra vires. However, this provision also 
ensures that, where the time period has expired and the authority 
has not responded to the S13 notice, the Secretary of State may 
apply the maxim quis silentiam consentire, take the authority's 
silence as meaning that it consents to his view of the situation, and 
13 Cf. Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] A.c. 332 
14 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 
374 per Lord Diplock 
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use his S14 powers as he sees fit. Finally it should be noted that a 
S14 notice will only be valid if the Secretary of State did not 
misdirect himself in law as to the matters stated in the preceding 
S13 notice15 
THE SANCTIONS WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED 
The sanctions available to the Secretary of State are set forth in 
S14(2) of the 1988 Act, which states: 
"The Secretary of State may direct that with effect from such date as is specified in the 
direction the authority-
(a) shall cease to have power to carry out work falling within the appropriate activity, 
(b) shall cease to have power to carry out such work falling within that activity as is 
identified in the direction, 
(c) shall only have power to carry out work falling within that activity if such 
conditions as are specified in the direction are fulfilled, or 
(d) shall, as regards such work falling within that activity as is identified in the 
direction, only have power to carry it out if such conditions as are specified in the 
direction are fulfilled." 
The Secretary of State may thus issue a variety of notices under 
S 14. First, he may direct that the authority shall cease to have 
power to perform any work falling within the defined activity to 
which the notice relates' 6. Secondly, he may direct that the 
authority shall cease to have power to carry out such work falling 
within the defined activity as is specified in the notice' 7. Thus, 
where a defined activity has been exposed to competition as a 
number of contracts, the Secretary of State could issue sanctions 
relating to a single contract, as opposed to a defined activity in its 
entirety. The third option available to the Secretary of State is to 
issue a notice stating that an authority will be unable to carry out 
any work falling within a defined activity unless the conditions 
specified in the notice are complied with. Finally, a notice may 
specify that work of a particular description falling within a 
15 See Ettrick and Lauderdale D.C. v Secretary of State for Scotland 1995 
SLT996 
16 S14(2)(a) 
17 S14(2)(b) 
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defined activity may only be carried out by a OSO if certain 
conditions contained in the notice are fulfilled. The effect of these 
notices can be radical, removing from local authorities the power to 
perform certain work through its OSO, or even resulting in the 
closure of a OSO. While the Act may describe the content of such 
notices as "directions", it is more accurate to describe them as 
sanctions. 
Two points must be made about the exercise of these powers. 
First, it was held in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p. 
London Borough of Haringey 1 8 that: 
"When S14(1)(c) applies, the Secretary of State may issue directions as set out in 
ss14(Z)(a), (b), (c) or (d). There is no express limitation on his discretion. By the 
general law the Secretary of State must exercise that discretion rationally and so as 10 
promote the policy and objects of the Act which are to be determined by the construction 
of the Act by the Court (see Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture [1968] AC 997, [1968] 
1 All ER 694),,19 
Consequently, when it still appears to the Secretary of State, acting 
in accordance with the procedure set forth in either Act, that an 
authority has acted in the manner set forth in the S 13 notice, he may 
choose which of the sanctions contained in S14 to apply. As the Act 
does not set limits on the exercise of his discretion as to which 
sanction should be used in particular situations, the only constraints 
are that the Secretary of State should act rationally, without regard 
to irrelevant considerations, taking into account all relevant 
considerations, and should use his discretion to promote the policy 
and objects of the Act. Thus, provided he exercises his discretion in 
accordance with the established public law principles, the Secretary 
of State may validly sanction a OSO for a relatively minor 
infringement of one of the provisions mentioned in S 1 3 (1) by 
directing that it shall no longer have power to carry out work falling 
within the activity in question. While domestic law does not 
recognise the existence of a distinct principle of proportionality 
which would constrain the Secretary of State's ability to use the 
18 2nd February 1994, unreported 
19 See judgement of Ralph Gibson LJ 
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most severe sanctions for relatively minor infringements, the House 
of Lords has recognised that the proportionality of an action may be 
of relevance in establishing Wednesbury unreasonableness, and has 
not precluded the emergence of proportionality as a distinct ground 
of review at some point in the future2o, something which certain 
commentators believe to be "highly Iikely"21, Where there is a 
coincidence of the CCT legislation and the EC Services Directive, 
however, the principle of proportionality will apply to the 
enforcement of Community obligations22 
However, it appears that the Department of the Environment at 
least may be in the process of establishing a policy regarding the 
situations in which S14 notices will be used to preclude DSOs from 
competing for work23 , It has been indicated by a junior minister in 
speeches to the Public and Local Service Efficiency Campaign, and 
the Association of Direct Labour Organisations that the sanctions 
contained in S14(2)(a) and (b) of the 1988 Act will be used to 
prevent DSOs from competing for or carrying out work in four 
situations24, 
The first situation in which the most severe sanctions will be 
applied is where the DoE warns a local authority that it is acting 
anti-competitively, giving it the chance to rectify the alleged 
breach, but it continues to do so, This, however, very much depends 
on the DoE and the authority's respective views on what constitutes 
anti-competitive conduct: an obvious example of where there would 
be a divergence of opinion is the applicability of TUPE and the 
content of TUPE clauses in contract documentation25 • Secondly, the 
most severe sanctions would be imposed where an authority 
abandons the tender process when it appears that the DSO is not the 
20 R v Home Secretary ex parte Brind [1990] 1 All ER 469. See also on this 
point lowell and Lester, Proportionality: Neither Novel nor Dangerous, in 
lowell and Oliver, New Directions in ludicial Review. For a general overview 
of the issue of proportionality see Craig, Administrative Law, (3rd Ed. 1994) 
pp411-421 
21 See e.g. Craig, Administrative Law (3rd Ed. 1994) at p 421 
22 State v Watson and Belmann, Case 118/75, [1976] ECR 1185, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 
552 
23 DoE strengthens arsenal for enforcement of competition, 10/2/95 LGC 2 
24 See also DoE sets out tougher sanctions for banning DLOs 16/6/95 LGC 5 
25 See Ch 4 for a discussion 
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lowest tenderer. The third situation is where the DSO fails to 
achieve the rate of return on capital employed in spite of having 
been the lowest tenderer. This may have the greatest impact given 
that the statutory duties to meet the rate of return on capital 
employed are the ones with which local authorities have most 
difficulty complying. Finally, these sanctions will be utilised where 
"competition is poor" or the DSO's standard of service falls 
considerably below that set out in the specification. The imposition 
of these sanctions where "competition is poor" is quite disturbing; 
apart from the obvious subjectivity of this standard, the failure of 
the private sector to compete is a matter very often beyond the 
control of a local authority, as was recently illustrated by the 
failure of the private sector to bid for one contract which had been 
exposed to competition again because the Secretary of State had 
utilised his S 14 powers to prohibit a DSO from carrying out a 
contract, or participating in the new award procedure26• While it 
must be remembered that it is always open to a Minister to 
formulate a policy regarding the exercise of his powers, provided he 
is willing to derogate from that policy in an appropriate case27 , it 
must also be borne in mind that the exercise of his powers must be 
consistent with the policy and purposes of the Act28• While the other 
situations in which it has been suggested that the Secretary of 
State will use his most severe powers of sanction appear to be 
consistent with the policy and purposes of the 1988 Act, their use 
where "competition is poor" cannot be so characterised. As Ralph 
Gibson LJ pointed out in R v Secretary of State for the Environment 
ex parte Knowsley regarding the 1988 Act: 
liThe purpose of the Act is not, as I understand it, primarily to secure to contractors 
opportunities of bidding for and obtaining contracts for the performing of functional 
work for local authorities. The purpose is rather to secure that local authorities will 
only undertake such activities ... if they can do so competitively ... n29 
26 See Borough ordered to re-tender work after lack of private bids, 28 April 
~S May 1995 MJ 7, regarding Haringey LBC, whose DSO was prevented from 
tendering for a contract 
27 British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 
28 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 
29 R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Knowsley,3117/91 
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To impose the most draconian sanction available in circumstances 
where "competition is poor" suggests that local authorities should 
be penalised not only for their own failures to act competitively, but 
also for the private sector's lack of interest in tendering: this is 
tantamount to suggesting that the purpose of the legislation is to 
secure opportunities for the private sector to secure contracts, 
something which is clearly at variance with the purpose of the 
legislation identified in the dicta contained in ex parte Knowsley . 
However, it must be borne in mind that, while there have been two 
public pronouncements regarding the adoption of this policy 
regarding the use of the most severe sanctions, there has yet been 
no official indication or evidence of its adoption. Moreover the 
position in Scotland is unclear, there having been no pronouncement 
on the use of sanctions as yet. 
Secondly, it would appear that the Secretary of State enjoys 
considerable discretion in the exercise of the powers contained in 
S14(2)(c) and (d) of the 1988 Act, which permit him to impose 
conditions precedent to DSOs being permitted to carry out the work 
which is subject to the notice. In R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment ex.p. Knowsley M.B.C. and others 30, for example, it was 
held that the Secretary of State could impose a condition to the 
effect that an authority must re-tender the work which had been 
awarded to its DSO and, if its DSO were successful again, must show 
that the conditions contained in S7 of the 1 988 Act had been 
fulfilled and seek the consent of the Secretary of State to the DSO 
carrying out the work. As Ralph Gibson LJ commented in his leading 
judgement: 
"By section 14(2)(c) the powers of the Secretary of State, when they arise, include the 
giving of a direction that the authority 'shall only have power to carry out ... [the] ... work 
if such conditions as are specified in the directions are fulfilled'. The Secretary of State 
could not use that power to require compliance with a condition which is not in proper 
furtherance of the legislative purpose of this part of the Act as determined by the court. 
Nor could the Secretary of State lawfully impose a condition which, although in proper 
furtherance of that purpose, utilised in effect a sanction not permitted by the Local 
Government Act 1988. Condition 3(b) [the sanction at issue] was not properly phrased 
30 31 July 1991, unreported 
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to express the intention of the Secretary of State: it said that the authority must 'after 
fulfilling all the conditions contained in section 7 obtain the consent'. The intention was 
that the authority was to apply for consent on fulfilling the conditions and, on showing 
that the conditions were fulfilled, consent would be given. " 
Thus there are two constraints on the nature of the conditions 
imposed on local authorities by the Secretary of State: such 
conditions must be intended to further the proper purposes of the 
Act, and they must not be conditions which are not permitted by the 
Act, even though they apparently further the purposes of the Act. It 
is difficult to envisage situations where a condition would not be 
permitted by the Act, given the terminology used S14. However, the 
requirement that conditions should be intended to fulfil the proper 
purposes of the Act leaves the Secretary of State with considerable 
latitude. 
As a result of R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p. 
Knowsley MBC and others, several amendments were made to the 
1988 Act, by the Local Government Act 199231 , Section 14( 4A) and 
(48) declare: 
"( 4A) The conditions that may be imposed by a direction given under this section in 
relation to the carrying out of any work include a condition restricting the carrying out 
of work to cases where-
(a) the Secretary of State is satisfied as to any matter specified or described in the 
direction, or 
(b)the work is carried out under and in accordance with an authorisation or consent 
given for the purposes of the direction by the Secretary of State. 
(48) Where a direction under this section imposes any condition in relation to the 
carrying out of any work, that direction may provide that the requirement that the 
condition is fulfilled is to have effect, in relation to that work, instead of any 
requirement which (apart from the direction) would have effect in relation to that work 
by virtue of this part." 
These amendments permit the Secretary of State to do a variety 
of things when issuing a direction. First, it is obvious that S14( 4A) 
is intended to forestall challenges to the issue of S 1 4 notices on 
31 Sll and Schedule 1 
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similar grounds to Knowsley . Section 14( 4A)(a) permits the 
Secretary of State to require that a condition which he specifies in 
the S 14 notice must be fulfilled to his satisfaction prior to the 
local authority being able to perform work via its OSO. Section 
14(4A)(b) permits the Secretary of State to require as a condition 
precedent to an authority performing work via its OSO that it should 
have sought his authorisation or consent before carrying out work 
and performs the work in accordance with his authorisation. This 
provision is perhaps only relevant to the situation where an 
authority has been forced to re-tender work, and must, after 
conducting the retendering exercise, seek the Secretary of State's 
consent before beginning performance of the work subject to the 
S 14 notice. It should be noted that the content of a notice may 
"include" the directions listed in S 14( 4A): these provisions are 
without prejudice to the other conditions which the Secretary of 
State may impose. 
The second provision inserted in S14, S14( 48), is potentially the 
most invidious provision contained in Part I of the 1988 Act. As this 
provision refers to conditions in a S 14 notice which will prevail 
over any contrary requirement contained in Part I of the 1988 Act, it 
in effect allows the Secretary of State to disapply any of the 
provisions of Part I of the Act. Thus, any of the tendering provisions 
may be dis applied or altered, with a potentially serious effect for 
the fairness and objectivity of a retendering exercise. The most 
obvious examples would be the revision of the timing of the stages 
of the tendering process, or the definition of certain conduct as 
anti-competitive in relation to a particular tendering exercise: 
however, all tendering exercises must comply with the minimum 
standards of objectivity contained in the EC public procurement 
regime. This provision would also allow the requirements as to DSO 
accounts, annual reports, and financial objectives to be effectively 
suspended or altered if conditions specified in a S 1 4 notice were 
met. 
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ALTERATION OF S14 NOTICES. 
The issue of a S 1 4 notice does not necessarily conclude the 
process, however. The 1988 Act contains provisions facilitating the 
alteration of such notices. Section 14(3) of the 1988 Act provides 
that: 
"Where the Secretary of State has given a direction under subsection (2) above or this 
subsection (the previous direction) he may give a direction (a new direction) that with 
effect from such date as is specified in the new direction-
(a) any prohibition applying by virtue of the previous direction (whether the 
prohibition applies outright or if conditions are not fulfilled) shall cease to apply, 
(b) any outright prohibition applying by virtue of the previous direction is replaced by 
a prohibition applying (as regards the same work) if conditions specified in the new 
direction are not fulfilled, or 
(c) any prohibition applying as regards work by virtue of the previous direction 
(whether the prohibition applies outright or if conditions are not fulfilled) is replaced 
by a prohibition which applies only to such of that work as is identified in the new 
direction but which is otherwise in the same terms as the prohibition in the previous 
direction. " 
In addition, S1 4( 4C) states that: 
"Without prejudice to subsection (3) above, the power to give a direction under this 
section shall include power, at any time, to make such variations of a direction under 
this section as may be agreed with the authority to which the direction relates" 
The Secretary of State thus enjoys considerable scope to vary 
directions. First, by virtue of S14(3)(a) the Secretary of State may 
simply issue a new direction stating that the previous S 14 notice 
shall cease to apply. Secondly, S14(3)(b) permit him, in effect, to 
reduce the severity of the notice by changing it from being one 
where an authority is prohibited from carrying out the work defined 
therein in any circumstances, to one where the authority will be 
able to perform work via its DSO if certain conditions set out in the 
revised notice are fulfilled. Third, if a notice either prohibits an 
authority from performing an activity via its DSO in any 
circumstances, or requires the authority to comply with certain 
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conditions prior to performing any work falling within that activity, 
the Secretary of State may reduce the scope of the prohibition by 
redefining the range of work which an authority is prohibited from 
carrying out, or can carry out only after fulfilling conditions32 . The 
prohibition or conditions remain the same, only the scope of the 
work to which the original notice applied is changed. Finally, it is 
significant that S 1 4( 4C) gives the Secretary of State power to make 
such variations to a notice as he agrees with the affected authority. 
Given that the variations are agreed with the authority in advance, 
the possibility of challenge is effectively excluded. 
Section 16(2) of the 1988 Act provides that: 
"Nothing in sections 13 and 14 above shall prejudice any remedy available to a person 
(apart from those sections) in respect of a failure to observe a provision of this Part." 
The wording of S16(2), by referring to remedies available "apart 
from those sections", would appear to imply that the procedures 
contained in SS13 and 14 represent one particular remedy available 
to redress failures to conform with the provisions of Part I of the 
1988 Act. The remedies available to aggrieved contractors will be 
discussed briefly below. However, it must be remembered that, to 
the extent that the EC Services Directive applies, those aggrieved by 
failures of authorities to comply with the procurement regime must 
be able to seek redress at a national level by pursuing a remedy 
consistent with the Compliance Directive33. The extent to which the 
procedures under S13 and S14 of the 1988 Act comply with the 
Compliance Directive must now be considered. 
THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES AND THE COMPLIANCE 
DIRECTIVE 
As the procedures contained in the 1988 Act may be used to 
redress failures in the competition process, and there is a 
considerable overlap between domestic and EC legislation as to the 
manner in which tendering procedures are to be conducted, the 
32 S14(3)(c) 
33 Directive 89/665 
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Compliance Directive prescribes the nature of the remedies which 
must be available to those aggrieved by failures which violate not 
only domestic provisions, but also the EC public procurement rules. 
It now remains to examine the extent to which the statutory 
sanction procedures conform to the Compliance Directive. 
It must be emphasised that the provisions of S 1 3 and S 14 are 
only being examined here to the extent that they relate to the 
failures in the competition process: the Compliance Directive does 
not apply in situations such as those relating to failures to meet 
financial objectives, and can only be used to redress failures in the 
tendering process. There would appear, however, to be a number of 
points at which the statutory procedures in question are at variance 
with the provisions of Directive 89/665. 
Article 1 of the Compliance Directive imposes three duties on 
Member States as to the system of remedies which must be put in 
place to redress failures to comply with the EC public procurement 
rules. Article 1 (1) provides that Member States must take measures 
to ensure that, as regards contract award procedures falling within 
the scope of the EC public procurement Directives, decisions of 
contracting authorities which infringe Community law, or national 
rules implementing the law, "may be reviewed effectively and .... as 
rapidly as possible". Article 1 (2) requires Member States to ensure 
that there is no discrimination between undertakings seeking re lie f 
as a result of the Directive's distinction between national rules 
implementing Community law and other national rules. Article 1 (3) 
states: 
"The Member States shall ensure that the review procedures are available, under 
detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or 
having had an interest in obtaining a particular public ... contract and who has been or 
risks being harmed by an alleged infringement." (Emphasis added) 
Two issues arise as a result of Article 1 which call into question 
whether the procedures set out in S 1 3 and S 14 are capable of being 
characterised as being remedies. First, Article 1 (1) of the 
Compliance Directive requires that review procedures should be as 
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rapid as possible. The DoE has stated that it has achieved its aim of 
completing the statutory action where anti-competitive behaviour 
has been alleged within 5 months in 75 per cent of cases. This figure 
is at variance with the experience of one of the authorities surveyed 
where the reply to two S 1 3 notices had been under consideration by 
the Scottish Office for over a year34. There is therefore some 
evidence that the statutory procedures are not conducted with 
sufficient expedition to be characterised as being 'as rapid as 
possible". However, it is the second issue which is the more 
damning. 
As was noted above, Article 1 (3) requires that a Member State 
must ensure that review procedures are available to those aggrieved 
by the conduct of a tendering procedure "under detailed rules which 
the Member States may establish." Article 1 (3) would appear to 
imply that where existing procedural rules cannot give effect to the 
duties imposed by the Directive and specific procedural rules are 
adopted, or in any situation where a State adopts new procedural 
rules to give effect to the Directive, the new procedure should be 
contained in "detailed rules". If we are to judge the provisions of 
S 1 3 and S 1 4 by that standard, we find that the procedure suffers 
from several deficiencies. The most serious deficiency regards the 
vital matter of how those procedures are initiated. The legal 
position is stated in the opening words of S 1 3 (1) which state that 
the notices initiating the procedures may be issued "if it appears to 
the Secretary of State" that certain statutory provisions have been 
contravened. As a matter of law this particular national "remedy" is 
initiated by the Secretary of State. The DoE may maintain that: 
"Most allegations of anti-competitive behaviour are made against local authorities by 
external contractors. Some allegations are made by trade associations, opposition 
councillors or members of the public. In addition, the Secretary of State can take action 
on his own initiative. ,,35 
34 Interview with officers of Strathc1yde R.C., 1112/93, 30/3/95 
35 CCT And Local Government in England: Annual Report for 1993, DoE 1994, 
p7 
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but this only reveals the parties by whom the Secretary of State i s 
informed of alleged breaches of the tendering process. Nothing is 
revealed of the mechanics of bringing a complaint. However, it is 
also clear that there are no rules as to the procedure for informing 
the Secretary of State of irregularities in an award process. The 
fact that no "detailed rules" exist as to who can inform the 
Secretary of State of irregularities in a contract award, or by what 
means he is to be informed, indicates the fundamental flaw which 
ensures that the statutory procedures cannot be a remedy for the 
purposes of ensuring compliance with the EC public procurement 
rules which apply whenever the CCT legislation and the EC public 
procurement Directives apply to the same tendering exercise: 
Article 1 (3) indicates that the review procedures in Member States 
must be available "at least to any person having or having had an 
interest in obtaining a particular" contract, whereas the procedure 
set out in the statute is available only to the Secretary of State, 
who patently has never had any interest in obtaining the contract in 
question. Thus the statutory procedures clearly cannot be remedies 
as understood by the Compliance Directive, because they are 
insufficiently detailed as to the circumstances in which they are 
initiated, and they are incapable of being initiated as a matter of 
law by those who have been injured by a failure in the tendering 
process. Thus the it is impossible for an aggrieved party to put 
forward cogent legal reasons via this procedure as to why they 
should be granted relief. 
It would therefore appear that while the domestic view is that 
the procedures contained in S13 and S14 of the 1988 Act are a form 
of remedy, they are clearly incapable of fulfilling the criteria for 
remedies which are capable of being used to enforce the EC public 
procurement rules set out in Article 1 of the Compliance Directive. 
Bearing in mind the considerable identity of scope of the CCT 
legislation and the Services Directive this is an unsatisfactory 
situation, illustrating the extra-judicial nature of the Secretary of 
State's powers under these statutory provisions. The situation is 
more unsatisfactory if one bears in mind that the statutory 
tendering regime contains certain provisions which have no 
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equivalent in the EC Directive36, thus opening up the possibility that 
these procedures may be perfectly valid as regards certain aspects 
of a tendering process, but incapable of application where the 
provision in question is supposed to implement the provisions of one 
of the EC public procurement regime. However, a sense of 
perspective must be maintained, and we must bear in mind that the 
extensive powers entrusted to the Secretary of State by Parliament 
are generally not used in order to redress failures in the competition 
process: in 1992, 8 notices were issued under S14, and the 
corresponding provision of the Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 1980, regarding irregularities in the tendering process, as 
opposed to 11 notices relating to financial failure, while in 1993 
the corresponding figures were 1 2 notices containing sanctions 
relating to tendering failures, and 11 relating to financial failures. 
However, far more S 1 3 notices are issued to authorities for 
financial failures than for tendering irregularities: in 1992 there 
were three notices issued relating to financial failures for every 
one relating to an alleged tendering irregularity, with the ratio for 
1993 rising to four notices relating to financial matters for every 
one concerning tendering irregularities37. Thus, the Secretary of 
State is far more likely to initiate procedures using a S 1 3 notice 
regarding financial failures, but is almost as likely to impose 
sanctions under S 14 for tendering irregularities as he is for 
financial failures. 
Having examined the Secretary of State's powers it now remains 
to examine the remedies which aggrieved tenderers will be able to 
pursue in court. 
REDRESS VIA THE COURTS FOR BREACH OF THE TENDERING 
REGIME 
In examining the remedies available to aggrieved tenderers one 
is again forced to recognise the impact of the EC public procurement 
regime upon this area of the law. Where a tendering exercise 
36 See Chapters 2,3 
37 CCT and Local Government in England: Annual Report for 1993, DoE 1994, 
pp 8-9 
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required by the 1988 Act also falls within the ambit of the Services 
Directive, then the system of available remedies must conform to 
the requirements of the Compliance Directive38, The obligation to 
implement the Compliance Directive has been fulfilled by virtue of 
provisions contained in the Public Services Contracts Regulations 
199339, which provide that contracting authorities owe a duty to 
contractors to comply with those Regulations and "any enforceable 
Community obligation"40 where a contract falls within the ambit of, 
and above the thresholds set in the Services Directive. Breach of 
this duty shall be actionable by any contractor "who, in consequence, 
suffers, or risks suffering, loss or damage"41, the appropriate forum 
for such an action being the High Court in England and Wales, and the 
Court of Session in Scotland, However, proceedings may not be 
brought unless the contractor has first informed the authority of the 
breach or apprehended breach of duty and indicated his intention to 
bring proceedings42, and must be brought "promptly and in any event 
within 3 months from the date when grounds for bringing the 
proceedings first arose unless the Court considers that there is good 
reason for extending the period"43: it would appear that, even if 
brought within three months, it is still possible that proceedings 
may be barred because they have not been brought Ipromptly"44, 
Having considered who may bring proceedings, the appropriate forum 
and the time limits pertaining to such proceedings it now remains to 
examine the remedies which are available to aggrieved contractors 
38 Directive 89/665. For a Detailed discussion of the Compliance Directive see 
Arrowsmith, Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules: Legal Remedies in 
the Court of Justice and National Courts in Arrowsmith (Ed.) Remedies 
Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules. For a discussion of the system of 
remedies available in domestic law for enforcing the EC procurement rules 
see Arrowsmith, Enforcing the E.C. Public Procurement Rules: the Remedies 
System in England and Wales (1992) 1 P.P.L.R. 92 and Weatherill, Enforcing 
the Public Procurement Rules in the United Kingdom in Arrowsmith (Ed.) 
Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules 
39 1993 S.l. 3228, Regulation 32 
40 1993 S.l. 3228, Regulation 32(1) 
41 Regulation 32(2) 
42 Regulation 32(4)(a) 
43 Regulation 32(4)(b) 
44 For a discussion of this point see e.g. Arrowsmith, Enforcing the E.C. 
Public Procurement Rules: the Remedies system in England and Wales (1992) 
1 P.P.L.R. 92 at p104 
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when a tendering exercise conducted under the 1988 Act also falls 
within the ambit of the Services Directive. 
Regulation 32(5) of the Public Services Contracts Regulations 
provides that: 
" ... in proceedings brought under this regulation the Court may-
(a) by interim order suspend the procedure leading to the award of the contract in 
relation to which the breach of duty owed pursuant to paragraph (1) above is alleged, or 
suspend the implementation of any such decision or action taken by the contracting 
authority in the course of following such procedure; and 
(b) if satisfied that a decision or action taken by the contracting authority was in breach 
of the duty owed pursuant to paragraph (' ) above-
(i) order the setting aside of the decision or action or order of the contracting authority 
to amend any documents, or 
(ii) award damages to a services provider who has suffered loss or damage as a 
consequence of the breach, or 
(iii) do both of those things." 
However, Regulation 32(6) states that: 
"In any proceedings under this regulation the Court shall not have the power to order any 
remedy other than an award of damages in respect of a breach of the duty owed pursuant 
to paragraph (1) above if the contract in relation to which the breach occurred has been 
entered into." 
The aggrieved contractor thus may have a variety of remedies 
available to him where he feels that the conduct of a tendering 
exercise has offended against the terms of the procurement 
directives or some other principle of community law. However, it 
would appear from the use of the word "may", that these remedies 
may be discretionary, not mandatory4s. First, during the course of 
the award procedure the contractor may seek an interim suspension 
of the award procedure on the ground that the authority has breached 
one of the duties imposed upon it by Community law. However, this 
is only an interim measure, and there must consequently be remedies 
4S On this point see Arrowsmith, Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: 
The Remedies System in England and Wales (1992) 1 P.P.L.R. 92 at pp 100-1 
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available before the Court following fuller consideration of the case. 
Thus the Court may set aside a decision of an authority which is in 
breach of Community law, or order the amendment of documents 
(something which is of considerable relevance where it is alleged 
that a specification is discriminatory, for example), but the Court 
may not order the setting aside of an award procedure once a 
contract has been entered into. Therefore, until a contract has been 
entered into the Court may set aside an award procedure, but after it 
has been entered into it possesses no power to do so. The obvious 
problem which arises here is where a situation exists akin to that in 
Ettrick and Lauderdale D.C. v Secretary of State for Scotland 46, 
where the contract documents issued with the invitation to tender 
state that the submission of a tender will constitute the acceptance 
of the tendering conditions contained therein, and that the 
submission of a tender will constitute an offer which, once accepted 
by the authority will constitute a contract. In such a situation a 
contract is concluded as soon as the result of the award procedure i s 
intimated to the successful tenderer, thus depriving other tenderers 
of the opportunity to have the procedure set aside. Thus, aggrieved 
contractors may often be forced to accept that, if they have an 
objection to any aspect of the award procedure they should raise the 
matter prior to the award of the contract if they wish to have a 
realistic opportunity of challenging the award procedure, having it 
set aside, and subsequently participating in an objective tendering 
exercise. Otherwise, aggrieved contractors will find that the only 
effective remedy available to them is to seek damages for the loss 
or damage which they have suffered as a result of the breach of 
Community law. 
The provisions of regulation 32 of the Public Services Contracts 
Regulations 1993 provide a succinct indication of the remedies 
available to aggrieved contractors for a breach of Community law 
where a tendering exercise conducted under 1988 Act also falls 
within the ambit of the public procurement directives. However, 
what remedies are available to aggrieved contractors where a 
tendering exercise does not fall within the scope of the directive, or 
where the aggrieved contractor wishes to rely on the provisions of 
46 1995 SLT 996 
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the 1988 Act rather than found his case on a breach of community 
law, something which is quite conceivable because of the 
divergences between domestic law and the Services Directive? 
In determining the remedies available to aggrieved contractors 
one must first ask: what is the evil to be addressed? An aggrieved 
contractor wishes to show that an authority has failed to comply 
with the provisions of the 1988 Act in awarding work. Aggrieved 
contractors will therefore allege a breach of one of the duties 
imposed by the statutes47 • It was accepted in Colas Roads Ltd v 
Lothian Regional Council 48 that it is competent for a contractor to 
bring an action for breach of statutory duty where he avers an 
apparent failure to comply with the tendering regime prescribed by 
the statute. Colas Roads concerned the prohibition of anti-
competitive conduct contained in S9 (4 )(aaaa) of the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act 198049, but it would appear that 
an action for breach of the duties imposed by the other provisions 
contained in the 1980 Act, and the 1988 Act, would also be 
competent. 
The appropriate forum for such an action would be the High 
Court in England and Wales, and the Court of Session in Scotland, as 
the action would have to be raised using the judicial review 
procedure contained in R.S.C. Order 53 in England and Wales, and by 
an application to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of 
Session under Rule of Court 58 in Scotland. A contractor could seek 
an injunction or interdict, or interim injunction or interdict, to 
prevent an authority from proceeding further with a tendering 
procedure once it appears that the authority has breached one of its 
statutory duties. In England a contractor could seek a declaration, 
and in Scotland a declarator, that an authority had breached its 
statutory duty: for reasons which will become apparent this may 
well be the most appropriate remedy. In England certiorari, 
mandamus and prohibition are also available under order 53. In 
47 See on this point e.g. Meade v Haringey LEC [1979] 1 W.L.R. 637, Watt v 
Kesteven C.c. [1955] 1 QB 408, Walker v Strathclyde R.C. (No.1) 1986 SLT 527 
481994SLT 396 
49 This is the equivalent of the prohibition contained in S7(7) of the 1988 
Act 
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Scotland reduction, suspension, and payment of damages are 
probably also competent remedies. However, once again one must 
recognise that the possibility of obtaining a remedy which a 
contractor will consider to be both effective and satisfactory 
diminishes when the Court is faced with a concluded contract: as the 
available remedies are discretionary it is highly likely that a Court 
will be unwilling, for example, to reduce a concluded contract 
because of the ramifications which that may have not only upon the 
parties to the contract and most importantly the contract's 
performance, but also upon wider commercial relations such as 
those with sub-contractors and suppliers, although it may have 
fewer qualms about declaring that a breach of statutory duty has 
occurredso. However, it should be remembered that under both Order 
53 and Rule of Court 58 an aggrieved contractor may seek damages 
for a breach of statutory duty. 
CONCLUSIONS 
An aggrieved contractor wishing to seek redress against a local 
authority for a perceived breach of the 1988 Act's tendering 
provisions may simply wish to take the authority in question to 
court. Should he choose to do so a variety of remedies are available. 
Certainly, where the tendering process at issue also falls within the 
ambit of Directive 92/50, a variety of effective remedies must be 
available in order to satisfy the provisions of the Compliance 
Directive. However, while the remedies available to aggrieved 
contractors permit the court to suspend or set aside an award 
procedure, and to alter contract documents which contravene the 
Services Directive or other principles of EC law, significantly, it 
does not allow a court to set aside a contract which an authority has 
been entered into, but does permit the award of damages. 
Alternatively, where an aggrieved contractor wishes to rely, or 
because of the subject matter or value of the proposed contract 
must rely, on the provisions of the 1988 Act, the most likely course 
SO See e.g. R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte Argyll Group pic 
[1986] 2 All ER 256, where it was held that discretionary relief should be 
withheld in the interests of good public administration where granting it 
would have a disruptive effect on established commercial relationships. See 
especially Donaldson MR at p 266b-h 
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of action is that he will seek to review the authority's decision on 
the grounds that it has breached its statutory duties. While he may 
seek to have the decision of the local authority reduced, it is 
unlikely that the aggrieved contractor will succeed once a contract 
has been concluded: once again, while declarator and damages may be 
sought, the Court would be reluctant to use its discretion to grant a 
remedy which would disrupt established commercial relations and 
prejudice certainty and good administration. Thus an aggrieved 
contractor will find that it is highly unlikely that he will succeed in 
having an award process reduced after a contract has been 
concluded, although if he wishes to act prior to the conclusion of a 
contract a wider range of remedies will be available. 
However, the most obvious route for an aggrieved contractor to 
take is to make a complaint to the Secretary of State in the hope 
that he will exercise his powers under S13 and S14 of the 1988 Act. 
Indeed it would appear that these powers are intended to be the main 
avenue for redressing failure to comply with the tendering 
procedures, and the screen of anonymity which S13 gives to those 
making complaints by adopting the formulation that the procedure is 
initiated by the Secretary of State appears to be more attractive to 
aggrieved contractors than the more orthodox, expensive, and public 
route of raising a civil action. The powers contained in S13 and S14 
permit the Secretary of State to investigate apparent failures to 
comply with the statutory tendering regimes, and, where it appears 
to him that there has been a failure to comply with those 
procedures, he may, amongst other things, compel an authority to re-
tender the work in question, possibly in accordance with conditions 
imposed by him, or may withdraw from an errant authority the right 
to perform the work in question, thus ensuring that it will be 
performed by the private sector in future. This would probably be the 
most attractive result for an aggrieved contractor, as it would give 
him another opportunity to tender for the work. However, one must 
note that the vast majority of notices issued by the Secretary of 
State relate not to failure to comply with the tendering procedures, 
but to failures to achieve the statutory rate of return on capital 
employed when performing the work in question. The other major 
failing in this procedure, from a contractor's point of view, is that 
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it is formally initiated by the Secretary of State, not the contractor. 
The contractor therefore has no control over what happens once the 
initial complaint has been made to the Secretary of State. The fact 
that the procedure is formally initiated by the Secretary of State 
and not the contractor also means that this procedure cannot be 
considered to be a remedy for the purposes of the Compliance 
Directive. 
It would thus appear that while there are potentially various 
avenues of redress available to the aggrieved contractor, each has 
its limitations. Moreover, an examination of each available course of 
action reveals that, in effect, a contractor seeking to reduce an 
award procedure has little hope of doing so. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PART II OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1988: THE NON-
COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGIME 
The Local Government Act 1988 did not only establish a 
compulsory competitive tendering regime for procurement of 
services discussed above: by virtue of Part II it also established the 
"non-commercial considerations regime" which permeates all 
aspects of local government procurement, and is intended to 
preclude authorities from using their procurement powers to further 
their wider policy objectives l . Thus, in addition to conforming to the 
requirements of the tendering regime discussed above local 
authorities must also ensure that the tendering exercises required 
by Part I of the Local Government Act 1988 are conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of Part II of the 1988 Act. 
Part II of the 1988 Act does essentially three things. First, it 
prohibits authorities from taking into account non-commercial 
considerations both up to and after the award of a contract2 . 
Secondly, it contains provisions as to the rights of action of those 
harmed by a decision which violates the non-commercial 
consideration regime3. Finally, it places a duty on authorities to 
provide reasons for certain decisions relating to the award of 
contracts, and certain decisions taken in the course of the contract4 . 
It now remains to examine each of these aspects of the non-
commercial consideration regime in turn. 
THE PROHIBITION OF TAKING NON-COMMERCIAL 
CONSIDERA liONS INTO ACCOUNT 
The prohibition of taking non-commercial considerations into 
account is essentially contained in S 1 7. The general prohibition i s 
set out in S17(1): 
1 On this matter see e.g. Daintith, Regulation by Contract: the New Prerogative 
[1979] 32 C.L.P. 41; Arrowsmith, Public Procurement as an Instrument of 
Policy and the Impact of Market Liberalisation [1995] 111 LQR 235 
2 Sections 17, 18, 21 
3 S19(7)-(9) 
4S20 
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"It is the duty of every public authority to which this section applies, in exercising, in 
relation to its public supply or works contracts, any proposed or any subsisting such 
contract, as the case may be, any function regulated by this section to exercise that 
function without reference to matters which are non-commercial matters for the 
purposes of this section." 
Four matters must be addressed in the course of examining this 
prohibition. First, to which "public authorities" does this prohibition 
apply? Second, to which contracts does the prohibition apply? Third, 
what "functions" are regulated by this section? Finally, what are the 
non-commercial matters which must not be taken into account? 
The first two questions can be dealt with fairly quickly. The 
"public authorities" subject to this prohibition are listed in Schedule 
2 of the 1988 ActS, and, most significantly for the purposes of this 
discussion, includes a local authority, which is defined as meaning, 
in England and Wales, a county, district, London borough, parish or 
community council, the Council of the Isles of Scilly, and the 
Common City of the City of London; and in Scotland a council 
established by the Local Government Act 1994 and any joint board or 
committee thereof. Moreover, 517 applies if an authority is 
exercising the functions regulated by it on behalf of a Minister of 
the Crown6, or is exercising the functions of another authority 
pursuant to an arrangement under 51 01 of the Local Government Act 
1972 or S56 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 19737• Thus 
every conceivable layer of local government must comply with the 
non-commercial considerations regime. 
The second matter to be discussed is which contracts this 
prohibition relates to. The definition of what constitutes a "public 
supply or works contract" is found in 517(3): 
"The contracts which are public supply or works contracts for the purposes of this 
section are contracts for the supply of goods or materials, for the supply of services or 
5 S17(2) 
6 S19(5) 
7 S19(6) 
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for the execution of works; but this section does not apply ... to contracts entered into 
before the commencement of this section." 
The prohibition of taking into account non-commercial 
considerations therefore extends to every conceivable contract 
which a local authority may enter into: all contracts for the 
performance of works, or of the supply of goods and services fall 
within the ambit of the prohibition. It should be noted that, unlike 
the provisions implementing CCT, there is no financial threshold 
limiting the application of the prohibition to contracts of in excess 
of a specific value. However, there is one limiting factor: contracts 
entered into prior to the commencement of S17 will not be subject 
to any element of its provisions. Thus, as S23 declares that Part II 
of the 1988 Act shall come into force 14 days after the date on 
which the Act was passed, and the Act received the Royal Assent on 
24 March 1988, any contract entered into prior to 7 April 1988 will 
not be subject to any of S17's provisions. One must, however, 
question how many such contracts still exist at this remove. 
The final two issues, the "functions" relating to a local 
authority's exercise of its contractual powers which are regulated, 
and the matters which are defined to be non-commercial, are 
slightly more complex and merit individual consideration. 
The functions regulated by S 17 
The "functions" of local authorities regulated by S 17 are 
enumerated in S17(4), which states: 
"The functions regulated by this section are-
(a) the inclusion of persons in or the exclusion of persons from-
(i) any list of persons approved for the purposes of public supply or works contracts 
with the authority, or 
(ii) any list of persons from whom tenders for such contracts may be invited; 
(b) in relation to a proposed public supply or works contract with the authority-
(i) the inclusion in or the exclusion of persons from the group of persons from whom 
tenders are invited, 
(ii) the accepting or not accepting the submission of tenders for the contract, 
(iii) selecting the person with whom to enter into the contract, or 
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(iv the giving or withholding approval for, or the selecting or nominating, persons to be 
sub-contractors for the purposes of the contract; and 
(c) in relation to a subsisting public supply or works contract with the authority-
(i) the giving or withholding approval for, or the selecting or nominating, persons to be 
sub-contractors for the purposes of the contract, or 
(ii) the termination of the contract." 
A very wide range of activities in the course of the contractual 
process therefore fall within the ambit of the S17 prohibition: at 
one extreme elements of the procedure prior to the formation of 
contracts are regulated, while at the other extreme, the termination 
of a contract falls within the scope of the prohibition. The various 
functions must be examined in a little more detail, however. 
By virtue of S1 7( 4 )(a) two functions must be performed in 
accordance with the provisions of S17. The first is the inclusion in 
or exclusion8 of persons from a list of approved contractors9. A 
local authority often maintains a list of approved contractors in any 
given field (for example, the supply of building materials or office 
stationary, or performance of minor building repairs). The authority 
has basically satisfied itself by applying certain criteria that a 
potential contractor is a suitable person with whom to contract. In 
relation to such lists, S21 provides that, where an authority has 
issued questionnaires including, notified potential contractors of its 
intention to take into account, or made policy statements referring 
to, non-commercial matters, a person subsequently excluded from 
the list will be deemed to have been excluded by an authority having 
reference to non-commercial matters, and a new list of approved 
contractors will have to be compiled. This task should have been 
completed soon after the 1988 Act came into force, and 
consequently this transitional provision need detain us no further. 
The second is the inclusion in, exclusion or removaP 0 of persons 
from a list of persons from whom tenders for public supply or works 
contracts may be invited11 . In relation to many contracts there is 
little practical difference between these two lists: if a person is 
8 Exclusion includes removal by virtue of S17(8) 
9 S17( 4)(a)(i) 
10 See S17( 8) 
11 S17(4)(a)(ii) 
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not included in the list of approved contractors, that person will 
invariably not be included in a list of those from whom tenders will 
be invited. In relation to the list of persons from whom tenders may 
be invited, it is possible to see the influence of the CCT provisions 
on this provision12. While authorities may maintain lists of those 
from whom tenders may be invited for other contracts, this is the 
most obvious example. However, while the lists covered by the 
prohibition are easily ascertained, it is not immediately obvious at 
which point the general prohibition takes effect: does it apply only 
at the point at which an authority determines that a potential 
contractor will be excluded from a list, or is the prohibition 
effective at some point prior to that determination? 
A cursory examination of S17( 4 )(a), which refers to "the 
inclusion of persons in or the exclusion of persons from" the lists 
identified therein, would appear to suggest that only once a 
determination is made taking into account non-commercial matters 
will the prohibition be contravened. However, in spite of the wording 
of S1 7(4 )(a), one must have reference to the general prohibition 
contained in S17{1). Section 17(1) places a duty on authorities to 
exercise "any function regulated by this section ... without 
re fe re n ce to matters which are non-commercial" (emphasis added). 
Thus the functions listed in S 1 7 (4) must be exercised without 
reference to non-commercial matters. If the formulation chosen had 
prohibited decisions being taken in accordance with non-commercial 
matters, this would have implied that the crucial point in time is 
when a decision is taken that a potential contractor will be excluded 
from or included in a list. However, the temporal focus is shifted by 
the use of "reference" in the general prohibition. By prohibiting 
"reference" to non-commercial matters in the exercise of the 
functions contained in S17( 4 )(a), an authority will therefore 
contravene the prohibition not when it includes or excludes a 
contractor in a list, but at the point at which it "refers" to a non-
commercial matter. Some may question whether there is any 
practical value in such a distinction, as it will only be obvious that 
a contractor is included or excluded in a list once it has been 
12 See e.g. S9( 4) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, which 
is predicated on tenders being invited from an approved list of tenderers 
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published. Such a suggestion would ignore the fact that lists of 
approved contractors are compiled following the issue of 
questionnaires to contractors, and an assessment of their technical 
and financial capacity. If a contractor applied to be admitted to a 
list of approved contractors and was issued with a questionnaire 
including questions relating to non-commercial matters, then the 
authority would prima facie have referred to non-commercial 
matters, and contravened the prohibition. At this point the potential 
contractor could raise an action for declarator, or seek to interdict 
(or injunct) the authority from taking a decision on inclusion in or 
exclusion from a list on the basis of criteria which refer to a non-
commercial consideration 1 3. 
The next set of functions regulated by S 17 are set out in 
S17(4)(b) and relate not to the compilation of lists, but to the award 
of a contract. Four distinct activities relating to the award of a 
contract are subject to the general prohibition set out in S17(1). The 
first function enumerated is the inclusion in, exclusion or removaP 4 
of a person from the group of persons from whom tenders are 
invited1 s. Although this is not limited to tendering procedures 
conducted under the CCT legislation, this function correlates to the 
invitation of tenders required by S7( 4) of the 1988 Act. Once again, 
it must be emphasised that it is not simply the final decision to 
include or exclude a person from the group from whom tenders will 
be invited which is regulated: the prohibition will be contravened at 
the point at which the authority refers itself to a non-commercial 
matter. Thus, if, for example, a pre-tender questionnaire 16 used to 
decide which potential contractors who had expressed an interest in 
being awarded the contract should be invited to tender included a 
question referring to a non-commercial matter, the authority, by 
referring to that matter, would have contravened the prohibition 
contained in S17( 1). 
13 The various actions available to those prejudiced by a contravention of S17 
will be discussed below. 
14 See SI7(8) 
15 SI7(4)(b)(i) 
16 See chapter 2 
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The second function listed in 51 4( 4) (b) is accepting or not 
accepting the submission of tenders by a potential contractor' 7. It 
is unlikely that a non-commercial consideration would be taken into 
account in accepting or rejecting a tender where eeT legislation 
applies. The reason for this is simple: as potential contractors are 
almost invariably required to answer questionnaires prior to being 
invited to submit tenders, if a non-commercial consideration is to 
be taken into account, it is much more likely to happen when 
assessing which contractors will be invited to submit tenders. As 
authorities are unlikely to invite a potential contractor to submit a 
tender without having investigated whether or not that contractor is 
suitable in accordance with the criteria which each authority 
applies in assessing interested contractors, extending the 
prohibition to this function only serves a useful purpose in two 
situations: the first is where some activity of a potential 
contractor, which falls within the ambit of a non-commercial 
matter, becomes unacceptable to an authority after an invitation to 
tender has been extended, and the authority decides not to accept the 
contractor's tender; the second is where an authority uses an open 
procedure in a competitive tendering exercise and refuses to accept 
a tender, although this does not fall within the classic eeT scenario. 
The third function listed as being subject to the general 
prohibition contained in 517(1) is selecting the person with whom to 
enter into a contract' 8. Like the other functions listed in 51 7 ( 4) 
this function is not just limited to eeT contracts. Indeed, the 
inclusion of this particular function illustrates that 517 applies to 
all local authority contracts. Thus if any contract is awarded with 
reference to non-commercial matters, this will amount to a 
contravention of 517(1 )'s general prohibition. 
While the first three paragraphs of 517 (4 )(b) list functions 
which correlate to stages of the tendering process set out in the 
1988 Act (although the contracts covered extend beyond the ambit of 
the eeT legislation), the fourth paragraph does not do so, although, 
like the other paragraphs, it does relate to proposed, not concluded, 
17 S17( 4)(b)(ii) 
18 S 17( 4)(b )(iii) 
284 
contracts. Section 17(4)(b)(iv) lists "giving or withholding approval 
for, or the selecting or nominating, persons to be sub-contractors" 
as one of the functions regulated by S 1 7. Thus, if an authority has 
reference to a non-commercial matter in the course of giving or 
withholding approval for a person to be a sub-contractor, or in 
selecting or nominating a person to be a sub-contractor, it will 
violate the S17(1) prohibition. It should be noted, however, that 
nothing in S17 precludes an authority nominating, selecting, giving, 
or withholding approval for a person to be a sub-contractor by 
applying other criteria relating to a potential sub contractor's 
technical ability or financial standing. Thus approval may be 
withheld from a sub-contractor if it has been adjudged to be 
technically incapable of performing the work which a contractor 
wishes to sub-contract to it. 
The third set of functions listed in S 1 7 (4) relate to matters 
which occur after a contract has been awarded. The first function 
listed as falling within the ambit of the S 17( 1) prohibition is 
identical to the last listed in relation to proposed contracts: giving 
or withholding approval for a person to be a sub-contractor, or 
selecting or nominating a person to be a sub-contractor 1 9. The only 
difference between this provision and that discussed immediately 
above is that this provision precludes non-commercial matters being 
taken into account when selecting, nominating, giving or withholding 
approval for a person to be a sub-contractor where a contract has 
been awarded, whereas the earlier provision related to proposed 
contracts. However, it must once again be emphasised that 517 does 
not prohibit selecting, nominating, giving or withholding approval 
from a sub-contractor, but only prohibits non-commercial 
considerations being referred to in the course of doing so. As before, 
a decision based on an assessment of the sub-contractor's technical 
ability and financial standing would be valid. The second function 
listed as being subject to the general prohibition is the termination 
of contracts20. It is thus impermissible to have reference to non-
commercial considerations either in the course of reaching the 
19 S17(4)(c)(i) 
20 S17(4)(c)(ii) 
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decision to terminate a contract, or as one of the reasons for 
terminating a contract. 
However, the provisions of S17 are not simply limited to taking 
into account certain matters relating to contractors, as is evident 
from S17(7): 
"Where any matter referable to a contractor would ... be a non-commercial matter in 
relation to him, the corresponding matter referable to-
(a) a supplier or customer of the contractor; 
(b) a sub-contractor or his supplier or customer; 
(c) an associated body of the contractor or his supplier or customer; 
(d) a sub-contractor of an associated body of the contractor or his supplier or customer; 
is also, in relation to the contractor, a non-commercial matter for the purposes of this 
section." 
This provision extends the application of the prohibition to matters 
not directly referable to a contractor. By declaring that the matters 
which represent non-commercial considerations in relation to 
contractors will also be non-commercial matters in relation to the 
various persons listed in this subsection, the effect of the regime is 
greatly extended, and the possibility that the S17 regime may be 
circumvented is greatly reduced. This provision precludes an 
authority, for example, from excluding a potential contractor from 
an approved list, or from withholding an invitation to tender not by 
having reference to a non-commercial matter regarding the potential 
contractor, but instead by referring to a non-commercial matter 
regarding that potential contractor's suppliers, other customers, 
associated bodies21 and so on22 . Thus an authority cannot take into 
account the activities of the various persons listed in S17(7), to the 
extent that they fall within non-commercial matters, as a 
determining factor in its relationships with contractors. What, 
however, are the non-commercial matters which must not be 
referred to? 
21 As defined by the Companies Act 1985: S17(8) 
22 Cf. R v Lewisham LBe ex parte Shell UK Ltd. [1988] 1 All ER 938 
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THE NON-COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Section 17( 5) lists eight matters which are non-commercial 
matters in relation to proposed or subsisting contracts for the 
supply of goods or services or the execution of works for the 
purposes of the general prohibition contained in S17(1). Some are of 
greater significance than others. Each will now be examined in turn. 
(a) Terms and conditions of employment 
Section 17(5)(a) defines as a non-commercial matter: 
"The terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers or of the 
composition of, the arrangements for the promotion, transfer or training of or the other 
opportunities afforded to, their workforces" 
This is perhaps the most significant of the matters defined as non-
commercial considerations, as it raises a number of important 
issues. As a result of these matters being declared to be non-
commercial considerations an authority will ostensibly be 
contravening the prohibition contained in S 1 7 (1) if it refers itself 
to such matters as the terms and conditions of a contractor's 
workforce, the composition of a contractor's workforce, the 
contractor's promotion system, questions relating to the transfer of 
workers, and the training of and "other opportunities afforded to" 
the workforce, a term which would encompass such matters as 
holiday and sick pay. The reference to the terms and conditions of 
the contractor's workforce is a generalisation, with the other 
matters listed here representing specific cases. The phrase "terms 
and conditions of the workforce" ensures that in theory any matter 
regarding the basis on which persons are employed cannot be 
referred to by an authority in the course of its relationships with 
contractors or potential contractors. However, not all references to 
legislation regarding the terms and conditions of employment are 
prohibited: 
" ... I should stress that I do not ... intend to hold that a local authority is not to include in 
its contracts provisions requiring the contractor to comply with the general law. It is 
only to the extent that there are specific obligations so included which cover such 
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matters as pay, hours of work, what a particular employee is or is not permitted to do 
and so on that there would be an infringement."Z 3 
However, a closer examination of several of the specific elements 
listed in S17(5)(a) raises questions about their validity. Four 
matters merit further examination: the composition of the 
workforce, the arrangements for promotion, the transfer of the 
workforce, and the training received by employees. The first two can 
be considered together. 
The composition of the workforce, and the arrangements for 
promotion of employees can be considered together because the most 
obvious reason why a local authority would wish to concern itself 
with these matters is to ensure that the legislation regarding sexual 
and racial discrimination is complied with. In relation to race 
relations matters, S18 of the 1988 Act does allow local authorities 
to have regard to their duty under S71 of the Race Relations Act 
1976 to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and promote 
equality of opportunity and racial harmony by asking questions 
seeking information or undertakings as to workforce matters, and by 
including in a draft contract or tender document provisions relating 
to workforce mattersZ4. However, this exception does not extend to 
terminating a contract and all questions must be put to potential 
contractors in written formZ5: the Secretary of State may specify 
the questions which a local authority may askZ6. This exception is 
therefore of limited utility. Race relations matters fare rather 
better than sex discrimination, however: a local authority cannot 
require compliance with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975z7. Thus, 
while it is permissible for an authority to draw a contractor's 
attention to race and sex discrimination legislation, and to require 
observance of the general law, it cannot require compliance with 
specific legal measures which impinge on the terms and conditions 
23 R v London Borough of Islington ex p. Building Employers' Confederation 
[1989] IRLR 382 per Parker LJ at para 43 
24 S18(1), (2) 
25 S18(3) 
26 S18(5) 
27 R v London Borough of Islington ex p. Building Employers' Confederation, 
supra. 
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of employment. It has been suggested that the DoE may modify its 
position on the race relation provisions of the 1988 Act in the belief 
that this aspect of the non-commercial considerations regime is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the EC public procurement 
Directives28• To an extent this position is supported by two 
judgements of the European Court of Justice. The first29 held that 
it is possible as a matter of domestic law to take into account other 
policy aims in the award of contracts provided that the provisions of 
the Directives have also been complied with, the secondary policy 
aim being pursued is consistent with the wider principles of 
Community law and the Treaty in particular, and the awarding 
authority has publicised its use. It is therefore highly unlikely that 
the provisions of Part " of the 1988 Act are precluded by EC law. 
However, the fact that the ECJ has held that one of the factors 
governing the acceptability of secondary policies is their legality in 
national law3o, means that it is ostensibly open to the UK 
government to regulate reference to other policy aims in the 
procurement process as they have done in Part " of the 1988 Act, 
and to extend the non-commercial considerations regime as it sees 
fit. The second case, Commission v Italy 31 conflicts with Beentjes 
to the extent that it states that an authority may only have 
reference to the criteria for exclusion of tenderers set forth in the 
Community's public procurement directives32 : as the government 
considers that compliance with employment protection legislation 
does not impinge upon a contractor's competence, probity, technical 
ability or financial standing, this case undoubtedly supplies some 
support for its position. 
However, where the Services Directive applies, there is another 
provision which bears directly upon the validity of S 1 7 to the extent 
that it precludes the terms and conditions of employment being 
28 See e.g. DoE issues new guide for CCT race relations clauses 4-10/3/94 MJ 11 
29 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The Netherlands, Case 31187, [1988] ECR 4635, 
[1990] 3 CMLR239 
30 See paragraph 20 
31 Case C-360/89, 3/6/92, unreported 
32 The decision in this case is arguably devalued by the ECl's failure to 
consider its earlier decision in Beentjes when issuing its judgement 
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referred to in the course of awarding a contract. Article 28, one of 
the common rules on participation, provides that: 
"1. The contracting authority may state in the contract documents ... the authority or 
authorities from which a tenderer may obtain the appropriate information on the 
obligations relating to the employment protection provisions and the working conditions 
which are in force in the Member State, region or locality in which the services are to 
be performed and which shall be applicable ... during the performance of the contract. 
2. The contracting authority which supplies the information referred to in paragraph 1 
shall request the tenderers ... to indicate that they have taken account, when drawing up 
their tender, of the obligations relating to employment protection provisions and the 
working conditions which are in force where the [contract] is to be carried out. This 
shall be without prejudice to the application of the provisions ... concerning the 
examination of abnormally low tenders" (emphasis added)33 
The Services Directive, where it applies, thus endows an authority 
with the discretion to direct a potential contractor to the lIauthority 
or authorities" which may provide information on the obligations 
relating to employment protection and working conditions in the 
Member State, region or locality. Until its abolition this would 
ordinarily have been the Department of Employment: it is presently 
unclear whether this function will be performed by the Department 
of Education and Employment or the DTI. However, what is the 
"appropriate information"? This term is not defined, but as the 
"information" supplied to potential contractors must relate to the 
obligations regarding employment protection provisions and 
working conditions it should be a comprehensive list of the 
legislative provisions which impose a duty on employers concerning 
these issues: a vague reference to the compliance with the "general 
law"34 would not suffice, as contractors must receive information 
as to their various legal obligations, not a general reference to the 
existence of a body of law. However, as the information to be given 
may relate to the contractors' obligations in the Member State, 
region or locality this raises the possibility that the authority 
awarding a contract may be one of the authorities from whom a 
33 The equivalent provision in the Works Directive, Directive 93/37, is Article 
23. There is no equivalent provision in the Supplies Directive, 93/36 
34 See Parker LJ, R v Islington LBC ex p. Building Employers' Confederation, 
supra, at para 43 
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contractor may obtain the "appropriate information". Indeed, if 
central government was to prove reluctant to provide such 
information, it would be prudent of the authority to do so. 
Once the authority has exercised its power to direct a potential 
contractor to the body from whom information on its obligations 
may be obtained, it is then under a duty to request potential 
contractors to indicate that they have taken into account the 
obligations regarding employment protection provisions and working 
conditions when preparing their tender. The Directive is silent on 
what happens when a potential contractor refuses to give such an 
undertaking, although, presumably such a refusal may merit 
exclusion. It would certainly appear that a failure to take the 
relevant legislation into account may permit the authority to 
exclude potential contractors as, once notified of the employment 
protection provisions, an undertaking to comply with them would 
appear to become a material condition of participation in the award 
procedure, or the authority may invoke the procedure regarding 
abnormally low tenders. What, however, happens, where a potential 
contractor has a poor record of compliance with employment 
protection legislation? Certainly, this is not per se a ground for 
exclusion from participation in an award procedure, as it would 
appear that this may only happen where a contractor refuses to give 
an undertaking regarding compliance. However, where a contractor 
indicates that it has taken account of the relevant employment 
protection legislation in preparing its tender, surely it is prudent to 
assess the sincerity of that undertaking by referring to its past 
record of compliance? Moreover, the possibility arises that where a 
potential contractor has a consistently poor record of compliance 
with the relevant employment protection legislation, the disregard 
for his statutory obligations may constitute "grave professional 
misconduct" in accordance with Article 29(d) and permit the 
authority to exclude the contractor from participation in the award 
procedure. Thus, insofar as the non-commercial considerations 
regime excludes local authorities from referring to matters 
pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment, and the 
composition of the workforce and the arrangements for promotion, it 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Services Directive, which, 
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where applicable, permits authorities to refer to the obligations 
regarding employment protection and working conditions, which will 
obviously include sex and race discrimination legislation. 
Similar considerations apply to the second matter contained in 
S17(S)(a) which provides cause for concern: the fact that matters 
relating to the transfer of workers are non-commercial matters. 
This is a voluminous subject in its own right and sadly cannot be 
considered at the considerable length which it merits35. The 
relevant legislation is the Acquired Rights Directive36, as 
implemented by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 1981 37, which is designed to ensure that 
where an undertaking is transferred its employees shall continue to 
observe the same terms and conditions for at least one year38. 
Problems have arisen as to the UK's position on the circumstances in 
which an undertaking is transferred: until amended by the S33 of the 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 the TUPE 
regulations provided that an undertaking could be any trade or 
business, but not an entity which was "not in the nature of a 
commercial venture", thus, it was contended, precluding the 
application of the Regulations to situations where public sector 
work was transferred from the public to the private sector. 
However, it has become apparent that such a limitation is 
unjustified and that the Acquired Rights Directive does in principle 
apply to contracting out, and in circumstances which involve a non-
commercial venture39. A transfer for the purposes of the Directive 
will take place whenever the economic entity being transferred 
retains its identity40, but the person responsible for carrying on the 
activity in question changes41 . All the circumstances of the case 
35 See for a fuller explanation Napier; CCT, Market Testing and Employment 
Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired Rights Directive, Institute of 
Employment Rights, 1993 
36 Directive 77/187 
37 1981 S.l. 1794, as amended by the Trade Union Reform and Employment 
Rights Act 1993, S33 
38 See e.g. Article 3(2) 
39 See Dr. Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartols and Others, case C-29/91, [1992] 
IRLR 366; Rask v ISS Kantineservice, Case C-209/81, [1993] IRLR 133 
40 Spijkers v Benedik, Case 24/85, [1986] ECR 1119 at 1128 
41 Ny M011e Kro, Case 287/86, [1989] 2 CMLR 468 at 478; Berg and Besselsen, 
Cases 144 and 145/87, [1988] ECR 2559, at 2583 
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must be considered in order to evaluate whether a transfer has taken 
place: the nature of the undertaking, whether tangible assets have 
been transferred, the value of the undertaking's intangible assets, 
whether the majority of employees are taken on by the new 
employer, whether customers have been transferred, the degree of 
similarity between pre- and post-transfer activities, and whether 
the activities were suspended at any point42. Many of these criteria 
are relevant to CCT exercises: the customer and the work to be 
performed will certainly be identical if work is contracted out, and 
it is obvious from a perusal of the Guidance on anti-competitive 
practices that the other matters identified as being relevant by the 
E.C.J. do playa significant part in the tendering process43. It is thus 
highly likely that the TUPE Regulations will apply if local authority 
work is contracted out as a result of CCT. Consequently, the relevant 
legislation is one of the obligations relating to protection of 
employment and working conditions, and any attempt to prevent an 
authority having reference to it in the course of an award procedure 
is inconsistent with the Services Directive and impermissible. 
The Government, however, has recently issued advice to local 
authority chief executives in England regarding the pensions 
provided to staff transferred as a result of CCT which appears to 
contradict S 1 7. This advice, which is expressly stated not to be 
guidance for the purposes of S9 of the Local Government Act 1992, 
states: 
"As regards section 17 of the 1988 Local Government Act, the Department's view is as 
follows. Where there is a transfer of an undertaking to which TUPE applies, and where 
an authority had concluded that it should require the contractor to offer comparable 
pensions ... those matters are commercial matters which the authority is not precluded 
from considering as part of the procurement process. . .. In requiring the provision of 
comparable pensions an authority is acting to protect itself from claims of unfair 
dismissal... This is clearly a commercial matter rather than a non-commercial 
matter. .. "44 
42 Spijkers v Benedik, Case 24/85, [1986] ECR 1119 at ppl128-9 
43 See DoE Circular 10/93, Welsh Office Circular 40/93, Scottish Office 
Environment Department 13/93, discussed at length in Chapter 3, supra 
44 Text of letter reproduced in: DoE latest on pensions and TUPE 31 March-6 
Apri11995 MJ 20 
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This advice in many ways illustrates the unreality of the 
Government's position in relation to the applicability of TUPE and 
the provisions of the 1988 Act. First, it illustrates that the DoE at 
least believes that it can issue pronouncements on the application of 
TUPE which will be unswervingly accepted by both authorities and 
contractors. Secondly, the DoE has misdirected itself in law as to 
the import of the non-commercial considerations regime. Section 
17(S)(a) states that the "terms and conditions of employment by 
contractors ... or the other opportunities afforded to, their 
workforces" will be a non-commercial consideration: irrespective of 
what the DoE may think, the pensions provided by contractors clearly 
fall within either the terms and conditions of employment or, 
alternatively, the "other opportunities afforded" and local 
authorities will be prohibited from taking this matter into account. 
Third, this advice ignores the fact that, unlike the tendering regime 
contained in Part I of the 1988 Act, the non-commercial 
considerations regime contained in Part II does not make provision 
for the enforcement of its provisions by the Secretary of State. Had 
it done so, the DoE's pronouncement that it would not consider this 
matter to be a non-commercial consideration would be of some 
significance. However, the scheme of Part " of the 1988 Act 
envisages that the duties it establishes will be enforced by 
aggrieved contractors in court proceedings4S. It is thus for the court 
to decide on a construction of S17(S)(a) what the ambit of the non-
commercial considerations regime is: given the wording of the 
provision it is highly improbable that a court would concur with the 
DoE's pOSition. In view of this fact the views expressed by the DoE 
are of no consequence, and the objections to S17(S)(a) expressed 
above are unaffected. 
The final aspect of S17(S)(a) which is the fact that the training 
of employees is a non-commercial consideration. Certainly, the 
training given to a contractor's workforce in future may 
legitimately be a non-commercial consideration. However, the 
training of a potential contractor's employees in the past is an 
important factor in assessing technical ability. The Services 
Directive provides that: 
4S See below for a discussion of the enforcement procedures 
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"The ability of service providers to perform services may be evaluated in particular 
with regard to their skills, efficiency, experience and reliability,,46 
Moreover evidence of a potential contractor's ability may be 
assessed by evidence relating to the contractor's "educational and 
professional qualifications and/or those of the firm's managerial 
staff and, in particular, those of the person or person's responsible" 
for the contract's performance47 may be taken into account in 
assessing a potential contractor's technical ability. The educational 
and professional qualifications of the contractor and his staff 
inevitably relates to the training of the contractor's workforce. 
Thus, where the Services Directive applies, it is impermissible to 
restrict an authority's ability to take into consideration the training 
of the contractor's workforce as this is an important element of 
assessing technical ability in the course of a contract award 
procedure. 
(b) The contractor/sub-contractor relationship 
Section 17(S)(b) defines as a non-commercial matter: 
"whether the terms on which contractors contract with their sub-contractors 
constitute, in the case of contracts with individuals, contracts for the provision by them 
as self-employed persons of their services only." 
This provision effectively precludes local authorities from 
referring to the basis of the relationship between contractors and 
sub-contractors if the authority's intention is to establish whether 
the contractor is maintaining a workforce, or is refraining from 
engaging employees, and instead is only prepared to enter into a 
relationship with an individual on the basis that they are self-
employed, and thus technically a sub-contractor. This provision is 
therefore intended to complement S17(S)(a). While S17(S)(a) is 
intended to preclude reference to a contractor's relationship with 
individuals as employees, this provision is intended to preclude 
reference to a contractor's relationship with individuals as sub-
contractors. However, the form of the relationship addressed here is 
46 Directive 92150, Article 32(1) 
47 Directive 92/50, Article 32(2)(a) 
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significant. As this provIsion relates to individuals as sub-
contractors rather than employees, the provisions of the Services 
Directive most relevant to terms and conditions of employment48 
cannot be relied upon. However, the Services Directive permits a 
tenderer to indicate the share of the contract which may be sub-
contracted to third parties49. To that extent, authorities may 
concern themselves with the relationship between contractor and 
sub-contractor. Moreover, while it would appear that a contractor 
may not be excluded from an award procedure on the basis that i t 
does not posses the necessary technical skills, provided that it can 
show that it has access to those skillsso, the Services Directive, 
where it applies in its entirety, permits an authority to assess the 
technical ability of potential contractors by taking into account the 
contractor's average annual manpower over the previous three 
years51 and the proportion of the contract which the contractor 
intends to sub-contract52. If a potential contractor wished to 
engage individuals as sub-contractors rather than employees, this 
may be indicated by a low average manpower and an unusually high 
proportion of the contract being sub-contracted. As the local 
authority is permitted to set the level of technical expertise which 
it finds acceptable53, it may therefore exclude contractors from 
participation in the contract which engage an unacceptably high 
proportion of sub-contracted labour. However, while these are the 
criteria which impact most directly upon decisions to exclude 
contractors because they engage individuals as sub-contractors 
rather than employees, there are other which would have an indirect 
impact. For example, a potential contractor may be required to 
indicate the "technicians ... involved, whether or not belonging to the 
service provider"s4: this may be easily ascertained if a contractor 
uses its own employees, or those of another company to which it 
sub-contracts the work, but where individuals are engaged as sub-
48 Directive 92/50, Article 28 
49 Directive 92150, Article 25 
50 See Directive 92/50, Article 26; Ballast Nedam Groep NY v Belgische Staat, 
Case C-389/92 
51 Article 32(2)(d) 
52 Directive 92150, Article 32(2)(h) 
53 See e.g. Gebroeders Beentjes BY v The Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635; [1990] 1 
CMLR 287 
54 Article 32(c) 
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contractors rather than employees, those individuals will generally 
only be engaged after the contract has been awarded, and the 
contractor will be unable to give an indication of who will be 
involved. 
(c) Government policy 
A contractor's involvement with "irrelevant fields of 
Government policy" is defined as a non-commercial matter by 
S17(S)(c). The contractor's involvement may take the form of 
"business activities and interests", which means that the extent to 
which the field of Government policy relates to the contractor 
carrying on his business may not be referred to. The phrase 
"irrelevant fields of Government policy" is defined in S17(8): 
" 'Government policy' falls within 'irrelevant fields' for the purposes of this section if it 
concerns matters of defence or foreign or Commonwealth policy ... II 
Thus an authority will refer to an irrelevant field of Government 
policy, if it refers in essence to defence or foreign policy and the 
extent to which contractors [or those bodies listed in S 1 7 (7)] have 
supplied goods or services, or executed works for "any person or 
authority" executing defence or foreign relations functions55 . This 
provision is consistent with EC law: taking into account these 
matters in the award of a contract could not be characterised as 
awarding a contract in accordance with objective criteria. Moreover, 
it should be noted that, at common law, taking into account a 
contractor's involvement with other areas of Government policy can 
probably be successfully challenged on the ground of manifest 
unreasonableness56 or improper purposeS?, 
(d) Contractors and industrial disputes. 
Section 17(S)(d) defines as a non-commercial matter: 
5S S17(8) 
S6 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
233; Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] lAC 1054 
57 R v Lewisham LBC ex parte Shell UK Ltd [1988J 1 All ER 938 
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"the conduct of contractors or workers in industrial disputes between them or any 
involvement of the business activities of contractors in industrial disputes with other 
persons" 
I n effect what is prohibited here is not only reference to a 
contractor or potential contractor's own industrial relations record, 
but also its involvement in the industrial disputes of others, the 
most obvious example being the situation where a contractor's 
employees have been used to perform the work of striking workers 
elsewhere in an attempt to break a strike. While the latter may well 
constitute an irrelevant consideration at common law, many would 
contend that a contractor's industrial relations with its own 
workforce are relevant, as poor industrial relations may affect the 
ability of a contractor to perform work satisfactorily. While the 
Services Directive does not permit a potential contractor's 
industrial relations record to be taken into account in assessing 
technical ability, it does permit authorities to investigate the 
extent to which potential contractors have satisfactorily performed 
similar work in the recent past, and to seek references from former 
clientsS8: it may be that poor industrial relations have had an 
adverse effect on the performance of previous contracts, and may 
thus be reflected in the references of previous clients. Therefore, 
while a contractor or potential contractor's industrial relations 
record may validly be included in the list of non-commercial 
considerations, the effect of poor industrial relations may be 
evident in the manner in which previous contracts have been 
performed, a matter which may validly be referred to by authorities. 
(e) Territorial origin 
The fifth non-commercial matter is: 
"the country or territory of origin of supplies to, or the location in any country 0 r 
territory of the business activities or interests of, contractors"S 9 
58 Directive 92150, Article 32(2)(b); 
59 S17(5)(e) 
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This provision effectively prohibits several things from being taken 
into account, especially as the phrase "country or territory of origin" 
is so wide as to encompass any geographical area. First, an authority 
is prohibited from having reference to the place of origin of supplies 
used by contractors or potential contractors in the course of 
performing a contract. Secondly, and most obviously, it prohibits an 
authority from taking into account the country of origin of the 
contractor or potential contractor. Finally, it ensures that it is 
impermissible to take into account the location of any activity 
related to the pursuit of a contractor or potential contractor's 
business. This provision is consistent with the general principles of 
EC law, which prevents discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
where a contractor originates in a member state60, and prevents any 
measure which may have the effect of restricting the free movement 
of goods between Member States61 . However, this provision goes 
further than the Provisions of the EEC Treaty, by relating not only to 
Member States, but to any country or territory. 
(0 Irrelevant affiliations 
Section 17(S)(f) defines as a non-commercial matter: 
"any political, industrial, or sectarian affiliations or interests of contractors or their 
directors, partners or employees" 
What will constitute "political, industrial or sectarian affiliations 
or interests" is defined in S17(8) as meaning: 
"actual or potential membership of, or actual or potential support for, respectively, any 
political party, any employers' association or trade union or any society, fraternity or 
association" 
Section 1 7 (5)( f) thus casts a wide net. First, it will be a 
contravention of the general prohibition on referring to non-
commercial matters to refer to the affiliations and "interests" not 
60 EEC Treaty, Article 6 
61 Ibid., Article 30; see also Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unita Sanitaria 
Locale No.2 Di Carrara, Case 21188, [1990] ECR 889, [1991] 3 CMLR 2S 
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only of contractors, their directors, and partners, but also 
employees. As one of the matters defined as an industrial affiliation 
is actual or potential membership of a trade union, this prevents an 
authority from having reference to whether a contractor or potential 
contractor recognises trade unions. Secondly, it is the actual or 
potential membership or support for a variety of bodies by any of the 
persons listed above which cannot be referred to. Membership or 
support for a political party, for example, involves some positive 
action, and is thus easily ascertained, but potential membership, or, 
more particularly, potential support is a much more vague notion: 
anyone can potentially support a political party. Third the range of 
bodies to which this prohibition relates are potentially limitless: 
political parties, employers' associations, and trade unions can be 
fairly easily identified as such, but this provision also extends to 
"any society, fraternity, or other association", which is very vague 
and presents almost limitless possibilities. There are problems 
inherent in almost every category, however: "political party" 
includes not only the mainstream political parties, but also those of 
extreme values such as the BNP; "employers' association" may 
include any number of ephemeral, single issue, pressure groups; and 
"society, fraternity or other association" would most obviously 
include the freemasons, and the support or membership of pressure 
groups. While most of the matters prescribed as non-commercial 
considerations in this provision are legitimately included as such, 
there is one serious flaw in the matters proscribed as non-
commercial by S17(5)(f). As this provision effectively declares that 
an authority cannot refer to the membership of an employers' 
association or any society or association by a contractor, its 
directors, partners or employees, a significant problem arises. In 
relation to some services it will be necessary to require that a 
contractor is a member of a professional body: the most obvious 
examples are legal services and accountancy, where membership of a 
professional association is mandatory. Yet, as a matter of national 
law, reference to membership of any society or association is 
technically prohibited. This, however, is inconsistent with the 
Services and Works Directives, which provide that an authority may 
require potential contractors to show evidence of membership of the 
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relevant professional body62. Thus, to the extent that S17 prohibits 
local authorities from ascertaining that contractors are members of 
a relevant professional body, it cannot survive scrutiny against the 
standards set by the Services and Works Directives. 
(9) Support for certain bodies 
The penultimate non-commercial matter is: 
"financial support or lack of financial support by contractors for any institution to or 
from which the authority gives or withholds support" 
The aim of this provision is to prevent an authority taking into 
account a contractor, or potential contractor's financial support, or 
lack of it, for an institution which it does or does not support, or to 
prevent an authority from attempting to pressurise such persons to 
give support to, or withdraw it from, institutions. The most obvious 
"institution" is a political party, in which the most likely scenario 
is either inviting a person to submit a tender because of their 
support for a political party, or conversely, withholding an 
invitation to tender for similar reasons. However, the "institution" 
in question could also be a charity, for example. 
(h) Use of technical services. 
The final matter prescribed as being a non-commercial 
consideration is: 
"use or non-use by contractors of technical or professional services provided by the 
authority under the Building Act 1984 or the Building (Scotland) Act 1959" 
This provision essentially prevents the authority from requiring that 
a contractor or potential contractor should avail itself of services 
provided by the authority in the course of performing certain work. 
To require in the course of an award procedure that contractors do 
so would represent a restriction on the free movement of services 
62 Directive 92/50, Article 30; Directive 93/37, Article 25 
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by reqUlrmg use of local services, and thus represent a 
contravention of Article 59 of the EEC Treaty63 
The list of non-commercial matters contained in S17 is 
extensive, but perhaps not exhaustive. Consequently the Secretary of 
State may, by statutory instrument, extend the list of non-
commercial considerations64, which includes the power to extend 
the list of other persons to whom non-commercial considerations 
are referable contained in S17(7), amend any definition contained in 
S17(8)65, and orders may include such consequential or transitional 
provisions as the Secretary of State deems necessary or 
expedient66. Drafts of any order exercising these powers must be 
laid before, and be approved by a resolution of, each House of 
Parliament67. None has as yet been made. 
I n view of the nature of many of the matters listed as non-
commercial considerations in S 1 7, the nondcommercial 
considerations regime would have its effectiveness reduced if 
authorities had not been placed under a duty to give reasons for their 
decisions. This was imposed by S20 
THE DUTY TO GIVE REASONS 
The duty to give reasons for decisions is contained in S20(1) of 
the 1988 Act: 
"Where a public authority exercises a function regulated by section 17 above by making, 
in relation to any person, a decision to which this section applies, it shall be the duty of 
the authority forthwith to notify that person of the decision and, if that person so 
requests in writing within that period of 1 5 days beginning with the date of the notice, to 
furnish him with a written statement of the reasons for the decision." 
63 See e.g. Commission v Italy (re Data Processing), Case C-3/88, [1989] ECR 
4035, [1991] 2 CMLR 115 
64 S19(1) 
65 S19(2) 
66 S19(3) 
67 S19(4) 
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The first thing which S20 does is to impose a duty on an authority 
exercising many of the functions listed in S17(4) to notify 
"forthwith" the person affected by the authority's decision if it also 
relates to a decision to which S20 applies. The decisions to which 
S20 applies are listed in S20(2): 
"This section applies to the following decisions in relation to any person, namely-
(a) in relation to an approved list, a decision to exclude him from the list, 
(b) in relation to a proposed public supply or works contract-
(i) where he asked to be invtted to tender for the contract, a decision not to invite him to 
tender, 
(ii) a decision not to accept the submission by him of a tender for the contract, 
(iii) where he has submitted a tender for the contract, a decision not to enter into the 
contract with him, or 
(iv) a decision to withhold approval for, or to select or nominate, persons to be sub-
contractors for the purposes of the contract, or 
(c) in relation to a subsisting public supply or works contract with him-
(0 a decision to withhold approval for, or to select or nominate, persons to be sub-
contractors for the purposes of the contract, or 
(ii) a decision to terminate the contract." 
The list of functions contained in 520(2) is similar in many respects 
to those contained in S17(4), but differs in two vital respects. First, 
it does not divide approved lists into two sub-categories as 
517(4)(a) does. Secondly, unlike the list contained in 517(4), the 
functions listed in 520(2) are couched solely in a negative manner: 
they only deal with some form of exclusion from the contractual 
process. This provision sensibly acknowledges that a potential 
contractor, for example, is not likely to want to know the reason 
why he has been included in a contract award procedure, while a 
potential contractor who has been excluded is more likely to want to 
know the reason for his exclusion, and in the case of a concluded 
contract, a contractor will wish to know why it has been terminated. 
However, this does create an anomaly: while 520 requires that a 
person excluded from the contractual process should be informed of 
an authority's decision "forthwith", there is no duty placed on 
authorities to inform those not excluded from the contractual 
process promptly, although given the timing of the various stages of 
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CCT exercises it is inevitable that they will be. However, what must 
be emphasised is that this element of 520 only places a duty on 
authorities to inform any person affected of a decision to exclude 
them from the contractual process: it does not impose a duty to give 
reasons for that exclusion. 
The second element to 520(1) does impose such a duty, however. 
When a person excluded from the contractual process by an 
authority, has been informed of that fact, he may request written 
reasons for his exclusion within 1 5 days of the notice of his 
exclusion being issued. The authority in question is then placed 
under a duty to give reasons to that person, and must send a written 
statement to him within 1 5 days of receiving his request68. The 
Secretary of State may amend the period during which an excluded 
person may request reasons, and the period during which reasons 
must be dispatched69. His capacity to alter the period during which 
an authority must provide reasons for its decision is restricted by 
the Services Directives, which, where it applies, states that an 
eliminated potential contractor must be informed of the reasons for 
his exclusion within 1 5 days of the receipt of his request70. 
Moreover, 520(3), is at present at variance with the Directive: the 
former requires authorities to issue reasons within 1 5 days of the 
"date of the request", while the latter requires reasons to be given 
"within 1 5 days of the date on which the request is received". 
What, however, must be the content of the statement of reasons 
which must be given on request? This matter was addressed by lord 
Maclean in the case of C and E Campleman v Clydesdale DC 71: 
"It is not in doubt that the 'written statement' in terms of section 20(1) of the 1988 Act 
must provide proper and adequate reasons which deal with the matters in issue in an 
intelligible way. It must leave the informed reader in no real and substantial doubt what 
the reasons were and the material considerations taken into account in reaching the 
decision .... Consistently with what I have just said ... the purpose of section 20 is to 
68 S20(3) 
69 S20(4), (5) 
70 Directive 92/50, Article 12(1) 
71 Outer House, 15 May 1992 (unreported) 
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ascertain whether a decision in relation to section 17(4) has proceeded on a proper 
basis and not simply whether in reaching it the local authority took into account non-
commercial matters." 
The reasons given must, therefore, be proper and adequate, leaving 
the informed reader in no doubt as to what the authority's reasons 
for excluding a person from the contractual process, and the factual 
and legal basis for the reasons, were. To this end it becomes 
apparent that a statement to the effect that no non-commercial 
matters were referred to will not suffice: the purpose of S20 is to 
ascertain whether a decision regarding the functions in S17(4), or, 
more to the point the decisions listed in S20(2), have been taken on 
a proper basis, which in relation to CCT will mean not only without 
reference to non-commercial matters, but also without acting anti~ 
competitively. Section 20 therefore provides an important means of 
scrutinising the legal validity of an authority's actions. However, it 
is unclear what will happen when an authority fails to comply with 
its duty. The only case in which an authority failed to give reasons, 
R v Enfield London Borough ex p. T. F. Unwin (Roydon) Ltd 72, occurred 
in peculiar circumstances, the authority not wishing to give reasons 
in order not to prejudice a criminal investigation. The court felt 
that, even if there had been a breath of the S20 duty, this was cured 
by the reasons given by one of the authority's officers in his 
affidavit, and thus no remedy was necessary73. 
Having examined the content of the duty to give reasons, it now 
remains to consider what action an aggrieved contractor may take 
following their receipt. 
AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF S17 
The legal remedies available to parties prejudiced by a breach 
of S17 are enumerated in S19. Section 19(7) provides that the duty 
contained in S17(1) does not create a criminal offence. However, 
S19(7)(a) declares that in any action for judicial review a number of 
persons shall have sufficient interest (in England and Wales), or 
72 [1989] 1 Admin,LR 50 
73 per Glidewell L1 at p 58E 
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sufficient title and interest (in Scotland). The first is a potential 
contractor. The second is a former potential contractor, in relation 
to a contract which has been awarded. Finally, a body representing a 
group of contractors is entitled to bring an action for judicial 
review of a breach of S17(1). The obvious omission from this list is 
a potential sub-contractor, or former potential sub-contractor: as 
the terms in S 1 9 have the same meaning as those contained in 
S1774, a contractor or potential contractor is "in relation to 
functions as respects a proposed public supply or works contract, 
any person who is or seeks to be included in the group of persons 
from whom tenders are invited or who seeks to submit a tender fo r 
or enter into the proposed contract"75. As a sub-contractor does not 
seek to be invited to tender, submit a tender, or to enter into a 
contract with the authority, he cannot therefore be included in the 
list of persons declared to have a right to seek judicial review by 
virtue of 519(7)(a), although a trade association could raise the 
issue on his behalf. 
A sub-contractor would, however, appear to be one of the 
persons who could take advantage of S19(7)(b), which declares: 
"a failure to comply with [S1 7(1)] is actionable by a person who, in consequence, 
suffers loss or damage" 
Any person suffering loss or damage as a result of a decision 
violating the 517(1) prohibition is therefore entitled to raise an 
action against the offending authority. As S19(7)(b) refers to "a 
person" who suffers loss or damage, this provision would not only 
appear to encompass contractors and potential contractors, but also 
sub-contractors and the suppliers of contractors. However, the 
attractiveness of such actions may be reduced by S19(8): 
"In any action under section 17(1 ) ... by a person who has submitted a tender for a 
proposed public supply or works contract arising out of the exercise of functions in 
relation to the proposed contract the damages shall be limited to damages in respect of 
expenditure reasonably incurred by him for the purpose of submitting the tender." 
74 S19(12) 
75 S17(8) 
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Thus the damages awarded to potential contractors availing 
themselves of S 19(7)(b) are limited to the amount "reasonably 
incurred" in the course of submitting a tender. As sub-contractors 
and suppliers have a contractual relationship with the potential 
contractor, it is inconceivable that their loss or damage may be 
greater than his. 
The final provision of S 19 which relates to legal remedies is 
S19(9): 
"Nothing in section 17 above or subsection (1) above implies that the exercise of any 
function regulated by that section may not be impugned; in proceedings for judicial 
review, on the ground that it was exercised by reference to other matters than those 
which are non-commercial matters for the purposes of that section." 
In essence this provision declares that neither S17 nor S19 prevents 
a person who is entitled to do so from seeking judicial review of the 
exercise of one of the functions listed in S 1 7 ( 4) on the grounds that 
an authority's actions have offended against the general principles 
of administrative law, such as reasonableness76 or irrelevant 
considerations, as opposed to relying on one of the non-commercial 
considerations listed in S17(5). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Part II of the 1988 Act follows a logical progression: it 
establishes the regime which prevents authorities from taking into 
account certain matters which are deemed to be non-commercial, 
establishes a duty to give reasons which should reveal the basis on 
which a wide range of decisions are taken, and finally contains 
provisions regarding the remedies available to those apparently 
affected by a decision to take into account non-commercial matters. 
In some respects this regime complements the Secretary of State's 
powers regarding anti-competitive conduct: both are police powers, 
the former allowing aggrieved contractors to take action when 
authorities take certain matters into account, the latter permitting 
the Secretary of State to penalise authorities for doing so. There is 
76 See e.g. Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] 1 AC 1054 
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even one major point of similarity between the subject matter, as 
both represent attempts to exclude the application of TUPE. Like the 
anti-competitive conduct provisions, the non-commercial 
considerations regime contains a number of serious flaws, and 
conflicts with the EC public procurement regime on a number of 
issues, thus providing further evidence of a failure on the part of the 
UK Government to ensure that the provisions of national legislation 
are consistent with its obligations under EC law. 
The non-commercial considerations regime is of considerable 
importance to tendering exercises conducted under Part I of the 
Local Government Act 1988. There is considerable identity between 
the functions regulated by the non-commercial considerations 
regime and the stages of the tendering process prescribed by Part I. 
Thus authorities must take care not to refer to non-commercial 
considerations in reaching decisions as to which potential 
contractors who have expressed an interest in being awarded work 
should be invited to submit a tender, whether to accept or reject a 
tender, and in reaching a decision as to the award of the contract. 
However, perhaps of more relevance to the conduct of tendering 
exercises is the duty placed on local authorities to inform potential 
contractors of decisions taken during the conduct of tendering 
procedures which affect them, and to give reasons for their 
decisions promptly when requested to do so by contractors. The 
significance of this measure is that it will enable contractors to 
find out not only whether non-commercial considerations have been 
taken into account in the course of a decision which affects them, 
but also to find out whether the decision affecting them has been 
taken in accordance with the provisions of the tendering regime 
prescribed by the 1988 and 1992 Act, or the requirements of the EC 
public procurement regime. Contractors could subsequently use such 
information to form the basis of a complaint to the Secretary of 
State, or to found the basis of court proceedings 
308 
CHAPTER 7 
A PUBLIC LAW OF CONTRACT? 
Shortly after the passage of the Local Government Act 1988 a learned 
commentator observed that: 
"English law ... has no special system of rules governing contracts made by public 
authorities. Formerly the Crown had a special legal position, and to some extent it still 
has; but ... it has for most practical purposes been put into the same position as an 
ordinary litigant by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 .... Ot!let" governmental bodies such 
as loca! authorities are subject to the ordinary law of contract which applies to them in 
the same way as to private individuals and corpot"ations. They are, as also are govemrnent 
departments, restricted in certain ways by rules of administrative law ... But there is no 
special body of law governing their contt"acts other than that which governs contracts 
generally." 1 
This statement would apply equally to the United Kingdom's other 
constituent jurisdictions. However, this view, apparently having its 
roots in Dicey's conception of the rule of law2, can be criticised at 
two levels. First, some express the view that the ordinary law of 
contra has only a limited role to play where government contra 
are concerned3 , and that: 
" ... the general law of contract, in short, is only one of the elements, and not necessari!y 
the most significant, by Wllich the conduct of the parties to a government contract is 
regulated" 4-
The contractual might of governmental institutions in particular can 
act as a distorting factor on the contractual relationship, especially 
wl1ere a governmental institution wishes to use this asp of its 
dominium powers to pursue a policy objective. Thus the application of 
1 Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edition (1988), pp 787-8. See also Wade and 
Forsyth, Administrative Lavv, 7th Edition (1994), which repeats this staternent 
atp801 
2 See Dicey, Lavv of the Constitution, 10th Edition, Chapter 4 
" See Craig, Administrative law, 3rd Edition, pp 696-7 
4 Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts, (1989), pp 104-5 
5 See Daintith, The E\:ecutive Power Today: Bargaining and Economic Control, 
in Jowel1 and Oliver, The Changing Constitution, 2nd Edition; also Daintith, The 
Techniques of Government in Tbe Changing Consti tution, 3rd Edition. The term 
"dominium pmver" hroadly relates to a governmental institution's economic 
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the general law of can ct may only of secon 1m nce: the 
can only a means to an end, n an E~nd in 
will refl the a econ c on of the and the 
policy objective which the governmen institution wishes pursu 
diy, while one m qu ether the general law of 
contra is the most important fa on the contractual tionship 
use of the dominant economic position, and bargaining position, 
of governmental bodies, one may also question whether the assertion 
th there \I no of rules ing can m3 by 
public authorities" is any longer a valid one. In other war do we 
now have a public law of con ct? We must remembf~r that Wade's 
statement related not merely to central government, but also to local 
authorities. Therefore, examining the development a 
framework of regulation of public contra the 
ich e legislation posing compulsory competitive nd ng 
evidences such a development will be considered, 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PI ANNING AND 
LAND ACT 1980, AND THE 1988 AND 1992 ACTS 
It in Parts I and II of the Local Government A 1988, its 
predecessor, Part III of the Local Governrnent, Planning and Land A 
1980 (which i CCT for con on and main ance workG), 
and in sections 8 to 11 the Local Governrnent 1992 til we can 
rn rly see the ce of II al body of lawl! governing 
the can a of public authorities, The various provisions of these 
repri:;sent a cornprehen ve a rnpt regula every 
element the con actual 
While rt III of e 1980 I of e 1988 an e! 
11 of the 1992 Act ostensibly only regula the situation where a 
local authority aware! the right to in activities 
to 050, two things m not be forgotten., First, the legislation 
rni ght as a means of pursuing pollcy objectives by making financial 
disbursements, e.g. making grants, entering contracts 
() For a brief discussion see Part I chapter 1 
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establishes the client/contractor split7, thus ensllrlllg that in the 
cou rse of a compulsory competitive tendering exercise an au thority' s 
effectively the con ctor side, the OSO, 
condly, 3S a result of the client/con ctor split, and the other 
emen of the anti~competitive practices regime8 , supported by the 
Secretary of State's police powers contained in 519A and 519B of the 
1980 and 5513 and 14 of the 1988 Act ensure that a 050 
placed in the same position as other tenderers and enjoys no a! 
privil in e course of an award procedure. Thus, although the 
legislation only applies at present to a limited range of activities, 
nd only the OSO involved in the tendering it 
promulgate a of provisions which regulate the award of local 
au ority con acts and bl h conditions precedent to the 
formation of agreements between authorities and OSO's, However, it 
ml! be remembered that the ry of State may nd the 
application of CCT by using his powers un S2(3) of the 1988 
us in ng the significance of these provisions. 
The nature of the provIsions contained in the 1980, 1988 and 
1992 A wh important for the purposes of this discussion, 
The tendering provisions establish a set of rules regulating the basis 
on which local authorities award, and can en in can 
relating to in activities, Indeed, the provisions of the 1988 and 
1992 are such that it possible for the S ry of Sta to 
tailor the tendering regime for a particular service9 , In the light of 
IS on, it can no longer be maintain that, as local 
authoriti there is no "special body of law" regarding their 
al ration where the CCT legislation applies e 
circum nces in which a local authority awards a con act are the 
subj of a con derable body of !ation, and, as the ran of 
services subject to CCT expands, the impact, and significance of th t 
body of law con ently increases. 
7 See the Local Government (Direct Services Organisations) (Competition) 
Regulations 1993 S.L 848, Regulation 4 
8 See 1980 }\ct Sli(4)(aaaa), 1988 Act S7(7), lLJ92 Act S9, Local Government 
(Direct Services Organisations) (Competition) Regulations 1993 SJ. 848, DoE 
Circular 10/93, Scottish Office Environment Department Circular] 3/93, Welsh 
Office Circular 40/93, Chapters 3 and 4, supra 
9 See e.g. S2(9), S7, S8, S15(5), SI:,)(6) of the 1988 Act, S8(5)(b), S9(4)(b) of the 
1 C)C) 2 ,I'\ct 
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The emergence of a body of law ating the con of loca! 
authorities is further emphasised by the conten of Part II of the 
ment A 1988, Whereas Part III of the 1980 Act, Pa I 
of the 1988 A and SS8 to 11 of the 1992 Act only regula the 
ba on which con re awarded and in Part II not 
so limited. While there is a considerable correlation between the 
a by the non-commercial considerations regime and 
the various stages of the tendering procedures required by the CCT 
legislation 10, Part II of the 1988 applies to all local authority 
can a irrespective of their subject ma r or financial value. 
Moreover, every conceivab ge of the con ctual process is 
regulated, from the compilation of lists of approved con ctors 11, to 
the various elemen of a tendering procedure 12, the can of the 
contra 13, and the termination of the contract1 ii, However, while 
a of th con ctual regula eI, and all local 
authority contracts are subject to til regim one cannot ignorE~ the 
that S17 of the 1988 A only prohibits non~commer al 
considerations frorn being referred to, and thus regula the 
can al in a negative manneL Two pain must noted 
rela tion to til is. Fi it is probably ea r regu I a complex 
can al by identifying what is prohibited, rather than 
what IS permitted. Secondly, the list of non commercial~ 
derations contain in S17(5) sive, but not exhausti 
and it is not inconceivable that th(:: Secretary of Sta will define 
other m as nO!1-comm al consi tions at some point in the 
futu re 15. Til erefore, just as til ere is th e potentia! for fu rth er 
lation of e can 31 a es of local authorities by til 
extension and refinement of the CCT legislation' reglnl so too 
there tile tial for ail local authority con rtller 
regul3 d by the extension of the definition of wh may a non~ 
comme al consi tion. 
lOS S'J7(4") ftI 't OOO A~t d(~1 t ~ ~ -,.ee ""!, . 0 le 700 i~C ,an ... 1ap el ), SUPJa. 
11 Sl 7( (:1) 
12 Sll)(b) 
13 S19(10)(b) 
1;1 Sl (-/)(c)(ii) 
15 Sll)( 1) 
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In addition, in Scotland and Wal by virtue of S57 of the Local 
Government (Scotland) A 1994 and S25 of the Local Government 
(Wa A 1994, the ability local authorities con with 
ea ch her for th e provision of services is defin ed, and til e 
Clrcu nces in which authorities may en into such con 
subject to periodic regulation by the Secretary of State 16. 
It can th d that e dibonal position that there is 
no special body of law regulating the contracts of local authoriti 
and th they are subject to the ordinary law of contract can no longer 
be maintained. Certainly, the ordinary law of contract continues to 
pi not in gnificant part in evaluating a local authority's 
contractual activities: for example, the principle which allows ont: 
chara the rei onship a local authority and its DSO 
resulting from a tendering process conducted under the CCT 
legi a tion as a contra at !east as far as th i parties are 
concerned, is drawn from the ordinary law of contract17. However, it 
obvious that rules specifically designed to regul the various 
elemen of the contractual proc<:~ss are becoming increasingly 
impo nt in relation to the contractual relationshi of local 
authorities, with the CCT regimes contained in the 1980 and 1988 Act 
bl ing conditions t to the blishment of con ctual 
relationships between local authorities and DSOs, while Pa II of the 
1988 regul ing up to the point of nation of the 
contract. There is by no means a cleve/oped SE~t of rulE~s regulating th(~ 
con a al relationships of local autho es. However, there a 
developing' body of such ru In the body of rules relating 
local authori con while it m not have reach i final 
ge tJf de\/el()!)nlent, clearly at Ctuite an aclvanc s g(~ ()f 
and will continue sorne tim rticularly 
by the (~xpansion of the range of activities subj to CCT, and the 
refinement of the anti~competitive actices regime, which i 
arguably the most important factor in determining the basis on i 
a award ma under the CCT legislation. The body of rules 
specifically relating to local authority contra will thus continue 
16 See Chapter 1 for a fuller discussion 
11 See Bremer HandeJsgeseJJscl1aft m,b,H F Toepfer [1980] 2 LloydsLR43, 
discussed in Chctpter 1, SUr)!'a 
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to expand, and in 
can However, 
many cases II supplant the ordina law 
as the nature of the legislation rding CCT 
erally n in it usually defines wh i/)ited, as 
opposed to wh IS permitted, it is unlikely that the era! law 
can ct will ever lIy replaced18, although its gnifican ce has 
been, and will continue to 
The ern nce of a rie of spe al rules es bli II1g 
conditions precedent to the formation of contra and th ir 
rmination n however, a Ii d to local auth es. 
Pa ra lIel developmen can also be dete In the NHS and cen 
ment, and these mu briefly exa 
trend towards a public law of contra 
n in 
may be 
r ttlat the 
aCE~d rnore 
ef vely. 
As has no a 19 ttle use rna techniques is 
a which has not been confined to local government, but wh 
a ment and the NHS. While both have 
subject to extensive market testing prograrnm the approa 
a with rd the NHS larly guing20, 
In 1983 Circular 19/83 signifi on of mark t 
ng mme ancilla cross e NHS, 
ng for, and thf~ contracting out of, services thus has a 
titive 
irly 
lengthy hi within e NH and e commi ent ma 
ng was reaffirm in the Competing Quality White Paper21, 
However, Ion the im In the In the 
formance of n servi it has also been recogn cI that the 
may not er or able to de 
18 It is noteworthy that vvhile the various provisions of the J 980,1 988 and] 992 
Acts regulate contracts for the supply of goods and services, and performance 
of works, contracts for the acquisition of heritahle property, for example, do 
not fall within their ambit 
19 See Part I chapter 5 
20 See gener:111y on this issue Harden, The Contracting State pp ] 4-7, 
Chapter 5; Allen, Contracts in the National Health Service Internal jVlarket 
[1995] 58l\/lLR321 
21 See Competing for Quality, em 1730, chapter 4 
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services: the concept of managed competition within the NHS was 
therefore introduced by the National Health Service and Community 
re Act 1990. The 1990 Act provided by virtue of S4(1) that: 
"In this Act the expression' NHS contract' means an arrangement under which one Ilealth 
service body' means an arrangement under which one health service body (' the acqu irer') 
arranges for the provision to it by another healttl service body ('the provider') of goods or 
services which it requires for the purposes of its functions." 
Parallels can be drawn between this provision and S57 of the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1994 and S25 of the Local Government 
(Wales) A 199422: firstly, all three are intended to regulate 
agreemen between statutory bodies for the provision of goods and 
services, and secondly, as a result of this, the influence of S4(1 )'s 
terminology upon the drafting of S57(1) and S25(1) is obvious. 
However, an examination of S4(3) reveals how distinct the 
agreements envisaged by the '1990 Act are from those which local 
authorities may enter into with each other in Scotland and Wales: 
"Whether or not an arrangement whicll constitutes an NHS contract would, apart from this 
subsection, be a contract in law, it shall not be regarded for any purpose as giving rise to 
contractual rights or liabilities, but if any dispute arises with respect to such an 
arrangement, either party may refer it to the Secretary of State for determination ... II 
The f~ffect of S4(3) is to declare that while the agreements 
encompassed by S4 may draw much from the concept and terrninology 
of con ct, they shall n be a contra in law, irrespective of any 
rule of law which would imply that such agreements are contractsn . 
In essence what the 1990 Act pu in place is a non-contractual 
agreement, which is nevertheless intended to be binding as between 
the parties involved, and in relation to which the Secretary of State 
possesses considerable powers in effect to impose an agrE)ement upon 
the health service bodies involved24, 
22 S (~l 7 f d' ~ . Lee .' 1apter L. or a .1ScUSSlon 
23 Given the organisational structure put in pJace by the 1990 Act it is highly 
probable that, apart frorn S4( 3), the agreements set out in S4( 1) would fall 
within the ambit of Bremer HandelsgeselIscIwf't m.h. H F Toepf't:r [1930]2 
Lloyds L R. 43, and constitute contracts, at least as regards tbird parties 
26 :t See S4( 3 ) -( 8) 
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The agreemen encompa by S4 are therefore SUI er 
Unlike agreemen between local authorities pursuant S57 of the 
Local Government (S and) A 1994 and S25 of e Local 
Government (Wal A 1994, for example, they are not binding 
not give any con al righ or liabiliti and 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, although the 
the variou entru to the of by 
S4(3) to S4(8) may well be subj(:;ct to review. However, while the 
tu may dep these agreemen of con al tus as a 
matter of law, it simultaneously puts in place a curious and intriguing 
I I regime to regulate ose ts. The clear aim of S4 to 
ensure th the agreemt~nts reached between health service bodies are 
binding upon, and res by, the es invol . While the 
agreemen themselves may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
cou the Act in place own resolution reo 
This a m interesting element of the regime regarding NHS 
con In e ditional con ctual model, parties are to 
agree the terms and conditions of a contract with whoever they 
even th reflect the ative economic inequality of the 
and, if a dispute subsequently arises between the parties to the 
contra the e m be the cou for ution. In 
relation to NHS con , however, a different approach is taken. 
In d of permitting an a ent be en d in and then 
allowing a dispute to al" subsequently, S4 recogn that a dispu 
more likely to a prior an agreernent being en 
a a result of the tive economic position of the parties (although 
this If II la ly be the result of the ry of 
allocation of resour ,and const~quent!y focuses a tion on 
rea ing, or more correctly imposing, a able agreement. This 
appro8ch is unique, and even though the agreemen in qt! on are 
fied n con ai, it ify the em ce of a 
body of rules specifically ilored to regulating the formation of 
a en by blic authorities. 
While the Government has sought to regula the con a al 
ationshi f local au es in a vari of eli t and 
establish a regime regarding the formation of agreemen 
dif ren t health s ce bodi on e 0 f th e peculiarities of th e 
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imposition of mark IlIques across e public the 
general absence of legislation regarding central government. With the 
of Pa II the Deregulation and Contracting Out 1994, 
which, amongst other things, regula the circumstances in which 
the fu of Min may out, there no dom 
legislation specifically regulating the process of central governm 
market ng, or blishing conditions precedent the form on 
of contracts for the procurement of goods and services by the Crown. 
Th may be ain by the fact th successive Governments have 
ch osen to reform til e stru ctu re and workin g pra cti ces of th e 
rtments of cen I government by using th r prerogative and 
common law powers, rather than by statute, Howev(~r, while 
rliament may not have enacted legislation regulating the market 
testing programme, that is not to say that central government 
unregulated: the EC procurement regime will have an 
impa upon the activities of central government, as well as those of 
local authorities and the NHS, 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE EC PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES 
The EC Public Procurernent Directives, although they blish the 
ndards by which many elemerl of the 1980, 1988 and 1992 A 
must be evaluated, actually go much further. 
Suppii 6 and Works27 Directives apply not only 
The Services25 , 
local authorities 
but also aim any conceivable governmental body or public 
auth ority28, an d consequently the contract award procedures of public 
authorities in general mu conform to the standards contain 
th n. e dire rrn another, and haps the m 
Impo nt, conditions precedent to the award and formation of 
con public authorities, As has been noted a til has 
severe ramifications for several critical elemen of til CCT 
regim 9, However, we cannot ignore the wider ramifications of the 
principles of EC law on the procurement activities of all public 
authorities. 
2S Directive 92/~O 
26 Directi\'p (B/~6 
27 Directi\'e 93'37 
28 See Article 1 (b) of each Directive. 
29 See Chapters 1,2, 3, -l, 5, supra 
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It must be appreciated th the Supplies and Works 
Dir are not the only source of the rules relating to the awa 
of con by blic au thorities. The EC Trea also gr 
importance. As a consequence of the Treaty provision a public 
uthority for exampl ted from ng a proportion a 
contract to contractors in a particular locality30. Procurement 
pres mu not, there mply conform to the ons of 
the Directives. However, the Directives are perh the ngle rn 
impo nt, and perhaps the m bl element of the EC 
procurement rules. The Directives pursue three objectives: Community 
wi a ent, common chnical ecification and grea r 
transparency of award procedures. Consequently, each Directive n 
only fines the parties to the con ct, and the subj matter and 
minimum value of the contra falling within its ambit, but also 
deals th a variety of other ma rs ich are imp ance. 
Principal among these are the rules relating to the technical 
ecification for e work exposed competition, e rules 
regardin g the advertisemen t of a ward procedures in the 0 ffi ci a I 
Journal of the European Communiti the publication of award 
notices, and, perhaps m crucially, each Directive establishes tile 
ra for the conduct of the award Thu the can of 
tilt; open, res ed, and negotiated procedures, and the 
elrCl! ces in which each may be used, forth. In addition, the 
Directives out the common rules on which potential contra 
m rti p e in an award ocess, blish the na 
qualitative selection which may be used to exclude unsui 
can and the the which may u 
in awarding contra Finally, both the S(~rvices and Works Directives 
abli 
circum 
a proce re for the 
nccs. 
The Pub! Procurement Di 
of law which public authorities mu 
van of con ch has 
on of a contract in limi cl 
t a su ntial b 
comply witl) in the award of a 
implemented in the United 
2() See Article 30, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v TJnita Sanitlria Locale No. 
2 Di Carrara, C3se C-21 88 [19901 ECR 889, [19911 3 Cl\iILR 25; Articles 52,59, 
Commission v It31y (Re Data Processing), Case C-3/88, (1989) ECR 4035, [\ 99 l] 2 
ClvlLR 115 
318 
Kin adam by nleans of dele9a ted le9islation31. eh is the nature of the 
Directives that it is arguable that what will constitute a contr 
their pu 
empha 
oses is a Community law eoncept32, something which 
th r impact on national law: if so, where one of the 
Oi applies it will not the can of a can out in 
rlational law which is predominant, but th contained in Community 
law. Th empha e fact that the general law of contra is 
being increasingly supplanted by a body of law relating specifically to 
the can of public authorities, and that European legislation is 
playing what is perhaps the predominant role in th process. 
However, it mu rem that European legisl on does not 
only out substantive rules regarding the award of contracts by 
public authorities: it a provides the minimum requiremen for the 
procedures which must available to those who have a grievance 
regarding the condu of an award procedure33 , 
The EC public procurement regime thus covers a comprehensive 
range of issu from the parties to, and subject matter of, a 
contra to the procedures regulating i award, the limi d 
nces in which contracts may be awarded, and the procedures 
regarding the expression of grievances relating to award procedures. 
While the EC regime d to a grea range of public bodies, 
and contracts, than the regime established by the 1980, 1988 and 
1992 A ,it exclu vely concerned with the award of 
con . Unlike Pa II of the 1988 Act, for example, it not 
concern with tile of a al of con cts, or with the 
circumstances of their nnination. Perhaps the EC procurement 
s con on res as opposed to es such 
as the circumstances in which the contracts of public authorities rnay 
nated, or the which m included in such 
is its main limitation, and one which will hopefully be addressed in 
e. However, one cann ignore I fa . Fi by vi e of 
the principle of supremacy of Community law, it is the EC public 
rement me which establishes the minimum ndards which 
the condu of contra award procedures by public authorities mu 
31 Public Supplies Contracts Regulations 1995 S.L 201; Public Works Contracts 
Regulations 1991 S,L 2680; Public Services Contracts Regulation 1993 S,L 3228 
32 See Chapter 1, supra 
33 See Directive 89/665 
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conforrn to, and n nation diy, one rnu r in mind th 
hitherto th rn concerted a pt at a domestic to regula 
the rement activities of blic uthorities tile laban of 
local authority activities contain in the 1980, 1988 and 1992 A 
no legisl initiative ich a regula 
any aspe of the contractual activities of other public authorities 
and, in rticular, cen al governrnent. The only body of law which 
does so is th relating to the award of contra arising frorn the 
public procurernent and irnplementation in national law34. 
Consequently, whenever central governrnent, or an N!~IS tru enga 
in a rnarket g In a or wishes to en 
In a supply con ct, or en r into a contra for tile con ction 
or rn;::lIn ance a Hding, while there m be no dorn c te 
prescribing the award procedure which mu b(~ cornpli with, th 
r Irernen irnposed by the procurement Dir ves rnu be 
cornplied with whenever the necessary thresholds are exceeded, a 
ere an identity of subj rna 
CONCLUSION 
It cann 
laws relating 
and 1992 
rnal 111 any Ion til there no I body of 
to the contra of public authorities. The 1980, 1988, 
rture frorn tile on that it the 
ordinary law con a which governs the contra of public 
U orities. The three s In qu Oil, a whole, 
bl a substantial body of law regulating element of the 
al process: til blish procedures whi mu be 
complied with prior to the formation of con a In spe fie 
rcu nand la the and con ons will may 
included In local authority contr as w I a til reu nces In 
m However, the 1980, 1988 and 1992 
A only rE:~gulate the con actual relationships of local authoriti 
Ap of the N Health and unity Care 
A 1990, there is no dom c legislation atin g sped Ily e 
con I ation er blic uthorities. 
the 1990 A a lHllqU and significant pro ion: it rnark a 
34 See fn. 23 
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departure from the traditional model of contractual relations. It 
establishes a le9al regime pecu liar to agreements between dis tin ct 
health ce bodies. The agreements in question are not to be 
contracts in law, or justiciable by the courts, but would appear 
intended to be formal and no binding on the parties to them, and 
are subject to a dispute resolution procedure which, curiously, 
op prior to formation of the agreement, not after its formation. 
While NH5 contracts are declared not to give rise to contractual 
rights and liabilities, one cannot ignore that 54 of the 1990 Act 
nevertheless establishes a legal regime which regulates the 
formation of an important set of the agreements of pu blic au thorities. 
One criticism of the regime established by the 1990 Act, however, is 
that it focuses on the formation of contracts, and the content of the 
agreements, primarily because the intention of 54 is to ensure that a 
of conditions agreeable to both parties is achieved, rather than 
the termination of such contracts, for example. 
While the body of domestic rules regulating the various stages of 
the contractual process may have emerged on an ad hoc basis, and 
while there is no body of legislation relating cifically to the 
contracts of central government, the EC public procurement regime 
applies to all public authorities. Thus it is not only the provisions of 
the 1980, 1988 and 1992 Acts which must be evaluated against the 
standards set by the procurement Directives: the Directives also set 
the minimum stan darcls to which the procu rement activities of oth er 
public authorities mu con form. It is the EC public procurement 
regime which provides the only body of legislation regulating the 
procurement activities of, most significantly, central government. 
Neither the EC public procurement regime, nor the domestic 
regulation of local authority contracts can, however, be characterised 
as being fully developed bodies of law. Both have flaws, particularly 
in relation to the circumstances in which they apply. The EC public 
procurement Directives are limited by the fact that they only regulate 
the award of contracts, and not other aspects of the contractual 
process such as the termination of contracts, and by the two-tier 
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a!)f)lication of the ces Directive35 . a clorn level, it should 
be noted that, although Part II of the 1988 Act regul asp 
of the the CCT ined in the 1980, 
1988 and 1992 Acts as yet apply to relatively few local government 
activiti although it obvious th the of the legislation will 
continue to expand for the foreseeable futur 6. Moreover, the 
refinement of the ndering provision and particularly the anti-
competitive practices regime will be an ongoing In refining 
and ming domestic legisl on, more attention will have to id 
to the provisions of the EC public procurernent regime. This 
illu ates a particularly important d opmen the increa ng 
importance of developments in European law in shaping developmen 
in our constitutional and administrative law37. Developments at the 
European level may well be of greater importance than those at a 
dom c I in the foreseeable future in the d opment of a 
coherent body of law aimed at regulating the contractual activities of 
public au orities. 
At t, however, it IS safe that we now Ilave an 
emerging body of special rules regulating various elernent of the 
con 81 of public authorities. While th body of law 
may be substantial, particularly in relation to the contra of local 
auth it 111 chara as a oping, rather than a 
fully developed set of rules governing the contra of public 
auth es. The at til II a doping dy of law 
ernphasised the fact that, both at dorn c and European I 
111 mpha S ,at presen placed on blislling conditions 
precedent to the formation of a contra with the exception of 517 
the I Government A 1988, no ru h as ena 
regarding the terrnination of contr . Moreover, although the general 
law of con has been supplan a large degree by the 
development of a body of rules regarding the contractual relationshi 
of public au oriti it is unlikely that it II ever b tally 
35 See Directive 92/50, Articles 8,9, The tVI"O tier application of the Directive 
must be reviewed by 1st July 1996, in accordance with Article 43 
j6 ~ ~l . 
, See C 1apter 1, supra 
37 See on this point Lord Sc~:mnan, The Development of Administrative L:n\': 
Obstacles and Opportunities, 1990 Public L:nv~t90. One of the rne examples of 
this phenomenon in recent years is the case of f7actorta111e Ltd, F Secretarv of 
State [1 C)C)]] 3 All ER 7()9 
replaced; 85 is evirie!1ced, for example, by the er;:J1 a ce of 
le9islation rcling the termination of contra thus f~nsuring th8t 
such 111 rs are condu in accordance with the blished 
common law principles, 
It a the absence of a body of prin pies regarding the 
regulation of contracts after their formation which most mark(~dly 
clistingu es th ding m of rules rtaining to the 
contra of public authorities from the highly developec! system of 
a inistrative con a ich some possess, If we are to 
compare the principles governing administrative contra in Fran 8 
those in Britain) at n ceable is that French administra 
law not only recognises special principll'::!s regarding the formation of 
con which, like those discussed above in ation Britain, 
will increasingly be shaped by the influence of the EC publir: 
rement regime 3c), but has also developed a of principles 
regu la te th e relationsh ips between th e pa rties to pu bli c sector 
can thereafteL Thus French administrative law recogn that 
contracts may be varied by public authorities due to a change in 
Circum n and if the can ctor its to agre may engage 
another party40: the contractor mu however, be indemnifiE~d for the 
variation of the can a if it imposes more onerous duties upon 
him41" The right of a public authority to vary the contract would 
r an inherent on distin the of the con 
in Britain variation of the contract would only be permitted to th 
t at it had en in the can ct itself, and a 
attempt by a public authority to vary the contract beyond th8t would 
en til con to 
There are several other n able principle of French 
cimini ative law rang the contra bllc authorities, 
Chief amongst these are imprevision, fait elu prin and force 
38 See generally on this issue Bell and Brovvn, French Administrative Lavv (4th 
Ed, 1(92) at pp 192-200; tvlitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities: a 
Comparatlve Study, Chapter 4 
39 See e.g. Bell and Brown, op.cit. pIgS 
40 S rT (' 1" . (' - 1 D F ,- (' E '17 >, il r 'l 0 --, --'. (' 1" . 
. Lee e'o,.ornpabme ,enera e es ,aux,,". ~ 1\ C1';, ,J:) ,') , _,omp;:tb111e 
Nouvelle Du Gaz Deville-Les-Rouen, CE 10 January 1902 
41 Compagnie Cenerale Des E:mx, CE 12 )\/l8)' 1933 
majeure. Imprevision is the principle that, where there is a 
fundamental dlange in circumstances after the formation of the 
con ct which renders it uneconomical for the contractor to perform 
his duti he will not be allowed to rescind the contract where the 
public interest demands that it should be performed, but may 
compelled to perform it and be entitled to be indemnified by the 
public authority42. Once again, In Britain such a change in 
circumstances, unless envisaged in the contract, may justify its 
recission. Fait dl! prince is the principle that a contractor may not 
claim an indemnity if his cos are increased, and profitability 
affected, by a governmental act of general application, but only if the 
act in question has a particular impact on the subject matter of the 
contract43 . Force majeure the prin pie that where a change of 
circumstances has occurred which neither party can overcome and the 
object of the contract has been destroyed, the contractor may expect 
to be released from his obligations44. The thrust of the principles of 
French administrative law regarding the contracts of public 
authorities is to attempt to ensure that a change of circumstances 
does not adversely affect the effective functioning of the public 
service by resulting in the recision of the contract45 , Its object is the 
maintenance of the contract in the public interest, with the 
contractor being indemnified if necessary in proportion to the change 
in his duties: 
it seems that the solution reached is to regard the contract as fixing an equation 
between the rights of the contractor and the administration, and provided that that equation 
is not disturbed adjustments are possible, and the extent of obligations or rights may be 
varied according to need,.,>t6 
An examination of the position In France illustra 
of the law in the constituent jurisdictions of the 
wh ile it has undoubtedly undergone considerable 
the deficiencies 
United Kingdom: 
development in 
42 See e.g. Compagnie Generale D'Eclairage De Bordeaux, CE 30 f.lfarch 1916 
43 See e.g. Ville de Paris, CE 14 February 1936. For a detailed discussion of 
this principle see ]vlitchell, op.cit. pp193-8 
44 See e.g. Comp8gnie des Tramways de Cherhourg, CE 9 December 1932 
45 See ]vIitchell, op.cit at p182, pp 188-193. This is particularly evident in 
IVfitchell's view in relation to the doctrine of imprevision 
46 lv'Iitchell, op.cit. 1'218 
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recent yea it has concentr on 
has been m a dornestic level 
and no 
a coherent 
of in pies regar ng e con a of all public au orities 
However, a Par I and 1\ of 
illu a ,where e will 
willing regul con 
e cal Government A 
rliament has 
e of the can 
sp fic public authorities, There no reason, erefor 
attempt cannot be made emulate the example of sam 
European neighbours and blish a more nging and 
of principles regulating the of all public auth 
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1988 
own 
of 
why an 
of our 
erent 
es" 
The Local Government Acts 1988 and 1992 do not merely put in 
place a system of regulating the competition process: they also 
contain provisions relating to the accountability of local authorities 
not only for the conduct of the competition process but also for the 
conduct of work by DSO's thereafter. However, it is not intended to 
limit this examination of the effect of CCT on local authority 
accountability to consideration of, for example, the provisions of 
the 1988 Act regarding DSO accounts. One must remember that the 
accountability of governmental bodies can be divided into three 
broad categories: legal accountability, financial accountability, and 
accountability through the political process. The legal 
accountability of local authorities for their conduct of the tendering 
pro particularly the vital ue of the Secretary of State's 
powers regarding anti-competitive conduct, and the rights of 
contractors who wish to pursue actions regarding irregularities in 
the award of contracts, have been dealt with extensively above!, and 
consequently need not be considered in detail here. The effect of the 
1988 and 1992 Acts upon the other two facets of accountability, 
namely financial and political accountability, does, however, m 
more substantial attention. 
In considering the effect of the 1988 and 1992 A upon 
financial and political accountability, the three sets of provisions 
relating most directly to these issues must be examined fi The 
first provisions to be examined are those contained in the 1988 Act 
regarding the maintenance of DSO accounts. The second, basically an 
extension of the duty to keep accounts, are the provisions relating to 
publication of annual reports. Finally, the public right of access to 
information under S12 Of the 1988 Act and S10 of the 1992 Act, 
will be considered. 
:1See Part II Chapters 4, 5, 6 
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The basic duty to keep DSO accounts IS contained in S9 of the 1988 
Act, which declares th 
"( 1 )This section applies where a defined authority carry out, in the financial year 
beginning in 1989 or in a subsequent financial year, work which falls within a defined 
activity and fulfils the condition that-
(a) it is carried out under a worts contract to vvhich section 4 above applies, or-
(b) section 6 above applies to it 
(2) For each financial year in which the wor-k is carried out, the authority shall keep an 
account as regards all work which falls vvittlin that activity, is carried out by them in 
tllat year and fulfils that condition," 
There is thus a duty to maintain accoun regarding defined 
a tie where the work in question is as fun nal 
work by virtue of S6, or under a works contract en red into 
pursua S4" as INas illustrated above, as the of 
recent legislation, works contra can no longer exist in Scotland 
or Wal ,and, as it highly likely that milar legislation will be 
enacted in England in the near future) it is not proposed to discuss 
the accounting provi ons ating contra which would 
ostensibly fall within S4. However, as regards functional work 
( ieh wil! in future (1 rently encompass all work by 
DSOs)4, S9(2) clearly irnposes a duty to maintain annual accounts for 
ea !ar defined activi which is perform by a DSO 
following compliance with the competition provisions of the 1988 
The of BCCOI! atingfunctional work further 
expanded upon by S9( 4): 
"Where any work fallin~l within the activity is functional \AJork, tile authority shaH 
entet", in the account kept under tl1is section as regat-ds tile activity fot" the financial 
r in \lvhich the work is carriecl out, such item as is necessary to carry out any 
2 See Local Government Act 1988 S2, cmd Part II Chapter 1, supra 
3 See Part II Chapter 2, the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994, and the 
Local Government (\I\7a1e5) ,i'"ctl C)C)·Cl 
I See Pari II" CIL1L'>tcr 2 
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intention expressed by the authority in relation to the work in any bid prepared under 
section 7(6) above." 
The pu of th IS ensure e amount 
to a pa lar accou auld no an the SLlm contain 
in, or a inablefrom, e DSO d re i by S7(6), and 
prepared in accordance with the provisions of S8(3) of the 1988 A 
on 9(4) the 1988 A th effectively prohibits a I 
authority from crediting a DSO account with an amount 111 excess 
til contain in the DSO's d. It 111 ng con ns no 
provision which expr permi the variation of the amount 
a DSO account if ere a ange In rcu n 
although this does not mean that any variation of the am au 
credited to a DSO account One mu rerTl e 
central importance of the fi the 1988 Act's dering 
regime, and, in particular the duty i on DSOs to 
In accor nce with the specifications. Thus, if the specification 
en the possibility of vari on in particu la r circu n 
with consequences for the arnount paid con a it will 
possible vary the amount credited the accou as e 
bid should have been prepa In a nce with the specification. 
The 1988 Act reserves e ry 
regarding the DSO accou Section 9(5) provi til 
"The Secretary of State may specify"" 
(a) items which are to be entered in accounts kept under this section (in acldition to 
items to be entered by virtue of subsections (3) ... above), and 
(b) the method of determinin~l tlle amount of any item to be entered by virtue of the 
specification. " 
This prOVIsion empowers e SecI' of 
con t of accoun The ry of Sta 
which mu be inclu d in accoun 
required by S9(3), an second, the m ad 
any 
ould 
5 S'I Rl 
'- 1\\'1 
of account en e 
n at e 
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fy e 
may, fy 
In a on ose 
calculating the amount 
e e fication. It 
has the power 
\I S fy" these m 
regulations, nor subje 
irement is at the 
ese m rs are 
Parliamen 
fi ons as 
n E~ subje of 
scrutiny: e only 
e can nt 
accou should be m In writin 
The ex of e power fy e m of calcul ng 
any item of account entered by virtue of the specification ra 
I ng poin Fi e m gnificant 
limiting the of this that it "any item 
by virtue of on" " As e ry 
will use til ne the way in which of account 
a I one again drawn 
ba the central significance of the specifi orL Any item of 
account arising from the cifi on will d nd on what the 
spe fication i elf says" Of particular impo nce will be the 
n re of the ce which the fi on relates, and the 
provisions of the contract relating to costing: each spe fication 
will con in own provisions on the way in which a contract 
should be costed in order that bids may be evalu and subsequent 
variations m on an objective This m however, vary from 
authority authority and specification to specifi on" Thus, if the 
ry of to use e power ed in (5)(b) 
specify the method of calculating items of account he is faced with 
two option given at the items I mu 
the specification" Firs he may choose a lowest common 
omm approach, dealing with m only e rn neral 
, and addressing those particular items which are common, or 
notoriou enough, to merit fic regulation, diy, he could 
specify the method of calcul ng items of account arising the 
spE~cifi on having fi to ne wh ose 
m 
could 
should ta In fication. e ry of 
pt to do by ex g his powers regarcling e 
an competitive conduct determine more clos 
the con t of specifi ons. However, quite a from a 
qu ion concerning the vires such measur more In nse 
regul on of the on rn can in e fl f:: 
GS15(4) 
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competition and corn tioll. There e fi 
course a a to the 
The second point of in of the 
the meth calculating an account arising om 
the specification contained in S9(S)(b) th there may some 
sion between the of th power and the provisions of 
S8(3) regarding the calculation of the DSO bid. While each relates 
different points in time, with S8(3) relating to participation III e 
dering process, and S9 the performance of the work it 
has been awarded to the DSO, the common element the 
dfication. Section 8(3) blishes the rules as the costing of 
the DSO bid, and provides, for exampl that: 
"( c) in tile case of an item to be credited [i.e. to a DSO account], the bid must state either 
what the authority intend as its maxirnum amount or the method by which they intend to 
calculate its maximum arnount." 
The Secretary of State may Issue regulations regarding the DSO bid 
by virtue of S8( 4). While it is only the DSO bid which mu be 
prepared in a nce with S8(3), it impa directly upon the way 
in which the future cost of work will calcul the DSO bid 
must either the amount which will be charged for e work, or, 
more prudently, given the possibility of contra variation, 
cially in areas slIch as building cleaning, the method by whl 
the cost of the work will be calcula cL This is basically the 
culation of the amount which will be the DSO accou 
While the III calculation con in in the DSO bid can only 
lated by tory in ment7 , however, S9(S)(b) permits e 
Secretary of to specify in writing the method of calculating 
any item of account. Two possible in of sion thus ex 
between (3) and (5)(b): each m permit essentially the same 
culation to be regu in different a secondly, ere IS 
a on between the meth of r lation, as S8(3) may only 
amend by virtue of ument, while e power 
contain in (5)(b) mu d by a specification, which 
lis outwith the ambit of In limen A 1946, 
7 S8( 4) 
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Indeed the 
In men 
scrutiny and n 
at 
an d con 
own piications 
fications un 
h 
o 
( 
su 
are n 
parliarnen 
seen 
accoun 
The provisions outlin a only blish ties as e 
mam nance and con t DSO accoun these duties r 
IIlSU ent in th ensure scrutiny of DSO formance. It 
is only once one considers the duty maintain accoun alongsi 
among er things, e publish those accoun the 
accoun bility of DLOs and DSOs for their activities can 
evalu 
The m obvious duty rsuant the maintenance of accoun IS 
til ould pu Wh er e of accoun bility 
comrnensu with the degree of financial inform on whi IS 
available is a qu on which can be answer bar an 
exa ation S10 and 11 of e 1988 
111m duties as to the 
annu I finan al It requires th 
carries out work lling in a defin 
wor con en red in under 
S6 in e anCl 
Finan al rS, then, by virtue S11 ( it: 
CtlOl1 and con 
where a local autho 
a 
or as 
pursuant a 
n onal work 
0, or a su 
" , shall prepare a for thefinallcial year concerned conta as II 
work which falls within tilat activity, is carried out by thern in that year and fulfils the 
condition ~ 
(a) a summary of the account for that year under section 9 as regards Hie work, 
(b) a statement whether tile requirement under section 10 above has been 
fulfilled for that year as regards the work, 
(c) a staternent identifying such of the work (if any) as falls witllin the activity by 
virtue of a decision under section 2( 5) 
8Sl1(1) 
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(d) a statement identifying sLich of tile v\lork (if any) as falls within the activity by 
virtue of a decision under section 2(7) ai)ove, and 
(e) a statement identifying sLich of the work (if as is work to which section 6 above 
applies by vil'tue of a decision under section 6(4) above." 
It IS perh er a e finai ree ,~ ,") S11 (2) 
b re considering til import S11(2)(a) and (b). Basically 
agraphs (c), Cd) and 
local authorities mu 
S2(5) 
en as 
11 (2) ( 
which 
thin where til 
( 
re 
n 
and 
mu 
th where an 
as 
at, 111 III rcu n 
In th r annual finan 81 report 
e r 
e power given to local authorities 
a work ould as 
lis within o defin a 
th , it 
identifying the work 
one n activity. In wh 
similar 
treat 
where a local au 
as falling within a d 
power un S2(7) 
ned a work which is n 
subj 
III finan 
n otherwise fall wi 111 
r quirt~d S11 (2)(e) is 
author es should identify 
e appl by virtue a 
on lies in the 
n so. No regul 
e 
S In 
e fi 
gnificant, as 
it m by virtue of S11 (2)(d), ma a 
I ti ng e work which would 
defin a ty. The tement 
more 0 cure, as it reqLllres at 
wo whi the fun onal work 
un S6(4). of 
at S6( 4) rei a to the regulations 
ares 
ng work 
defin a 
,-;:, ha 
S2(5) and S2(7), 
would ed. 
511(2) are un 
finan al m 
it di cult 
e m 
The fi 
ry 
by 
S11 (2)(a), a summa e account k un S9 
mu p 
a 
a summa 
perform 
e 
means til an autho 
s accoun 
finan al 
a ally 
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ng ea 
L on 11 (2)(a) 
Ires the 
n 
of 
financial repo for ea d n a VI SU repo mu t 
fin II present: irly e finan al result" of pe rmmg e 
a III e Finan al r was ca ed out, and 
E~X essed in 
Au 
a 
with 
orities rn 
onal inform 
e other finan 
e of s eifi 
scrutiny, e 
ired financial 
(th 
whi they 
31 11 
S11 
e Secr ry of 
r 
10 
vours 
rliamen 
e 
ry 
ment. e 
r not la than 30th 
man s of the end of the financial ar 
submitted the authority's auditor by 
Althou the second paragraph, S11 (2)(b) blandly 
annu m inclu a t indi ng compliance 
S10 as the 
on, th e m usion in 
the annual a the 1m nt piece 
In 
1m 
return on ca pi employed. on 10 
on auth ties 
as he fi 
A s 
financial 
fit 12 in , 
one III 
When a 
has submitted 
with S11 (7), the au 
r and 
Thus the 
mu 
his 
of and e auth 
9 SIl( 3) 
[0 Sl1(4), (5) 
11 S 11(7) 
12 S10( 
13 Sl t(8) 
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the finan ve 
ce 
rsuant 
1989-90 onwa e 
irement to 
ent requi 
Ion on e 
III qu 13 
leve a 
by S11 (2)(b) 
or has n 
n 
ent 
activity 
nee 
e 
e 
The in provid e accounting 
compliance duties g e financial by 
the con e 1m nCE~ to 
anyone pting u e financial performance DSOs 
DLOs~ Consequen e various provi ons con ined III e 
accounting me the 1988 A ould p de can rable 
opportunities to those who see at authorities auld 
lIy accou ble the public for e activities eir DLOs and 
, one can 
of e 1988 A increase public accoun 
ance of these bodies. 
whom are authorities accoun ble for 
e provi ons 
bility for the Finan 211 
a 
r financial 
Firs 
ance 
by virtue of the statutory diy, are ere a a a 
means of ensuring financial accoun 
and DSOs eous to e 19 
The first qu 
s en t 
lures comply with the accou 
the financi objective, 
of the 1988 A 14" The 
au ties accoun 
relation d a vities per 
II it e 
has il In accoun 
annual finan al accoun ill 
e financial 
the rpose 
bility for the performance 
by examining the of 
S1 
ation, 
eme edress 
and failures 
n in S13 and S14 
me thus renders local 
u if, in 
r the 1988 A 
tel! at an a 
ance with S9, pr 
S 11, or c 
he may 
nei if 
an 
ce 
ill 
one 
provi 
con III in S14. us 
empha ses at authoritiE,!s a e pnman answerable e 
e financial r and 
r compliance with accounting 
e m su In on 
14 See Part If chapter 5 for 8.11 expbl18.tiol1 of these provisions, 
the un 513 is n prescn d 
financial a d accou 9 r 
e 1988 
1'01 of 
an 
na re: authorities are accoun ble him 
acoillan 
r their finan 211 
an 
e 1988 A 
com 
auth and ta 
Whi the 1988 ,11, 
accoun lity 
ability 
comply with 
avenue accoun 
DSOs" e m 
accoun bili 
tion The 
accoun bility m 
The pa wlli 
can 
e use e 
e Secretary of as e In 
e finan al per rmance of 
c courses of actimL 
ensures e ma avenue of finan al 
m severe 
ng 
e auditor pi 
san 
the 
is IS n 
fin n 
of , who II 
iiure 
ma ce 
owe a du 
mance ir in house 
in e arena of financial 
e auditor and e public. 
In scrutin ng activiti 
n exammmg e ons e 
1982 (wlli gland and Wal 
and the 
these 
sa hi 
are relativ 
accoun 
e pons of 
Sa cally an auditor mu 
111 aceor nee 
the appr 
PI' 
all documen 
explan 
m 17 
n only 
relating 
a ma 
To what 
til 
ccoun 
r con ined III 
ex nt do 
prop accounting 
has e 
t a 
seek er 
the accoun or rela 
e audi r's powers of 
15 The majorit;,r of SI4 notices are now for failure to meet financhl objectives. 
There are no recorded instances of S14 notices being used wi th regard to the other 
requirements of the accounting regimes 
16 Local Government Finance Act 19R2, SIS; Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. 
S99 
17 1982 Act, S16; 1 C)73 Act, Sl6 
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investigation result in a local authority being held accoun b!e for 
the activities of its OSO? The auditor has the power to examine a 
local authority's accoun and the documen relating thereto: tilUS 
he possesses the power to examine the accounts of OSOs, either on 
the basis that they form part of the accounts of the authority in 
generai, or on the ba til payments to these local authority 
con troll bodies for work performed represen an item of account, 
and can thus be investigated by him. It mu also be remembered 
til auditors are not merely empowered to examine the financial 
propriety of items of account, but also their legality1S. It would 
therefore appear that the auditor, in addition to the Secretary 
State, may investigate the matters listed in S1 3 of the 1988 A He 
may thus consider not only the legality of an award work to a 
OSO, but also whether the relevant accounts have been main ined in 
the form prescribed by The auditor, while he may be able to 
consider the same matters as the Secretary of State, cannot avail 
himself of the courses of action out in 514: the decision as to 
which sanctions to invoke again 
expenditure is unlawful, or which 
a local authority whose 
Us to comply with good 
accounting practice ultim Iy lies with others 19• However, while 
the auditor does not enjoy the same powers of sanction which e 
Secretary of State does, he also is not quite as constrained in the 
matters which he may investigate. While e Secretary State can 
only exercise his de ult powers in relation to the matters 
identified in S1 3 of the 1988 Act, which relate essentially to the 
conduct of the dering process, the maintenance and content of 
accounts, and the du to per rm work in a nee with the 
specification 20, the auditor1s powers relate to any item of account 
Consequently he possesses the ability to hold a local au ority 
accountable for any item of expenditure made by, or any funds 
allocated to, OSO: while the Secreta of may only exercise 
his powers of sanction in relation to certain statutory defaults, the 
auditor exercises powers a , more investigative, natu 
and should therefore provide a valuable avenue of accountability in 
relation to the activities of DSOs. 
18 1982 Act, S19; 1973 Act, SHi2 
19 1982 Act, SS19 - 20; 1973 Act, SSl02-104 
20 This duty is contained in S7( 8): see Part II chapter 2 
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The final issue examined In r lation the fin n 31 
accou bil DSOs is th role rrH~m of e public 
pi There re I nt di ces e 
role mem the public m pi in scrutin mg e 
nee DSOs in England and Wal and the ding 
role In Scotland. The position in the fonner juri on will b 
It with fi 
In gland and Wales e reu nees in i an in VI 31 
e directly involved in the scrutiny of the financial affairs 
authorities are ! by S17 of the I Government 
F 1982. This 0 tiers public involvement. 
in whi the publ m e III a 
publi of inspection con In III S17(1): 
";\t each audit by an auditor under this part of this Act any persons interested may 
inspect the accounts to be audited and all books, deeds, contracts, bills, vouchers and 
pts relating to them and make copies of all or any part of the accounts and those 
other doc uments." 
Th ere are several In 
right of access 
n t I on 
pa of thi A 
m on. The 
m by 
auditor is con 
significance 
accoun e r 
con 9 
whi ould 
it should 
n d 
noted th 
II each audit an auditor un 
the 
this 
limitations on the right of 
I: access aecoun and 
Ion only available when an 
The second of rill! more 
examme In of a DSO' 
only ere e aud IS 
" While an au 
will e accoun a local authority and all e 
n ibl h responsibilities with r rd 
perha I:~ m significant III ca r relating D 
performance, the r of rn on cap I employed, are n 
blish e 1982 A t the 1988 A 1, It would 
appear arguabl at access Impo nt docum 
re DSO es m be s because e au rl 
21 Sll(8) 
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'j 
scrutiny of the performance of these bodies neous his 
duties under the 1982 Act. The other m point of note regarding 
the public right of access that it available II any on 
interestedll > the relevant interest being either a financial or legal 
interest22, and thus being wide enough to encompass the fidu ary 
duty ow to council taxpayers, and the duties owed to tenderers by 
virtue of the 1988 Act's dering regime, or the EC public 
procurement regime. 
The second way in which the public may become involved in the 
scrutiny of the financial activities of local authorities is by making 
representations to the auditor about the content of accou 
(2) At the request of a local government elector for any area to which those accounts 
relate, the auditor shall give the elector, or any representative of ilis, an opportunity to 
question the auditor about the accounts. 
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, any local government elector for any area to which 
those accounts relate, or any representative of his, may attend before the auditor and 
rnake objections-
(a) as to any matter in respect of which the auditor could take action under section 19 or 
20 below; or 
(b) as to any matter in respect of which the auditor could make a report under section 
15(3) above" 
A number of points are raised by these provisions. Fi it should be 
noted that, while the right inspection open to II any person 
interested", the right question an auditor about the content of 
accounts, or to object to the content of the accounts, is limited to a 
local government the area to which the audit rei Thus 
the num of members of the public who may appear before the 
auditor obj or to qu n him, is potentially smaller than 
those who may inspect accounts and related documen However, it 
must be borne in mind that any elector wishing to rnake an objection 
concerning a DSO's performance will often have to obtain 
information via the right of ction given by S17(1): as was 
discussed above, the possibility ex that inspection may not 
always be available. diy, it ould be noted that there are two 
22 See l'4arginson F TilctsJey (1903) 67 J.P. 226 
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!t would th appear that, e Local 
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ons con n 
1992 
ef 
which ensure ;3 public righ t of access 
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B S12 the 
Governrnent A 1992 
m 
provide 
19 ,and S10 
public right of 
e 1988 nd 
rlnation. The 
n()~' 
the 
aeces to 
In .. ation, thus placing in the blie am III rrnation jcll 
ISln g e performan of DSOs. 
on 12 of e 1988 crea a of ccess 
of in nla The first on of In rnation whi ther 
IS a hlie I"'!nllt- ,:1rrt-1C:C: t-Jilf ::::J _~ 'lA '-"~,,""-," .. .J.,J out S12(1) nd (2): 
"('1) IF a defined autllOrity, decided to I:any out functional INo,"k to wllich section 
6 8bove 8 21 person t ';u 8 statp;"()Nlt falling vvithin 
subsection (2) bl:~lo\N, sha1l supply such cl statcrr1C:?llt to the: Plel"SOn, 
(2) ,~ staternent within this subsection is a writti"n stat(?t"ent 
) tile authority's decision to cany Ollt tile 
(b) the ncia! shovvn if'! each offer ';::i 
to an invitation made under section 7(4) and 
(c) thp financial Of the biel 
the work," 
The first thinq to note about til IS I S1 2(1) on 
Imposes du r'eveal in for-rnation r ardinq fun ional work 
rsuant the 1988 ,tJ, ent vvllich an 
authority mu provi to any person requ q it must can In 
three im nt pieces of ation: fi :3 ment relating 
the decision award the work to a OS025; secondly~ the financial 
ions of a ten submi an In tion 
der rrlade un S7(4)26; finally, the financial pro ons of the 
OSO subm pursuant S7(6). The tion ma available 
by 512(1) and (2) thus primarily rei a not the performance of 
the con ct, but to award. Moreover, the man tory n re of 
this provision removes the possibility til at th e provisions of til e 
I Government (Access Information) A 1986 can be to 
deny access to th e fin an cia I in formation rela ting i n~h ouse 
performed under the 1988 A 
The public availability of this information wil! allow members of 
tile public evolved in the accoun bility process in a 
number of . First, such information may reveal that an authority 
has awarded a con to 050 when it had not subm the 
lowest der, raising the possibility of anti~cornpetitive practi 
and thus permit mem of the public make tions to 
the Secretary 5tate til he should in gate the award of this 
con 9 h 513 diy, if it becomes a t th 
a con a has not been awarded the !owest bidder, th 
in ation m u to ma tions the auditor 
un 517 of the Local Government Finance A 1982, and 5101 of 
the (Scotland) Act 1973. Thus it would appear til 
the access to formation by virtue of 512(1) and (2) may cure rna 
of the the 1982 and 1973 A Finally, a may use 
til is in forma ti on ra Ise th e ma r with a local a uth ority 
councillor, the ma e political These 
courses ref! nds of accoun bility: I I, finan ai, 
and political. H one must not sight of the limited nature 
of the information available by virtue of 512(1) and (2): as it 
entiaily prO'll In a ng the finan I ons 
25512(2)(a) 
26 S12(2)( tI) 
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of tenders submitted, it a concernmg only one 
th rs us III evaluating the relative men of deI's, In 
to use this In ation gaining access to it 
would have to not only can ble understanding of the 
ons rding the financial evaluation 
an appreciation of the other factors taken in account in the course 
of del' uation. While such information may of some use 
an aggrieved contractor (who also has his own right of access to 
information un S20), members of the eral blic will 
til e necessary expertise to uti! til power effectively. 
The second right of in formation crea by S12 a 
for the financial year prepa In accordance with S1121\. By virtue 
of S12( 4) any m in the DSO's annual of 
charge, while S12(5) provides til a local authority must supply a 
of the a person who requ it for a reasonable 
charge. Thus the inforrnation contained in the annual reports will be 
available the blic. Til III make available a nei,A.! range of 
information to those members of the public who wish to become 
involved in the of accoun bility, but it is estionable 
whether the availability of slIch information actually increases 
accountability: es of the annual mu dispatched to 
both the auditor and the ry of , who vvill take action 
ccordingly. Til 
accountability! 
In 
th 
ses that the principal avenues of 
ry of and the auditor, rather 
than e public. 
Tile final on con m In e a erne l,fiihich 
me consl is S 10 of til e 1992: 
"( 1) Trlis section where a relevant make a decision in cons,~quence of 
which any work is red to be out by the authority t or 
by some othel" person) ill accol"dance with a specification which has bC(~!L" 
) ... 
27 See, in particular. the Locai Govermnenr (Direct Service C)rganisations) 
(Competition) Regulations 1993 S.l 848. discussed at length in Part II. Chapter 3 
28S12(3) 
(b) made available for inspection in accordance vvith notice 
of section 7(1) of tile 1988/\ct ... " 
for the pL!f"pOSeS 
(2) Where this section appl it shall be the d of the a t!!aking the 
decision~ 
(a) to 
(i) a of the specification; and 
(ii) 21 document a summary of the main requirements of the tC) 
be kept available, throughout the pet-iod deu-ing which the wOI-k in question is to be 
carried out, for by of the public, at all reasonable hours, at the 
principal office of the authority; and 
(b) to such publicity to those arrangements as they think sufficient for drawing the 
attention of membel-s of the public who rnay be intel-ested to the fact that the 
specification and that document are so available" 
on 10 thus that both the cification of functional 
work i has been the su of a re un 
of the 1988 A and a summary of the main requiremen of the 
fication, mu be available In on by the public at the 
head office of the authority all reasonable hours during the iod 
in Wlli the work ned in the fication being performed. 
Moreover, the authority mu publish details of the availabili of 
f3se men It is i ng n th the irement 
make available these documen whether or not the work 
ich e fi on inS or n ed by the I 
authority' DSO, Thus the intention of S12 IS n so much to 
of a OSO, but cilita scrub of the performance of 
work irrespective of wh er it is ed by the public or the 
. In work DSO's however, this 
provision would of the public bring 
e notice of the ry of S di nCles en e 
specification and the perfonnance of work by the DSO whi are 
In of ilure comply with the ty perform work in 
a nce with the fication can ined in (8) the 1988 
A and hence of use his S13 and S14 
powers. However, for a member of tile public to utilise e Iy 
e In bon a men t such a tially 
chnical nature as the 
ssess considerable kn 
which til sp fication 
specification, he or she would have to 
edge of the legal amework III 
the I I ane! technical import of 
3~~3 
many of the terms used in specifications (given that specifications 
are often draft contracts), and of the particular work to which the 
specification relates. One must ask how many members of the 
general public possess such expertise, and would consequently be 
able to use the documents prepared under S 1 2 as an effective means 
of scrutinising performance? 
While the statutory scheme contains several measures which 
have a bearing, to a greater or lesser extent, on holding a local 
authority accountable for the performance of its DSO, it is perhaps 
naive to consider each of these provisions in isolation. To appreciate 
fully the adequacy of the measures relating to the accountability of 
DLOs and DSOs, one must obtain an overview of all the avenues of 
accountability: legal, financial, and political. 
An Overview of the Avenues of Accountability 
There are in essence three strands of accountability: legal, 
financial and political. The importance of each of these in relation 
to holding local authorities accountable for the activities of their 
DSOs must be considered in turn. 
The question of legal accountability has not been directly 
addressed by this chapter, primarily because the most important 
aspects of legal accountability were dealt with above29. However, 
the purpose of this discussion is not to explain the mechanics of the 
process of legal accountability, but to place it in its context. There 
are primarily two ways in which a local authority may be held 
accountable for its relationships with, and the performance of, its 
OSO. The first is accountability to the courts. This will occur almost 
exclusively where an aggrieved contractor wishes to challenge 
either the basis on which he has been excluded from a contract 
award procedure, or the basis on which the work has been awarded 
to a OSO. In doing so he will probably be trying to avail himself of 
the remedies which exist by virtue of Part \I of the Local 
Government Act 1988, or are required by the Compliance Directive30. 
29 See Part II chapters 5, 6 
30 Directive 89/665 
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compliance with the duties rei ng the accounting me and 
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~.,. ~ 
arises regarding failure to comply with the various duties imposed 
by the 1988 and 1992 
e cretary of also permeates consideration of the 
financial accoun bility of local authorities for the actions of th r 
DSOs. While an authority's auditor may have powers to investigate 
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whenever he considers th an item of expenditure has been ill eg a I, 
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dering process and e formance of DSOs, the aditional 
pi ure of political accountability is n only disrup ,but 
replaced. Whereas the aditional situation would have been that 
accoun bility the of a on would have 
primarily via the political process, it now the case that, with the 
imposition a series formal It~gal duties, the scope for purely 
political accountability is reduced, more so because the statutory 
scheme does not simply im those duties, but em ph s that 
authorities are responsible the ry of for adherence 
those duti and may ultimately be san oned by him for non~ 
adherence. 
vera! of the problems regarding accountability are, however, 
indicative of deeper tren and ten ons regarding servict~ delivery 
and accountability. One of the trends in accoun bility over the past 
few deca is the tendency involve in the scrutiny of the 
actions of public authorities44-. However, the scheme of the 1988 Act 
is such that it not only involves expe in the process of 
accountability, by involving both auditors and civil servants in the 
examination of the DSO accoun and civil servan rticular in 
the examination of allegations of anti-competitive practice, but 
produces a range of inform on which will generally In ligible 
only to those who possess some form of expert knowledge, As the 
flow of information is the essential prerequisite to the scrutiny of 
any public body, the production of a range of information which rnay 
only be u effectively by those possessing a of e 
makes the process of accoun bility an increasingly ra and 
alised exercise. 
Secondly, there the issue of the t to wbich accountability 
refle responsibility: 
"_,. tile growth of services and the division of responsibility for tllem between central 
and local governrnent also I"aises questions about different lines of accountability. if 
!'esponsibility is the other side of the coin of accountability, if the two would seem to be 
logically indivisible then local provision of services would appear to irnply 
accountability to the local body of citizens ... But if responsibility fOI- setting objectives 
44 See e.g. Delyand Klein, Accountabilities (1987) Chapter 2 
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and defininC) rules is national, if the aim is to achieve a 'uniform' of service 
del wllile responsibilitv for providinq sel"vices is local, where then does lie 
accountabil lie? Is the of divisible?"45 
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III L.ocal Governmen 
I See Introduction, above 
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Planning and n d A '1 9 80 I rn 
2 See Direct Worl(s Undertakings Accounting, CIPFi'\, 1975 
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While A was e fi 1m e 
n til t it was the result e 
con ensus b ervative an d botH n w h i c:h 
was ro d In a common cce nee of e CIPFA report's 
recommen on However, ile ere able ee 
consensus 9 the 1980 A pr s, ese have 
til el 988 3 and 1 99 A 
m tions t am political ought 
e 19 eu 
and can a ng~out of, local au ority 
WOLI ultitTl I pcl ge 
'1988. Whereas the surrounding 
III til 1980 A hac! been rna 
consen the n ishing e 
on f' local au 
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ces were e increasing Inl nee of New Ri t i ogy In 
r nd {1 I eren In e P lei 
su tion e In) nee of New 
Right thinking is iilu trate a u nswervin g belief In h 
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ern 
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In 
local au 
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oriti(~s whi 
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197 9" 
b a n 
. J 981 
e ces 
n come om 
small nurn 
g(~n r Ily had 
on a n 
min! tel' 
adoption of such mark sed techniques had brought these 
authorities. Consequently, between 1980 and 1985, Government 
InlnlS adopted a policy of encouraging other local authorities to 
adopt a competitive tendering and contracting-out in the pursuit of 
greater value for money, more efficient services, and the 
opportunity to reduce public expenditure, although from 1983 
onwards it was clear that both mini ers and Conservative 
backbenchers were growing increasingly frustrated at the failure of 
this policy to convince local authorities of the meri of 
competitive tendering. Thus, in early-1985, with the publication of 
the consultation paper Competition in the Provision of Local 
Authority Services, the policy rnoved from one of encouraging local 
authorities to use competitive tendering to one of compelling it. 
However, this policy initially m with no greater success: no 
legislation was forthcoming in the 1985-6 01\ and when the 
Local Government Bill had its second reading in early-1987, the 
Secretary of te for Environment was forced to admit that the 
provisions relating to CCT and the non-commercial considerations 
regime had not yet been prepared, in spite of the fact that it had 
been two years since they had been first mooted, and th 
consequently the Government would be unable to bring those 
provisions before Parliament in the 1986-7 Session. 
After the '1987 General Election, however, the Government did 
bring both tile CCT regime for local authority ces and the non~ 
commercial considerations regime before Parliament. These duly 
found their way into the Local Governrnent Act 1988. The services 
covered by HIe CCT regime were essentially blue-collar services, 
however, and it had been indicated during the Bill's Comm ge 
that ces would only be added to the list of defined activities if 
the savings which could be realised from subj ng them CCT 
WOll lei II su bsta ntiai", and if the service itself was su fficiently 
definable for specifications be drawn up. This forrnulation 
simultaneously out the criteria for extending C new 
servi and apparently uded the possibility of extending CCT to 
administrative, technical and professional services due to 
difficulties in defining the content of many of these services. 
Neverth it soon became apparent that, having established those 
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3 8 
en , I would now appear at the savin reali 
frorn are on ar()und 6.5 8 
ving noted the lack of coherence which \lvas t In the policy 
fi imposing and then the expansion of e 
range of ces subject to competition, it now remains to consider 
the legal regime f. I the 1988 A initially subje d 
seven services to although it did provide the ry of 
witll e pow r add er services e I t of fin 
a ivitie there are no con 
may subje the 
add n only new blu 
to the t also wh 
housing managem 
on the ran services which 
is power) which has been used 
such as supervision of parking 
ar services such as legal services and 
The m significant element of e 1988 undou dly the 
tendering regime con n In rt L The fi and m imp nt~ 
it only applies when ing to n about the ng regime is th 
a local authority wishes to use eitiler own, or another au orityls 
DSO a service, The fun onal work regime established in 
s 6 to 8 of the 1988 Act blished six conditions whi 
have with where local authorities intend form 
work via a of these conditions constitu the tendering 
m while e sixth irn a du to comply with the il 
tion e work fornl 10 e ng regime 
con ined requirernen as publication of nder noti the 
availabil a il fication of e work to be 
e Issue 
authori of 
submission of a 
condu on the 
In r 
bid, and 
the I 
ose who have n fied an 
in being awarded work, and til 
also a prohibition an cornpetitive 
au the I is undoubtedly e 
rn significant of the conditions, as the concept of an 
comp ve condu permea eve as of e ng 
The regime blished by the 1988 A was exacting, but 
n with fail amon ese was ilure p 
8 See \lV::tlsh ::tnd D::tvis, Competition ::tnd Service: The Iml_,(1ct of the 
Local GOFernment Act 19S5 ::tt l3.5 
9 S2( 3) 
10 S7( 8) 
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performance DSOs. The powers contained in S13 and S14 of the 
1988 Act are intended to provide the main avenue of redress 
those who wish to make complaints about the conduct of tendering 
procedures. Certainly the anonymity of this process and its lack of 
expense will be attractive to those who wish to make complaints. 
However, for the purposes of the Compliance Directive 16, this 
procedure cannot be characterised as an effective remedy for those 
contractors who wish to seek redress for a failure to comply with 
the various elements of the EC public procurement regime in the 
course of a tendering exercise, on account of the fact that it is 
neither a detailed legal procedure specifically available to aggrieved 
contractors, nor are damages available via this procedure. This is 
not to say that an adequate range of remedies is not available for an 
authority's failure to comply with tile requiremen of the EC public 
procurement regim as suitable provision has been rnade elsewhere 
to ensure that this is the case 17, while there is an adequate range 
remedies available to a contractor wishing to raise an action based 
on a failure to comply with the duties contained in the domestic 
tendering regime 18 , 
In considering the tendering procedures contained in Part I of the 
1988 Act one mu also consider the impa of the non-cornmercial 
considerations regime contained in Part II of that Act upon tendering 
procedures, Part II of the 1988 A not only prohibi local 
authorities from taking a range of non-commercial considerations 
into account at any stage of the dering pro but also 
e ctively blishes a duty to give reasons to those potential 
contractors who have either been excluded from the award procedure 
at some stage of the process, or whose nders have been 
unsuccessful, and defines the circumstances in which contra 
all ing a con avention of the non commercial considerations 
regime will have a right of access to the courts. In considering the 
irnpa of the non-commercial considerations regime con ined in 
517 of the 1988 Act upon tendering procedures one m appr 
that it not only regulates every aspect of the tendering procedure, 
l6 Directive 89/665 
17 Public Services Contracts Regulations 1993 S.L 3228, Regulation 32 
J 8 See Part II Ch~lpt(~r 5 
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t e range of con ieh IS ibitecL The rna whi 
are defin non-eornrn con tion are n 
xhaustive. Perha the most significant non~cornrnercial 
consi tion listed the and conditions employment In 
prohi ting local authorities am asking qu ons of potential 
con concerning the and condition their work 
the 1988 A would r to confli with Directive 92/50 once 
again 19. However, in considering the im e non-comm 31 
considerations rime one mu also consi r I na reo The 
In tion of th non~cornmer al con ideration regime is to 
con ain til e discr on of loca I a uth orities to ta ke ce In 
on relating the del of ces. However, th 
m the in tion Pa II of e 1988 e obj rt I 
til A is also remov(~ a large measurt~ e 
local authorities forrnerly enjoyed in making decisions a 
way in whi ces ould be del 
In considering the 19 and '1992 Act1s regulation of a number 
of conclusions can be drawn. F one cannot esca noticing til 
on e the obj of e legislation is con in the discretion of 
local authorities make in ons regarding the delivery of 
s ces by compelling local authorities expose a range of 
ces comp tendering by e of a regim icll IS 
to move 
'I 88 
if can 
con 
b I governrnent. diy, the ran of 
ke 
IS an nding orl and e given 
are such at ny conceivable service 
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one mu 
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III e e 
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a ing anti~cornpetitively if 
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succe n 9 III 
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nciering exer ses: e 
sourCt~ some concern as it confl the p 
mu 
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J9 ,L\rticle 28. See Part II, Chapter () for a discussion 
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e 19 A I arnongst e I of concerns 
about the expanding on surrounding however) is 
the legal propriety of many the provisions. The provisions of many 
of the subordina legisiation pursuant the 1988 
and 1992 A rticularly that ating the central issue of 
anti competitive practices, do n bear scrutiny again the 
provisions of the primary legislation. Furthermore many of the 
provisions of the tendering regime blished by the 1988 and 1992 
and the subordina legislation issu uncler it, as well as of 
the non-commercial consideration regime blish Pa II of 
the 1988 cannot survive evaluation against the ndarcls of the 
EC public procurement regime. In view of these concerns a t the 
propriety of many elemen of the tendering regime it is clear 
th a thorough re~evaluation of the provision the 1988 and 1992 
A necessary. 
dering the possibility of a re-evaluation of the provIsions 
the tendering regime put in place by the 1988 and 1992 Act's 
wi questions about the future of CCT, and indeed ra qu ons 
about the position of CCT in relation other initiatives conCE-~rning 
the res U ring and working practices of governmental 
institutions. The future , however, lin d WI r 
I cleveloprnen 111 rticular the outcome of the n neral 
ele on. 
e fi on one rnu what eli on will ke 
if e t Conservative adrnin on continues in a 
the ne nerai el on? Til raises consi ration of whether 
there In any radical 111 e eli on of Conserva 
policy if it were find elf in governrnent for a fifth su 
tenn. t, given e Right of the Con e pa 
received a significant In e lea ip election rnl 1995, 
and in view of a distin la of new policy initiatives, 
possibili a new radical departure in the regime would 
appear unlike but n impossible, es ally if a dee nll1g 
economic re on necessita nificant reductions in public 
expenditure. However, one of t[H:~ distinguishing tures e 
lides of success Conserva admini ations over e 
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and one which has en no less evident in relation 
has a la erence. The lack of coherence in th 
oprnent of poli m make predictions as to the direction 
which poli will take more difficult~ but In In ces rnay 
wn from developments thus far. 
In attempting to predict policy developmen one Illay assume that 
the Conserva party will n abandon its belief in the natural 
superiority of the mark Th is likely to remain a k ! n 
ining the shape future policy initiatives, In view of this 
it is highly likely th the ran of ces subject wi II 
once a In expanded. In spite of recent assurances20, therefor it 
not incon ble th rn be corpora and 
a inistrative support for example. Secondly, should the 
national economy continue ora and a poli cmg 
blic expenditure pursued there are two possible consequences 
for CCT The fi that the Government m r ne 
e cr which may ken into account in evaluating deI's in 
an a pt dimin the biiity of D winning work and 
mcrease e likelihood th those pri contractors who win work 
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are incumbent upon them, for exampl nd a 
ry of 
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increasing ingent Finan al 
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in the me r Finan al obje ve, 
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20 Sec e.g. 199::1·-5 He Debs Vol 250 cols 879~880w 
refine dramatically the cri ria r ar ng e calculation and 
cornparison of ten in a way whi reduces the chances of a 
ing su i, or 1m a more severe financial objective 
which would lead more 0 finan al ilures, then the e 
would b respectively, that 0 would find themselves less 
II competitive" and lose work, or subj to san on In U ng 
osu imposed by the ry of Sta uSing his S14 powers: 
indeed the operation the 1988 and 1992 A IS t leading 
a dual on the work performed by due to the 
appli on of such measures" The impl on the fu Ie 
e legislation is at tendering under the 1988 A 
will becorrle progress less significant: as 0 ppear 
e e appl of provISions, e 1988 Act l s scope will 
redu as local authorities increasingly donn work vi 
prlva con ors. While the CCT legislation may thus by i 
operation effectively reduce the scope of its application, there 
one rtller possibility regarding nsion which mu be 
con 
Hither h as applied e work performed by 0 , as 
e functions by local au orities. Howeve~r; 
e provISions of II of the lation and acting Out 
1994 permit local authorities con a out voluntarily the 
per nnance of their s tu ry nons, tilUS enabling the 
on a d ran discr onary decision the 
e main irnpli on contracting out n on as 
the per rnance of services, is that, a the whole 
a out, it ble contra out the eli 
of th n well as e con actor : an author 
the contain the 1994 would be much 
more of a rninimal t, enabling, authori , than one which w 
rnerely su bj It is likely that, as with competitive 
ndering and the con ng out of services, 
(luthor es to out th r functions will 
control! coun which ere are 
lowing e 1995 local whose lea 
W In the ea re a 
ate fi r 
nservative 
likE~ those in 
g n 
e su a of market . If ose auth oriti(~s which a va i I 
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about e a n and In particular any savin 
which In result from IS ble that til ! 
Governm on e will mirror the development 
poli 
Or! 
on com t~ mn flcl 
services over the la en years. At first, local 
au es would encoura follow the example of a 
councils and use tl1eir un e 1994 A 
e benefi having the per I'll 
n hen local utl10rities fail respon d such 
encou ement, it is p a Conse Governrnent would 
ena legislation whi vely upon e 
fu n on of local au oriti the p man 
If it lik at 
legislation, and 
servative Government would main 
bly nd it i rno 
III th e 
difficu I 
assess what on the policy of a ture Labour ment 
would Officially the poli of th bour pa IS t 
would repla by an al ative initiative which 
has as n clearly forrnula cl 21 , althou it is a cl 
r rty do n necessarily a e 
and see some e tion pol 
some inty about what bour ' s poli on 
will finally 
diy, if 
se 
boling 
wha means IS a 
es. Fi how mple would it 
n be abolish how ould it 
encoun 
1988 and '1992 
num 
If 
are 
F 
ply an 
A r Ire whi will 111 ke sorn 
Urn e C I egislati on will 
and au es II b 
2J See Composite'i2, \vhich was passed at the Labour Party Conference 
in October 1 C)()::; 
n See e,g. Competition leaves L1.bour in a tender spot, 22 'S/()S FT 8 
3()8 
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slon 1 
as a failure expose work to competition would expose authorities 
to the possibility of actions being raised for breach of statutory 
duty arising from their failure to comply with the statutory scheme. 
A new Secretary of State may be tempted to forestall the 
possibility of actions being raised by removing all of the services 
subject to CCT from the list of defined activities contained in S2 of 
the 1988 Act, but this would not be possible: while S2 provides a 
mechanism for adding services to the list of defined activities, 
there is no mechanism for removing them from that list. 
Furthermore, any atternpt to extend the moratoria for CCT arising 
from reorganisation until such time as the 1988 and 1992 Acts 
could be repealed would be open to challenge on the grounds that the 
powers to grant such moratoria were being used for a purpose which 
was at variance with the purposes for which the legislature had 
enacted them. It is thus obvious that any Government which wished 
to abolish CCT would face a period prior to the enactment of the 
necessary legislation where, contrary to its own policy, the 1988 
and 1992 Acts would have to be complied with by authorities. 
Certainly, during this period the Secretary of State could revise the 
Guidance on anti-competitive practices and take a more relaxed 
view of how to exercise his powers under S13 and S14 of the 1988 
Act to sanction authorities for a ilure comply with the 
tendering regime, but this would not preclude aggrieved contractors 
from raising actions again authorities on the grounds th in the 
condu of tendering procedures they had either iled to comply 
with the statutory duties imposed by the '1988 and '1992 A or 
with the ndards contained in the public procurement regime. 
At the Labour Party Conference in October 1995, Cornposite 42 was 
passed, which, amongst other things, II calls for an incoming Labour 
government to use its powers under existing legislation to ensure 
th no local authority is required to let a contract under the CCT 
regime, until such time as a permanent legislative change can be 
madell • An examination of the relevant legislative provisions reveals 
that such a course of action is not a viable legal proposition 
One other problem regarding attempts to abolish CCT rela to 
work In progress at the time of its abolition. While CCT has n 
resul in the priva winning as much work as SU'-"~y\~ . .J0 
369 
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are now a sign nt number con local autho es 
and private s r con rs the provisions of services, 
Problematic issues not actually a the point when 
ould be abolished, but when ose contra come to an (~nd. Would 
authori simply see the end of a con ct with the priva 
as the opportunity nd th r DSO perform su work? 
til Will authorities simply accept that it n not assum 
ces ollie! be performed in house, and initia ndering 
procedures with a view engaging a new private con 7 
Will authorities initia a ndering exercise with a view 
biishing whether dire service provision or the use of pr 
con is more advan geous? A nurnber of es would have to 
,Perha in situation w~lere the legi !ation 
d the coli mind of authorities, a new s of 
clrcu nces and options will have evalu One ing i 
ar' even a its abolition CCT would continue to have a profound 
on local governrnent due the con a 211 r ationshi 
whi it has and, perhaps more importantly the a nce 
once again of the p bility of con a ng out services a n 
a di ce provIsion. 
It however, p til a Labour ment would n 
abol h but rnply me. I the 
difficulties whi 
even ali rnu 
trend shift aw 
towards ern bra cin 9 
tion thi 
om I 
market 
to abolish su 
ble In view II New" Labour l s 
aditional econorni prin pi 
economics: the mo obvious 
was e removal of Clause Four m i manl 
con 
CUriOU 
tion at a pecial par eon renee in A il 1 995. It 
Imp 
however, 
consider til 
t a Conserva governmen m Iso 
course action given that in a num of 
the regim confli with publi 
rement me. The revision e regime may thus 
place i 
m m 
whi politi power. Howev 
In ny 
A revision of e 1988 and 1992 A may re~evaluate which 
s ces should be subj but any on remove a 
ervice frorn the list of defined activities would require an 
amendment to of the 1988 Act, The m significant an 
mu be to the tendering regime, More care must be ken to 
ensure the legal propriety many of the dering regime. 
bordin legislation, rticularly that relating to the definition 
of anti-competitive condu mu be re-evaluated as it has 
il to comply with the parameters by the primary 
legislation. The most radical changes mu occur in relation the 
provisions on anti-competitive condu in particular a duty to avoid 
anti-competitive practices corresponding to that imposed on local 
authorities must be imposed upon priva contractors. The position 
of the Guidance on anti-comp ve con ct mu rece al 
a ntion: while it is of vital importance in shaping the model of 
competition which the Government wish to pursu it is disturbing 
that a document carrying such considerable prescriptive force lies 
outwith the purview of Parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore the issue 
of the Guidan and any revision to it, should be laid before each 
House of Parliam However, in considering the dering regirne 
e major ue to addressed is the way in which so many 
elemen of it, from the provisions of the 1988 and 1992 A 
rough those of the Guidan confli with the EC public 
procurement regime. Thus any revision of the legislation mu t 
ce dering me which con t with the regime, 
While the legislation may till require at services rnu t 
periodically be exposed comp ition, other eiemen of the 
tendering regime will require wholesale on In refl 
e public procurement regime: sorne of the m obvious 
revisions ar, for exampl the clarification of the position on 
nu potential contractors who should be invited submit a 
der, and the recognition of the ability of authorities u 
con a rs frorn rticipation in a con a aware! process in 
In rcu n an e! to deci for th emselves wh i cn ria 
oule! ken into account in ng tenders. Alongsi this, 
one rnu appr a th t the provi ons the non-commerci I 
con tions regime contained in Pa II of the 1988 A are of 
considerable relevance tendering ex condu under 
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I, and con ently mu also undergo some on 
ensure their cons cy law. 
When con dering the regime one mu also consider the 
ry of tel powers contained in S'13 and S14. It would 
probably unnecessary to revise these, There are two significant 
reasons til While these powers are in to e rnanl 
avenue for re of failures comply with the tendering regim 
and whi the procedure n accord with the 
Corn pi ian ce Oi rectiv(~, a ggri eved co n tr actors 
themselves of righ of action before the courts 
provisions of e 
may still avail 
which do fy 
e s provisions. Secondly, the procedure contained in S13 
and S14 also provi a means of sanctioning authorities for 
gnificant ilures in OSO performan and will continue to be of 
considerable value in doing so. However, in operating th 
nctions one must appr a the relevance of the 1988 Actls 
accounting provisions, particularly the r irement, effectively, 
produce a specified rate of return on capital employed: a 
cr ry of who wished the 1988 A have a less 
oppr eHect on n only lower the of return on 
capl employe ther reo AI rnatively, !laving received an 
xplanation am the authority, he may simply exer se his 
discretion n apply the sanctions can III in S14, or only apply 
e onerous sanctions. 
In discu 
in the 
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has 
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ment a r have made with r ence more 
economic than political cr h s resulted In e emer ce 
executive cies in cen government, {md the application of 
the can of the enabling authority to the reorganisation of iocal 
ment considerable importance to both of these initiatives 
the application of market d techniques in making cisions 
a ut the delivery of services. u the activities of central 
govern are subj the prior options In 0 essenti Ily 
assess the whether they auld perform by government, and, 
23 P3rt 1, Ch3pter 5 
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amon other things, whether the s 
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government the Governm s PI' 
ces formed by agen cles 
ng exercise. In local 
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which will emerge from reorganisation the enabling authority" 
particular rnodel of the enabling authority which the present 
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, although the party's increasingly pragmatic approach the 
place of mark forces in economic poll would tend to indica 
th it may not reverse ese initi immediately. Indeed, given 
that the process of establishing executive agencies is so w I 
advan and that enabling authorities have a tory basis, any 
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political, as opposed to economic, fa in determining the rol 
and institutional structure of govermnent. 
The way in which mark nlques increasingly ea 
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e di In and pecial nature of e contrac of public 
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regul of public authorities mation: 
exampl 
and termination are permitted 
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assume a role In regulating such contra a th r atiofL 
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